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Preface
C o n s id e r in g  th e  i n d i r e c t  l in k a g e  between 
p u b l ic  o p in io n ,  as  r e f l e c t e d  in  th e  p r e s s ,  and 
government p o l ic y ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  in  th e  f o r e ig n  
p o l ic y  sphere  where th e  government i s  a t  i t s  most 
s e c r e t i v e ,  i t  i s  no t s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  v e ry  l i t t l e  
r e s e a r c h  i n to  t h e i r  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  has  been 
c a r r i e d  o u t .  I t  i s  easy  to  u n d e rs ta n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t h a t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  a p p l i e s  w ith  r e g a rd  to  pre-War 
Japan which had a  more a u t h o r i t a r i a n  t r a d i t i o n  th a n  
most W estern n a t i o n s .  Even th e  Japan ese  p r e s s ,  
however, had a r o le  to  p la y  in  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  
government p o l ic y  and i t s  a t t i t u d e  a t  t im es  d id  
have s e r io u s  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  f o r e ig n  p o l ic y  and 
d iplom acy. I n  t h i s  s e n se ,  th e  d e c l in e  o f  th e  Japan ese  
p r e s s  as  an O pp o s itio n  fo rc e  between 1927 and 1933, 
which i s  th e  s u b je c t  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .
I t  was in  t h i s  p e r io d ,  w ith  th e  Manchuria C r i s i s  o f  
1931-1933 as  th e  d e c i s iv e  t u r n i n g  p o in t ,  t h a t  not 
on ly  th e  Japanese  p r e s s  b u t a lso  Japanese  f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y  t i l t e d  from a ten dency  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  as  
r e f l e c t e d ,  f o r  example, in  th e  Washington t r e a t i e s  
o f  1922, to  th e  more xenophobic n a t io n a l i s m  which 
was to  le a d  Japan to  th e  S ino -Japanese  War and, 
u l t i m a t e l y ,  to  P e a r l  H arbor.
Well b e fo re  th e  M an ch u rian C ris is ,  i t  could  
be fo re s e e n  t h a t  Japanese  f o r e ig n  p o l ic y  would face  
s e r io u s  c h a l le n g e s .  I t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  tendency
s t i l l  rem ained to  some e x te n t  i n  th e  form of  
'S h id e h a ra  Diplomacy1 o r  even in  th e  supposedly  
more n a t i o n a l i s t i c  ‘Tanaka Diplomacy1* Japan*s 
w i l l in g n e s s  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  th e  Geneva and 
London n a v a l  c o n fe ren c es  o f  1927 and 1930, though 
undoub ted ly  d e r iv e d  p a r t l y  from f i n a n c i a l  n e c e s s i t y ,  
suggested  such rem ain in g  in te rn a t io n a l i s m *  Her 
r e a d in e s s  to  a g re e ,  p r i n c i p l e ,  to  China*s
reco v ery  o f  t a r i f f  autonomy and e x t r a r - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  
a lso  in d i c a t e d  t h a t  Japan  would even accep t a c e r t a i n  
amount o f  f i n a n c i a l  s a c r i f i c e  in  an endeavour to  
o b ta in  some goodw ill e i t h e r  from China or th e  West*
I t  was c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  th e  growing n a t i o n a l i s t  
sen tim en t in  China would, sooner o r  l a t e r ,  c h a l le n g e  
any and every  form o f  f o r e ig n  encroachment and th e  
‘ s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t s *  in  Manchuria and Mongolia which 
Japan had been seek in g  to  expand and c o n s o l id a te  
would th en  be in  jeopardy* Japan*s main problem 
would., t h e r e f o r e ,  be how b e s t  to  p r o te c t  th e  
‘ s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t s * .
The Japanese  p re s s  a lso  found i t s e l f  in  
a confused s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  same period*  The growth 
of e d u ca t io n  d u r in g  th e  p rev io u s  ’Taisho Democracy* 
p e r io d  had enab led  th e  *n o n -p a r t is a n *  * com m ercia l’ 
newspapers o f  t h i s  p e r io d  to  b o as t  of
^  circulations of hundreds of thousands or even
of millions each compared with/tens of thousandsA •
Meiji predecessors, which had been used as political forums 
for their proprietors cum editors* The 'popularisation' 
of newspapers had also led to the flourishing of various 
'quality' journals which catered mainly for the equally 
growing liberal or left intelligentsia* The phenomenal 
growth of the Japanese press, coupled with its traditional 
anti-government attitude, with the enactment of universal 
male suffrage in 1925 f and with the subsequent 
consolidation of the party cabinet system, had
transformed itself into a force which the government could not afford to 
ignore* On the other hand, such growth inevitably contained problems which 
were bound to surface* The excessive commercial rivalry
among the press organisations had pushed the press,
ct
especially the major newspapers, to sensationalism^ was not always
supported by the editorial departments, thus creating
schism not onl^ between the rival newspapers but also within
a single newspaper* At the same time, the untested
internationalism of the Japanese press, which pressurised
the government to take 3- more sympathetic attitude towards China's national
iv
aspirations but which nevertheless failed to question the 
validity of the government contention that Japan possessed 
f special interests1, was being challenged by the harsh 
reality of Chinese nationalism* These factors,
•t&jether with the secretive handling of the China issue 
by the Foreign Ministry, pushed the Japanese press, 
if gradually, to adopt an attitude which was still 
anti-government but which was less conciliatory towards 
China than that of the government* The outbreak of the 
Manchuria Crisis pushed the reluctant Foreign Ministry 
towards guideline^drawn by the military authorities 
whose 'spokeaman1 the press had virtually become* In 
retrospect, the weakening and ultimate loss of the 
traditionally liberal and anti-government attitude of the 
Japanese press in the period between 1927 and 1933 was 
significant because it was in this period that the Japanese 
press had a real chance to influence the course of foreign 
policy to a greater degree than ever before or after, and 
did so, but in a regrettable direction*
VI t  i s  no t uncommon f o r  s tu d e n ts  o f  Japanese  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s to  
quote  p r e s s  o p in io n s  i n  o rd e r  to  i n d i c a t e  th e  t r e n d  
o f  'p u b l i c  o p in io n '*  N e i th e r  in  E n g lish  nor  i n  Ja p a n e se ,  
however, i s  t h e r e  a  s y s te m a tic  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  th e s e  
o p in io n s  and t h e i r  cau ses  and consequences. Takeuchi 
T a t s u j i ' s  War and Diplomacy in  th e  Japanese  Empire (
London, 1936), i t  i s  t r u e ,  p laced  m ajor emphasis on 
p re s s  a t t i t u d e s  in  h i s  s tudy  o f  Japan ese  fo re ig n  p o l ic y ,  
but h i s  work covered  a much lo n g er  p e r io d  and th e  f a c t  
t h a t  o f f i c i a l  documents were not a v a i l a b l e  to  him meant 
t h a t  he was un ab le  to  r e s e a r c h  in to  government p r e s s  
c o n t r o l .  There have a lso  been a  number o f  s tu d i e s  on th e  
methods o f  such p re s s  co n t r o l ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th o se  o f  th e  
1930s, m ostly  by Japanese  s c h o la r s .  O kudaira Y a s u h iro 's  
P o l i t i c a l  C ensorsh ip  i n  Japan from 1931 to  1943 (
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  P e n sy lv a n ia ,  1962) and Uchikawa Yoshimi 
( e d . )  Gendaishi Shiryo : Masumedia Tosei I  & I I  
(M a te r ia ls  f o r  Modern H is to ry  : C o n tro l  o f  Mass Media 
I  & I I )  (Tokyo, 1973 & 1975) p ro v id e  much in fo rm a t io n  on 
le g a l  r e g u la t io n s  c o n ce rn in g  p re s s  c o n t r o l  as  w e l l  as  
o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  on t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  but do not i n d i c a t e  
what e f f e c t s  th e y  had on th e  tone  o f  p re s s  o p in io n s  o r  
th e  c o n f l i c t  among th e  government departm en ts  co n ce rn in g  
th e  im plem entation  o f  th e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  Some contem porary  
s c h o la r s  have d e a l t  w ith  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a s p e c i f i c  
fo re ig n  p o l ic y  i s s u e  and 'p u b l i c  o p in io n ' as r e f l e c t e d  in  
th e  p r e s s ,  w ith  some r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  'gu idance*  
provided  by th e  government. I t o  T a k a s h i 's  Showa Shoki 
S e i j i s h i  Kenkyu (s tu d y  o f  P o l i t i c a l  H is to ry  in  th e  
E a rly  Showa Era) (Tokyo, 1969) i s  in fo rm a tiv e  on th e  
g e n e ra l  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  m ajor newspapers tow ards th e
London n av a l  con ference  o f  1930 and Stephen P e lz* s  
London Naval Disarmament Conference (1934) and P u b lic  
Opinion in  K o k u s a i s e i j i  N o.I (Tokyo, 1969) has  a lso  
touched  upon government ♦guidance* on th e  p r e s s .
In  th e  same e d i t i o n  o f  K o k u s a i s e i j i , Ogata Sadako 
dealt;  w ith  th e  p r e s s  a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  Manchurian 
C r i s i s  in  h e r  a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  Gaiko to  Yoron 
(Diplomacy and P u b lic  O pinion) whereas Kakegawa 
Tomiko*s The P re ss  and P u b l ic  O pinion in  Jap an ,
1931-1941 in  Dorothy Borg ^  Okaraoto Shunpei (ed „ )
P e a r l  Harbor As H is to ry  (New York, 1973) fo c u se s  
a t t e n t i o n  on th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  Japanese  p r e s s  
tow ards th e  U .S . in  th e  p e r io d  between th e  o u tb re ak  o f  
th e  Manchuria C r i s i s  and P e a r l  H arbor. These s tu d i e s  have 
been,however* e i t h e r  c o n f in ed  to  one o r  two newspapers 
o r  jo u r n a ls  whose views were not n e c e s s a r i l y  
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  o f  ’p u b l ic  o p in io n * ,  o r ^ l im i te d  in  
t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  in to  th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between government 
p re s s  c o n t r o l  and th e  p r e s s  a t t i t u d e .  V/atanabe Toru 
Inoue K iyoshi (ed„) T a ishok i no KyUshinteki 
J iy u  Shugi (R ad ica l  L ib e ra l ism  in  th e  Taisho P e r io d )
(Tokyo, 1 9 7 2 ) though co n fin ed  to  th e  economic jo u r n a l ,  
T o y d k e iz a ish in o o , i s  th e  on ly  s tudy  to  have examined 
a jo u rn a l  o r  newspaper so th o ro u g h ly  and s y s te m a t i c a l ly  
t h a t  th e  r e a d e r  can fo l lo w  th e  change o f  i t s  
a t t i t u d e  not only  tow ards dom estic  but a lso  tow ards  
s p e c i f i c  d ip lo m a tic  i s s u e s .  The l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
s tudy  i s  t h a t  T dyoke iza ish inpo  * s view i s  compared 
almost e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  t h a t  o f  th e  Osaka Asahi which 
was g e n e ra l ly  accep ted  as th e  most l i b e r a l  among th e  
major newspapers but which d id  not n e c e s s a r i l y
v±i
r e p re s e n t  th e  m a jo r i ty  p r e s s  o p in io n  in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
c a p i t a l ,  Tokyo. Moreover, because th e  jo u rn a l  escaped 
much o f  th e  p re s s  c o n t r o l  imposed upon th e  m ajor ' 
newspapers and o th e r  more i n f l u e n t i a l  j o u r n a l s ,  
l i t t l e  o f  th e  government 1 guidance* i s  d isc u s se d  
in  t h i s  s tu d y  which co v e rs  th e  f i r s t  t h r e e  decades 
o f  t h i s  cen tury*  I t  i s  a lso  a p p ro p r ia te  to  m ention 
th e  s tu d i e s  o f  Ono Hideo who was a l r e a d y  an e s ta b l i s h e d  
s c h o la r  o f  Japanese  jo u rn a lism  when th e  Manchuria C ris is  
broke out in  1931* His Nihon Shinbunshi (H is to ry  o f  
Japanese  Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1948), Shinbun no R ek ish i 
(H is to ry  o f  Newspapers), (Tokyo, 1955) and Shinbun 
Kenkyu Gojunen ( F i f t y  Y ears ' Study o f  Newspapers)
(Tokyo, 1971) make . e s s e n t i a l  r e a d in g  f o r  any 
s tu d en t  o f  Japanese  jo u rn a l is m ,  but a re  too g e n e ra l  
in  t h e i r  c o n te n t  and do not
th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between government p r e s s  c o n t r o l  
and p re s s  op in ions*  T h is  s i t u a t i o n  a p p l ie s  a l s o  w ith  
reg a rd  to  Okamoto Kozo (ed*) Nihon Shinbun H.yakunenshi 
(One Hundred Y ears ' H is to ry  of Japanese  Newspapers) 
(Tokyo, 1961). On th e  o th e r  hand, some s tu d ie s  such 
as Arase Y u ta k a 's  Nihon Gunkoku Shugi to  Masumedia 
(Japanese  M il i ta r i s m  and Mass Media) in  Shiso (Tokyo, 
September 1957) d i s c u s s  “feta of fit p re^s  c o n t r o l
e x c e rc ise d  in  th e  1930s* Once a g a in ,  however, th e  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p re s s  c o n t r o l  and p re s s  
o p in io n s  i s  not examined, duvuj. 3* conspicuous
absence o f  any k ind  o f  exam ination  o f  th e  p e r io d  which 
preceded th e  Manchuria C r i s i s .  Thus, t h e r e  s t i l l  
remains room f o r  much r e s e a rc h  to  be c a r r i e d  out on 
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  Japan ese  p re ss  and th e
course  o f  Japan ese  f o re ig n  p o l ic y ,  not j u s t  in  th e  
l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s hut a lso  in  th e  p re v io u s  
and succeed in g  pe riods*  T h iS j in  fa c t> h a s  benen one 
o f  th e  most n e g le c te d  a s p e c ts  o f  Japanese  h is to ry *
I t  should  be s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  g e n e ra l  
n a tu re  and l i m i t a t i o n  o f  th e  docum entation which i s  
a v a i l a b l e  has  put c o n s id e ra b le  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h i s  
study* I t  i s  p o s s ib l e ,  even p ro b a b le ,  t h a t ,  a t  th e  
end o f  th e  Second World War, th e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
departm ents  o f  th e  Im p e r ia l  Army and Navy d e s tro y e d  
th e  f i l e s  which co n ta in e d  s e n s i t i v e  r e f e r e n c e s  to  
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them and th e  press*  C e r t a in ly ,  
th e r e  a re  few t r a c e s  o f  them among th e  rem ain ing  
f i l e s ,  HjLthough some o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  c i r c u l a r s  produced 
by th e s e  depar tm en ts  which su rv iv e  in  th e  F ore ign  
M in is try  a r c h iv e s  suggest th e  e x is te n c e  o f  such documents 
?n th e  s e rv ic e  M in i s t r i e s  a t  th e  t im e .  A s im i l a r  
s i t u a t i o n  a p p l i e s  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  a v a i l a b l e  f i l e s  
o f  th e  Home and th e  Communications M in i s t r i e s  which 
were c lo s e ly  in vo lved  in  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  p r e s s .
This i n e v i t a b l y  made i t  n e c e s sa ry  to  r e l y  alm ost 
e x c lu s iv e ly  on th e  F ore ign  M in is t ry  f i l e s  f a r  as 
o f f i c i a l  pap ers  a re  concerned .
I t  should  be n o te d ,  however, t h a t  th e  
Foreign  M in is t ry  f i l e s  them se lves  a re  by no means 
com plete . Not only  many o f  th e  c i r c u l a r s  produced 
and su p p lie d  by th e  s e rv ic e  M in i s t r i e s  but a lso  th o se  
compiled by th e  In fo rm a tio n  Bureau o f  th e  F o re ign  
M in is try  on 'p u b l i c  opinion* a re  m iss in g  from th e s e  
f i l e s  ; no r  i s  i t  in c o n c e iv e a b le  t h a t  o th e r  f i l e s  
which e x i s t e d  a t  th e  tim e have been ' l o s t *  c o m p le te ly .
ix
N e v e r th e le s s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  th e  F o re ig n  
M in is t ry  p ap e rs  have p rov ided  v a lu a b le  in fo rm a tio n  
f o r  t h i s  s tu d y .
Company h i s t o r i e s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  p r e s s  
o r g a n i s a t io n s  have a lso  been e x te n s iv e ly  u t i l i s e d .
Asahi Shinbun no Kyujunen (N inety  Years of  th e  A sah i) 
(Tokyo, 1969) and Asahi Shinbun Shuppankyukushi 
(H is to ry  o f  th e  P u b l i c a t io n  Department o f  th e  A sah i) 
(Tokyo, 1969) a re  u s e f u l  in  t r a c i n g  th e  development 
o f  th e  Asahi a lth o u g h  th e y  cover too  long  a p e r io d  
to  be o f  much im portance f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s tu d y .
A s im i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  a p p l i e s  w ith  re g a rd  to  o th e r  
company h i s t o r i e s  such as  N ish in ih o n  Shinbunshashi 
( H is to ry  o f  th e  N ish in ih o n ) (Fukuoka, 1951) and 
Yomiuri Shinbun Hyakunenshi ( One Hundred Y ears '
H is to ry  o f  th e  Yom iuri) (Tokyo, 1976). I t  should  be 
no ted  t h a t  th o se  which were w r i t t e n  between th e  
o u tb re a k  o f  th e  Manchuria C r i s i s  and th e  end o f  th e  
Second World War ten d  to  s t r e s s  t h e i r  'p ro -g o v e rn m en t ' 
a t t i t u d e ^ a s  Ton ich i Nannajunenshi (Seventy  Y ears '
H is to ry  o f  th e  Tokyo N ic h in i c h i ) (Tokyo, 1941) and 
Dentsu Shashi (H is to ry  o f  Dentsu) (Tokyo, 1938) 
c e r t a i n l y  do. On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  post-W ar accoun ts  
by th e  same companies such as  M ainichi Shinbun 
Hyakunenshi (One Hundred Y ears ' H is to ry  o f  th e  M a in ich i) ^  
(Tokyo, 1972) and Dentsu Rokuj unen (S ix ty  Years o f  D en tsu ) 
(Tokyo, 1967) seem e i t h e r  to  ig n o re  th e  sudden change 
o f  view which took  p la c e  a f t e r  th e  summer o f  1931, o r  
to  p r o je c t  them se lves  as th e  'v i c t i m s '  o f  s t a t e  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  th e  'freedom  o f  th e  p r e s s ' .  I n t e r n a l  
c i r c u l a r s  which would have c a s t  a b e t t e r  l i g h t  on th e
X .
c o n f l i c t s  w i th in  th e  p r e s s  o r g a n i s a t io n s  th e m se lv e s ,  
o r  th o se  "between them and th e  government d e p a r tm e n ts ,  
have not g e n e r a l ly  "been a v a i l a b l e  o r  t r a c e a b l e .
Memoirs o r  accoun ts  p u b l ish e d  in  jo u r n a l s  
by v a r io u s  j o u r n a l i s t s  have a lso  been e x te n s iv e ly  u se d .
Once a g a in ,  however, t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between th e  pre-War and th e  post-W ar v e rs io n s#  Some 
pre-War acco u n ts  w r i t t e n  by th o se  who were fo rc e d  to  
r e s ig n  a f t e r  th e  ou tbreak , o f  th e  M anchurianC ris is  
sound h ig h ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e i r  form er c o l le a g u e s  who 
had now become l i t t l e  more th an  fgovernment spokesmen*•
I to  M asanori*s Shinbun S e ik a tsu  NijUnen (Twenty Years 
in  Newspapers) (Tokyo, 1933) and Ogawa S etsu*s  
Shinbun S e i j i  Gaiko K i j i  no Kiso C h is h ik i  (B asic  Knowledge 
Concerning P o l i t i c a l  and D ip lom atic  A r t i c l e s  in  Newspapers) 
(Tokyo,1932) a re  but two examples in  t h i s  c a te g o ry .  Most 
o f  th e  post-W ar accoun ts  by th e  ^government spokesmen* 
i n e v i t a b ly  sound somewhat d e fe n s iv e  a s ,  f o r  example,
Ogata T a k e to r a 's  I c h i  Rohei no S e tsu n aru  Negai ; Genron 
no J iy u  ga Subete de Aru (Ardent Wish o f  An Old S o ld ie r  s 
P re ss  Freedom I s  V i t a l )  in  Bungeishunju (Tokyo, December 
1952) s u g g e s ts .
I t  may a lso  be n e c e s sa ry  to  m ention th e  l i n g u i s t i c  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  e x t r a c t s  from th e  Japanese  
p re s s  in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s. To beg in  
w ith ,  t h e r e  i s  th e  in h e re n t  vagueness in  th e  way in  
which th e  Japanese  language i s  used  as compared w ith  
most o f  th e  European lan g u ag es .  Moreover, no t only  
was pre-War Japanese  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  o f  today , 
but many c o n t r ib u to r s  took  p r id e  in  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  
w r i te  in  a more e la b o ra te  and g ra n d io se  s ty l e  which
was o f te n  im p rec ise  and a l l u s i v e .  T h is  may have been
due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  many o f  th e se  w r i t e r s  had read  
£
l i t e r a t u r e .  As a r e s u l t ,  many a r t i c l e s  c o n ta in
passag es  which a re  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  put in to  c l e a r
and com prehensib le  E n g l ish  w ithou t some em bellishm ent.
In  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  I  have ta k e n  th e  view t h a t  i t  would
be in a p p r o p r ia te  to  modify th e  o r i g i n a l  and t h a t  i t  i s
p ro p er  to  t r a n s l a t e  as  l i t e r a l l y  as  p o s s ib l e ,  even 
unfo r tu n a t  e ly  
though t h i s  r e s u l t s  in  awkward p h ra se s  and 
A
p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  e x p re s s io n s  in  v a r io u s  places*
A b r i e f  word may a lso  be n e c e s sa ry  on th e  
background o f  th e  p r o p r i e t o r s ,  e d i t o r s  and 
co r re sp o n d e n ts  o f  th e  Japanese  newspapers and jo u r n a l s .
The m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  e d i t o r s  and c o r re sp o n d e n ts  had 
always been g ra d u a te s  o f  p r iv a te  e d u c a t io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
This  was p a r t l y  due to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  g ra d u a te s  o f  
s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  th o se  of Tokyo 
Im p e r ia l  U n iv e r s i ty ,  v i r t u a l l y  monopolised government 
p o s t s .  In  1882, Fukuzawa Y ukich i,  th e  no ted  M eiji  
e d u c a t io n i s t  and th e  founder  o f  th e  p r iv a te  Keio 
U n iv e r s i ty ,  e s ta b l i s h e d  th e  p r e s t i g i o u s  newspaper,
J i j i s h i n p o  to  in t ro d u c e  th e  new id e a s  and id e o lo g ie s  
o f  th e  West w h ile  Tokutomi Soho, once a s tu d e n t  a t  
a n o th e r  well-known p r iv a te  e d u c a t io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  
D oshisha, a lso  founded in  I 887 Kokumin Shinbun in  
o rd e r  to  p re s s  f o r  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  th e  Im p e r ia l  
D ie t .  Even in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s when 
th e  major newspapers were ho lo n g e r  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
forums o f  t h e i r  p r o p r i e to r s  o r  e d i t o r s  l i k e  t h e i r  
M eiji  p re d e c e s s o r s ,  and when th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e i r  
s t a f f  became more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  and c a r e e r i s t  
th ro u g h  th e  i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  p u b l ia  exam inations
rM
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open to  any u n i v e r s i t y  g ra d u a te s ,  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  
th e  e d i t o r s  and c o r re sp o n d e n ts  s t i l l  came from 
p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as  Waseda and ICeid.
(Ogata T a k e to ra ,  th e  c h ie f  e d i t o r  o f  th e  Tokyo Asahi 
and a  Waseda g rad u a te  was a  n o ta b le  exam ple.)  This  
e x p la in s ,  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y ,  why th e  Japanese  p r e s s  was 
in  g e n e ra l  a g a in s t  government p o l i c y .  On th e  o th e r  
hand, th e  p r o p r i e t o r s  o f  th e  m e t ro p o l i ta n  newspapers 
in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s were g e n e r a l ly  
businessm en w ith  no p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t i s a n s h i p .  Murayaraa 
Ryuhei o f  th e  Asahi and Motoyama H ik o ich i  o f  th e  
M ainichi were th e  b e s t  examples in  t h i s  c a te g o ry .
In  c o n t r a s t ,  not a  few owners o f  p r o v in c ia l  newspapers 
were i n f l u e n t i a l  l o c a l  p o l i t i c i a n s  who e i t h e r  were 
a l r e a d y  members o f  th e  Im p e r ia l  D ie t  o r  had am b itio n s  
to  be so , and th e y  in c lu d e d  Hamada Kunimatsu o f  th e
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Mie N ic h in ic h i  and Kosaka Junzo o f  th e  Shmano M a in ic h i .
F i n a l l y ,  some words may be n e c e s sa ry  
on th e  o r g a n i s a t io n  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  Chapter I  
o u t l i n e s  th e  g e n e ra l  s i t u a t i o n  w i th in  th e  p r e s s  i t s e l f  
a t  th e  dawn o f  th e  new Showa e r a  in  December 1926, 
but I  leav e  u n t i l  C hapter  V a  d i s c u s s io n  o f  how th e  
government and th e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  sought to
c o n t r o l  th e  p r e s s  th ro u g h  c e n so rsh ip  and o th e r  means* 
The s u b je c t  i s  t r e a t e d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  because  th e  n a tu re  
o f  c e n so rsh ip  changed d u r in g  th e  e a r ly  Showa p e r io d  
and because i t  i s  conven ien t to  d i s c u s s ,  and e a s i e r  to  
g ra sp ,  th e  v e ry  i n t r i c a t e  workings o f  c e n so rsh ip  by 
c o n s id e r in g  bo th  th e  background and changes in  a 
s e p a ra te  c h a p te r .  I t  i s  im portan t  to  n o te ,  however, 
t h a t  even in  th e  e a r l i e r  p e r io d ,  some degree  o f  government 
cen so rsh ip  had always e x i s t e d .
Abstrac t
Much research  has been c a r r i e d  out on the causes and consequences 
of  the dramatic Manchuriarjcrisis of  1931-1933, Many books have a lso  
been w r i t ten  on the h i s to r y  of  the Japanese press  with not a l i t t l e  
a t t e n t io n  being paid to  the e f f e c t  o f  s t a t e  in te rve n t ion  on press  freedom. 
A systematic  an a ly s is  of press  t rea tment  of fore ign  po l icy  before and 
during the Manchurian Inc ident  and of  the ways in which the ro le  and 
cha rac te r  of  the press  changed has,  however, been lacking .  This th e s i s  
a t tempts  to f i l l  the gap by examining a number of newspapers and j o u rn a l s ,  
including the most i n f l u e n t i a l  and those sp ec ia l i s in g  in fore ign  a f f a i r s  
fo r  the years  1927-1933, focusing on the c ruc ia l  fore ign  pol icy  issues  
of  naval disarmament and the China ques t ion .  The var ious methods of 
government censorship are  a lso  examined, I t  lends support to  those who 
have seen the Japanese press in the period of  ’Taisho Democracy' as a 
formidable c r i t i c  of the Japanese government in fore ign po l icy  as well as 
domestic p o l i t i c s .  This c r i t i c a l  tone,  based in p a r t  on l i b e r a l  i n t e r ­
nat ional  a t t i t u d e s ,  i s  shown to have continued down to  1930, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
with regard to disarmament, The t h e s i s  a lso  shows, however, t h a t  well 
before 1931, there  was a growing tendency to emphasise sensa t ional  r e p o r t ­
ing ,  of ten  of  an ant i -Chinese  n a tu re ,  fo r  reasons of  commercial r i v a l r y .
I t  is  a lso argued t h a t ,  l a rg e ly  fo r  commercial reasons,  the press tended 
to move away from a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  independent e d i t o r i a l  pos i t ion  towards 
conformity with publ ic  opinion,  and t h a t  i t  sought to avoid c o n f l i c t s  
with the government, which might r e s u l t  in temporary bans on pu b l ica t io n .  
Thus i t  in d ica te s  t h a t  to  a cons iderable  ex ten t  the apparent ly  dramatic 
switch of  ro le  to support of  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  o f f i c i a l  p o l i c i e s  in 1931 had 
a l ready been foreshadowed,
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CHAPTER I -  Br ief  Survey of  the Japanese Press
1. Newspapers, News Agencies and Radio
The h i s to ry  of  the two g ian t  newspaper concerns,  the Asahi and 
the Mainichi , was v i r t u a l l y  the h i s to ry  of  the Japanese press  in pre-  
War Japan. Their  r i s e  and the  decl ine  of t h e i r  r i v a l s  began roughly 
in the 1890s when the newspapers s t a r t e d  s h i f t i n g  t h e i r  main emphasis 
from d iscuss ion  to  repor t ing  and f i n a l l y  to en ter ta inment.^
The two Osaka newspapers,  the Asahi and the Mainichi , had a t  
l e a s t  two advantages over t h e i r  Tokyo r iv a l s  to e x p lo i t  and develop the 
new s i t u a t i o n .  F i r s t l y  t h e i r  e a r ly  growth away from the p o l i t i c a l  
centre  had l e f t  them with much l e s s  sense of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  the press 
in the conventional sense. Unlike the ' g r e a t  newspapers' (dai shinbun) 
in Tokyo, which had been e s ta b l i sh ed  by t h e i r  founders as the p o l i t i c a l  
forum, the Asahi s t a r t e d  in 1879 as a 'minor newspaper' ( sho shinbun) ,  
whose main function was to provide r epo r ts  on socia l r a th e r  than p o l i ­
t i c a l  aspec ts  of  the local r e s id e n t s  and which did not usually  carry  
any lead a r t i c l e .  Indeed, the  Asahi published i t s  f i r s t  leader  only 
in 1893, when the controversy over the 'unequal '  t r e a t i e s  between Japan 
and the Powers was a t  i t s  height .  The Mainichi , whose o r ig in  dates  back 
to 1872, catered p r im ar i ly  fo r  the business  c i r c l e s  of the commercial
cap i ta l  of  Japan and as such placed much emphasis on the economic
2r a th e r  than p o l i t i c a l  aspects  of  the country as a whole.
Secondly, and perhaps more importan t ly ,  they had a much s t ronger  
f inanc ia l  background than t h e i r  r i v a l s .  They had a l ready es tab l i sh ed  
themselves as the most i n f l u e n t i a l  and popular newspapers in Osaka when 
one of the 'g r e a t  newspapers' in Tokyo, J i j i s h i n p o , s t a r t e d  publishing 
i t s  s i s t e r  newspaper, Osaka J i j i s j i n p o , in 1898. The outbreak of  the
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Russo-Japanese War in 1904 led the  Asahi and the Mainichi to form a 
ca r te l  ca l led  Teikauri  Sokkokai ( the Associat ion fo r  Immediate Execu­
t ion  o f  Sale a t  a Fixed Pr ice)  which quickly forced t h e i r  weaker r i v a l s
in the c i t y  e i t h e r  to  c lose  down or to switch over to evening newspapers,
3
thus achieving a near monopoly between them by the end of the War.
Their  advance to  Tokyo began when the Asahi acquired the control 
of  a 'minor newspaper ' ,  Mezamashi Shinbun, in 1888. This newspaper was 
subsequently  published under the name of  the Tokyo Asahi and the o r ig ina l  
Asahi was renamed as the Osaka Asahi . The Mainichi on i t s  p a r t  made a 
somewhat t e n t a t i v e  advance to  Tokyo in 1906, but i t  was not u n t i l  a f t e r  
i t s  a c q u i s i t io n  of the e r s tw h i le  most p r e s t ig io u s  Tokyo Nichinichi 
in 1911 t h a t  the Mainichi changed i t s  name to the Osaka Main ichi .
Indeed, i t  was then,  according to  Shimizu Iku ta ro ,  t h a t  the course which 
the Japanese press was to follow in the next th ree  decades was f i n a l l y
4
decided.
While the advance of  the two Osaka newspapers to Tokyo was in 
p rogress ,  such important events as the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) 
and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) aroused g r e a te r  public i n t e r e s t  
in r ep o r t s  from overseas .  In 1897, the Osaka Mainichi (then the Mainichi) 
decided to send t h e i r  own s t a f f  members as the permanent correspondents 
to London and New York in i t s  a t tempt to over take the more reputed 
Osaka Asahi. The Osaka Asahi in turn  not only signed an exclus ive  
c o n t rac t  with Reuters of B r i t a in  l a t e r  t h a t  y e a r ,  but a lso  followed 
the example of i t s  Osaka r iva l  fo r  the improved overseas news supply. 
However, the main purpose of  these movements by the Osaka Asahi was not 
to compete with the Osaka Mainichi but to catch up with ,  and even tua l ly  
to over take ,  the  h i th e r to  most respected  newspaper in in te rn a t io n a l
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5a f f a i r s ,  J i j i s h i n p o  of Tokyo, This was an important development in 
a country,  where there  was no news agency which could a f ford  to send 
i t s  correspondents  overseas .  There was not even a Japanese news agency 
a t  the time which could a c t  as the dominant mediator  between the fore ign  
news agencies  and the domestic newspapers. Indeed, by 1918, Tokyo had. 
come to claim more o f f i c i a l l y  r e g i s t e r e d  news agencies than any o ther
C.
cap i ta l  c i t y  in the world.
The outbreak of the  F i r s t  World War not  only consolida ted  the 
s h i f t  o f  emphasis from the leader  to r ep o r t s  but a lso  helped the  Asahi 
and the Mainichi groups to f u r th e r  t h e i r  ques t  fo r  supremacy, thanks
la rg e ly  to  t h e i r  su p e r io r  overseas news supply network. Mitarai Tatsuo,
the well-known Asahi columnist ,  w r i t ing  in 1961, observed:
War never f a i l s  to promote the c i r c u l a t io n  of 
newspapers. This war was regarded as the 
'o n c e - in - a - l i f e t im e  opportuni ty  to t h i s  end.
Everyone wanted to  get  the war r e p o r t s ,  wished 
to peep in to  the real  s i t u a t io n  behind d ip lo ­
matic wars . . . .  People 's  demand fo r  the news­
papers could only be summarised in the cry ,
' I  want to ge t  the news and f a c t s  as soon as 
p o s s i b l e ' .  Thus the newspapers were forced
in to  an era  in which repor t ing  was supreme,
with the i n e v i t a b le  consequence of  the dec l ine  y 
of  the Tokyo-based ' l e a d e r '  (bokutaku) newspapers.
The Armistice in 1918 had a s ig n i f i c a n t  impact on the news 
supply system world wide. I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  the 'Big T h ree ' ,  i . e .  Reuters ,  
Havas of  France and the Associated Press (h e re in a f t e r  AP) of  the U.S.,  
subsequently divided the world outs ide  the U.S.S.R. in to  t h e i r  'spheres  
o f  i n f l u e n c e ' ;  Havas fo r  France and her t e r r i t o r i e s ,  AP fo r  the U.S. 
and i t s  t e r r i t o r i e s  and Reuters fo r  more or l e s s  the r e s t  of the world.
In ad d i t io n ,  there  was an independent American news agency, the United 
Press ( h e re in a f t e r  UP) whose repu ta t ion  had been somewhat l e ss  than the 
'Big Three1, but whose monopolist ic coverage of  the Russian Revolution
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of  1917 had come to place i t  v i r t u a l l y  equal to i t s  th ree  main r i v a l s
g
in i t s  s t a t u r e .  Within Japan,  the importance of in te rn a t io n a l  r epor ts
r ap id ly  decreased.  This in turn  forced most of  the smal ler  Japanese
/
news agencies  e i t h e r  to c lose  down or  mergejn order  to  survive  and by the
end of  1926, only two news agencies o f  any s ig n i f i c a n c e  in overseas
news supply were s t i l l  in ex is tence .  They were Shinbun Rengosha and
and Nihon Denpo Tsushinsha ( h e re in a f t e r  Rengo and Dentsu r e s p e c t iv e ly ) .
Dentsu was e s ta b l i s h e d  as an independent commercial o rgan isa t ion
in 1901 and had been the sole  r e c ip i e n t  in Japan of r epo r ts  from UP since
July  1907. Rengo, on the  o the r  hand, was s t a r t e d  in April  1926 and
was modelled a f t e r  AP with an equal share owned by each of  the e ig h t
o r ig in a l  shareholders ,  i . e .  the Asahi of  Tokyo and Osaka, the Tokyo
N ic h in ich i , the Osaka Mainichi and four o ther  major Tokyo newspapers.
At f i r s t  Rengo was a n o n -p ro f i t  making body l ik e  AP and i t s  main aim
was to  a^id excessive and unnecessary competition between the e ig h t
founder members. In a d d i t io n ,  Rengo enjoyed the subsidy from the Foreign
Minis t ry  which hoped t h a t  i t  would grow in to  a powerful news agency
g
comparable to the 'Big Three1. Neither  of  these two news agencies ,  
however, had the f in a n c ia l  base to send out i t s  own s t a f f  correspondents  
overseas o the r  than to China. As such, each agency remained a passive  
r e c ip i e n t  of  i t s  sen ior  p a r tn e r s ;  UP fo r  Dentsu and Reuters,  AP and 
Havas fo r  Rengo. ^
This did not mean t h a t  the Asahi and the Mainichi groups had 
come to r e ly  mainly on these two news agencies fo r  overseas news supply. 
Indeed, desp i te  the f a c t  t h a t  they owned h a l f  the shares of the 
cooperat ive news agen-cy, Rengo, t h e i r  r i v a l r y  aga ins t  each other  and 
aga ins t  t h e i r  Tokyo r i v a l s  prevented them from giving se r ious  cons ide ra ­
t ion  to changing the s i t u a t i o n  u n t i l  the cos t  of  keeping t h e i r  own s t a f f
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correspondents  forced them to  do so,  in favour of  the uniformed news 
supply through the newly e s ta b l i s h e d  semi-governmental news agency,
Domei Tsushinsha ( h e re in a f t e r  Domei) .  in 1 9 3 6 .^
While the commercial expansion of  the Asahi and the Mainichi 
groups through the b e t t e r  coverage of  overseas events  was s t i l l  poss­
ib le  even a f t e r  the Armis t ice ,  i t  was the  Great Tokyo Earthquake in 
1923 t h a t  gave them a dec is ive  oppor tun i ty  to over take t h e i r  Tokyo 
r i v a l s ,  a t  l e a s t  in c i r c u l a t i o n .  In the immediate af termath of  the 
ca ta s t ro p h ic  even t ,  the Osaka Asahi and the Osaka Mainichi and t h e i r  
s i s t e r  newspapers in Tokyo f u l l y  exp lo i ted  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  t h e i r  
r i v a l s ,  which culminated in the  ap p l ica t io n  of  a new ' c a r t e l 1 formed 
between them in December 1925.
The method employed was id e n t ic a l  to  one used in Osaka during the 
Russo-Japanese War two decades e a r l i e r .  Unlike in Osake where there  
had been no e x i s t in g  ' c a r t e l '  agreement,  however, Tokyo already had 
Goshakai ( the  Five Companies' Club) which c o n t ro l led  the p r ice  of  each 
copy produced by i t s  member companies, i . e .  the Tokyo Asahi , the Tokyo 
N ich in ic h i , J i j i s h i n p o , Kokumin Shinbun and Hochi Shinbun, and o ther  
agreements concerning the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  the newspapers which were 
designed to avoid an excessive  sa les  competition among them. In order  
to take fu l l  advantage of  the af termath of the Earthquake, the Tokyo 
Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi  needed to break up Goshakai which had 
by now become an obs tac le  fo r  t h e i r  commercial expansion. This they 
did with the backing of  more than one hundred of the b iggest  d i s t r i b u ­
to r s  of  newspapers in T okyo .^  By the end of  1926 they had e s ta b l i sh ed  
themselves as the unchallenged g ian ts  with
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13t h e i r  adver t i sed  c i r c u l a t io n  of  one m il l ion  each. From now on, the 
sa le s  war in Tokyo entered  a new phase where the main i n t e r e s t  was 
focused on the competition between the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo 
Nichinichi  r a th e r  than between these two on the one hand and the o ther  
th ree  on the o ther .
The commercial success, of  the Asahi and the Mainichi groups in 
Tokyo and Osaka did not  n e ce s sa r i ly  permeate to  the provinces a t  the 
same pace. Indeed, there  remained, r i g h t  up to the Second World War, 
some ’pockets '  where they f a i l e d  to pene t ra te .  One of  the reasons fo r  
t h i s  f a i l u r e  was t h a t  t h e i r  'p rov inc ia l  e d i t i o n s ' ,  d e sp i te  a fu l l  page 
of  local news fo r  'appeasement ' ,  did not s a t i s f y  the proud local 
readers  who f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  were not f u l l y  represented  in the 
metropoli tan  newspapers. Secondly, the special 'p rov inc ia l  e d i t i o n s '  
were normally poorer in t h e i r  content as well as appearance owing la rg e ly  
to  the n eces s i ty  of  t h e i r  e a r l i e r  p r in t in g  fo r  shipment. F in a l ly  and 
perhaps most im portan t ly ,  one o r  two local  newspapers had already e s t a ­
b li shed  t h e i r  dominance well before the in t roduc t ion  of  modern t r a n s ­
por t  made i t  phys ica l ly  poss ib le  f o r  the metropol i tan  newspapers to
14reach these  r a th e r  remote areas .
These provinc ia l  newspapers of ten  kept t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  i d e n t i t i e s  
well a f t e r  the 'commercial'  newspapers of  Tokyo and Osaka had embarked 
on t h e i r  expansion under such se lf -acc lam atory  phrases as ' im par t ia l  
and s e l f l e s s '  ( the Asahi) and 'non-al igned and non-par t i san '  (the 
Mainichi). I to  Masanori, the former e d i to r  of  J i j i s h i n p o , observed:
Among the i n f l u e n t i a l  provinc ia l  newspapers,  there  
are  those which are  assoc ia ted  with the p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s .  I f  the re  are only two i n f lu e n t i a l
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newspapers in one provinc ia l  c i t y ,  the one with 
a s t ronger  p a r t i s an sh ip  may well be more p r o f i t ­
ab le ,  con tra ry  to the popular b e l i e f .15
Perhaps none were b e t t e r  su i t ed  to t h i s  d esc r ip t io n  than the
Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i . This newspaper was f i r s t  published as a Seiyukai
newspaper f inanced by subsc r ip t ion  in 1891. I t  has been a l l eg ed ,  however,
t h a t  t h i s  newspaper had e s ta b l i s h e d  an independent e d i t o r i a l  pos i t ion  d u r in g  tb
16
era of 'Taisho Democracy'. Nevertheless ,  the o f f i c i a l  view in 1927 was
t h a t  i t  was s t i l l  a Seiyukai newspaper while i t s  r i v a l ,  the Kyushu
Nippo, was c l a s s i f i e d  as a 'Minsei to  newspaper ' ,  because of  i t s  e d i t o r ,
Nakano Seigo, who was a Minseito Diet  member. Whereas the Kyushu Nippff
was c re d i te d  with a f a i r l y  small c i r c u l a t i o n ,  the Fukuoka Nichinichi
enjoyed a readership  not much smaller  than one of  the f iv e  major Tokyo
newspapers, Kokumin Shinbun, with i t s  d is t r ibu t ion r  extending not only
to Tokyo and Osaka but to  Korea, Taiwan and M anchur ia .^
Most of  the provinc ia l  newspapers, including the Fukuoka
N ic h in ic h i , depended more on the independent news agency, Dentsu, fo r
overseas news supply than Rengo which was owned - and th e re fo re  p re fe r red
18- by t h e i r  metropoli tan r i v a l s .  The Fukuoka Nichinichi was in f a c t  a
major shareholder  o f  Dentsu and i t  was no s u rp r i s e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  t h a t  in
1936, t h i s  newspaper and nine of  the most i n f l u e n t i a l  provinc ia l
newspapers opposed most vehemently in the name of  'freedom of  p ress '
the forced merger of the communication department of  Dentsu and i t s
arch r i v a l ,  Rengo. They claimed then t h a t  the es tabl ishment  of  Domei
as a r e s u l t  o f  the proposed merger would only help the Asahi and the
Mainichi groups to expand in t h e i r  areas  because of  the subsequent uni-
19f i c a t i o n  of  the rep o r t s .
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While the sa le s  competition between the newspapers i n t e n s i f i e d
towards the end of  the Taisho e r a ,  the re  appeared another  f a c to r  which
looked s e t  to add more fuel to  t h i s  t rend .  Radio broadcast ing was
f i r s t  introduced in Japan on 22 March 1925 under the d i r e c t io n  of  the
Conmunications Minis try .  As had been p red ic te d ,  the speedy repor t ing
of d a i ly  events in i t s  ' f l a s h  news' programmes 'made the morning ed i t ion
20of the newspapers look l ik e  nothing more than t h e i r  remnants ' .  The 
popu la r i ty  of  t h i s  novel form of  communication was such t h a t  following 
the c rea t io n  of  i t s  'Radio Programmes' column l a t e r  in 1925, the c i r ­
c u la t ion  of  the Yomiuri, the small evening newspaper, immediately
21increased from 40,000 to 70,000. Nor was t h i s  phenomenon l i k e ly
to be confined to the m etropol i tan  areas where the major newspapers
_ 22 
d i s t r i b u t e d  f ree  ex t ra  e d i t io n s  (gogai) to compete with the rad io .
Indeed, i f  anywhere, i t  was in the provinces t h a t  the radio was s e t  to
gain g r e a t e r  popu la r i ty  thanks to  i t s  speedy re po r t ing .
2. Pe r iod ica ls
Not a l l  'pub l ic  opin ion '  was represented  in the newspapers. J u s t
as there  was some room l e f t  f o r  smaller  newspapers to f lo u r i s h  in 
remote a r e a s ,  so the re  was fo r  p e r io d ica l s  in Tokyo. The development 
of  the more ' s e r i o u s '  p e r io d ic a l s ,  such as Kaizo and Chuokoren, was 
very c lose ly  r e l a t e d  to t h a t  of  the metropoli tan  newspapers.
In pre-War Japan, p e r io d ic a l s  used to be c l a s s i f i e d  in to  several 
c l e a r - c u t  c a teg o r ie s .  Among them were sogozasshi (omnibus j o u r n a l s ) ,  
and gakujutsu zasshi ( sch o la r ly  jo u rn a l s ) .
Sdgdzasshi were genera l ly  regarded as a uniquely Japanese f e a ­
tu re .  They, l ik e  popular j o u r n a l s ,  d e a l t  v i r t u a l l y  with a l l  the
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sub jec ts  which were s ep a ra te ly  taken up by o the r  more sp e c ia l i s e d
23jou rna ls  with more or  l e s s  equal emphasis on each theme. Their
respec t ive  readers belonged to very d i f f e r e n t  socia l  s t r a t a ,  however. 
Popular jo u rn a ls  such as Kingu ca te red  fo r  a much g r e a te r  readership  
with t h e i r  sensa t ional ism and of ten  the in c l in a t io n  to the Right 
whereas sogbzassh i , e s p e c ia l ly  KaizU f R e c o n s t ru c t io n ' ) and Chuokoron 
(the Central Review) were proud of  t h e i r  'high c l a s s '  readership  although
pc
i t  in e v i tab ly  e n t a i l e d  a smal ler  c i r c u l a t i o n .
Sogozasshi were a lso  an at tempt  to put the var ious top ics  
d e a l t  with by the d a i ly  newspapers in to  a b e t t e r  perspect ive  and ana lys is  
through t h e i r  longer pub l ica t ion  per iod - normally a month. This s t r a ­
tegy worked la rg e ly  because the Japanese newspapers seemed to l i e  b e t ­
ween the q u a l i ty  newspapers and the  popular newspapers in the Western
sense. This tendency had developed in proport ion to the ‘commercial-
25i s a t i o n '  of  the newspapers under the mask o f  ' n e u t r a l i t y ' .  The cons tan t
propagation of  ru l in g  conservat ive  par ty  pol icy  of  the time by these  
’n e u t r a l '  newspapers may have con t r ibu ted  to the steady demand fo r  
sogozasshi which tended to be L e f t - i n c l in e d ,  e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  the F i r s t  
World War when Kaizo was born more or  l e s s  as a d i r e c t  product of  
'Taisho Democracy'.
Kaizo was f i r s t  published in April 1919. I t s  ch ie f  r i v a l ,  
Chu5koron, which was e s ta b l i sh e d  in 1837 had already overtaken in i t s  
in f luence the e r s tw h i le  most p re s t ig io u s  'bourgeois '  l i b e r a l i s t  journal 
Taiyo (the Sun). The emergence of  the more acute socia l  problems during 
and in the af termath of  the war had begun to push Chuokoron f u r th e r  
towards the Left  when, as a r e s u l t  of  the most famous d i r e c t  s t a t e
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in te rv e n t io n  in press  freedom in Taisho during the Rice Riot of  1918,
the  two well-known columnists of  the Osaka Asahi, Hasegawa Nyozekan
and Kushida Tamiz5, were forced to re s ign .  I t  was s i g n i f i c a n t  because
the opinion of  the Osaka Asahi had by then come to be regarded more
27highly than t h a t  of the Tokyo p ress .  These two columnists jo ined  
t h e i r  f r i e n d s ,  Oyama Ikuo of  Waseda Univers i ty  and Yoshino Sakuzo of 
Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty ,  both considered the 'Fa thers  of  the Taisho 
Democracy', as well as the 'M arx is t '  s ch o la r ,  Kawakami Hajime of  Kyoto 
Imperial Un ivers i ty ,  to become reg u la r  c o n t r ib u to r s  of  sogozassh i .
This not only provided the  much needed impetus to t h i s  genre in t h i s  
t r a n s i t i o n a l  period but enabled the jo u rn a ls  to enjoy a much g r e a te r  
p r e s t ig e  than any comparable category in post-War Japan.
The two g ian t  newspaper concerns attempted to  answer the ch a l ­
lenge from sogozasshi with t h e i r  pub l ica t ion  of  weekly jou rna ls  in
— 281922. Encouraged by the success of  the economic weekly, Toyokeizaishinpo, 
Shukan Asahi (the Asahi Weekly) and Sande Mainichi (the Sunday Mainichi) 
were intended to  'p u t  to g e th e r  the fragmented repor ts  published in haste 
a t  the outbreak of  events  in the d a i ly  newspapers' and to  ' c o r r e c t
29the  wrong r epor ts  as well as to  descr ibe  the  events s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ' .
In s p i t e  of  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  la rge  c i r c u l a t i o n s ,  however, they remained
in the shadow of  t h e i r  ' p a r e n t '  newspapers and never r e a l l y  came to
-  — 30be regarded as a r iv a l  force to  Chuokoron or  Kaizo.
There was a l so  competition from o ther  sogozassh i . but Kaiho
( 'L i b e r a t i o n ' )  which had shown *  promise in the e a r ly  20s f a i l e d  to
_ 31become a ' g r e a t '  sogozassh i . Bungeishunju (the L i te ra ry  Chronicle) 
which was r e g i s te red  as sogozasshi remained, desp i te  i t s  l a rg e r  
c i r c u l a t i o n ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  a ' l i t e r a r y '  journal  while Nipponhyoron (the
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Japanese Review) came in to  ex is tence  only in 1935. Others were n e g l i -
32gib le  ini t h e i r  in f luence  compared to  the two most respected jo u rn a l s .
More i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  jo u rn a ls  such as Warera ( 'We’ ) and 
Shakai Mondai Kenkyu (the Study of  Social Problems) were, though not 
n e c e s sa r i ly  small in c i r c u l a t i o n ,  confined to the  devotees o f  the per ­
sonal ch a rac te r  of  ideology o f  the e d i t o r  himself .  Among the women's 
j o u r n a l s ,  Fujinkbron ('Women's Review') was the only journal  of  any 
s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  but i t  was published by the company which also published 
Chuokoron. Besides,  i t s  preoccupat ion was with the ro le  o f  women in 
soc ie ty  r a th e r  than p o l i t i c s  in g enera l ,  not to mention fore ign  pol icy .  
Some 'L e f t '  jo u rn a ls  such as Senki ( 'B anner ' )  and Rodo Tsushin 
( 'Workers '  Correspondence')  a l so  enjoyed respec tab le  c i r c u l a t io n s  in 
the  e a r ly  '20s.  As the Peace P reserva t ion  Law was enforced in re tu rn  
fo r  the universal  male su ff rage  in 1925, however, these  jo u rn a ls  were 
subjec ted to  f requent  sal e-bans fo r  t h e i r  ' a n t i -w a r '  views, e s p e c ia l ly
a f t e r  the Mudken in c id en t  in 1931, and found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to reach the 
33reader .
'Scho la r ly  j o u rn a l s '  were a lso  a v a i lab le .o n  the market, but the
m ajor i ty  of  t h e i r  c o n t r ib u to r s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  those of the well e s ta b l i sh e d
jou rna ls  such as Kokusaihogaikozasshi ( ' Journa l  For In te rn a t io n a l  Law
and Diplomacy'),  was the same as t h a t  of  sogozasshi and diplomat ic 
36jo u rn a l s .  The reader  could a l so  subscribe to  some of  the u n iv e r s i ty
newspapers. Even the most i n f l u e n t i a l  Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun ofTokyo 
Imperial Univers i ty ,  however, only became the place fo r  d iscuss ion  to 
any s i g n i f i c a n t  degree a f t e r  the  Mukden in c id e n t ,  not to mention the 
conspicuous absence of  any lead a r t i c l e .  Moreover, i t s  c o n t r ib u to rs
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were confined to  the  p ro fesso rs  of  the u n iv e r s i ty  whose opinions were
often being heard through sogozasshi which adapted kashizashiki  henshu
( l i t e r a l l y  the ' room - le t t ing  e d i t i n g 1).
This e d i t o r i a l  method was, according to  Ikeshima Shinpei ,
to pick out  an au thor  whose opinion was known to be 'g e n e ra l ly  in l in e
with that of the ed itor ' ,  and to ask him^O'Write on a t i t l e  selected
35by the e d i t o r  himself .  This was, by no means, however, to  exclude 
opinions con tra ry  to the  e d i t o r ' s .  Indeed, in s p i t e  of  t h e i r  proclama­
t ion  to be the ' lead ing  advocate of  progressive th o u g h ts ' by the two 
36sogozassh i , a t  l e a s t  Chuokoron was w i l l in g  to welcome co n t r ibu t ions  
from the Right as well as the Left  as i t s  e d i t o r  wrote in 1929:
We hereby dec lare  t h a t  Chuokoron does not belong 
to  the Right or  the  Left and t h a t  i t  w i l l  not be 
mean in providing the f r e e s t  opporuni t ies  fo r  both 
p a r t i e s  to  express  t h e i r  s ince re  thoughts and 
ideas ,  although we shal l  be taking the utmost 
caution l e s t  one par ty  make i l l  use of the journal  
f o r  i t s  own propaganda. 37
Chuokoron1s d ec la ra t io n  was echoed in the 'non-alignment with
the  government or  the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  claimed by the most i n f l u e n t i a l
_ — 38diplomatic  journal  a t  the t ime,  Gaikojiho ( le  Journal Diplomatique).
This journal  was f i r s t  s t a r t e d  by a p r iv a te  pub l i she r  in February 1898
and continued to voice i t s  'non-alignment '  po l icy  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  the 
39spring of  1931. In c o n t r a s t ,  another  diplomatic  j o u rn a l ,  Kokusaichi-
sh iki  (the In te rn a t io n a l  Understanding) ,  was a monthly pub l ica t ion  of
the League of Nations Associat ion in Japan. As such i t  was ' a l ig n e d '
from i t s  s t a r t  in March 1921 and i t s  c h ie f  goal was to promote a b e t t e r
40understanding of  the League of  Nations among the Japanese people.
Neither  of these  jo u rn a ls  seems to have matched sogozasshi
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41in c i r c u l a t io n  l a rg e ly  owing to t h e i r  s p e c i a l i s t  na ture .  On the o the r  
hand, they  played an important ro le  in the d iscuss ion  of  fo re ign  pol icy  
and diplomacy by providing a place fo r  those whose opinions  were not 
represented in sogozasshi e i t h e r  because t h e i r  views were too 'conserva­
t i v e ' ,  or  'moderate '  or  ' r e a c t io n a r y '  or  because sdgozasshi were too 
l im i ted  in space, owing to  the shortage of  pages. I t  i s  a lso  s ig n i f i c a n t  
t h a t  some of  the co n t r ib u to r s  of  these diplomatic  jo u rn a ls  were as
c r i t i c a l  a s ,  i f  not  more so, than those of  sdgozassh i , but  t h a t  they
■ _  42
escaped the  degree o f  censorship appl ied  to  sogozassh i .
Another journal  of  some s ignf icance  a t  the time was Toyokeizai- 
shinpo (the Oriental Economist).  I t  was undoubtedly the most p r e s t i ­
gious economic journal  in pre-War Japan and i t s  'uniquely systematic  
and c o n s i s t e n t '  a t t i t u d e  provided the 'most rad ica l  and m i l i t a n t
l i b e r a l i s t  argument' not  only in t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  category but among
43the Japanese press  as a whole.
The journa l  was s t a r t e d  immediately a f t e r  the Si no-Japanese War
in 1895 by Machida Chuji whose aim was to make i t  the  regional equiva-
44le n t  o f  the p re s t ig io u s  Economist of  London. Unlike o the r  economic 
jo u rn a ls  such as J i tsugyo no Nihon (Business Japan) which were f i l l e d  
with r a th e r  fl imsy ' rags  to r i c h e s '  s t o r i e s ,  i t s  r ep o r t s  were more 
a n a l y t i c a l . and i t s  e d i t o r i a l  d i sc u s s io n s ,  l ik e  the Economist 's , 
covered not only the economic aspects  of  the country but p o l i t i c s  of 
a l l  kinds.
I t s  prolonged c r i t i c i s m  of  the government derived p a r t ly  from
i t s  ' l i b e r a l '  founder and i t s  nature  as an economic journa l  with a r e l -
45a t iv e ly  small c i r c u l a t i o n .  More important ,  however, was the unique
46'co-ownership'  of  the company among i t s  employees. In a d d i t io n ,  the
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e s s e n t i a l l y  'c losed-shop '  e d i t o r i a l  method which, unlike the 'room-
l e t t i n g '  policy of  sogbzasshi and diplomatic  j o u r n a l s ,  r e s u l t s  in f a r
fewer ex ternal  con t r ibu t ions  i l l u s t r a t e d  i t s  e d i t o r i a l  policy more
47c l e a r l y  than any o the r  jo u rn a l .
3. Some In ternal  Developments
The t h i r d  decade of  t h i s  century in Japan coincided with the 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  s a le s  war between the newspapers,  between sbgozasshi 
and even between these two widely d i f f e r e n t  press  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Especia l ly  acute  was the dilemma which faced the  newspapers of how not 
to a l i e n a t e  the b e t t e r  educated readers  while a t  the same time expand­
ing f u r th e r  in an age when the improvement in the content  of  the leader  
was un l ike ly  to increase  the  c i r c u l a t i o n .  A l a t e r  r e c o l l e c t io n  about 
the Tokyo Asahi, by now the most p re s t ig io u s  newspaper in Japan, descr ibes  
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n :
Towards the  end of  Taisho and e a r ly  Showa . . . ,  
the  Tokyo Asahi which enjoyed a big readership  
was, among o th e r s ,  obliged  to popular ise  i t s  
repo r ts  and to make them more i n t e r e s t i n g  to 
read.  I t  had to  grasp the  essence of  the impor­
t a n t  p o l i t i c a l ,  d ip lomatic ,  economic and o ther  
issues  and to e d i t  them e f f i c i e n t l y  in order  
to s a t i s f y  the i n t e l l e c t u a l  c la s s  while e xp la in ­
ing and d iscuss ing  them f o r  the ordinary  readers  
to understand e a s i l y .  48
Various at tempts  were made to t h i s  end. Shortening of  the l ead e r ,
the  in t roduc t ion  o f  the  tanpyo ( ' s h o r t  review')  column in the evening
e d i t io n  and even the emergence of  the evening e d i t io n  i t s e l f  were the
49r e s u l t s  of  such ' p o p u l a r i ^ - a t i o n ' . On the o the r  hand, the pub l ica t ion  
of  zadankai (symposia) was to re in troduce  an old format used by the
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jou rna ls  in order  to  'appease* those  who used t o r e l y m a i n l y  on the 
leader  f o r  the formation of  t h e i r  opinions.
Behind a l l  these  changes, the re  was an in tense  s a le s  war b e t ­
ween the newspapers which made them very vulnerable  to the 'yellow 
journa l ism '  imported from the U.S. and B r i t a in .  Indeed, as Hugh Byas, 
the Tokyo correspondent of  The Times and The New York Times a t  the 
t ime,  observed, many of  the  young Japanese j o u r n a l i s t s  had come to
regard sensa t ional ism r a th e r  than the ' d u l l '  accuracy as the essence
50of modern journalism. Any at tempt to  'q u ie t en '  the newspapers was,
t h e r e fo r e ,  bound to  f a i l  e i t h e r  because of  the pressure  from the sa les
department o r ,  more of ten  than no t ,  owing to the in tense  r i v a l r y  be t -
51ween the rep o r te r s  themselves. The e f f e c t  of  the of ten  sen sa t io n a l i s e d  
repo r ts  on the reader  was so g rea t  t h a t  Ono Hideo, the well known scho­
l a r  of  pre-War Japanese jou rna l i sm ,  observed t h i s  phenomenon with ce r t a in  
i rony:
Ordinary people, the  most important readers  of  
the newspapers,  did not p a r t i c ip a t e  in the d i s ­
cussions as they used to .  On the con t ra ry ,  they 
seem to have devoted themselves to reading r e p o r t s  
and were trapped by them. An a r t i c l e  w r i t ten  by 
an unknown correspondent had the same impact as a 
leader  by Fukuchi Ochi. 52
The ' l e t t e r s  to the  e d i t o r '  column in the Japanese newspapers
a lso  was e s s e n t i a l l y  a product of  the g r e a t ly  i n t e n s i f i e d  sa le s  war
among them. Though, as Ono sugges ts ,  the re  had been occasions on which
53l e t t e r s  from ordinary  readers  were published in the newspapers,  the 
es tab l ishment  of  the f i r s t  reg u la r  column ca l le d  Tesso (the Iron 
Sweeper) in the Tokyo Asahi in 1917 marked the a r r i v a l  of  a new era 
in the h is to ry  of the Japanese press .
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I n i t i a l l y ,  Tesso was intended to  convey the opinions of  the
s t a f f  members o f  the newspaper with an emphasis on the -high-class
readers '  and tended to  exclude the wider range of  sub jec ts  which would
56have in t e r e s t e d  ord inary  people.  On the o th e r  hand, the newspaper 
was quick to  see i t s  po ten t ia l  to a t t r a c t  more readers  who be l ieved ,  
r i g h t l y  or  o therwise ,  t h a t  a t  l a s t  the re  was some channel through which 
they could make t h e i r  views known to  t h e i r  fel low readers  and t h a t  they 
could p a r t i c ip a t e  in the formation of  'pub l ic  o p in io n ' .  A Tesso ' f a n '  
wrote on 18 February 1923:
The column in d ic a te s  the rapprochement between 
the newspaper and i t s  readers .  I t  i s  a lso  
popular perhaps because these  l e t t e r s  contain 
f re sh  i n t e r e s t s  in t h e i r  amateurish observat ions  
and sentences  which those by profess ional  w r i te r s  
do not .  55
In s p i t e  of  such enthusiasm among i t s  r eaders ,  Tesso and i t s
equivalents  in o th e r  newspapers such as Tsunobue ( 'H orn ' )  of  the Tokyo
Nichinichi f a i l e d  to develop in to  a place fo r  d iscuss ion  l ik e  t h a t  in
a Western newspaper, e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  of  The Times. One obvious reason
56fo r  t h i s  was the l im i ted  s ize  of  these  columns. Another was the 
newspaper 's pol icy  o f  not al lowing more than one l e t t e r  on any to p ic ,  
however important i t  might be. A high degree of  so p h is t i c a t io n  was 
a lso  required  to  comply with the 'humour' and ' c h a t ty  tone '  to  make the 
l e t t e r  'worthy of  p u b l i c a t i o n ' .  The Tesso e d i t o r  wrote on 18 October 
1924:
I t  i s  n a tu r a l ly  impossible fo r  the co n t r ib u to rs  
to pursue scrupulous log ic  and to e s t a b l i s h  a 
d e l i c a t e  argument. I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  him to
provide h in ts  and to  show the t rend  ___  The
newspapers chase new events ,  r a re  th ings  and 
i n t e r e s t i n g  m at te rs .  I t  i s  d es i r ab le  fo r  one not 
to run r i o t  in b l ind im i ta t ion  of o thers  but to 
p resen t  arguments on a new and i n t e r e s t i n g  to p ic .
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Neither  Tesso nor Tsunobue appeared eager  to p r in t  l e t t e r s  on
fore ign  pol icy  or diplomacy in the l a t e  1920s and ea r ly  1930s. I t  i s
un l ike ly  t h a t  t h i s  was due to a shortage of  l e t t e r s  on these  su b je c ts .
299-300
As Table I (Appendixpp.^ i n d i c a t e s ,  in the case o f  Tesso, an average 
of over two hundred l e t t e r s  were received each month according to  i t s
monthly s t a t i s t i c s  on which the t a b le  i s  based. Moreover, many of
— 5ftthe signed T e t te r s  received by Tesso had come from noted c r i t i c s  who
could not have lacked the ' s o p h i s t i c a t i o n '  demanded by the column,
59although the e d i t o r  claimed the  chronic shortage of  ' s u i t a b l e '  l e t t e r s .
Indeed, as the tension  between Japan and China mounted in the spring of
1931, th e re  was an increase  in the number of  l e t t e r s  d iscuss ing  the
60sub jec t .  Very few of  them, however, were published .
F ina l ly  and perhaps most im portan t ly ,  the Japanese newspapers 
began to  in troduce various  symposia a t  t h i s  ju n c tu re .  Together with 
the individual  co n t r ibu t ions  from the  exper ts  in almost every conceiv­
able f i e l d ,  these  symposia may well have worked ag a in s t  the expansion 
of the ' l e t t e r s  to the e d i t o r '  columns. Ogawa Setsu ,  an e d i t o r i a l  
s t a f f  member of J i j i s h i n p o  a t  the t ime,  observed:
[The Japanese newspapers] p resen t  even a most 
shaky argument very ex ten s iv e ly  i f  i t  i s  w r i t t en  
by a s o -ca l l ed  a u th o r i ty .  On the o ther  hand, 
they do not welcome very much those c o n t r ib u ­
t io n s  from anonymous and ord inary  r eaders ,  how­
ever  c r e d i t a b l e  they may be. 61
While some signs such as the  in t ro d u c t io n  of  various symposia 
ind ica ted  the ' p e r i o d i c a l i s a t i o n ' (z a s sh ik a ) of  the newspapers,  there  
was a lso  a t rend among jo u r n a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  sogozassh i , towards 
' newspaper!sa t ion ' ( shinbunka) . The inheren t  'omnibus' nature  of
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sogozasshi i t s e l f  inc l ined  them towards 'n e w sp a p e r i s a t io n ' . As the 
sa les  war between Chuokoron and Kaizo i n t e n s i f i e d  towards the end of  
Taisho and ea r ly  Show£, however, more obvious at tempts  towards t h i s  
end began to appear in these  jo u rn a l s .  Each co n t r ib u t io n  was s h o r t ­
ened and the overa l l  number of  essays and the range of  top ics  covered 
62increased .  At the  same time,  news columns such as the 'Recent Over­
seas Events '  ( in Chuokoron) and the  'World A f f a i r s '  ( in Kaizo) 
s t a r t e d  to  appear.
For a l l  t h i s ,  however, sogozasshi remained e s s e n t i a l l y  a place 
fo r  d iscuss ion .  Both jo u rn a ls  c a r r i e d  a shor t  ' l e a d e r '  whose comment 
will  be re fe r r ed  to as the opinion of  the  j o u r n a l . Each a lso  had a 
sem i-ed i to r ia l  column under d i f f e r e n t  t i t l e s  but w r i t t e n  by such wel l -  
known c r i t i c s  as Oyama Ikuo and Yoshino Sakuzo (Chuokoron) and Yamakawa 
Hitoshi (Kaizo) . Most of  the  o the r  pages were f o r  the ' e x t e r n a l '  con­
t r i b u t o r s ,  with p o l i t i c s ,  economics and fore ign  po l icy  discussed in 
such sec t ions  as Koron ( 'P u b l i c  Opinion')  and Setsuen ( 'Garden of  
D iscu ss io n s ' ) .
The s i t u a t io n  in diplomat ic jou rna ls  was very s im i la r  to t h a t  in
sogozassh i . Both Gaikojiho and Kokusaichishiki c a r r i e d  a shor t  ' l e a d e r ' ,
but Gaikojiho a lso  had a s e m i-ed i to r ia l  column c a l l e d  J i ro n  ( 'C ur ren t
63Review') exc lus ive ly  w r i t t en  by i t s  e d i t o r ,  Hanzawa Gyokuj5. Both 
c a r r ied  various  essays on diplomatic  t o p i c s ,  but those in Kokusaichi- 
shiki were more or l e s s  conf ined to  the works by the members of  i t s  
parent  body, the  League of  Nations Associat ion in Japan.
F in a l ly ,  the economic jo u rn a l ,  Toyokeizaishinpo, c a r r ie d  
b a s ic a l ly  th ree  regu la r  ' l e a d e r '  columns. Shasetsu ( 'L e a d e r ' )  was
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the  most important and Jihyo ( 'C u r ren t  Review') and Zaikaigaikan 
( 'General Survey of  the Financial  World') a lso  discussed issues  
r e l a t e d  to  fore ign po l icy .  Few external  c o n t r ibu t ions  in t h i s  sphere 
were in v i t e d ,  however.
4, The Japanese Press and Japanese Foreign Policy
Towards the end of  the Taisho e r a ,  the Japanese press  found 
i t s e l f  in a p recarious  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  had su ccess fu l ly  inf luenced the 
government to accept the Washington naval t r e a t y  and universal  male 
su ff rage  during th e  Taisho peried, thus encouraging the publ ic  to par­
t i c i p a t e  in the  decision-making process o f  not only domestic but  a lso  
fore ign pol icy .  The government on i t s  p a r t  had come to  recognise the 
danger of  such 'pub l ic  opin ion '  led  by the p ress ,  and was determined
to curb press freedom through every conceivable channel including the
64enforcement of  the  Peace P reserva t ion  Law in 1925.
Not the l e a s t  daunting to  the  press  was the ever  i n t e n s i fy in g  
sa le s  war among the jo u rn a ls  themselves. In order  to survive and expand 
commercially, the  press  would have to  undergo various in te rn a l  changes. 
Individual methods might d i f f e r  from one journal  to  another .  There was 
l i t t l e  doubt,  however, t h a t  more space was to  be devoted to  e n t e r t a i n ­
ment r a th e r  than ser ious  d iscuss ion .  To educate and en l igh ten  the 
public  in t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  was by no means an easy ta sk ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
the areas of  fore ign pol icy  and diplomacy where the government a t t i t u d e  
was a t  i t s  most s e c re t i v e .  In an age of  'democracy' ,  however, t h i s  
s i t u a t io n  had to  change. The p re s s ,  whose in f luence  in guiding public 
opinion had, according to a contemporary assessment ,  become ' f a r  more 
potent  than genera l ly  c re d i ted  by the fo re ign  s tudents  of  Japanese 
j o u rn a l i s m ' ,  seemed se t  to  take i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  'anti -government '  
a t t i t u d e . 66
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CHAPTER II - In Search of  ' Independent Diplomacy1
The death of  the  Emperor Taisho coincided with the dawn of  the 
new year  1927. Af ter  the l a s t  few r a th e r  gloomy years  which had been 
plagued by such ca tas t rophes  as the severe post-War depress ion and the 
Great Earthquake of  Tokyo in 1923, the  accession of  young Hirohito  to 
the throne seemed a spur to  new hope among the people in every sphere.  
Even the t r o u b l e - f i l l e d  Japanese diplomacy appeared to  be heading for  
a b r ig h t e r  f u tu r e .  At l e a s t  t h i s  was the  p ic tu re  presented by the 
press a t  l a r g e J
The press had found some encouraging s igns in the way Foreign 
Minis ter  Shidehara was conducting his  o f f i c e .  These symptoms were 
widely regarded as an in d ica t io n  of  the long-awaited ' independent 
diplomacy'.  Even the more n a t i o n a l i s t i c  Gaikojiho e d i to r  f e l t  t h a t  a t  
long l a s t  Japanese diplomacy had begun to grow out of  a 'B r i t i sh -b o rn  
p a r ro t '  or  'myna im i ta t ing  the U.S. '  confined to and manoeuvred within 
a 'cage '  a t  Kasumigaseki. He wrote r a th e r  proudly on 15 January 1927:
For tunate ly  the recen t  bi rdkeeper  has s t a r t e d  te a ch ­
ing our ce leb ra ted  b ird  such new forms of  a r t  as 
'economy-f irs t  diplomacy' and ' independent China 
diplomacy*. We should encourage him to proclaim 
the s ig n i f ican ce  of the Showa diplomacy and to 
aim a t  the s t a b i l i t y  of  the d a i ly  l i f e  of  the 
people .2
What p o l i c i e s  then had Shidehara been pursuing to receive  such 
appraisa l  and what s o r t  o f  reac t ions  had the press  shown to them?
1, ' N on-In terven t ion '
'Non-in terven t ion '  in the Chinese c i v i l  war had been the 
t a c i t l y  recognised o f f i c i a l  pol icy  of Japan since  the Hara Kei Seiyukai
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3
cabine t  (1918-1921), I t  was no s u rp r i s e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  t h a t  Shidehara,
as Foreign M inis te r  under the two success ive Kenseikai cab ine ts  of  Kato
Takaaki and Wakatsuki R e i j i r o ,  adopted i t  as h is  po l icy  as wel l .  This
does not mean t h a t  he always succeeded in maintaining t h i s  a t t i t u d e .
Shidehara 's  immediate predecessors  had been supporting Chang
T s o - l in ,  the head of  the Mukden c l iq u e ,  in his  ques t fo r  Peking. Not 
Shidehara*s
s u rp r i s in g ly ,  ^ more conservat ive  colleagues  and the m i l i t a r y  au tho­
r i t i e s  forced him to issue  a 'warning* to  both Chang and his  foes in 
1924 and.again in 1925. Despite i t s  claim of  ' n e u t r a l i t y 1, the  warning, 
which declared Japan 's  in to le ran ce  towards the spread of  warfare in 
Manchuria where she held ' s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t s ' ,  was c l e a r ly  designed to
4
rescue Chang from an imminent d e fea t .  Even so, the press  accepted 
i t  as a f a i r ,  i f  not i d e a l ,  measure in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^
Such f a i t h  in the government would have l a s t e d  had Shidehara 
not succumbed to  pressure  from h is  colleagues  a t  the cab ine t  meeting 
on 15 December 1925 when the Japanese government decided to send t roops
to  Manchuria. This sudden development was almost u n iv e r sa l ly  condemned
by the p ress .  As the Tokyo Asahi wrote on the following day:
Moreover, we f e a r  t h a t  the government's change 
of  a t t i t u d e  compels us to suspect  t h a t  i t  was the 
r e s u l t  o f  the  change in the power balance between 
the army and the  Foreign Minis try  within  the 
government r a th e r  than the change of  the Manchu­
r ian  s i t u a t i o n  . . . .  We f e a r  t h a t  such lack of  
diplomatic  p r in c ip le  wi l l  br ing a s i t u a t i o n  in 
which an o u t s t a t i o n  army commander con t ro ls  not 
only the m i l i t a r y  but diplomatic  a u th o r i ty .  We 
r ec a l l  the  time of  the S iberian  expedit ion when, 
owing to the ex is tence  of  the dual governments, 
we had an in ev i t a b ly  b i t t e r  experience.  We pray 
fo r  our country t h a t  the p re sen t  expedi t ion i s  
nothing more than the replacement of  the Kwantung 
army force and th a t  i t  w i l l  not be drawn in to  
any o the r  controversy .  6
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This ’r e g r e t t a b l e ’ inconsis tency  on Shidehara’s par t^  came 
under cons tan t  f i r e  from the  press  which was more sympathetic towards 
China’s na t ional a s p i r a t i o n s  than the Foreign M in is te r .  Indeed, i t  
was t h i s  lack of  p r in c ip l e ,  r a th e r  than ,  as Bamba Nobaya sugges ts ,  
the in c reas ing ly  conservat ive  and n a t i o n a l i s t i c  sentiment within the 
p re ss ,  t h a t  made the h i th e r to  ’most p rog ress ive '  Tokyo Asahi p r i n t  
the following observat ion on 6 February 1926:
Recent Japanese diplomacy, i . e .  Kasumigaseki 
diplomacy, has undeniably been imbued with 
l ib e ra l i s m .  This tendency i s ,  i f  anything,  
to be welcomed as the conversion from con­
servatism to l ib e ra l i s m  s u i t s  the new e ra .
There remains, however, g re a t  anxie ty  and 
danger in i t  because the l ib e ra l i s m  of  the 
Foreign M inis ter  i s  nothing more than a 
cover-up of  empty content  with no s ta tesman­
ship  o r  determination.  We cannot help counting 
the government 's a t t i t u d e  towards the recen t  
f i g h t  between Chang Tso- l in  and Kuo Sung-1ing 
as an obvious case imbued with such l i b e r a ­
lism of  the Foreign M in is t ry .8
I t  was a lso  the uneasiness  towards Shidehara 's  change of  a t t i ­
tude t h a t  a week l a t e r  led the  Tokyo Asahi to  rep ly  'on beha l f  of  the 
government' to the growing anxiety  among the Chinese over the recent  
surge of  ' spec ia l  i n t e r e s t s  in Manchuria and Mongolia' arguments in 
Japan. C lear ly  offended by the 'h a s ty '  and 'misguided'  conclusion 
drawn by China, the e d i t o r  wrote:
I f  they have judged the ac tual  s t a t e  of  Manchuria 
and Mongolia only from the cu r ren t  s i t u a t i o n  and 
have come to  cons ider  i t  the r e s u l t  of  Japan 's  
ambition fo r  more r i g h t s ,  we cannot but feel t h a t  
they have t o t a l l y  d isregarded Japan 's  h o n o u r . . . ♦ 
The age of  m i l i ta r i sm  or imperial ism has ceased 
to  e x i s t  even in Japan s ince the Great War. There 
i s  no one who has any t e r r i t o r i a l  ambition fo r  
China.9
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Thus the Tokyo Asahi and the press  in general a t  the time 
was, con tra ry  to Bamba's con ten t ion ,  s t i l l  very sympathetic towards 
China and t h i s  was even more c l e a r l y  shown in the o the r  i ssue  t h a t  
g r e a t ly  concerned the  two c o u n t r ie s ,  t r e a t y  r e v i s io n .
2. Revision of  Unequal T re a t ie s
The ’negative* a t t i t u d e  of  the Japanese government towards 
China 's  a s p i r a t i o n  f o r  the rev is io n  o f  the various unequal t r e a t i e s  
had long been the  t a r g e t  of  press  c r i t i c i s m .  The most immediate issue 
in t h i s  sphere t h a t  faced Shidehara in 1925 and 1926 was China's  demand 
fo r  g r e a te r  t a r i f f  autonomy.
Having watched the powerful a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  upr is ing  in the 
spring and summerA1925 to  which even B r i t a i n ' s  gunboat diplomacy was 
no a n s w e r , ^  the press  f irmly  believed t h a t  J apan 's  re luc tance  to  com­
ply with China's demand fo r  a un i f ied  12.5% ins tead  of  the c u r re n t  5%
import duty would lead to  a f u r t h e r  i n s t a b i l i t y  in East Asia.  I t  
was no s u rp r i s e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  the somewhat caut ious  dec is ion  by the
government^ on 7 October on the coming Peking t a r i f f  conference
between China and the Washington t r e a t y  s ig n a to r i e s  in v i ted  the 
following a t ta ck  from the  Tokyo Asahi two days l a t e r :
We suspect t h a t  Japan 's  in te n t io n  i s  to  impose 
a maximum inc rease  of  2.5% and to  obl ige  China 
to recompense Japan with the surp lus  income fo r  
the debt ,  thus minimising her s a c r i f i c e  with t h i s  
negative a t t i t u d e .  I f  so, Japan who has claimed 
to be most sympathetic to  the wishes of  the Chinese 
people and who has c o ns tan t ly  ta lked  about mutual 
ex is tence  and p ro sp e r i ty  between the two coun t r ie s  
i s  in f a c t  the meanest.  I t  would be unthinkable 
t h a t  such an a t t i t u d e  on her p a r t  as to keep her 
eyes closed to  the  general t rend  and to  pursue 
so le ly  her immediate i n t e r e s t s  would con t r ibu te  
to  the  fundamental improvement in the Si no- 
Japanese r e l a t io n s h ip  J 2
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The press was well aware t h a t  the Chinese demand would hur t  
Japan more than B r i ta in  and the U.S. owing to the overlapping nature of 
her export goods with the Chinese products .  The en ten te  c o rd ia l e  b e t ­
ween the  two A s ia t ic  n a t io n s ,  however, meant more to the  press  a t . t h i s  
stage than any o the r  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  When on 26 October, th e r e fo r e ,  
Japan unexpectedly declared her support in p r in c ip le  fo r  China's t a r i f f  
autonomy, the  su rp r i sed  but de l igh ted  press  ha i led  t h i s  ac t ion  as a 
welcome in d ica t io n  o f  the ' independent diplomacy' and unanimously urged
the  government to  s t i c k  to t h i s  p r in c ip le  regard less  of  the change in
13the Chinese government. The conference i t s e l f ,  however, made l i t t l e  
progress  because of  the  c o n f l ic t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  among the p a r t i c ip a n t s  
and the unyielding a t t i t u d e  of the Chinese government which subsequently 
f e l l  on 30 April 1926. Three days a f t e r  the i n d e f in i t e  c losure  of  
the  conference was announced on 3 Ju ly ,  the d isappointed Tokyo Asahi 
wrote with a c e r t a in  p r ide :
Japan 's  a t t i t u d e  has l o s t  her a l l  the  f r iends  
except China and she i s  in f a c t  i s o l a t e d .  I t  
would be extremely d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the  Powers to 
accept the Japanese opinion even i f  the con­
ference is  reopened in the f u tu r e ,  thus making 
Japan 's  prospect  gloomier.  The h o s t i l i t y  of  
B r i ta in  and the  U.S. towards Japan 's  indepen­
dent ac t ion  i s  f a i r l y  s t r o n g , . . .  Although we 
hope f o r  the reopening of  the conference and 
long fo r  cooperat ion between the Powers and 
Japan, never the less  we urge the Japanese 
government to adhere to  i t s  j u s t  a t t i t u d e  and
p r in c ip l e .
The ' independent diplomacy' to the Tokyo Asahi was, th e r e fo r e ,  
a diplomacy which should not exclude in te rn a t io n a l  cooperat ion but 
which should be able to stand up aga ins t  such cooperation i f  and when
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i t  was designed to  hinder  the  recovery of  China’s ha t iona l  r i g h t s ' .
This concept was shared even by the more n a t i o n a l i s t i c  Gaikojiho 
when i t s  e d i t o r  wrote on 15 January 1927:
The surv ival  of  a nat ion  could not be achieved 
through i n j u s t i c e  to and suppression of  another  
na t ion .  The Japanese n a t io n ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  wishes 
to achieve i t s  demands fo r  surv ival  through the 
l ink  of  economic n ecess i ty  which i s  universal  
to  every country ,  thus  co n t r ib u t in g  to the 
mutual progress  of  the human race .  The ideal 
o f  'cooperat ion and peace of  a l l  n a t io n s '  should 
be the  essence o f  fore ign  p o l i c y . 15
Even though, as Bamba Nobuya poin ts  ou t ,  t h i s  journa l  published 
in i t s  New Year ed i t io n  a l eader  which proclaimed the ' s u p e r i o r i t y '
1 c
o f  Japan 's  kokutai (nat ional  p o l i ty )  over o ther  forms of  government,
such n a t i o n a l i s t i c  a s s e r t i o n s  had been a f a i r l y  common fe a tu re  a t  l e a s t
s ince 1 9 2 0 ^  and did not n e c e s sa r i ly  r ep re sen t  or  in d ic a te  a ' s t r i k i n g
change t h a t  was tak ing  p lace '  in the journal  which 'had been advocating
18in te rn a t io n a l  cooperat ion u n t i l  a few years  b e f o r e ' .  Indeed, con­
t r a r y  to  Bamba's c o n ten t io n ,  the press  a t  la rge  maintained i t s  sympathy 
towards China and continued to  encourage and support Shidehara from 
the more progressive  po in t  of  view.
3. Sh idehara 's  New Year Speech, 1927
J u s t  as the TarrPf conference a t  Peking was coming to an end, 
the Kuomintang government was e s ta b l i s h e d  under Chiang Kai-shek in 
Kwangtung on 1 Ju ly  1926. Almost immediately, i t  organised the 
'Northern Expedition '  forces  under the banner of  the u n i f i c a t i o n  of  
China and the recovery o f  her 'na t iona l  r i g h t s ' .  Chiang‘s nation-wide
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appeal f o r  the  a b o l i t io n  of  e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  and fore ign  s e t t l e ­
ments on 19 November kindled the  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  as well as xenophobic 
sentiment  among the Kuomintang army, and the fore ign  se t t lem en ts  in 
various Chinese c i t i e s  looked in c reas in g ly  vulnerable .  I t  was the 
B r i t i s h  se t t lem en ts  a t  Hankow and Chiu-chiang in e a r ly  January 1927 
t h a t  received the  f i r s t  Chinese a t t a c k s .
In many ways i t  was a p r e d ic ta b le  r e s u l t .  Japan had earned 
China's f r iendsh ip  through her re fusa l  of  an Anglo-Japanese expedi t ion
, in 1925 and her  sympathetic a t t i t u d e  a t  the conference,  b e n e f i t -
19t in g  her g r e a t ly  in her  China t r a d e .  Only nine days before Chiang's
h i s t o r i c  speech, the Japanese government had agreed to the opening of
the neg o t ia t io n s  fo r  the  renewal of  the Sino-Japanese t r a d e  t r e a t y
which came up fo r  rev is ion  every ten y ea rs .  B r i t a in ,  well aware t h a t
she was f ig h t in g  a los ing  b a t t l e  ag a in s t  Japan, proposed on 18 December
the  reopening of  theT iw ff  conference with a su b s ta n t i a l  amount o f  con-
20cession on her  p a r t .  While the  Japanese government was. reported
to be indignant  about such a u n i l a t e r a l  ac t ion  and expressed i t s  r e se rva -
21t io n s  about the legal standing of  the Peking government, the B r i t i sh  
concession a t  Hankow was reoccupied by the Chinese on 4 January 1927.
I t  was in t h i s  r a th e r  complex s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  Baron Shidehara de l ivered  
a New Year speech a t  the Imperial Diet on 18 January.
B as ica l ly ,  his speech cons is ted  of  the so -c a l l ed  'Four P r in c ip l e s '  
concerning China; high regard fo r  China's sovereignty  and non- in te rven t ion  
in the Chinese c i v i l  war; sympathy towards China 's  nat ional  a s p i r a t i o n s ;  
mutual economic p ro sp e r i ty ;  and to le rance  fo r  the cu r ren t  Chinese s i t u ­
a t io n .  On the same pla tform,  the  Foreign Minis te r  a lso  proposed the
- 30 -
reopening of  the  pending Tacn^f conference followed by a t h i n l y  disguised
22warning to Russia ag a in s t  in te rv e n t io n  in China. Three days l a t e r ,
the  Sino-Japanese nego t ia t ions  over the b i l a t e r a l  t rad e  t r e a t y  opened
23in Peking on an u n o f f ic ia l  b a s i s .  On the same day, Shidehara 
r e j e c te d  the B r i t i s h  proposal f o r  a new j o i n t  expedit ion to the th rea tened  
Shanghai which had been made twenty-four hours e a r l i e r .  B r i ta in  never­
th e le s s  sen t  a force  of  23,000, which in e v i t a b ly  s t i r r e d  up a n t i -  
B r i t i sh  sentiment  among the Chinese e v e n . fu r th e r .
The press  was unanimous in i t s  support of  Shidehara’s r e j e c t i o n  
of  the B r i t i sh  proposal and ha i led  i t  as an in d ica t io n  of  h is  ’independent 
diplomacy'.  Underneath such p r a i s e ,  however, th e r e  was a f a i r  amount 
o f  h o s t i l i t y  towards Japan 's  former a l l y  who had 'abandoned' her a t  
the Washington conference,  leaving many Japanese fe e l in g  in t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
i s o l a t e d .  The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 1 February:
We are not to  c r i t i c i s e  the B r i t i s h  pol icy  by 
dat ing  back to  the abrogat ion of  the Anglo- 
Japanese a l l i a n c e .  We b e l ie v e ,  however, t h a t  
i t  i s  a duty fo r  Japan to remind her long­
s tanding f r i e n d  t h a t  B r i t a i n ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  
high-handed pol icy  towards the various, nat ions  
in the East has con t r ibu ted  to  her present  
misery in C h i n a . 24
The expedi t ion issue  a p a r t ,  however, Shidehara was by no means 
f ree  from press  c r i t i c i s m .  Few c r i t i c s  doubted the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of 
the  non- in te rven t ion  pol icy  described in his  speech towards a 'p u re ly '  
in te rn a l  power s t rugg le  among the Chinese m i l i t a r y  c l iq u e s .  On the 
o the r  hand, most o f  them agreed t h a t  the ambiguity of  the speech i t s e l f  
ind ica ted  the lack of  any fundamental China pol icy  on his  p a r t  and 
feared t h a t  the Foreign Min is ter  would be incapable of  coping with
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China i f  and when the non- in te rven t ion  and the defence o f  vested
Japanese i n t e r e s t s  became incompatible with each o the r .
Sh idehara 's  vaguely-worded warning to  Russia pleased nobody
25except some of  the government suppor te rs .  Kokusaichishiki argued
26t h a t  the  e x i s t i n g  Russo-Japanese de ten te  would have been enough to
27r e f r a i n  Jap an 's  communist neighbour from in te rv e n t io n  in China.
To the  ardent  advocate of  t o t a l  n o n - in te rven t ion ,  Nakamura Yoshihisa 
of  the  Opposition Seiyuhonto, the  sheer weight of  Chinese h i s to ry  
appeared to be a s u f f i c i e n t  an t id o te  to the s o v ie t i z a t io n  of  the coun­
t r y .  Instead o f  is su ing  such a hasty warning, Nakamura contended the 
Foreign Ministry  should be paying more a t t e n t i o n  to the movements among 
the  Chinese youths and s tu d e n ts ,  an accura te  assessment of  which had
escaped the  Japanese diplomats because of  t h e i r  too b r i e f  a tenure  of
28o f f i c e  a t  one place.
The 'non-committal '  a t t i t u d e  of  the Foreign M inis ter  was also 
a focus of  press c r i t i c i s m .  Kamio Shigeru,  an e d i t o r i a l  w r i t e r  of  the 
Osaka Asahi, agreed with Shidehara t h a t  cooperat ion with B r i t a in  such 
as expedi t ion to Shanghai would turn  China towards Russia ,  thus provid­
ing an excuse f o r  a f u r th e r  communist i n f i l t r a t i o n  in to  the neighbouring 
country . On the o ther  hand, Kamio argued, Japan should stop t r e a t i n g  
the Kuomintang government ' l i k e  a s tep -so n '  immediately and show her 
sympathy to i t s  claim f o r  the  overthrow of  the m i l i t a r y  c l iq a e s  as
well as the  t o t a l  a b o l i t io n  of  the unequal t r e a t i e s  i f  such unfavourable
29development was to be avoided.
Uehara E t s u j i r o ,  a well-known Opposition Seiyukai Diet member, 
and aw 5 Shinobu Junpei f e l t  some uneasiness
- 32 -
about the  e n th u s i a s t i c  support among the people fo r  Sh idehara 's  r e j e c ­
t ion  of  the B r i t i sh  proposal .  The Japanese pub l ic ,  Shinobu argued, 
overjoyed with t h e i r  sudden discovery of  ' independent diplomacy',  would 
have to r e a l i s e  t h a t  independence and cooperat ion did not n e c e s sa r i ly  
c o n t r a d ic t  each o the r .  Moreover, he warned in Chuokoron  ^ in the absence 
of  any fundamental pol icy  concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, Shidehara 's  
' c o -p ro sp e r i ty '  and 'sympathy' towards China's  na t ional  a s p i r a t i o n s  
would become a mere f i c t i o n .  Were Shidehara 's  non- in te rven t ion  to
p r e v a i l ,  Uehara contended, Japan would have to  make doubly sure t h a t
30the Powers, including the  U.S.S .R .,  would follow her lead.
The e d i t o r s  of  Gaikoj iho, Kaizo and Chuokoron were equally  
d i s s a t i s f i e d  with Sh idehara 's  r a th e r  ambiguous a t t i t u d e .  Indeed, the 
d isappointed Chuokoron r a th e r  s u rp r i s in g ly  i d e n t i f i e d  i t s e l f  with the 
Japanese p ro le ta r i a n  p a r t i e s  and argued in favour of  the abandonment 
of  the ' s p e c i a l '  s t a tu s  h i t h e r to  enjoyed by Japan. The Japanese pro­
l e t a r i a n  p a r t i e s  would do, the  e d i t o r  promised the Kuomintang govern­
ment, everything shor t  of  giving immediate recogni t ion  to help i t  to
31recover China's 'na t iona l  r i g h t s ' .
Thus f o r  the  p re s s ,  how bes t  Japan could cope with the 
r ap id ly  changing s i t u a t i o n  i f  and when 'n o n - in te rv e n t io n '  and the defence 
of  vested Japanese i n t e r e s t s  became incompatible with each o ther  had 
become a major ques t ion .  The problem was t h a t  nobody seemed to possess 
any c l e a r - c u t  so lu t ion  fo r  t h i s  dilemma and the two unfortunate  develop­
ments a t  Nanking and Hankow in the spring of  1927 were the  f i r s t  of 
these occasions  t h a t  put the Japanese press  to the t e s t .
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4. Nanking and Hankow Incidents
Having occupied the  B r i t i s h  se t t lem ents  a t  Hankow and Chiu-chian^ 
in e a r ly  January ,  the Kuomintang army began to march downstream towards 
Nanking and Shanghai along the Yangtse. Ins tead  of  d i r e c t in g  i t s  
e f f o r t s  so le ly  a t  the B r i t i s h ,  however, the s o ld ie r s  a t tacked  a t  random 
the consula te s  and r e s id e n t s  of  various n a t i o n a l i t i e s  in Nanking on 
24 March with a death t o l l  o f  th ree  B r i t i s h ,  two French and one American 
as well as a number o f  o th e r  c a s u a l t i e s .  In r e t a l i a t i o n ,  the B r i t i sh  
and the American gunboats bombed the occupied c i t y .  The Japanese consul 
a t  Nanking, Morioka, however, feared  t h a t  such ac t ion  would f u r t h e r  . 
provoke the  Chinese s o ld ie r s  and succeeded in persuading the Japanese 
naval u n i t s  the re  not to  r e s i s t  them. As a r e s u l t ,  the re  were no death 
c a s u a l t i e s  among the Japanese re s id en ts  and the  Foreign Minis try  re leased  
i t s  own account to the  press  on the following day.
Immediately a f t e r  the  in c id e n t ,  the M inis te rs  of  Japan, B r i t a in ,  
the U.S.,  France and I t a l y  held a conference which agreed on th ree  p r in ­
c i p l e s ;  the  f ive  p a r t i c ip a n t s  would hand a note of  p r o te s t  to the revo­
lu t iona ry  army demanding an apology, compensation, punishment of those 
responsib le  and fu tu re  guarantees;  they would a t t a c h  a ' t ime l i m i t 1 
to the note ;  and they would hand the note to  Commander-in-Chief of  
the revo lu t ionary  army, Chiang Kai-shek.
While the i ssu ing  of  t h i s  note was held up owing to the ob jec­
t ion  of  both the  Japanese and the U.S. governments, a s im i la r  inc iden t  
occurred in Hankow. This t ime,  however, the Japanese marines landed 
in the  c i t y  and clashed with the  Chinese s o ld i e r s ,  and Shidehara was 
forced to  agree to  the i s su in g  of the note .  Nevertheless the Foreign
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Minis ter  managed to  leave out the ‘time l i m i t ’ o r  any o the r  re ference
32to  r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t io n s .
The press  reac t ion  towards these inc iden ts  was f a i r l y  r e s t r a in e d
unlike t h a t  o f  the main Opposition, Seiyukai ,  which embarked on a clam-
33orous a t t a c k  on Shidehara’s ’weak-kneed’ diplomacy on 2 A p r i l .  I t  i s
t rue  t h a t  some telegrams from China with such sensa t ional  headlines  as
'BRUTALITY! INDESCRIBABLE LOOTING BY THE SOUTHERN ARMY' and
'SWARMING HANKOW RIOTERS, LIKE A LIVING HELL!* seemed to
34f i l l  the  newspapers,  which, as Bamba Nobuya sugges ts ,  undoubtedly
became the tool  f o r  the  an t i -Sh idehara  campaign mounted by Seiyukai ,
35 'the  Army and the  Navy. I t  i s  too has ty ,  however, to  conclude t h a t
the  e d i t o r i a l  po l icy  represented  in the leader  had a lso  changed. Indeed,
the major newspapers on the whole supported Shidehara u n t i l  Baron
36Tanaka took over the Foreign Minis try  on 20 A pr i l .  The Tokyo Asahi , 
reminding i t s e l f  o f  the danger o f  f a l l i n g  a prey to the ' h a r d - l i n e r s ' ,  
wrote on 2 Apr i l :
Apart from some voices  among the population in 
B r i t a in  o r  the  U.S.,  n e i t h e r  government has y e t  
decided upon i t s  f in a l  a t t i t u d e .  Any hasty 
d e c la ra t io n  by our government a t  t h i s  stage 
would merely be made use o f  by the advocates of  
'uny ie ld ing  p o l i c y ' .  Considering the important 
ro le  which our government i s  playing a t  the 
th ree  Power conference in Peking, we should 
not lose  our coolness but take the most approp­
r i a t e  measures .37
Even a f t e r  the Hankow inc iden t  on 3 A p r i l ,  the press re luc tance
to lose Sh idehara 's  ' independent '  diplomacy remained s t rong .  True,
the re  was some c r i t i c i s m  of  h is  f a i l u r e  to take any advance measures
38before t h i s  second in c id en t .  On the o ther  hand, any j o i n t  ac t ion
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with the o the r  Powers was v i r t u a l l y  ruled out by the major newspapers. 
The Tokyo Nichinichi  s ta t e d  on 7 Apr i l :
We f ind  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to agree to  a j o i n t  p r o te s t  
because we be l ieve  t h a t  J apan 's  a t t i t u d e  towards 
China needs more c l a r i f i c a t i o n . . . .  Secondly, we^  
f e a r  t h a t  such j o i n t  p r o te s t  would as a na tura l  
course lead to  a j o i n t  e x p e d i t i o n . . . .  In s h o r t ,  
we-are saying t h a t  cooperat ion fo r  the sake of  
cooperat ion i s  undes irab le .  We cannot agree to  
such p r o te s t  uncondi t iona l ly  because we f e a r  t h a t  
i t  would open the way f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n . 39
The d is tu rbance  in China did not seem to have shaken the b e l i e f  
of the more progress ive  c r i t i c s  e i t h e r .  Those whose opinions were 
normally heard through Chuokoron and Kaizo maintained t h a t  the pol icy  
h i th e r to  pursued by Shidehara s t i l l  represented  the  r i g h t  a t t i t u d e .
To them, the  temporary turbulence in China looked another  e x c e l l e n t  
oppor tuni ty  to extend the f r a t e r n i t y  of  the Japanese people to  t h e i r  
neighbouring na t ion .  In t h i s  sense ,  a s h o r t - s ig h te d  'u ny ie ld ing '
China pol icy  should not be adopted by the government. Yoneda Minoru, 
a prominent legal s ch o la r ,  wrote in Chuokoron:
The fore ign  po l icy  t h a t  has been adopted by Japan 
s ince the t a r i f f  conference a t  Peking the year  
before ,  i . e .  sympathizing with and support ing 
the f a i r  demands and a s p i r a t i o n s  of  the Chinese 
people,  i s  the bes t  as a bas ic  pol icy .  I t  should 
not be pressed to  change according to the ever-  
changing Chinese s i t u a t io n  or  any o the r  temporary 
phenomenon.40
There were, however, those whose a t t i t u d e s  cons iderably  s t i f f ­
ened a f t e r  the two in c id e n t s .  Journals  and c o n t r ib u to r s  whose opinions 
had been leaning more towards S e iyuka i 's  view, began to advocate 
the idea of  applying two s e t s  of  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  in deal ing with
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China. They argued t h a t  i t  was time f o r  Japan to grow out  o f  the
'n o n - r e s i s t a n c e '  pol icy  towards the South and suggested t h a t  she should
cooperate with the o ther  Powers in deal ing  with the revo lu t ionary  govern­
ment. Nor was Shidehara 's  non- in te rven t ion  in the s t ru g g le  among the 
Northern m i l i t a r y  c l iques  c r e d ib le  to these  c r i t i c s  any longer .  On 
14 A p r i l ,  i . e .  the day before the Seiyukai dec is ion  to impeach the 
Wakatsuki cab ine t  on t h i s  score ,  the  Fukuoka Nichinichi  contended:
We should prevent the s o v ie t i z a t i o n  of  
Manchuria and Mongolia in order  to  p ro te c t  our 
own i n t e r e s t s  as well as to maintain the order  
o f  the neighbouring Japanese t e r r i t o r y ,  Korea.
To t h i s  end, we may need to  support Chang
Tso- l in  o r ,  should he f a i l ,  we may have to
r e ly  upon ourse lves .  We do not need neces­
s a r i l y  to wait  f o r  the  o ther  P o w e r s . 41
While such c r i t i c i s m  was rap id ly  gather ing  momentum, the
Wakatsuki cab ine t  f e l l  and a new Seiyukai government headed by Baron
Tanaka Giichi was e s ta b l i sh ed  on 20 A pr i l .  This was the d i r e c t  r e s u l t
vof  Wakatsuki 's f a i l u r e  to  sole  the  chronic f inanc ia l  c r i s i s  whose
A
culmination coincided with the two unfor tunate  events  in China. With 
i t ,  the Shidehara Diplomacy', which not only had won grea t  popu la r i ty  
as an ' independent diplomacy' but had even persuaded, i f  t em porar i ly ,  
the  t r a d i t i o n a l  bas tion  of  the 'h a rd - l in e  diplomacy' to c a l l  fo r  
caution in taking any kind of  ' i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t '  ac t ions  in the neigh­
bouring country,  came to  an end.
To the l i b e ra l  c r i t i c ,  Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, who bel ieved i t  e ssen­
t i a l  to send expedi t ions  to p ro te c t  the l i f e  and proper ty  of  the Japanese 
r e s id e n t s ,  the popu la r i ty  of  the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' was the product 
o f  the age r a th e r  than Shidehara himself  who, Kiyosawa cons idered ,
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possessed no v is ion  of  any long-term fore ign  po l icy .  Another i n d ic a ­
t io n  of  t h i s  t rend ,  according to  the c r i t i c ,  was the prompt acceptance 
of  the U.S. c a l l  f o r  a second naval disarmament conference a t  Geneva 
in February 1927 without any r e se rv a t io n s  by the Opposition p a r t i e s  
as well as the government, in c o n t r a s t  to  a few years  e a r l i e r  when 
the Washington naval conference had caused a g rea t  fu rore  among many 
of  the Diet members who c r ied  out  about the a r r i v a l  of  a ’nat ional  
c r i s i s ’ . Kiyosawa wrote in Chudkoron:
I repeat  t h a t  i t  was in e v i tab le  fo r  the 
Japanese fore ign  pol icy  to become more l i b e ­
ra l  and compromising because of  Japan’s 
economic n eces s i ty  f o r  su rv iv a l .  I t  i s  
noteworthy th a t  t h i s  was enforced by Mr. 
Shidehara who happened to  become Foreign 
Minis ter  when the  economic d i f f i c u l t y  fo llow­
ing the war was becoming more profound. The 
’Shidehara Diplomacy' was, in my view, merely 
a re source less  diplomacy crea ted  in t h i s  s i t ­
uation and he merely acted  accordingly .  I t  
i s  important  to note t h a t  t h i s  pol icy  acquired 
the support of  the peop le .42
I f  Kiyosawa's content ion  i s  v a l id ,  Sh idehara 's  - i . e .  J apan 's  - 
acceptance o f  the U.S. i n v i t a t i o n  to the 'second ' naval conference 
was the culminat ion of  the economic hardship borne by the people 
r a th e r  than t h a t  of  h is  high diplomatic  p r in c ip l e s .  To what ex ten t  
was t h i s  r e f l e c t e d  in the a t t i t u d e  of  the press  to the  conference?
5. Geneva Naval Conference: Background
On 10 February 1927, P res iden t  Calvin Coolidge sent  a Pres iden­
t i a l  message to the  Congress proposing to put a stop on the cons t ruc ­
t ion  of  a u x i l i a ry  warships.  At the same time,  he sent  out a memorandum
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to  the  governments of  the four  o the r  s ig n a to r i e s  of  the Washington 
naval t r e a t y ,  i n v i t in g  them to a second naval disarmament conference 
a t  Geneva. Two days la t e r ,  France refused to take p a r t  followed quickly 
by her  neighbour, I t a l y ,  with B r i ta in  undecided, Japan, however, 
accepted the  i n v i t a t i o n  'with a good g race '  on 19 February, which in 
tu rn  encouraged Coolidge to  propose a th ree  nat ion conference with 
B r i ta in  and Japan as the o the r  p a r t i c ip a n t s  on 8 March. Three days 
l a t e r ,  Japan once again accepted the i n v i t a t i o n  with the same s p i r i t .
By the time the  ac tual  conference s t a r t e d  on 20 June, Baron Tanaka 
of  the former Opposition Seiyukai had been ac t ing  as Foreign Minis ter  
as well as Prime M inis ter  f o r  exac t ly  two months. In s p i t e  of  the 
w i l l ingness  of  both Shidehara and Tanaka, however, the  conference 
f a i l e d  to reach any formal agreement and was o f f i c i a l l y  closed on 4 
August.
In many ways such a r e s u l t  had been p r ed ic ta b le .  The Washington
naval t r e a t y  of  1922 had put a temporary stop only to the cons truc t ion
of  c a p i ta l  warships . Moreover, the r a t i o  agreed in the t r e a t y  had
43s a t i s f i e d  no one but ,  perhaps,  the U.S. The d isp leased  France sub­
sequently  concentra ted on the cons t ruc t ion  of  a u x i l i a ry  vesse ls  which 
in turn  encouraged I t a l y  to follow her immediate neighbour 's  lead out 
o f  r i v a l r y .  Alarmed a t  such movements by her European r i v a l s ,  B r i ta in  
re so r ted  to  the same course ,  adding fuel to  the a lready s trong f i r e  
on the European f ro n t .
In the P a c i f i c ,  Japan was a lso  eager to increase  her a u x i l i a ry  
warships, having had her demand fo r  the 70% ra t io n  in c a p i ta l  ships  
ag a in s t  the th e o r e t ic a l  arch enemy, the U.S.,  r e je c te d  a t  Washington.
-  . 3 9  -
Her gain ,  i . e .  the h a l t ing  of  the cons t ruc t ion  of  the naval bases in 
the Ph i l ipp ines  and Guam by the U.S.
appeared to  be f a s t  d isappearing when the U.S. enforced the ’Japanese 
Exclusion Act ' in 1924^
providing the much-needed excuse by the Navy for  i t s  expansion plans in 
the age of  acute economic hardships .
What prompted Pres iden t  Coolidge to  propose the  conference a t  
t h i s  junc tu re  was l a rg e ly  his wish to counter  the Sena te ' s  approval 
of  the $320 m il l ion  naval expansion scheme in January 1927 in d e f i ­
ance o f  h is  pub l ic ly  declared o b jec t ion .  The P res id en t ia l  e l e c t io n
which was due in the following year  may well have been in h is  mind as 
44well .  Whatever his  motivat ions may have been, h is  o r ig in a l  proposal
45fo r  a f iv e  nat ion conference was r e j e c te d  by France and I t a l y ,  leaving 
B r i ta in  in a d i f f i c u l t  po s i t io n  in Europe. Although B r i ta in  eventu­
a l l y  jo ined  the U.S. and Japan, i t  was l a rg e ly  t h i s  European s i t u a t io n  
as well as the r i v a l r y  between B r i t a in  and the U.S. t h a t  led to  the  
f a i l u r e  of  the conference.
6. Pre-Conference Press A t t i tude
The press  support fo r  the  conference remained lukewarm through­
out the pre-conference per iod.  Despite t h e i r  unanimous acceptance of
i t s  s p i r i t ,  many c r i t i c s  not only saw the d i f f i c u l t y  lying ahead of 
46the conference but a lso  f e l t  s cep t ic a l  of  the timing and the  motiva­
t io n s  behind the  U.S. i n v i t a t i o n .  To those who bel ieved in the idea ls  
of  the League of  Nations,  such a proposal from a non-member country l ik e
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the U.S. was almost an i n s u l t  to the universal disarmament undertakings  
which had been o f f i c i a l l y  sponsored by the League s ince  May 1926.
Three days a f t e r  the P re s id en t ia l  message had been sen t  to the  Senate ,  
the  Tokyo Nichinichi  comnented:
Disarmament has been d e a l t  with as an issue  by 
the League of  Nations s ince  l a s t  year .  Indeed, the 
s tage has been s e t  f o r  a p re l iminary  assembly in 
March. I t  may not be i r r e l e v a n t  but i t  i s  c e r ­
t a i n l y  unnecessary fo r  the  U.S. to  propose a 
second disarmament conference which i s  nominally 
a pa r t  of  the League of Nations disarmament con­
fe rence  but which i s  in r e a l i t y  an e n t i r e l y  
independent one .47
The supposedly progress ive  jo u rn a ls  such as Kaizo and Chuokoron
appeared equal ly  unsympathetic towards the conference.  No leading
a r t i c l e s  were published by e i t h e r  o f  these  jo u rn a l s .  Indeed, Kaizo*s
only e f f o r t  was to  publish  the economist,  Takahashi Kamekichi 's r a th e r
48 —cynical Marxist  view o f  the  proposed conference.  Chuokbron, on the
o ther  hand, had in v i ted  Kiyosawa Kiyoshi to  express  his  advocacy of
49to t a l  disarmament j u s t  before the U.S. i n v i t a t i o n  was sen t  ou t .  In 
i t s  April  e d i t i o n ,  the journal  included a specia l  sec t ion  on the su b je c t ,  
but i t s  c o n t r ib u to r s  did not sound very e n th u s i a s t i c .  Yamakawa H i tosh i ,  
the noted s o c i a l i s t  and the w r i te r  of  a reg u la r  sem i-ed i to r ia l  column 
in Kaizo, wrote:
The t ru e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  and aim of  the conference 
does not l i e  in the discovery  of  a f a i r  r a t i o  but 
in the enforcement of  an u n fa i r  r a t i o  by the coun­
t r i e s  with the same vested i n t e r e s t s  on those with
d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  .........  The naval disarmament
conference i s  a f t e r  a l l  a c o n f l i c t  to gain t h i s  
r i g h t  of  enforcement,  and nothing more than p a r t  of  
an i m p e r i a l i s t i c  c o n f l i c t  and i t s  extens ion r a th e r  
than a means to prevent i t . 50
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Perhaps the only ' c o n s t r u c t iv e '  c r i t i c i s m  in t h i s  sec t ion  came 
from the naval c r i t i c ,  Nagaoka Gaishi ,  The recent  development of  
a i r c r a f t ,  he argued,  was a l ready  making t r a d i t i o n a l  naval warfare 
in c reas in g ly  obsole te  as the Navy i t s e l f  had learned through i t s  exper­
imental naval warfare in Saeki Bay in Kyushu the year  before .  Unfor­
tu n a te ly ,  the public had been kept out  of  t h i s  v i t a l  information as 
such 'm i l i t a r y  s e c r e t s '  were p roh ib i ted  f o r  p u b l ic a t io n .  Nagaoka 
cont inued:
The main aim of  the Imperial naval defence i s  to 
preserve the vested i n t e r e s t s  of  Japan in her 
t r a d i t i o n a l  land and sea as well as overseas .
In o the r  words, sheer  defence should be the u n fa i l in g  
nat ional  po l icy  of  the Empire. We must th e re fo re  
never dream of p lacing the 'a t t a c k in g  defence'  in 
i t s  place as advocated f e v e r i sh ly  by naval s o l ­
d i e r s .  51
The most a rden t  advocates of  the conference were the  economic 
jo u rn a l ,  Toydkeizaishinpo, and, r a th e r  s u rp r i s in g ly ,  the more 
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  Gaikoj iho . Each journal supported i t  from a very prac­
t i c a l  but somewhat d i f f e r e n t  poin t  of  view. Toyokeizaishinpo n a tu r ­
a l l y  based i t s  argument heavi ly  on the co u n t ry 's  f ina nc ia l  s i t u a t i o n  
and perhaps because of  t h i s ,  i t s  contention sounded more convincing to 
the public than t h a t  of  any o the r  jo u rn a l .  The e d i to r  wrote on 26 
February:
We i n s i s t  t h a t  our country adopt t o t a l  disarmament as 
i t s  pol icy  as we did l a s t  time. More concre te ly ,
Japan needs no such t r i v i a l  arguments as the r a t i o  
of  10:7 or  10:6. I f  the U.S. wishes the 10:6, t h a t  
i s  f in e .  We i n s i s t ,  however, t h a t  the naval force  
a l lo ca te d  to t h a t  ten be reduced to  such an ex ten t  
t h a t  i t  become v i r t u a l l y  zero as a t h r e a t  to  our country.  
We bel ieve  t h a t  the U.S. government wil l  not h e s i t a t e  
to accept  such wish from us i f  i t s  proposal f o r  d i s ­
armament nego t ia t ions  had come out of s in c e r i t y .5 2
- 42 -
Gaikoj iho 's  enthusiasm fo r  ' i n t e r n a t io n a l  coopera t ion '  on the 
disarmament issue  was in marked c o n t r a s t  to i t s  condemnation of  Shide­
hara ' s  'cooperat ion diplomacy' and 'fol low-up diplomacy' on the China 
is su e .  I t  may not have been su rp r i s in g  once i t s  reasonings had been 
heard, Japan, the  e d i t o r  contended, would never be able  to  catch up 
with the U.S. once a f u l l - s c a l e  naval expansion race had been launched. 
Secondly, the  U.S. might well u t i l i s e  the an t i -Japanese  sentiment among 
i t s  own people to  t h i s  end. F in a l ly ,  the  U.S. was l i k e l y  to  place a l l  
the blame on Japan i f  the proposed conference f a i l e d .  I t  was p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  important not to dr ive  the  U.S. to  do so,  as Japan had worked 
fo r  and had somehow managed to  achieve an independent China diplomacy. 
Japan should not i s o l a t e  h e r s e l f  over disarmament which was important
but  which would not too d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  her l i f e  and death.  The
e d i t o r  concluded:
From these  poin ts  of  view, Japan had b e t t e r  
cooperate  with B r i t a in  and the U.S. I t  would be 
fo o l i sh  and over-adventurous fo r  her to i s o l a t e  
h e r s e l f  even in the disarmament i s sue .  Should 
France and I t a l y  not respond, i t  would be a c ce p t ­
able  fo r  Japan to p a r t i c i p a t e  in a th re e -n a t io n  
conference.  This way she w i l l ,  in name and
r e a l i t y ,  be one o f  the th re e  g rea t  Powers of  the
world .53
Before these  arguments could ga ther  momentum, however, public  a t t e n ­
t ion  was g re a t ly  d ive r ted  to  such events as the Nanking and Hankow 
inc iden ts  which took place only a few weeks a f t e r  Japan 's  acceptance 
of the th re e -n a t io n  conference.
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7. Geneva Conference
As the Geneva conference opened on 20 June, the Japanese
public found press  a t t e n t io n  very much focused upon the Shantung
exped i t ion ,  which had been c a r r i e d  out by the new Foreign M in is te r ,
54Tanaka G i ieh i ,  th ree  weeks e a r l i e r .  I t  a l so  looked qu i te  c l e a r  from 
the press  re p o r t s  t h a t  whatever the Japanese a t t i t u d e s  might be, the 
Anglo-American r i v a l r y  would be i r r e c o n c i l a b le  and t h a t ,  unl ike a t  
Washington a few years  e a r l i e r ,  the  conference would be dominated by 
naval o f f i c e r s  r a th e r  than p o l i t i c i a n s ,  thus reducing the p o s s i b i l i t y  
of  the conference producing any concrete  agreements based on p o l i t i c a l  
compromises. In s p i t e  o f ,  or  perhaps because o f ,  these  o b s ta c le s ,  the 
Japanese p ress ,  which was s t i l l  very i d e a l i s t i c  in i t s  p u r su i t  o f  ‘world 
peace’ and ’progress o f  the human r a c e ' ,  was anxious t h a t  the government
should show i t s  ' independent '  i n i t i a t i v e s  in the promotion of  disarm­
ament. In the l i g h t  of  t h i s ,  the following sta tement by Admiral Kato 
Kanji,  then the Commander-in-Chief of  the F i r s t  F lee t  and a fe rven t  
opponent o f  the London naval t r e a t y  th ree  years  l a t e r ,  needs a c lose  
examination:
The most p leas ing  element in the disucss ion of  the 
c u r ren t  conference i s  t h a t  not only the Navy but 
the Foreign Minis try  o f f i c i a l s  and publ ic opinion
are uni ted  ___  Public opinion matches the opinions
of  the major newspapers which form the opinion of the 
na t ion .  These are a t  one t h i s  time perhaps because 
the government has very c a r e fu l ly  worked on t h i s .  
Unfortunately ,  t h i s  uni ty  was lacking a t  Washington, 
thus forc ing  us in to  g rea t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in the pro­
cess of  the conference.  5
I t  i s  qu i te  c l e a r ,  however, t h a t ,  ap a r t  from t h e i r  pledge to 
the s p i r i t  of  the conference,  th e re  was, con trary  to Kato’s view, 
l i t t l e  cooperat ion between the press and the government. Even before
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the opening of  the conference,  the press  had f e l t  f r u s t r a t e d  by the 
ambiguous and ‘h y p o c r i t i c a l ’ a t t i t u d e s  of  the government. As the 
Tokyo Asahi wrote on 11 June:
In the s ta tement by the Navy M in is te r ,  he sa id ,
’I t  would be a grave mistake i f  the people thought 
t h a t  Japan i s  t ry ing  to take advantage of  t h i s  
oppor tuni ty  to put a l i m i t  on armament because of  
her f inanc ia l  r ea so n s ’ . We do not see why i t  should
not be s o   We would l ik e  to  remind the reader  of
Pres iden t  Harding's  public  admission th a t  the l e s s ­
ening of f inanc ia l  burdens was s u f f i c i e n t  to  be the 
main reason fo r  proposing a disarmament c o n f e r e n c e . 56
Ishimaru Tota, a former l i e u te n a n t  commander and a regu la r  
c o n t r ib u to r  f o r  such jou rna ls  as the Tokyo N ic h in ich i , the Fukuoka 
Nichinichi and Gaikoj iho, regarded t h i s  evasive a t t i t u d e  of  the govern­
ment as i t s  unpreparedness.  As a r e s u l t ,  the public had been kept out 
o f  d iscuss ion  on the s ig n i f ic a n c e  of  the conference,  thus leaving the 
c oun t ry 's  defence e n t i r e l y  in the hands of  naval o f f i c e r s .  I f  Japan 
was to avoid repeat ing  her f a i l u r e  a t  Washington, the o ld ,  cor rup t  and 
s e c r e t  diplomacy should be abolished immediately. Ishimaru urged the 
public through K okusaichish ik i :
You, people,  should be prepared to c o n t r ib u te  to 
the formation of  a nat ional  opinion of  Japan. Her 
a s s e r t io n  should be the  essence of  your cry and 
her i n i t i a l  contentions  a t  the conference should 
rep resen t  your o p i n i o n s . 57
Despite these  public  o u tc r ie s  fo r  open d iscuss ion ,  the govern­
ment remained no l e s s  d i s t a n t  and unpredic tab le  than ever .  The o r i g i ­
nal Japanese claim of  the 'minimum l im i t  of nat ional  defence’ in 
ca p i ta l  ships a t  230,000 tons was subsequent ly lowered to 180,000 tons 
and Japan’s r e j e c t i o n  of  the 50% r a t i o  in a u x i l i a ry  vesse ls  did not 
reveal what r a t i o  she intended to acquire .  Nor did the government
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d isc lo se  i t s  ob jec t ion  to the ' p r o t e c t i v e '  armament a t  Hawaii and
CO
Singapore, Such '-indecisive* and ' in co h e re n t '  a t t i t u d e s  were con­
s idered  the in d ica t io n  of  her lack of  'independence* by the press  in 
general which never the less  regarded as d es i r ab le  any modif ica t ions  
aimed a t  disarmament in real t e r m s , ^  In the end, however, in s tead  
of  making f u l l  use of  the Anglo-American r i v a l r y ,  Japan h e r s e l f  seemed * 
to be trapped in the purely technica l  i s su e s .
Few c r i t i c s  questioned the  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of  a gradation in the
r a t i o  among the th ree  Powers. Even fewer advocated more than 70% in
fina u x i l i a ry  v e s se l s .  Indeed, most of  them agreed th a t  the acceptance 
o f  an i n f e r i o r  r a t i o  would not damage the  p r e s t ig e  o f  a sovereign 
country so long as i t  was done of  i t s  own f ree  w i l l .  Ins tead of  pay­
ing unnecessar i ly  g rea t  a t t e n t io n  to the  r a t i o  i s s u e ,  many argued,
Japan should promote a mutual P ac i f ic  t r e a t y  with both B r i ta in  and the  
U.S. and demand t h a t  B r i ta in  re th ink  her planned expansion of  Singapore. 
Some c r i t i c s  even went on to propose the t o t a l  a b o l i t io n  of  such ships  
as b a t t l e s h i p s ,  b a t t l e  c r u i s e r s  and- submarines which were useful only
in war and to  urge the th ree  governments concerned to  re tu rn  to the
61s p i r i t  of  the Hague peace conference o f  1899.
This temporary f lo u r i sh in g  in the discuss ion of disarmament 
was somewhat defused by the government's plea fo r  a 'u n i f i e d  nat ional  
opinion '  in support of  i t s  ' p o l i c y ' .  Some i n f l u e n t i a l  c r i t i c s  such as 
Ishimaru Tota began to feel  a c e r t a in  amount of  sympathy towards the 
d i f f i c u l t y  which the government faced a t  ' t h i s  c ruc ia l  s tage '  in mid- 
Ju ly ,  Consequently, t h e i r  c r i t i c a l  tone was g r e a t ly  modified and t h e i r  
c o n t r ib u t io n s  became le ss  in formative .  Ishimaru himself  confessed:
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The author  of  t h i s  essay i s  in a very f ree  p o s i ­
t io n  as a t h i r d  person to d iscuss  the present  
disarmament conference.  The time has come, however, 
when the conference i t s e l f  is  in the process of  change. 
Faced with t h i s  grave moment, I cannot help th inking 
t h a t  unreserved c r i t i c i s m  would g r e a t ly  a f f e c t  the 
na t ional  i n t e r e s t s  as the in te rn a l  s i t u a t i o n  becomes 
c l e a r e r .  I t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  fo r  me to 
re lax  my pen to a c e r t a in  ex te n t  and I hope th a t  
the reader  wi ll  understand i t . 62
When the Geneva conference f a i l e d ,  the general f e e l in g  among 
the c r i t i c s  was one o f  resigned r e l i e f .  At l e a s t ,  they thought ,  Japan 
had not been and would not be the focus of  c r i t i c i s m  before the-peace-  
loving nat ions  of  the  world. Never the less ,  they f e l t  t h a t  Japan had 
not been successful  in her  a ttempt - i f  she had attempted a t  a l l  - to 
convince the  world t h a t  the Japanese were a peace- loving nat ion and 
t h a t  t h e i r  country possessed i t s  own ' independent1 pol icy  to achieve 
disarmament. Indeed, they r e g r e t t e d ,  Japan had missed a heaven-sent  
opportuni ty  to prove h e r s e l f  on these  scores .  The Tokyo Asahi summar­
ised t h i s  f e e l in g :
I t  may be no exaggerat ion to  say t h a t  the d i sc u s ­
sion a t  Geneva bare ly  maintained i t s  appearance as 
a disarmament conference thanks to the Japanese 
presence.  The Japanese government, however, did 
not t r y  to win over world public opinion by ex p la in ­
ing i t s  a t t i t u d e s  to the conference and the fu tu re  
of  disarmament on t h i s  ra re  occasion. Ins tead ,  i t  
ended up with a negative explanation on i t s  f a i l u r e
of  mediation [between B r i ta in  and the U .S . ] -----
The f a i l u r e  of  the Geneva conference was due la rg e ly  
to the increas ing  i n s i n c e r i t y  of  B r i ta in  and the U.S.,, 
but was our government f ree  from any responsibili ty?®®
Such a f a r  cry fo r  an ' independent '  pol icy based on Japan 's  
economic n e c e s s i t i e s  was, however, to  be engulfed and forgo t ten  in the
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middle o f  the heated arguments over the China diplomacy conducted 
by the new Foreign M in is te r ,  Tanaka G i ich i .  From now on, the ’inde­
pendent diplomacy’ would be used almost exc lus ive ly  in the China 
issue by the government r a th e r  than the p ress .  I t s  connotat ion would 
a lso  become more t h a t  of  the ’p o s i t i v e ' ,  i . e .  unyielding and even 
f o r c e f u l ,  po l icy  o f  ’Tanaka Diplomacy1.
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CHAPTER I I I  - ’P o s i t iv e  Diplomacy’
1. F i r s t  Shantung Expedition, 1927
Praised or  blamed, the ’Shidehara Diplomacy’ came to an end 
and General Tanaka Giichi formed a Seiyukai government on 20 April 
1927, Ins tead  of  appoint ing a f u l l - t im e  fore ign  m in i s t e r ,  he himself  
assumed the p o r t f o l i o  o f  Foreign Minis ter  with h is  pledge of  a ‘p o s i ­
t i v e ’ po l icy .  The press  apprehension aroused by his  r a th e r  ambiguous 
inaugural speech was to some ex ten t  erased two weeks l a t e r  when Tanaka 
declared  a t  the Imperial Diet his  support fo r  Sh idehara 's  ‘non-res is tance* 
policy concerning the Japanese re s id en ts  in China. To the g rea t  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  the  p re s s ,  Tanaka a lso  made c l e a r  t h a t  he would not 
support any one par ty  or  c l ique  in the Chinese c i v i l  w a r J  What gave 
much i r r i t a t i o n  to the p ress ,  however, was his  pledge f o r  in te rn a t io n a l  
cooperat ion ,  e s p e c ia l ly  with B r i t a in ,  in his  handling of  China.
Such uneasiness  was l a rg e ly  the r e s u l t  of  the almost obsess ive
adherence by the press  to ' independent diplomacy' a t  the time. This
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  no t iceab le  a f t e r  the cooperat ion over the Nanking
inc iden t  had been broken up by the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent
modif ica t ion of  the B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  towards the Nanking government.
Japan had been the most r e lu c t a n t  p a r t i c ip a n t  in t h i s  coopera t ion ,
which was designed to ’punish’ China. Tanaka’s r e j e c t i o n  of the B r i t i s h
proposal fo r  a j o i n t  e x p e d i t i o n  to the Peking-Tientsin  area on 26 April
had been ha i led  not only as a r e t a l i a t i o n  fo r  such ' s e l f i s h '  a t t i t u d e
of  B r i ta in  and the  U.S. but a lso  as an in d ica t ion  of  Japan 's  ' inde-
2pendent diplomacy' which was genuinely sympathetic towards China.
- 49 -
Not su rpr is ing ly ,  Galkojiho wrote on 15 May:
They [ i . e .  the members of the Tanaka cabinet] say 
t h a t  they support cooperative diplomacy. We wonder, 
however, i f  they r e a l ly  know th a t  B r i ta in ,  deep in her 
hear t ,  had unt i l  recent ly  t rea ted  Japan very coolly.
. . .  I f  i t  i s  to be cooperative diplomacy, Bri ta in 
should make the f i r s t  move. At the same time, Tanaka 
should demand th a t  she bring the U.S. as a surety
since Japan cannot reach any agreement only with B r i t a i n .3
The press unity  was soon to be broken by the government decision 
to send troops to Shantung on 27 May for  the ’protection of the l i f e  and 
property of the Japanese re s iden ts '  in the area in the face of the 
advancing revolutionary army on i t s  way to Peking. This sudden deci­
sion not only provided an excuse for  the subsequent expeditions by 
Britain and the U.S. f ive  days l a t e r  but also made Japan the main ta rg e t  
of the Chinese h o s t i l i t y  th a t  had h i the r to  been directed largely  a t
Bri ta in .  An o f f i c i a l  p ro tes t  was immediately issued not only by the
two revolutionary governments a t  Nanking and Wuhan but, to Tanaka's 
surpr ise ,  by his ’p ro tege ' ,  Chang Tso-l in .  A ser ies  of anti-Japanese 
boycotts followed, thus threatening the expanding Sino-Japanese t rade .  
Faced with th is  grave s i tu a t io n ,  even the t r ad i t ion a l  bastion of con-
4
servatism was reported to be against  such hasty government act ion .
Press reactions to th is  development varied. What was c le a r ,  
however, was the fac t  t h a t  the press seldom questioned the motivation 
behind such i r r e s i s t i b l e  slogans as ’protection of the l i f e  and property 
of the Japanese r e s id e n t s ’ . What the press seemed to forget  was to 
ask whether the expedition, however j u s t i f i a b l e  th e o re t ic a l ly ,  would 
benefi t  Japan in the fu ture .  Indeed, i t  was not unt i l  a f t e r  the Northern 
army had made a s t r a te g ic  r e t r e a t  th a t  the Japanese press in general 
s ta r ted  to publish arguments against  the expedition. Even then, most 
c r i t i c s  appeared to believe th a t  the presence of the Japanese troops
5
had helped to 'calm' the s i tu a t io n .
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One journal  which did question the wisdom of the Foreign 
Minis ter  on the expedi t ion  was Toyokeizaishinpo. To t h i s  jo u rn a l ,  
i t  was his  d is regard  of  the par l iamentary  procedure t h a t  s i g n i f i e d  
the beginning o f  the fu tu re  t ro u b le s  of  Japan, I t s  Current Review 
column declared on 4 June:
Seiyukai had i n s i s t e d  on the convocation of  an 
ex t rao rd in a ry  Diet f o r  the rescue of  the Bank of  
Taiwan when the re  was a g rea t  f in a n c ia l  panic to 
take place .  Why then did i t  not do the same on the 
China expedi t ion? We do not bel ieve  t h a t  Prime 
M in is te r  Tanaka had the courage to do so. This i s  
why we feel  t h a t  t h i s  expedi t ion will  bring a g re a t  
ca tas t rophe  upon the n a t i o n . 6
Another staunch c r i t i c  of  the government ac t ion  was Yoshino
Sakuzo who was respons ib le  fo r  the reg u la r  column, ‘Social Review',
in Chuokoron. To him, i t  was the s e l f i sh n e s s  of  the two thousand 
at Ts^A-i-o
Japanese r e s id e n t s ^ th a t  provided Tanaka with the much needed excuse 
fo r  his  'warning'  to the revo lu t ionary  army in the form of  an expedi­
t ion  of  as many s o ld ie r s  to ' p r o t e c t '  them. This was inexcusable to 
the revo lu t ionary  army and i t s  supporters  who were f ig h t in g  fo r  the 
l i f e  or  death o f ' t h e i r  country  and th e r e fo r e ,  Yoshino asked:
Should Japan not provide some small accommodations 
to t h e i r  [ r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ' ]  a c t i v i t i e s  even i f  she 
had to s u f f e r  a l i t t l e  inconvenience fo i t ?  I even 
be l ieve  t h a t  the government, i f  a t  a l l  po ss ib le ,  
should order  the t o t a l  evacuation of  the Japanese 
re s id e n ts  in nor th  China in order  to provide the 
Chinese a chance to a c t  f r e e l y . 7
These comments by Toyokeizaishinpo and Yoshino were as f a r  
as the c r i t i c i s m  by most s o -ca l led  ' l i b e r a l s '  went. Indeed, the 
general tone of  press  c r i t i c i s m  remained somewhat lukewarm throughout 
the per iod.  At worst ,  the government was accused of  m isca lcu la t ing  
the s i t u a t io n  which had r e su l t e d  in the p r o te s t  from Tanaka's ’loyal
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a l l y ’ , Chang T so - l in .  Even the Tokyo Asahi did nothing more than 
to  repeat  i t s  f e a r  e ighteen months e a r l i e r  when i t  wrote.onl June:
The government says t h a t  i t  has to p ro te c t  the r e s i ­
dents and t h a t  d iso rde rs  in Manchuria and Mongolia 
are  not welcome. One f a l s e  s tep  would, however, 
lead to  some form of  i n t e r v e n t i o n . . . .  Even i f  the 
government pol icy  i s  c l e a r ,  the s ta t io n in g  a u th o r i ­
t i e s  may well complicate the s i t u a t i o n  because of  
t h e i r  immediate i n t e r e s t s  or  prejudiced views. We 
s in c e re ly  hope t h a t  t h i s  wil l  not h a p p e n . 9
Whatever the v e rd ic t  by the ’l i b e r a l 1 and the more 'p ro g re ss iv e '  
press may have been, the  o u t r ig h t  support fo r  the expedi t ion was most 
c e r t a in ly  in the minori ty .  Apart from the 'SeiyUkai newspapers' such 
as the Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i , ^  Gaikoiiho was more or  l e s s  the only journal 
t h a t  supported i t  as an in d ic a t io n  o f  Tanaka's ' p o s i t i v e '  and ' i n d e ­
pendent '  p o l i c y . ^  Even t h i s  b e l i e f  began to wear th in  as the troops 
remained well a f t e r  the immediate danger seemed to have passed, the revo­
lu t io n  having changed i t s  d i r e c t io n  westward to avoid clashing  with 
the Japanese. Tanaka's d is rega rd  f o r  the in c reas in g ly  an t i -Japanese  
sentiment among the Chinese as well as the growing d iscon ten t  in Japan 
towards the remaining Japanese s o ld i e r s  touched the nerve of  i t s  e d i to r  
who wrote on 1 August:
We do not know how many of the fore ign m in is te rs  
of  the Powers today do not  read important repor ts  
from t h e i r  overseas r e p re s e n ta t iv e s .  There could 
be nobody, however, o the r  than the Japanese 
fore ign  m in i s t e r ,  who has pub l ic ly  declared th a t  
the Foreign Minis try  i s  the most ' c a r e f r e e '  place 
in h is  own c o u n t r y . ^
What d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  Gaikojihd and the Fukuoka Nichinichi 
from the o the r  jo u rn a ls  was t h e i r  firm b e l i e f  t h a t  government a c t io n ,
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r ig h t  or  wrong, should not be c r i t i c i s e d  once i t  had been c a r r i e d  
out .  To them, such c r i t i c i s m  from within  the country would do nothing 
more than to jeopard ise  Japan 's  Nat ional  p re s t ig e ’ as well as to provide 
a f ree  'weapon* to China which was eager  to e x p lo i t  such ' d i s u n i t y 1 
to i t s  own advantage. I t  was t h i s  t h a t  Tanaka had been t ry in g  to put 
across  to the  people,  though without much success .  The following s t a t e ­
ment by a former ca re e r  diplomat in Gaikojiho i s  r e p re sen ta t iv e  o f  such 
sentiment:
I t  should be unthinkable  f o r  anyone to oppose or  
c r i t i c i s e  such b e l i e f  in the government, not to 
mention the provis ion of  i l l e g a l  propaganda 
mater ia l  to China. The an t i -Japanese  movement 
over the expedi t ion r e s u l t s  not only from the 
inheren t  element in China but from the wrong 
assessment of  the prejudiced Japanese by the 
Chinese a g i t a t o r s . ' 3
While the heated arguments continued over the government
-  14a t t i t u d e ,  the newly e s ta b l i s h e d  main Opposition p a r ty ,  Minseito,  had 
kept a complete s i l e n c e .  Indeed, i t  was not u n t i l  a f t e r  the s ta t io n in g  
of  t roops had become an embarassment to the government as a r e s u l t  
o f  the in c reas in g ly  h o s t i l e  press  c r i t i c i s m  of  the Foreign M in is ter  
t h a t  i t s  par ty  l ead e r ,  Hamaguchi Osachi , jo ined the chorus. By then,  
however, Tanaka had declared the withdrawal of  the so ld ie r s  which was 
in f a c t  to be completed hours a f t e r  Hamaguchi's f i r s t  public condemna­
t ion  of  the expedi t ion .  As such, the Minseito was condemned un ive r ­
s a l l y .  Oyama Ikuo wrote in Chuokoron:
What a u th o r i ty  does his  delayed opinion car ry  i f  
i t  i s  expressed a f t e r  the issue  has been s e t t l e d ?  
Such shameless following would do abso lu te ly  noth­
ing but to put the par ty  out of  countenance, which 
boasts to be a g rea t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y J 3
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2, Second Shantung Expedition and The Tsinan Inc iden t ,  1928
The day before the f i f t y - f i f t h  Extraordinary  Diet opened on
20 April 1928, the Tanaka cab ine t  decided to send t roops to Shantung
once again to  ' p r o t e c t  the l i f e  and property of  the Japanese r e s id e n t s '
in the  face of  the northward advance of  the revived 'Northern Expedit ion '
army. This ac t ion  had been a n t i c ip a t e d  for  some time and both the
Nanking government and i t s  sympathisers in the Japanese press  had been
16urging Tanaka not to embark on such an under taking.  .As such, the 
immediate press  reac t ion  was to condemn the dec is ion  on th ree  scores .
F i r s t l y ,  as the government had not consulted  the Diet ,  
the expedit ion did not r e f l e c t  the wil l  of  the Japanese people.
Secondly, the Chinese s i t u a t i o n  had not  appeared to be as dangerous 
as the government presented to the public  and the expedit ion was 
designed simply to impress the nat ion  with i t s  ' p o s i t i v e '  po l icy .
F ina l ly  and most im portan t ly ,  the  press feared t h a t  the c u r ren t  expedi­
t io n  with i t s  g r e a te r  number o f  s o l d i e r s ^  would a f f e c t  the outcome of'  
the c i v i l  war more in favour of  the Peking government than Nanking.
For these reasons,  the press  was almost unanimous in i t s  c r i t i c i s m  of  
the government dec is ion .  Even the more conservat ive  Gaikojiho which 
had s t e a d f a s t l y  supported the ' lo ca l  p ro te c t io n '  of  the Japanese 
r e s id e n ts  doubted the wisdom of  another  m i l i t a ry  ac t ion  a t  t h i s  s tage .
I t s  e d i t o r  wrote on i  May:
The Tanaka cab ine t  has always accused the previous 
cab ine t  of  i t s  inac t ion  and r e so u rc e le s s n e s s , I t  
has o f ten  declared  the need fo r  a p o s i t iv e  China 
pol icy  as wel l .  I f ,  however, i t s  ' p o s i t i v e '  pol icy  
means nothing more than exped i t ions ,  we wish to w i th ­
draw our p e t i t i o n  f o r  such p o l i c y . ^
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Such strong objec t ion  to the expedit ion was temporari ly  hal ted
when the Japanese and the Chinese armies clashed a t  Tsinan on 3 May.
I t  was a time when the Tanaka government was heavily  involved in - _
conf ron ta t ion  with the press  over i t s  oppress ive a t t i t u d e s  towards 
20the l a t t e r .  The Tsinan inc iden t  with i t s  wi ld ly  exaggerated casu- 
21a l t y  f ig u re s  was subsequently u t i l i s e d  by the government f o r  sending
f u r t h e r  t roops ,  thus making the t o t a l  number of  the expedi t ionary  force 
2215,000,on 8 May. Nanking in turn  presented the case to the League 
of  Nations two days l a t e r ,  followed by an o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  reques t  
to Japan on 13th fo r  p r io r  co n su l ta t io n  with her  in any fu tu re  ac t ions  
concerning China.
Press reac t io n s  to t h i s  development var ied to an i n t e r e s t i n g  
e x te n t .  The Tokyo Asahi , which had been cons idered the  bas t ion  of
23l ib e ra l i s m ,  r a th e r  h a s t i l y  supported the government decis ion  of  8 May.
The Tokyo Nichinichi  was somewhat more s cep t ica l  of  the government’s
in te n t io n  and ques tioned the wisdom of solving the unfor tunate  i n c i -
24dent so le ly  through m i l i t a r y  means. Some l i b e ra l  c r i t i c s  such as
Yoshino Sakuzo a lso  voiced t h e i r  opposit ion  to the 'unnecessary '
25 -expedi t ion .  Most s u rp r i s in g ly ,  however, i t  was the Gaikojiho
e d i t o r  t h a t  confronted the government with the s t r o n g e s t  c r i t i c i s m .
He wrote on 15 May:
We must accept  t h a t  the u l t im ate  so lu t io n  of the i n c i ­
dent l i e s  in diplomacy however much we approve of  the 
expedi t ion pol icy .  The government should, th e r e fo r e ,  
be well prepared fo r  i t .  We cannot see ,  however, t h a t
i t  i s  employing any f l e x ib l e  measures towards a so lu ­
t io n .  I t  i s  too preoccupied merely with the inc iden t
and the f a t e  o f  a c e r t a in  Chang T s o - l i n , . . .  We cannot 
help p red ic t in g  a na t ional  diplomatic  c r i s i s . 2 8
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Undeterred by, and d e f i a n t  o f ,  such c r i t i c i s m  of  his  ' p o s i t i v e '  
po l icy ,  Prime Minis ter  Tanaka issued a warning to  both governments of  
China on 18 May which read:
The warfare seems to be spreading to the Peking- 
T ien ts in  area and Manchuria i s  about to be 
subjec ted  to  i t s  e f f e c t s .  Since the maintenance 
of  peace and order  in Manchuria i s  the foremost 
concern of  the Empire, i t  i s  the duty o f  the 
imperial government to  prevent a t  any c o s t  the 
c rea t io n  of  d is tu rbances  o r  the cause of  such 
d is turbances  in t h i s  a re a .  The government 
th e re fo re  may be obliged to take appropr ia te  
and e f f e c t i v e  measures should the warfare  and i t s  
subsequent e f f e c t s  reach the a r e a . 27
This warning was regarded as the f i r s t  public s ta tement  by 
Tanaka of  his ambitions in Manchuria long suspected by the Powers.
As such, i t  immediately in v i ted  p r o te s t s  from the United S ta tes  which 
declared i t s  non-acceptance o f  the warning on the following day. More­
over ,  not  only the Nanking government but a lso  Chang Tso- l in  of  the Peking 
government f i l e d  an o f f i c i a l  p r o te s t  to Japan on 25 May claiming th a t  
the warning was an in te rv en t io n  in the domestic p o l i t i c s  o f  China.
Chang's dec la ra t io n  was his  public  defiance o f  the s e c r e t  'recommenda­
t i o n '  by Tanaka which had accompanied the above warning, advising him 
to r e t r e a t  to his  power base,  Mukden, i f  he was to enjoy the cont inuing 
support  of  Japan. In s p i t e  of  such a brave g es tu re ,  however, Chang 
was even tua l ly  forced to follow Tanaka's advice and s e t  out on a t r a i n  
journey back to  Manchuria on 4 June only to be a s sa s s in a ted  by the 
d e f ian t  young o f f i c e r s  of  the Kwantung Army who had been d i s s a t i s f i e d  
with the  slow progress of  Tanaka's Manchuria pol icy  o u t l ined  in the 
Eastern Conference the year  before .
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3. Eastern Conference and Assass inat ion  o f  Chang Tso- l in
The con t rovers ia l  de c la ra t io n  of  18 May 1928 was a culmination 
o f  Tanaka's ' p o s i t i v e  p o l ic y '  which had been over -pub l ic i sed  ever  since  
the Eastern Conference. This conference had been held in the period 
between 27 June and 7 Ju ly  1927 and i t s  ch ie f  aim was to decide on how 
to handle the  'Northern Expedit ion '  t h a t  had prompted the ' f i r s t  Shan­
tung exped i t ion '  by Tanaka a month e a r l i e r  and on how to p ro te c t  Japan 's
' s p e c ia l  s t a t u s '  in Manchuria and Mongolia. I t s  p a r t i c ip a n t s  included
28many o f  h is  prominent subordina tes .
The press had long been c r i t i c a l  of  the lack of  any permanent
pol icy  in the government's China po l icy .  The Eastern Conference should,
t h e r e f o r e ,  have been greeted  with some s a t i s f a c t i o n  by the press  had
i t  not been fo r  i t s  r a th e r  clumsy handling by Tanaka. Ins tead ,  i t
c losed merely with the pub l ica t ion  of  the vaguely worded 'General P r in -
29c ip l e s  o f  China P o l i c y ' ,  leaving the press as apprehensive about the 
poss ib le  consequence o f  his  ' p o s i t i v e '  pol icy  as ever  before .  Gaikojiho 
wrote on 15 September:
However important  the expansion o f  the par ty  may 
be, i t  i s  too shameless fo r  the cab ine t  to issue 
a pre-s igned cheque by suggest ing unobtainable 
diplomatic  g a i n s . . . .  I t  i s  abso lu te ly  unforgivable  
i f  t h i s  r e s u l t s  in Japan being t r e a t e d  as a defendant 
by o th e r  c o u n t r ie s ,  thus repeat ing  the precedent of  
the Twenty-One Demands,
Such apprehension a p a r t ,  the  press in general f a i l e d  once again
to ques tion the l e g a l i t y  of the government notion of  Japan 's  ' spec ia l
s t a t u s '  in Manchuria and Mongolia which was reconfirmed a t  the conf-  
31erence. This fundamental question was l e f t  to the few individual
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c r i t i c s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  the Marxist  economists,  whose opinions were heard 
through Kaizo and Chudkoron, Murofushi Takanobu, a f e rv en t  opponent 
of  'economic imperia l i sm1, denounced not only the 'm i l i t a r y  expansio­
nism' of  the government but a l so  the 'peti t-bourgeois opportunism* of  
the Opposition MinseitS as an unacceptable concept on which the ' s p e ­
c ia l  s t a t u s '  argument was based. He contended:
I t  i s  time fo r  the Powers not to send but  to withdraw 
overseas expedi t ions  and time fo r  them not  to i n t e r ­
vene in China but  to re tu rn  the so -c a l l e d  vested 
i n t e r e s t s  to t h e i r  r ig h t f u l  owner. Not only should 
the fore ign  se t t lem en ts  and the t a r i f f  autonomy be 
re turned  but every concession and p r iv i l e g e  should 
be abandoned. Then and only then,  can the im p e r i a l i s t  
Powers of  the world be allowed to  preach of  j u s t i c e  
to China.32
More concre te ly ,  the  p re s s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  the major newspapers, 
had f a i l e d  to grasp the  c o n t r ad ic t io n  between the acceptance of  the 
' sp ec ia l  s t a t u s '  and the pledge to re spec t  the independence of  China.
The ' sp ec ia l  s t a t u s '  could not have ex is ted  without the  assumption 
t h a t  Manchuria and Mongolia were not  an in teg ra l  p a r t  o f  China and 
t h a t  these areas  could even be regarded as a p ro te c to ra te  of  Japan.
By the end of  1928, only a handful of c r i t i c s  and the  conomic journal  
Toyokeizaishinpo, were s t i l l  reminding the public of  t h i s  c o n t r a d ic t io n .  
Indeed, the following d e c la ra t io n  by Toyokeizaishinpo in i t s  1 December 
1928 e d i t io n  was, according to Eguchi Kei ich i ,  an opinion 'widely 
d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  o f  the press  in genera l '  and an example of  the 
'profound a t t i t u d e s '  of  the journal  a t  the time:
I t  [the separa t ion  of  Manchuria and Mongolia from 
China] i s  imperial ism which has f a l l e n  behind time
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and nothing d i f f e r e n t  from the ghost which has 
gone too f a r  to r e t r e a t .  There i s  nothing more danger­
ous than to ask fo r  h is  guidance. Such opin ion,  we 
t r u s t ,  wil l  not be taken s e r io u s ly  by anyone except 
those who have some u l t e r i o r  m o t ives .33
One issue  on which the press  did hold an accura te  understand­
ing was the abo r t ive  nature  of  Tanaka’s continuing support  fo r  Chang 
T so - l in .  The almost unanimous press  opposit ion to the Foreign Min is ter  
on t h i s  score gained momentum as the spring 1928 saw the r a p i d . r i s e  o f  
the popu la r i ty  o f  the revo lu t ionary  government among the Chinese people. 
Most c r i t i c s  agreed t h a t  Chang had come to be regarded as the main 
cause of  the c u r re n t  c i v i l  s t r i f e  in China and t h a t  Japan 's  a s s o c i ­
a t ion  with him would be disadvantageous from her diplomatic po in t  of  
34view.
As a ’warning'  to the Chinese governments appeared imminent 
in mid-May, such s e n s i t i v i t y  in the press  towards the o ther  Powers 
was g re a t ly  sharpened. Moreover, Tanaka’s d is regard  of  a 'na t iona l  
diplomacy' based on public opinion touched the nerve of  almost every­
one, The Gaikojiho e d i t o r ,  Hanzawa Gyokujo,warned:
I t  would have a d i r e c t  and grave e f f e c t  on the 
China pol icy  o f  the Powers as well as the Si no- 
Japanese r e l a t io n s h ip  i f  Japan recommended peace 
in the name of the  government and i f  she s t a r t e d  
n ego t ia t ions  with China a t  an o f f i c i a l  level  as a 
s t a t e  po l icy .  A mat ter  t h a t  can be extremely d e l i ­
ca te  should never be decided h a s t i l y . 35
The day a f t e r  the ’has ty '  warning of  18 May was i ssued ,  the 
major newspapers were s t i l l  a t  pains in emphasising Japan 's  ' n e u t r a l i t y '  
in the Chinese c iv i l  war which they  themselves now found d i f f i c u l t  to- 
accept  without  h e s i t a t i o n ,  The following passage in the Tokyo Asahi
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seems to  be more one of  the newspaper’s desperate  e f f o r t s  to convince 
i t s e l f  than the express ion of  i t s  firm b e l i e f  in Japan 's  ’n e u t r a l i t y 1:
Tt would be unbearable fo r  Japan should her wish to 
maintain thorough peace in Manchuria r e s u l t  in secu r ­
ing the p o s i t ion  of  Mr. Chang Tso- l in  who has become
the so le  t a r g e t  in the p resen t  Chinese upheaval___
Although we accept  t h a t  the recommendation i s  not 
intended to  help him, we cannot help wishing t h a t  
the government had given more cons ide ra t ion  to the 
ac t ion  which i s  bound to be regarded as nothing 
o the r  than a s s i s t i n g  Chang in i t s  consequence.35
At the height  of  these  heated arguments,  Chang was as sa s s in a ted  on
4 June and a t o t a l  pub l ica t ion  ban was placed on t h i s  m a t te r ,  thus
37leaving the public uninformed of  the t r u t h .
4. U n i f i c a t i o n  o f  National Opinion'
The a s sa s s in a t io n  of  Chang Tso- l in  and the f a l l  of Peking to 
the revo lu t ionary  army f iv e  days l a t e r  took much of  the heat  o f f  the 
'punish China' argument which had a r i s e n  a f t e r  the Tsinan inc iden t  a 
month e a r l i e r .  They also  seemed to provide Japan with the long- 
awaited opportuni ty  to solve the th ree  most immediate China issues  in 
a coo le r  and more ob jec t iv e  l i g h t ;  the Shantung expedit ion and the 
s e t t lem en t  of  the Tsinan in c id e n t ;  rev is ion  of  the t r e a t i e s ;  and 
the Manchuria i s su e .  This sounded a reasonable wish on the p a r t  of 
the Japanese press as the Nanking government had acquired the appearance 
of  a sole  sovereign government of  the whole of  China, with the notable  
exception of  Manchuria. C r i t i c s  who had been sympathetic towards the 
revo lu t ionary  movement n a tu r a l ly  f e l t  i t  to be the r i g h t  moment fo r
J
Japan fo r  her own b e n e f i t  to give an o f f i c i a l  recogni t ion  to Nanking 
ahead of  and regard less  of  the o ther  Powers. The Tokyo Asahi wrote 
on 26 June:
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Japan need not n e c e s sa r i ly  be concerned with the 
Western, e s p e c ia l ly  the U,S,,  a t t i t u d e s  towards 
her  or  China, Rather ,  i f  she i s  r e a l l y  concerned 
with the Si no-Japanese r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  she should take 
diplomatic  I n i t i a t i v e s ,  I t  i s  a good opportuni ty  
f o r  her  to  consider  the recogni t ion  of  the Nanking 
government not to  f o r e s t a l l  the o thers  but to bene­
f i t  h e r s e l f  as well as o t h e r s . 38
Such sentiment  was c l e a r l y  reminiscent  of  the press support fo r  
the ' independent  diplomacy' which had once been so powerful under former 
Foreign M inis te r  Shidehara and which had been almost t o t a l l y  been i g ­
nored s ince Tanaka's takeover  a t  Kasumigaseki. To the disappointment 
of  the more progress ive  elements of  the p re ss ,  however, Tanaka was 
determined to  cont inue h is  support f o r  the Mukden c l ique  whose new 
head was the  son of  Chang T s o - l in ,  Chang Hsueh-liang.  To keep young 
Chang away from Nanking, Tanaka issued an 'adv ice '  on 19 July  warning 
Chang t h a t  Japan would ob jec t  to h is  'changing of  the f l a g ' .  This was
followed by a p r o te s t  from Nanking two days la te r  with the subsequent
39rek ind l ing  of  the  an t i -Japanese  boycott  movement a l l  over China. 
Unruff led ,  the Foreign M in is te r^ in s t ru c ted  Hayashi Gonsuke 
the  specia l  envoy to the funeral  of  Chang T s o - l in ,  to convey 
the same message to Chang. He hinted t h a t  the Mukden c l ique  would enjoy 
the continuing support of  Japan so long as i t  remained ' independent '  o f  
the Nanking government. This ' s e c r e t '  over ture  was quickly  d isc losed  
by the d e f i a n t  Chang, adding more fuel to  the a l ready burning hat red  
among the Chinese population towards Japan.
While t h i s  highly persona l ised  diplomacy proceeded, the press 
found i t s e l f  in disagreement with the government over the proposed 
advisory council  on fore ign  a f f a i r s .  This was an at tempt by 
Tanaka to  ' u n i t e '  public opinion and the opinion of  the council  was
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supposed to ca r ry  some weight on the d i re c t io n  of  J apan 's  China d ip lo -
macy. Such^proposal was not a new idea on his  p a r t  and l ik e  i t s
unsuccessful p redecessors ,  t h i s  council  was to comprise of  several  
Members
r e t i r e d  D i e t ^ a n d  diplomats as well as some ac t ing  Privy Council lors  
who were sympathetic towards the government.
The press  reac t ion  was p re d ic tab le .  Even 6 a ik o j ih o , whose 
u n fa i l in g  advocacy of  'u n i f i e d  nat ional  op in io n 1 had undoubtedly 
encouraged the government a t  various s ta g e s ,  wrote on 15 August:
I t  would be a f a r  more e f f e c t i v e  way of  con­
cocting na t ional  opinion i f  the government 
forsook i t s  clumsy diplomatic  ambitions and 
t r i e d  to  meet the thoughts and in c l in a t io n s
of  the  public  more open-mindedly  The
question i s  not the u n i f i c a t i o n  of  nat ional  
opinion,  or the success or f a i l u r e  of  the 
proposed advisory council  on fore ign a f f a i r s .  
I t  i s  whether the diplomatic  a b i l i t y  of  the 
government can match the expecta t ion  of  the 
e n t i r e  nat ion or  n o t . 40
In add i t ion  to  the counc i l ,  however, the government was reported  
to be considering the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  sending such prominent scholars  
as Drs. Nitobe Inazo and Kaneko Kentaro, to 'ob ta in  the understanding 
of the U.S. '  over the China i s su e .  Tanaka and his  supporters  in the 
press had claimed t h a t  the cu r ren t  suspic ion on the p a r t  of  the Powers, 
e s p e c ia l ly  the U.S.,  over the Japanese ac t ions  in China was l a rg e ly  the 
r e s u l t  of  Japan's u n s k i l l f u ln e s s  in propagating her cause. Such reason­
ing did nothing but i n f u r i a t e  the press  in general which regarded i t  
as the cover-up of  the mishandling of  the Chinese issues  by the 
government. Kokusaichishiki wrote:
People always t a l k  about propaganda, but the age of 
empty propaganda has passed. The p resen ta t ion  of 
sound f a c t s  i s  by f a r  the best  propaganda. I f  so,
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i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  the government to leave the 
m at ter  to  our own diplomats .  There should be no
need fo r  anybody e l s e   Is i t  not p a th e t i c  i f
a la te -comer should ask fo r  understanding? Or has . 
i t  got some fe e l in g s  of  g u i l t  about i t s  behav iour?^
Compared with the c r i t i c s  of  the government, i t s  sympathisers 
were much smaller  in number and very much on the defensive .  This was 
e s p e c i a l l y  no t iceab le  towards the end of  1928 when Tanaka was fo rced ,  
i f  g rad u a l ly ,  to recons ider  h is  ' p o s i t i v e 1 approach in the face of  the 
unyielding Chinese a t t i t u d e s  and in te rn a t io n a l  suspic ion towards Japan. 
The government and i t s  supporters  in the press  t r i e d  to label t h e i r
42c r i t i c s  as ' t r a i t o r s '  and the 'spokesmen of  the Nanking government' .
Such at tempts  were, however, l a rg e ly  unsuccessful desp i te  the s t r i c t
43censorship  placed upon the ' t r a i t o r s ' .  On the o the r  hand, i t  i s  to 
be remembered t h a t  the press  in general was a lso  highly c r i t i c a l  of  
the Opposition Minsei to ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  i t  c l a r i f i e d  i t s  pos i t ion  on 
the  Shantung expedit ion and i t s  consequences on 3 August, more than two 
months a f t e r  the government dec is ion  in favour of  the 'second' expedi­
t io n .  Even the August 3 d ec la ra t io n  by i t s  p re s id e n t ,  Hamaguchi, was
44so vaguely worded t h a t  the press  in general was d isappoin ted .  To 
the ' Seiyukai newspaper ' ,  the Fukuoka N ich in ich i , i t  was an i n s u l t  to 
the  na t ion:
Blinded by i t s  p a r t i s a n s h ip ,  Minseito took 
a t t i t u d e s  which seemed to s a c r i f i c e  the i n t e r e s t s  
o f  the country . As soon as i t s  popu la r i ty  had 
begun to  wane, however, the par ty  began hur r ied ly  
t ry ing  to  change them, arguing t h a t  the people 
have misunderstood the par ty  pol icy  e t c .  There 
is  nothing more deplorable  than the Minseito 
a t t i t u d e s . ^
I t  was a lso  t h i s  'hypocr isy '  of  Minseito t h a t  even tua l ly  made 
Gaik5jiho t a lk  more in favour of the government in ea r ly  1929 when
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Tanaka was exposed to  vigorous personal a t t a c k s  from the Opposition 
in the Imperial Diet .  The e d i t o r  despaired:
Even i f  the Tanaka diplomacy has been a f a i l u r e ,  
who e l se  would not  have f a i l e d ?  Who h i th e r to  
has had the confidence to  break the deadlock and 
with what p o l i c y ? . . . .  I t  i s  t r u l y  r e g re t t a b l e  
t h a t  those who have no concrete  and cons t ruc t ive  
idea ls  dare say th ings  which provide the o ther  
country with a f ree  weapon and n u l l i f y  the 
e f f o r t s  of  the government .^
5. Treaty Revision
In the controversy over the expedit ion and Manchuria, the t r e a t y  
r ev is ion  issue  tended to be considered as of  somewhat secondary impor­
tance .  On the o ther  hand, i t  was in t h i s  sphere t h a t  Shidehara was 
d is t in g u ish ed  himself  over B r i ta in  and the U.S.,  thus winning 
press support .  Tanaka had in h e r i t e d  two unf in ished neg o t ia t io n s  from 
his  predecessor  concerning t rade  with China. One was the con­
ference between China and the Powers t h a t  had been postponed i n d e f in i t e l y  
s ince  Ju ly  1 9 2 6 . ^  The o ther  was the nego t ia t ion  fo r  the renewal of 
the Sino-Japanese t rade  t r e a t y  which o f f i c i a l l y  expired on 19 October 
1926. The Peking government had formally requested a temporary p o s t ­
ponement of the nego t ia t ions  on the same day, and in s p i t e  of  Sh idehara1s
and Tanaka's subsequent at tempts  to s t a r t  formal n e g o t i a t io n s ,  the Peking
48government had su ccess fu l ly  delayed them.
The N a t io n a l i s t  government, on the o ther  hand, had chal lenged 
the Powers on the v a l i d i t y  of  the t r e a t i e s  concluded by the Peking 
government. Although i t s  f i r s t  public dec la ra t io n  to t h i s  end on 25 
November 1927 had not been taken very s e r io u s ly  by the Powers, the
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s i t u a t i o n  had completely changed by the time Nanking repeated i t s  
e a r l i e r  dec la ra t ion  on 7 Ju ly  1928, thanks la rg e ly  to the successful  
’second Northern Expedi t ion’ . The somewhat over -conf iden t  Nanking 
government n o t i f i e d  Japan twelve days l a t e r  t h a t  the Si no-Japanese t rade  
t r e a t y  had been u n i l a t e r a l l y  abrogated. This ac t ion  was in f a c t  a 
r e t a l i a t i o n  ag a in s t  Tanaka's s e c r e t  'adv ice '  to  Chang Hsueh-liang not 
to  a l ign  himself  with Nanking which had been de l ivered  only hours 
e a r l i e r .
Uninformed of  the cause, the Japanese press  was outraged by 
th i s  ac t ion  of  the Nanking government. This was understandable con­
s id e r in g  i t s  long-s tanding sympathy towards China 's ,  e sp e c ia l ly  
Nanking's,  a s p i r a t io n  fo r  the t r e a t y  r e v i s io n .  On the o ther  hand, 
Nanking's dec la ra t io n  revealed  the real  ex ten t  o f  such sympathy. As 
Eguchi Keiichi poin ts  ou t ,  even the most progressive  j o u rn a l ,
Toyokeizaishinpo, showed 'unexpectedly severe a t t i t u d e s '  towards
49Nanking when i t  wrote on 28 July:
There must be some sequence in everything.  What - 
the au thor  wishes to ask the Chinese government
i s  whose f a u l t  i t  is  to have had these  unequal
t r e a t i e s  up to now  P o l i t i c s  i s  c o n t ro l led  by
power and a d e c la ra t io n  unaccompanied by power
i s  i d le  t a l k ,  however admirable i t  may be___
Such t a lk  wil l  do nothing more than to compli­
ca te  the s i t u a t i o n  as well as to lead the under­
taking of  the N a t io n a l i s t  government to  f a i l u r e .
Such indignat ion  was expressed not so much because the press
was lacking in sympathy towards the Chinese ac t ion  as because i t
feared t h a t  the 'unwise t iming '  would work to the disadvantage of  the
Nanking government i t s e l f .  This i s  why, desp i te  i t s  support  fo r  Tanaka's
51r e t a l i a t o r y  d e c la r a t io n ,  the press  was a t  pains to place a t  l e a s t
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one h a l f  o f  the blame on the Japanese government. The Tokyo Asahi 
wrote on 21 July :
On r e f l e c t i o n ,  however, i t  i s  because Japan and 
the Nanking government have f a i l e d  to  c ons t ruc t  
any mutual understanding or communication. I t  
i s  undeniable t h a t  the present  cab ine t  i s  to 
blame fo r  i t s  in tense  d i s l i k e  towards the 
N a t io n a l i s t  movement, i t s  d e l ib e r a t e  d isregard  
of  the general t rend  in China and i t s  lack of 
any po l icy  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  the fundamental 
def ic iency  of  i t s  China p o l i c y . 52
While these arguments went on in Japan, a new Si no-American 
t rade  t r e a t y  was announced on 26 Ju ly  in which the U.S. approved of  
China's t a r i f f  autonomy. B r i t a in  followed the U.S. lead with a con­
clusion  o f  a s im i la r ,  and in some way more concessionary,  t r e a t y  with 
China two weeks l a t e r .  The Japanese p re ss ,  although contemptuous of  
the more c o n c i l i a to ry  and ' o p p o r tu n i s t i c '  a t t i t u d e s  of  the two Powers, 
feared Japan 's  f u r t h e r  i s o l a t i o n  on the  t r e a t y  i s sue .  This led  to the 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of  c r i t i c i s m  d i re c te d  a t  the government. Yoshino 
Sakuzo challenged Tanaka in h is  reg u la r  column in Chuokoron:
We should not n e c e s sa r i ly  follow the  doings of 
B r i ta in  and the U.S.,  but we can learn  something from 
how they look a t  China today. Is i t  not t h a t  the 
people are d i s s a t i s f i e d  with the  Tanaka diplomacy 
p a r t ly  because they do not agree with Tanaka's 
assessment of  the Chinese s i tua t ion?53
Some at tempts  were made by the government supporters  such as
the Fukuoka Nichinichi  to  defend the Tanaka diplomacy. They argued
t h a t  Sh idehara 's  follow-up ' and 'weak-kneed' diplomacy had won l i t t l e
54f r iendsh ip  and sympathy from China as well as the Powers. They were, 
however, in the minority and the s i t u a t io n  seemed hopeless fo r  these 
c r i t i c s  as Japan was g radual ly  forced to modify her unyielding a t t i t u d e s
- 66 -
towards China u n t i l  1 May 1929 when Japan agreed to  a revised t rade  
t r e a t y  with China more on the  l a t t e r ' s  terms. The following conten­
t ion  by Nishiyama Eikyu o f  Yamguchi Commercial College in Kokusaichishiki 
was an exceptional  r a th e r  than common opinion held in the press  a t  
the time:
How can we make p r o f i t  in g rea t  China i f  we 
abrogate the unequal t r e a t i e s ,  accept her t a r i f f  
autonomy, allow d e f a u l t  on her debt and l e t  our 
r ig h t s  be taken away from us? Some t rade  will  
s t i l l  be done even i f  the duty i s  increased 
g r e a t l y ,  but no s ig n i f i c a n t  fu tu re  development 
can be expected. I f  we were to inves t  t h e r e ,  
would i t  not be t h a t  even the o r ig in a l  cap i ta l  
would be endangered, not to mention the i n t e r e s t ,  
i f  we had the Chinese, who have no s i n c e r i t y ,  as
debtors?55
6. Collapse of  'P o s i t i v e  Diplomacy'
On 3 November 1928, the United S ta te s  gave o f f i c i a l  recogni t ion  
to the Nanking government. Encouraged, China announced on 22 November 
t h a t  she would h a l t  the n ego t ia t ions  over the Tsinan inc iden t  unless  
Japan c l a r i f i e d  the date  fo r  the  withdrawal o f  her troops from Shantung. 
While Tanaka was t ry in g  to  put on a show of  ind igna t ion ,  B r i ta in  and 
France followed the U.S. lead on 20 and 22 December r e sp e c t iv e ly .
A week l a t e r  on 29 December, Chang Hsueh-liang ordered his Manchurian 
sub jec ts  to ho is t  the N a t io n a l i s t  f l a g ,  thus endorsing Nanking's claim 
to be the so le  sovereign government of China. With i t ,  Tanaka's 
'p o s i t i v e  po l icy '  appeared to  have f a i l e d  completely.
The press  had been warning the government of  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
Japan becoming a s t r a g g l e r .  I t  had inva r ia b ly  maintained t h a t  the real 
competitor of  Japn in her claim fo r  ' spec ia l  s t a t u s '  in Manchuria and 
Mongolia was not the Nanking government but the Western Powers. On the
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other  hand, most c r i t i c s  had a lso  agreed t h a t  such ' sp ec ia l  s t a t u s '  
should be accepted only within the framework of  th e  'open door'  and 
'equal oppor tun i ty '  to everybody in these a rea s ,  whose po ten t ia l  was 
too enormous fo r  Japan to  absorb on her  own. The d i f f i c u l t y  which 
these  c r i t i c s  faced was t h a t  Tanaka and his  supporters  had been too 
a f r a i d  to  lose  Japan 's  ' p r e s t i g e ' .  Shinobu Junpei wrote in Gaikojiho:
The main ob jec t  of  each power should l i e  in 
the promotion of  general i n t e r e s t s .  The 
specia l  i n t e r e s t s  should be recognised only so 
long as they do not c lash  with the general 
i n t e r e s t s .  This i s  what should be demanded 
equal ly  from the coun tr ie s  concerned. Such 
ac t ion  by Japan should not  be regarded as a 
r e t ro g re s s iv e  a t t i t u d e  on her p a r t . 56
The recogni t ion  o f  the Nanking government by the  U.S. and Br i ta in
and the  alignment of  the Mukden c l ique  with Nanking spurred some c r i t i c s
to c a l l  fo r  the r e s ig n a t io n  of  the cab ine t  in ea r ly  1929. P red ic tab ly ,
most of  them were Opposition Minseito members such as Nakano
Seigo. Nakano, though somewhat d i s i l l u s i o n e d  with his  own p a r ty ,  was
the leader  in the 'exposure t a c t i c s '  employed by some Minseito Diet
members to embarrass the government over the a s sa s s in a t io n  of  Chang
T so - l in ,  which was becoming a big issue  within the governing c i r c l e s .
They u t i l i s e d  every oppor tuni ty  to  voice t h e i r  demand for  the re s igna-
57t ion  of  the government within  and without the Parliament.  The press  
in general was in sympathy with these Diet members r a th e r  than the 
government which was busy l a b e l l i n g  them as ' t r a i t o r s ' .  Chudkoron 
commented:
There i s  no e f f e c t i v e  measure which the govern­
ment can employ to stop the exposure t a c t i c s  without  
the punishment o f  those re spons ib le  and d e f i n i t e
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guarantees t h a t  there  wil l  be no such reck le ss  
a ttempt again.  The pas t  c a ree r  of  Prime M in is te r  
Tanaka and the recen t  behaviour of  Seiyukai com­
pels  us to r e a l i s e  t h i s . 58
Such sympathy was not s u rp r i s in g ,  considering the f r u s t r a t i o n
repea ted ly  f e l t  by the  press  whenever the government expressed i t s
purely verbal 'sympathy' towards the N a t io n a l i s t  government. As the
spring of  1929 a r r iv e d ,  not  only the government but a lso  the Opposition
Minseito came under f i r e  from the press  fo r  t h e i r  s i len ce  over the
59recogni t ion  i s su e .  Indeed, the following observat ion by the in f lu e n ­
t i a l  Seiyukai c r i t i c ,  Uehara E t s u j i r o ,  was an i n t e r e s t i n g  but r a th e r  
lonely  voice in defence o f  the  government:
The Japanese press  i s  so complex t h a t  i t  i s  not 
r a re  to f ind  those who u t t e r  i n d i s c r e e t  words as 
i f  they were commenting on the sum5 w res t l ing  a t  
Kokugikan or  a play a t  the Imperial Theatre when 
c r i t i c i s i n g  the government 's fore ign  pol icy .  
Furthermore, th e re  are  those jo u rn a ls  and news­
papers whose sa le s  pol icy  i s ,  without leave ,  to 
take excess ive ly  sympathetic a t t i t u d e s  to  the weak 
and focus t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  on the government. On 
the whole the Japanese newspapers a re  inc l ined  
to a t t a c k  the  government on every i s s u e . 58
On 28 March 1929, the Tanaka cab ine t  signed an agreement on the 
se t t lem ent  of  the Tsinan in c id e n t .  I t  accepted v i r t u a l l y  a l l  the Chinese 
demands, followed by a s im i la r  agreement on the Nan-king and Hankow 
inc iden ts  o f  1927 on 2 May. A new Si no-Japanese t rade  t r e a t y  was a lso  
concluded on 1 May with Japan following the s tep of  the U.S. and B r i t a in .
Most c r i t i c s  f e l t  t h a t  although these agreements were a setback 
from the o r ig ina l  Japanese demands, they were never the less  the s e t t l e ­
ments t h a t  should have been reached long before . Some Minseito members
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and t h e i r  supporters  once again t r i e d  to c a p i t a l i s e  on these  'd i sg ra c e -
61f u l ' agreements in t h e i r  demand fo r  the re s igna t ion  of  the government. 
This t ime,  however, they found t h a t  the press,  in general regarded 
t h e i r  argument as unreasonable and t h a t  the major i ty  opinion was in 
sympathy with the fol lowing remark by Gaiko j i h o :
There a re  some r e g r e t t a b l e  aspects  in the s e t t l e ­
ment o f  the Tsinan in c id en t  from our point of  view.
In p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  was an unnecessary decis ion fo r  
Japan to  agree to  a j o i n t  - i f  nominal -
in v e s t ig a t io n  concerning the damages  Let us
hope, however, t h a t  we fo rg e t  about the inc iden t  
once and f o r  a l l  with t h i s  s e t t l e m e n t . ^
The t roub le  was t h a t ,  although the people and the  press  were w i l l in g  
to  fo rge t  the Tsinan in c id e n t ,  the government was s t i l l  faced with the 
two unresolved issues  which led  to i t s  eventual downfall a few months 
l a t e r .
7. Kellogg-Briand Pact
Two weeks before the es tab l ishment  o f  the Seiyukai cab ine t
on 20 April 1927, French Foreign M in is te r ,  A r i s t id e  Briand, c a l l e d
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fo r  the conclusion of  a £  t r e a t y  between his  country and the U.S.
The French in ten t io n  was to  ban a l l  'wars of  aggress ion '  acknowledg­
ing as l eg i t im a te  only the 'war o f  de fence ' .  The actual  n ego t ia t ions  
began in mid-December and on 28th,  the U.S. Secre tary  of  S t a t e ,  F. B. 
Kellogg, suggested the inc lus ion  of  o ther  nat ions  in the proposed 
t r e a t y .  Following the conclusion of  a new a r b i t r a t i o n  t r e a t y  with 
France on 6 February, the U.S. sen t  on 13 April an o f f i c i a l  i n v i t a t i o n  
to B r i t a in ,  France, I t a l y ,  Germany and Japan to conclude a universal  
peace t r e a t y  aimed a t  the uncondi tional r e j e c t io n  of  war. A week
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l a t e r ,  France responded with the proposal of  her own version of  such 
a t r e a t y ,  confining the r e j e c t i o n  of  war to  the 'war o f  aggress ion '  
disapproved by the  League of  Nations. On 26 May, the Japanese govern­
ment accepted the U.S. proposal 'on the understanding t h a t  i t  would not
f i / Lr e j e c t  the r i g h t  of  s e l f  d e fence ' .
The Japanese press  in general had been scep t ic a l  or  even r e s e n t ­
ful of  the U.S. proposal.  The U.S. had been reported  to be aiming
a t  naval expansion on a grand sca le  following the abo r t ive  naval
65conference a t  Geneva, thus co n t rad ic t in g  the s p i r i t  of  a peace t r e a t y .
More d is tu rb in g  to the c r i t i c s  was i t s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  c e r t a in  cases
to which the peace t r e a t y  would not be app l icab le  but which appeared
to be the  only poss ib le  causes fo r  war between the U.S. and o the r  coun- 
fifit r i e s .  Gaikojiho commented on 15 January 1928:
Espec ia l ly  the exceptions  proposed by the U.S.
are  every one of  them the cause of  'non-peace'
(fuheiwa).  There are no o the r  reasons fo r  a
war. Those who agree to the U.S. proposal
without r e a l i s i n g  t h i s  are ideologica l  s laves  
of  the U.S. i f  not bourgeois p a c i f i c s t s .  I t  may 
be, however, acceptable  fo r  Japan to show her 
generos i ty  by agreeing to the proposed peace 
t r e a t y  should the U.S. so requ ire  f o r  i t s  domes­
t i c  r e a so n s .67
Even among those who accepted the s p i r i t  o f  the proposed t r e a t y ,  
resentment of  the ' s e l f i s h '  U.S. a t t i t u d e s  was very s trong.  Indeed, 
they had feared t h a t  Tanaka would accept  the i n v i t a t i o n ,  i f  i ssued ,  
not fo r  the  m er it  of  the t r e a t y  i t s e l f  but fo r  the sake o f  ' p r e s t i g e 1.
Machida Shiro ,  the head of  the fore ign  a f f a i r s  sec t ion  of  the Tokyo
Asahi , wrote on 1 February:
Japan should have her own diplomacy. Her 
in te rn a t io n a l  s t a tu s  should be acquired through 
her own e f f o r t s .  I t  would be t o t a l l y  unacceptable
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f o r  her to maintain her s ta tu s  as a Power by 
making an honour of  being present  a t  a u se less  
conference of  the Powers i n i t i a t e d  by the U . S . 68
The government's acceptance of  the i n v i t a t i o n  on 26 May; not 
s u rp r i s i n g ly ,d id  not s t im ula te  d iscuss ion  over the t r e a t y  to any s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  degree. This lack of  press  enthusiasm was no t ,  however, 
simply the r e s u l t  o f  the heated arguments in progress  a t  the time 
over the Shantung expedit ion and i t s  consequences. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi 
contended t h a t  the Japanese publ ic  was not much i n t e r e s t e d  in d ip lo ­
matic i s sues  in genera l ,  much l e s s  in the a b s t r a c t  ideologica l  debate 
over the proposed t r e a t y .  This meant, according to him, t h a t  the press  
which tended to  ' fo l low  up' the public  t a s t e  r a th e r  than i n i t i a t e  i t
almost completely ignored the  s u b je c t ,  thus confining i t  to sheer
69academic d iscuss ion  among the i n e l l e c tu a l  e l i t e s .  This view seems 
l a rg e ly  j u s t i f i e d  considering the ac tua l  s t a t e  of  d iscussion over the 
t r e a t y  by the press  whose m ajor i ty  opinion was c lose  to the following 
a s s e r t i o n  by the Tokyo Asahi on 27 June.
In s h o r t ,  we should accept  t h a t  the conclusion 
of  t h i s  t r e a t y  wi l l  force  the U.S. to cooperate 
f o r  the peaceful tasks  from the same s p i r i t  as the
League of N at ions   We should pay a t t e n t i o n  to
i t s  psychological e f f e c t s  r a th e r  than simply to 
the p r in c ip le  of  law. Our main concern is  t h a t  
each country should accept  t h a t  something i s  b e t t e r  
than nothing and th a t  i t  should not s t r a i n  a t  a gnat 
and swallow a camel. Our a u t h o r i t i e s  should do t h e i r  
bes t  fo r  the conclus ion of  the proposed t r e a t y  on t h i s  
s p i r i t .  '0
Perhaps the only concrete  and c o n s t ru c t iv e  contention came from 
Shinobu Junpei wr i t ing  in Gaikoj iho . In his opinion,  the t r e a t y  would 
supplement the League of  Nations Covenant r a th e r  than damage or weaken
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the foundation of  the in te rn a t io n a l  o rgan isa t ion  i t s e l f  as had been 
contended by many of  the c r i t i c s .  One major weakness.of the League was 
t h a t  the  Council was requ ired  to  agree unanimously to any question 
and the  o th e r  was, Shinobu argued,  t h a t  the re  were cases  on which i t  
could not recommend any so lu t ion  once they had been accepted as domestic 
i s su es .  The proposed t r e a t y  would, he concluded, f i l l  these  gaps:
I f  these  items o f  c o n f l i c t  are  en t ru s ted  to an 
in te rn a t io n a l  committee bu t t re s se d  by the new 
t r e a t y  - the re  i s  no a r t i c l e  to prevent t h i s  - 
the  st rong emotions would cool down as the long 
process of  stopping the outbreak of  the war 
passes .  The danger of  a war would thus be fu r th e r  
reduced and the t r e a t y  would co n t r ib u te  to the 
maintenance of  peace.
What even tua l ly  made the proposed t r e a t y  the focus of  press
a t t e n t i o n  was the seemingly harmless wording of  a phrase in the second
U.S. d r a f t  of  23 June. The 'p h ra seo logy ' ,  ' i n  the name of  t h e i r
re spec t ive  peoples '  had aroused some controversy only in the governing
c i r c l e s  ' i n  connection with i t s  bearing upon the provis ions  of  the
72C o n s t i tu t io n '  before the s igning o f  the t r e a t y  on 28 August.
Ins tead  of  reproaching the government fo r  i t s  f a i l u r e  to r a i s e  any ques­
t io n s  e i t h e r  on the exceptional cases put forward by B r i t a in  and the 
U.S. or  on her own r e se rv a t io n s  on any a r e a s ,  the Opposition Minseito 
immediately c a l l e d  f o r  the cooperat ion of  the Privy Council in i t s
a t t a ck  concerning the phrase which, the par ty  contended, v io la ted
73the imperial prerogat ive  over fore ign r e l a t i o n s .  The Privy Council ,  
which had customari ly  been consul ted before the r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  any 
t r e a t y  but which had never possessed the r i g h t  to r e j e c t  the a l ready-  
signed t r e a t y ,  appeared to be w i l l in g  to co l lab o ra te  with Minseito 
out of  i t s  wish fo r  the recovery o f  some of  the a u th o r i ty  which i t
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believed i t s e l f  to have l o s t  to  the par liamenta ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The press  was un i ted ly  behind the Seiyukai cab ine t  on t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  aspec t  of  the t r e a t y  i s su e .  Indeed, i t  was perhaps the 
f i r s t  time s ince Tanaka came to power t h a t  the Japanese press  was 
s o l id ly  behind him in the fo re ign  pol icy  sphere. I t  deplored the 
'h y p o c r i t i c a l '  and 'o p p o r tu n i s t i c '  Minseito dec la ra t io n  t h a t  the par ty
74approved o f  the s p i r i t  of  the t r e a t y  but not the con t rovers ia l  phrase.
No l e s s  abominable was the 'd e sp e ra te '  at tempt by the Privy Council to 
c a p i t a l i s e  t h i s  i s sue  f o r  i t s  own end. Even the more n a t i o n a l i s t i c  
Gaikojiho f e l t  t h a t  the time had come when the sovereignty  of  a s t a t e  
was to  be cons iderably  r e s t r i c t e d  through var ious in te rn a t io n a l  
t r e a t i e s ,  and t h a t  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in the t r e a t y  without  delay would add 
to the importance of  the country in the in t e rn a t io n a l  community. The 
e d i t o r  th e re fo re  wrote:
The s p i r i t  of  the t r e a t y  and the wording of 
the a r t i c l e s  have a l l  been resolved in the 
wisdom of the Emperor and his  sovereignty  pro­
mulgated outwardly to conclude the t r e a t y .
There was th e re fo re  never any v io la t io n  of 
his  sovere ignty .  The con t rovers ia l  English 
phrase did not  c a s t  doubt on the sovereignty  
but merely expressed im p re s s io n i s t i c a l l y  the 
se l f -consc ious  d es i re  of  the e n t i r e  popula­
t ion  in common in te rn a t io n a l  language.
In s p i t e  of  the press  support fo r  the government, however, the
delaying t a c t i c s  o f  the Opposition Minseito and the Privy Council
somehow succeeded, causing many c r i t i c s  to express  t h e i r  concern over
76the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  Japan becoming an in te rn a t io n a l  ' laughing s to c k ' .
Some newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi even went on to publish  the 
opinion of  na t ive  English speakers to support  the government d e c l a r a ­
t ion  a t  the f i f t y - s i x t h  Diet on 23 J a n u a r y . ^  Hugh Byas, the Tokyo
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correspondent  of  The Times and The New York Times, wrote in the 
Tokyo Asahi on 25 A p r i l :
Since t h i s  i s  a ques tion o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
the English language, we na t ive  speakers may 
be e n t i t l e d  to comment on t h i s .  The phrase 
does not possess such s t r i c t  meaning as whether 
sovereignty  l i e s  in the monarch or  the people
  Whoever in Japan t r i e s  to reason i t ,  we
English speakers could not f ind  any such mean­
ing as to whom sovereignty  belongs. This i s  
the opinion of  the world and we could not  poss ib ly  
imagine t h a t  the essence of  the nat ional  p o l i t y  
dat ing back to th ree  thousand years  wil l  be 
a f fe c te d  by such an ornamental p h r a s e . 78
While most c r i t i c s  were preoccupied with t h i s  su p e r f i c i a l  
power s t rugg le  between the  government and the Privy Council ,  backed by 
the Opposition Minsei to ,  the more important issue  concerning the t r e a t y  
was almost completely neglected .  B r i ta in  had made r e se rv a t io n s  on 
her ' r i g h t  of  s e l f  defence '  in her rep ly  s ix  days before the f ina l  
Japanese reply  f o r  the r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  the t r e a t y  was made on 25 May. 
Largely unrecognised a t  the time, Japan 's  f a i l u r e  to make any r e se rv a ­
t io n s  in her rep ly  was to become of  v i t a l  importance in the s t rugg le  
between her  and China, and between her and the o ther  Powers as the 
tension grew in Manchuria. The following remark by Shinobu Junpei in 
Gaikojiho was an excep t iona l ly  shrewd opinion:
Had Japan recognised the necess i ty  to have room 
in the Peace Treaty fo r  the p ro tec t ion  of  her 
specia l  i n t e r e s t s  in Manchuria and Mongolia, 
would i t  not  have been b e t t e r  f o r  her to c l a r i f y  
some kind o f  r e se rva t ions  l ik e  B r i t a i n ' s  ins tead  
of  reply ing  on the doubtful r i g h t  of  s t a t e  
defence?79
This was, however, the end of  d iscuss ion  on t h i s  sub jec t  and 
i t  was not u n t i l  the outbreak of  the Manchuria c r i s i s  in September 1931
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t h a t  Shinobu*s f o r e s ig h t  was to some ex ten t  recognised by the press  as
well as the government. In the meantime, the Privy Council forced
the government on 18 June to dec la re  t h a t  the con t rovers ia l  phrase
would not apply to the Japanese Empire ' i n  the l i g h t  o f  the Imperial 
80C o n s t i tu t io n '  and e ig h t  days l a t e r  the t r e a t y  was f i n a l l y  r a t i f i e d  
by the Tanaka c a b in e t .  By then ,  however, the controversy surrounding 
the o th e r  unresolved i s s u e ,  i . e .  the a s sa s s in a t io n  of  Chang Tso- l in  
by the Japanese army o f f i c e r s ,  had become too powerful in the govern­
ing c i r c l e s  f o r  Tanaka to c o n t ro l .  Rather than d isc lo s ing  the t ru th  
to the pub l ic ,  the  government resigned on 1 Ju ly  1929, hours a f t e r  i t  
had declared i t s  in ten t io n  of  punishing the o f f i c e r s  responsib le  
f o r  the p lo t .
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CHAPTER IV -  London Naval Conference, 1930
1. In v i t a t io n
When the Minseito cab ine t  headed by Hamaguchi Osachi came to 
power on 2 Ju ly  1929, i t s  fore ign m in i s t e r ,  Baron Shidehara, seemed to 
have in h e r i t e d  an unusual ly  q u ie t  diplomatic  s i t u a t i o n .  On the China 
i s s u e ,  the Tsinan in c id en t ,  along with the Nanking and Hankow i n c i ­
den ts ,  had been s e t t l e d .  The Si no-Japanese t rade  t r e a t y  had a lso  been 
success fu l ly  rev ised  while Tanaka's eventual recogni t ion  of  the Nanking 
government on 3 June had appeared to pave the way fo r  a new en ten te  
c o rd ia le  between the two co u n t r ie s ,  leaving only the d e l i c a t e  'spec ia l  
s t a t u s '  in Manchuria and Mongolia issue  to be reso lved .  In the wider 
arena of  in te rn a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  the issue  concerning the Japanese 
immigration to the U.S. had somewhat l o s t  i t s  i n i t i a l  impact.  The 
much pub l ic ised  Kellogg-Briand pact  had a lso  f i n a l l y  been approved by 
the  Privy Council ,  and fo r  once diplomacy and fore ign  policy had ceased 
to be the focus of  press  s c ru t in y .
This s i t u a t i o n  did no t ,  however, l a s t  long. The simultaneous 
d ec la ra t io n s  on 24 Ju ly  by P res iden t  Hoover and Prime Minis ter  Ramsey 
MacDonald in favour o f  a p a r t i a l  shedding of  the proposed naval con­
s t r u c t io n  plans of  t h e i r  coun t r ie s  drew a t t e n t io n  back to the sub jec t  
of  naval disarmament and t h i s  was to occupy a la rge  p a r t  of  press 
d iscuss ion  fo r  the  next twelve months.
The naval disarmament issue had been fo rgo t ten  almost completely 
in the  t rue  t r a d i t i o n  of  the Japanese press  following the abor t ive  
Geneva naval conference in 1927. Indeed, the major journa ls  had kept
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v i r t u a l l y  t o t a l  s i l e n c e  fo r  two years  p r io r  to the d ec la ra t io n s  by the 
heads of  the two super naval powers. Only Kokusaichishiki had voiced 
occasional c r i t i c i s m  of  the  government's 'n e g a t iv e '  po l icy  towards 
disarmament such as when Matsushita Yoshio, an outspoken c r i t i c  of  the 
m i l i t a r y  c l iq u e s ,  wrote in i t s  Ju ly  1929 e d i t io n :
Frankly, I th ink  t h a t  the a t t i t u d e s  of  the a u t h o r i t i e s  
are  f a r  too conservat ive  and t r a n s i e n t .  Whether we 
ca l l  i t  follow-up diplomacy or  opportunism, i t  i s  always 
on the defensive .  I fee l  sorry  r a th e r  than d i s s a t i s ­
f ie d  about the recen t  remarks by Navy M inis ter  Okada.
Why should he not  advocate some reductio/i  more openly?
Is i t  not  an axiom th a t  disarmament i t s e l f ,  even from 
a passive po in t  o f  view, would be a way to r e l i e v e  
g re a t ly  the p resen t  s i t u a t i o n  in Japan?!
Once the U.S. and B r i ta in  had made the d e c la r a t io n s ,  however,
the press  r eac t io n  was prompt and vociferous .  The major newspapers
which had previously  ignored the opinions  expressed by Matsushita
and others  in Kokusaichishiki were quick to urge the government not
2to f a l l  behind the o ther  Powers in the disarmament movement. They 
embarked on t h e i r  at tempt to persuade the cab ine t  to s e l e c t  a c i v i l i a n  
r a th e r  than m i l i t a r y  p le n ip o te n t i a ry  even before the a r r i v a l  of  the 
o f f i c i a l  i n v i t a t i o n  to  the London naval conference from B r i ta in  on
3
7 October. Such enthusiasm on the p a r t  o f  the press was the r e s u l t  
o f  i t s  apprehension o f  Japan g e t t in g  too involved with the technical  
d e t a i l s  of  disarmament as had happened a t  Geneva: two years  e a r l i e r .
I t  was a lso  an in d ica t ion  of  the press  f e a r  of  the  poss ib le  - indeed, 
probable - consequences o f  the  government 's ' l a c k  of  independence'  in 
disarmament, Ishimaru Tota, who had been a regu la r  c o n t r ib u to r  on the 
sub jec t  f o r  the Tokyo N ich in ich i ,  the Fukuoka Ni chi ni chi and
p-
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Gaikojiho and who v^Sf , toge the r  with Tagawa Daikichiro and Matsushita
Yoshio, to dominate the pages of  Kokusaichishiki on the London naval
4 -conference,  wrote in the  September 1, 1929 e d i t io n  of  Gaikoj iho:
Japan’s a t t i t u d e s  have always been to p a r t i c ip a t e  
w i l l i n g ly  in the actual as well as the  prel iminary 
conferences  and nobody has any ob jec t ion  to i t .  I 
cannot ,  however, help wishing f u r th e r  t h a t  she should 
make the utmost e f f o r t s  not only to ac t  as a mediator  
between B r i ta in  and the U.S. but to become the leader  
of  the  conference should the  s i t u a t io n  allow. I f  
there  i s  no chance to do so, she should a c t  p o s i t i v e ly  
to  c r ea te  such an o p p o r t u n i t y . 5
Press c r i t i c i s m  was by no means confined to  the government.
The Imperial Diet where the government and the Opposition appeared to 
be uni ted  in avoiding any d iscuss ions  on the s u b jec t ,  thus leaving the 
publ ic  uninformed of  the  t rue  s ig n i f ican ce  of  the possib le  naval d i s ­
armament conference,  came under f i r e  as i t  had done in 1927. Kokusai­
c h ish ik i  , f o r  example, asked:
I f  someone t r i e s  to question on aspects  o the r  than 
technical  ones, the cab ine t  members j u s t  leave the 
plat form saying t h a t  they should r e ly  on exper t
o p in io n s  Would i t  not be the duty of  the people
to contemplate p o l i t i c a l  so lu t ions  based on study 
by exper ts  fo r  the m i l i t a r y  budget,  which i s  equ i­
va len t  to 28 per cent of  the e n t i r e  nat ional  
budget?6
The proposed London conference was accepted by the Japanese 
government on 16 October, nine days a f t e r  the o f f i c i a l  i n v i t a t i o n  had 
been issued by the B r i t i sh  government. I t s  aim was fo r  the f iv e  s igna­
t o r i e s  o f  the Washington naval t r e a t y  to discuss  both cap i ta l  and 
a u x i l i a r y  warships. The Japanese government f o r  i t s  p a r t  remained as 
evasive and s e c re t iv e  on i t s  policy  towards the proposed conference 
as ev e r ,  leaving the press to draw i t s  own conclusions .
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2, ’Three Fundamental Claims*
On 28 November 1929, the government was reported  to have given 
i t s  o f f i c i a l  i n s t r u c t io n s  to the Japanese delegation headed by former 
Prime M in is te r  Wakatsuki R e i j i r o .  Wakatsuki had been in s t r u c t e d ,  
according to the p re ss ,  to  dec lare  a t  the conference t h a t  Japan renounced 
any in te n t io n  of  aggress ion a g a in s t  o the r  Powers and t h a t  her only con­
cern was her defence and s e c u r i t y .  Fur ther ,  the press  repo r ted ,  the 
' t h r e e  fundamental c la ims '  had been a t tached  to the i n s t r u c t i o n s .
They were: (1) to demand a 70 per  cen t  r a t i o  with r e spec t  to the
s t r en g th  of  the U.S. in 10,000-ton 8-inch gun c r u i s e r s ;  (2) to claim 
a 70 per  cent  r a t i o  in gross  tonnage fo r  a l l  a u x i l i a ry  c r a f t  with r e s ­
pect to the  U.S.;  and (3) to oppose rad ica l  reduct ions  or  a b o l i t i o n  of
submarines, as well as t o  maintain the p resen t  s t reng th  of  78,500 tons ,  
the tonnage being not below t h a t  of  e i t h e r  B r i t a in  o r  the U.S.^
Before these i n s t r u c t i o n s  were published in the major newspapers, 
the press  in general had always maintained t h a t  any amount o f  ac tual  
reduction in naval armaments, r a th e r  than the 70 per cent  r a t i o  f e r ­
vent ly  advocated by the Navy, was o f  supreme importance. Nor had the 
press  f e l t  obl iged to support such a stand by the Navy without ques t ion ­
ing the  poss ib le  c o n t ra d ic t io n  involved. Indeed, Gaikojiho had been 
the only major journal to declare  i t s  unbending support fo r  the claim 
as i t  wrote on 15 September:
Japan 's  a t t i t u d e  towards the coming conference is  
simple: She would be s a t i s f i e d  with the 70 per cen t
r a t i o  in a u x i l i a r y  warships   B r i t a in  and the U.S.
are th e re fo re  f r e e  to  conclude whatever t r e a ty  b e t ­
ween them so long as they cut out  the necessary ton­
nage so as not to  exceed t h e i r  r a t i o  of  10 as acpinst 
Japan 's  7. We wi ll  not make any o the r  d i f f i c u l t  
demands,3
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The m ajor i ty  opinion,  however, had considered the r a t i o  of  some­
what secondary importance and had advocated a p o l i t i c a l  r a t h e r  than a 
m i l i t a r y  or  techn ica l  so lu t ion  of  the i s su e .  The Tokyo Ni chi ni c h i , 
fo r  example, had wr i t ten  on 11 October:
The l a s t  key to the so lu t ion  of  t h i s  ques tion i s  
in the hands of  the p o l i t i c i a n  who takes his  stand 
on the s t r i c t l y  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  based on the 
nat ional  economy.9
The reported  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of  the government a t t i t u d e s  on 28 
November seems to have brought a fundamental change in the press  a t t i ­
tudes.  Many of  the major newspapers,  notably the Tokyo Nichinichi 
subsequently went on to  refuse  the ' p o l i t i c a l  so lu t io n '  which they 
had previously  advocated so a rd e n t ly .  The Tokyo Nichinichi  e d i to r  
wrote on 3 January 1930:
This conference i s  to be one fo r  d iscuss ing  
m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  and th e re fo re  the issue  should
be confined to the  area  of  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s ___
In case of  a U.S.-Japanese war, i t  i s  i r r e l e ­
vant whether or  not  Japan 's  economic s i t u a t io n  
gives her a chance to win. To t e l l  us to accept  
a r a t i o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  s e l f -de fence  i s  to t e l l  
us to  c a p i t u l a t e  uncondi t iona l ly  to the U.S.10
What brought t h i s  change of a t t i t u d e s  was, according to Ogata 
Taketora,  the c h ie f  e d i to r  of  the  Tokyo Asahi a t  the t ime,  the ' r e q u e s t '  
from the Navy to the metropoli tan  newspapers fo r  the ' u n i f i c a t i o n  of  
nat ional  opinion '  in favour of  the 70 per cent  r a t i o . ^  I t  was no t ,  
however, the r e s u l t  of  a s ing le  meeting but of  a s e r i e s  of  meetings 
' f o r  the  exchange of op in ions '  which had been held both c o l l e c t i v e l y  
and in d iv id u a l ly  between the Navy and the executive e d i to r s  of  more
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than ten newspapers who had fundamentally been the advocates of  the
• p o l i t i c a l  so lu t io n - .  Indeed, owing to  the s trong ob jec t ion  from
these  execu t ives ,  e s p e c ia l ly  Ogata of  the Tokyo Asahi , who feared
' l o s in g  face '  i f  Japan f a i l e d  to gain the 70 per  cent  r a t i o ,  i t  had
insistent
taken the Navy more than s ix  months o f  ^  persuasion to 'make the
newspapers agree to the cooperat ive  s p i r i t  i f  not the "absolute  70 
12per cent" ' .
What was s i g n i f i c a n t  in t h i s  development i s  t h a t  the  newspapers 
were su scep t ib le  to pressure  from the o u t s id e ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  the m i l i ­
t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Some newspapers such as the Tokyo Asahi , perhaps 
because o f  i t s  f e a r  of  any fu tu re  embarrassment, stopped touching on 
the r a t i o  in the l ead e r ,  while on a l l  the o ther  aspects  the newspaper
advocated the enforcement of  the s p i r i t  o f  the Kellogg-Briand pact
13throughout the conference.  Never theless ,  t h i s  was a t  bes t  a gesture  
of  'nega t ive  def iance '  and i t s  immediate e f f e c t  was most l i k e l y  to 
leave the reader  in confusion over i t s  a t t i t u d e s  towards the con fe r ­
e n c e . ^
As i t  turnecjfcut, most major newspapers became the p o s i t iv e  
'spokesmen' of  the Navy in 'u n i fy in g '  nat ional  opinion in favour of  the 
70 per  cent  as the 'minimum' fo r  s t a t e  defence. Accordingly, they began 
to f i l l  t h e i r  pages with sympathy f o r  the Navy's d ec la ra t io n s  while the 
government kept almost complete s i len ce  on the su b je c t ,  thus leaving the 
reader  with the fe e l in g  t h a t  public  opinion as r e f l e c t e d  in the news­
papers did support  the 70 per cent  r a t i o  a t  any c o s t .
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3. London Naval Conference
On 21 January 1930, the London naval conference o f f i c i a l l y  
opened. I t  was c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  the Japanese government was d e t e r ­
mined to provide as l i t t l e  information to the press  as p o ss ib le .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  the newspapers were f i l l e d  with specu la t ive  a r t i c l e s  on the 
proceedings o f  the conference.
The major newspapers having succumbed to  the pressure  from the 
Navy, any c r i t i c a l  comments on the  naval a u t h o r i t i e s  were l e f t  to- 
individual  c r i t i c s .  Their arguments were based on th ree  grounds.
F i r s t  and most i d e a l i s t i c  was t h a t  the moral disarmament based on the 
s p i r i t  o f  the Kellogg-Briand pact  was almost completely ignored by the 
Japanese - and o the r  - government as well as the Navy. Secondly, the 
70 per  cen t  r a t i o  claim would only be va l id  i f  Japan was to f i g h t  one 
super Power with an add i t iona l  smaller  power l ik e  China. F in a l ly ,  i f  
the 70 per cent  r a t i o  had been so v i t a l ,  Japan should have proposed a t  
l e a s t  more than 70 per cen t  in the f i r s t  in s tan ce ,  thus leaving some 
room fo r  n eg o t ia t io n s ,
Shinobu Junpe i , whose opinion on the Kellogg-Briand pact had been 
so prominent in Gaikojiho, f e l t  t h a t  the a cq u i s i t io n  of  the 70 per cent  
was nothing more than a peace-time conso la t ion .  A more important goal 
to him was to e l im ina te  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  the outbreak of  war in the
15P a c i f ic  through the expansion of  the s ix  e x i s t in g  in te rn a t io n a l  t r e a t i e s .  
Most important of  a l l ,  however, was the improvement of  the Sino-Japanese 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  but t h i s  was not  tak ing  p lace.  Shinobu r e g re t t e d  in 
Gaikffji h(T:
Unfortunate ly ,  as f a r  as I can see ,  the Navy has been 
pu t t ing  too much e f f o r t  in -  to put i t  kindly - t ry in g
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to e x t r a c t  consensus f o r  the technical  
demands from the  people, Inev i tab ly  the 
nat ion has come to be l ieve  t h a t  the r a t i o  
was what disarmament i s  a l l  about and t h a t  
the s e c u r i ty  o f  the s t a t e  depend?on the 
a cq u i s i t io n  of  the 70 per cent  r a t i o .  I 
f e a r  t h a t  Japan wi l l  have no room f o r  nego 
t i a t i o n  because of  t h i s . 16
Even more outspoken was Okamoto Tsurumatsu who l ab e l l ed  the 
Navy's claim as a ' c h i l d ' s  t r i c k ' .  The 70 per cen t  r a t i o  would not ,  
he f e l t ,  be enough i f  the U.S. sen t  i t s  e n t i r e  f l e e t  to the P ac i f ic  
although the Navy ignored t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  Nor was i t  c red ib le  fo r  
the Navy to  present  the s t r a t e g i c  s ig n i f i can ce  o f  Singapore as r e l a ­
t i v e l y  small as the Navy l iked  the nat ion to be l ieve .  What was t r u l y  
required  was an agreement based on the Kellogg-Briand pact between the 
U.S. and Japan not to e n te r  a war a g a in s t  each o the r .  To t h i s  end, the 
dogmatic 70 per  cen t  r a t i o  argument should be abandoned. Okamoto went 
on to chal lenge the  government and, t a c i t l y ,  the Navy behind i t  in 
Gaikojiho:
I f  Japan 's  p le n ip o te n t i a ry  s t i c k s  to the 70 per 
cent  by accepting the exper t  opinion and i f  as 
a r e s u l t  the conference f a i l s ,  i s  she prepared 
to take the  e n t i r e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on her shoul­
der? Concessions should be acceptable  i f  p o l i ­
t i c a l  means fo r  a so lu t ion  are to be found. In 
t h i s  l i g h t , * i t  i s  a g rea t  mistake f o r  Japan to 
have provided a good excuse to the o ther  Powers 
fo r  a poss ib le  f a i l u r e  of  the conference.  This 
simply shows how incompetent the Japanese Foreign 
Minis try  i s j ?
Opinions of  the c o n t r ib u to r s  in Chubkoron and Kaizo were in 
l in e  with Shinobu and Okamoto in Gaiko j i h o . Although n e i th e r  journal
18showed much i n t e r e s t  in the sub jec t  so f a r  as the leader  was concerned,
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t h e i r  regu la r  c o n t r ibu to rs  spared no c r i t i c i s m  o f  the government,
Machida Shiro ,  the head o f  the fore ign  a f f a i r s  sec t ion  of  the Tokyo 
Asahi , r eg re t t e d  t h a t  people were confused by the 'dual* diplomacy 
followed by the Foreign Minis t ry  as a r e s u l t  of  the government’s f a i l ­
ure to dec la re  pub l ic ly  the 70 per cent  r a t i o  as i t s  fundamental po l icy .  
He wrote in Kaizo:
I f  the 70 per cen t  demand i s  j u s t  an opening gambit,  
then i t  had b e t t e r  be stopped unless  declared by 
the Foreign M inis te r  a t  the  Imperial Diet to be 
the express ion of  s t a t e  pol icy  and the nat ional  
b e l i e f .  Only through t h i s  wil l  the Japanese people 
understand the g re a t  s p i r i t  of  the founding of  the 
s t a t e ,  and the Powers grasp the nat ional  conscious­
ness of  J a p a n  J 9
Kiyosawa Kiyoshi,  who had been appointed as a specia l  c o r r e s ­
pondent by Chuokoron to accompany the Japanese de lega t ion ,  was given a 
specia l  column in the journal and, fo r  example, wrote in the February 
1930 e d i t io n :
Japan would no doubt claim a success should she 
acquire  a 70 per cent  r a t i o .  But why should i t  be a 
a success f o r  a country to be a l lo c a te d  a bigger 
r a t i o  a t  a disarmament conference? How ©uld i t
be a success fo r  a country which claims to base 
i t s  s t a r t i n g  po in t  on the Kellogg-Briand p ac t ,  to 
allow m i l i t a r y  or  naval review to  take place which 
e n t a i l e d  an enormous expenditure on such an unpro­
ductive th ing  as arms? Not a l l  the Japanese should 
become m i l i t a r y  s p e c i a l i s t s . 20
The most ’r a d i c a l ’ suggest ion came, not s u rp r i s in g ly ,  from 
Toyokeizaishinpo, This economic journal contended t h a t  even i f  Japan 
s e t t l e d  fo r  the 60 per  cen t  r a t i o  ins tead  of  the 70 per cen t ,  the 
saving r e s u l t i n g  from i t  would s t i l l  amount to only s ix  m i l l ion  yens 
annual ly  which would hardly help to r e v i t a l i s e  the Japanese economy.
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The e d i t o r  wrote on 25 January:
As we i n s i s t e d  s t rongly  a t  the time of  the 
Washington conference,  we be l ieve  t h a t  i f  the 
Powers t r u l y  possess the s in c e r i t y  to avoid 
war, they should not  j u s t  l i m i t  but abo l ish  
t h e i r  armament. Our people should not be a 
s lave  to the t r i v i a l  r a t i o  issue  but show 
t h e i r  in te n t io n  to  lead the world in the  
d i r e c t io n  o f  t o t a l  disarmament as well as 
the London conference a su cc e ss .21
In s p i t e  of  these  c r i t i c a l  comments, however, the propaganda
by the Navy appeared to  be succeeding and the major newspapers as well
as the  t r a d i t i o n a l  supporters  o f  the 70 per cent r a t i o  such as
Gaikojiho- repeatedly  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  public  opinion in Japan was s o l id ly
behind t h i s  claim. They contended t h a t  the uni ted  'na t iona l  opinion '
of  Japan would enable the Japanese p le n ip o ten t ia ry  to acquire  the  70
per cen t  r a t i o .  Some even went on to argue t h a t  anyone who doubted
22t h i s  was a t r a i t o r .  The e f f e c t  of  such n a t i o n a l i s t i c  fervour  encour­
aged by the press  led Kiyosawa Kiyoshi to u t t e r  the following remark 
of  despa i r  in Chtlokoron:
Could we f ind any ins tance  a t  a l l  when the Japanese 
nat ion did not un i ted ly  back up a diplomatic  issue? 
So f a r  as the a t t i t u d e s  to foreign coun tr ie s  are 
concerned, the Japanese government has never made a 
mistake. The s t ronger  the demand by the Japanese 
p le n ip o te n t ia ry  the more uni ted  the people tend to 
become. . . .  So long as the e n t i r e  nation wants the 
70 per  cent  r a t i o  ignoring o th e r s ,  i t  would perhaps 
be his duty as a pragmatic p o l i t i c i a n  to provide the 
'peace of  mind' to the people by adhering to the  
defence l i n e  of  the 70 per cent  r a t i o . 23
4. ' Final U.S. ProposajJ
On 1 April 1930, the Japanese government decided to accept  the 
U.S. proposal of  12 March. ’ The U.S. had e a r l i e r  presented a memorandum
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to  the  Japanese de legat ion  on 5 February which sought to  a l l o t  
Japan a 60 per cent r a t i o  with re spec t  to the U.S. in t o t a l  tonnage f o r  
a u x i l i a r y  v e s se l s .  This was subsequently r e je c te d  by the Japanese who 
were press ing  fo r  the ' t h r e e  fundamental c l a im s ' .  To break the dead­
lock between the two c o u n t r ie s ,  a s e r i e s  o f  informal conferences were 
held between Ambassador Matsudaira,  one of  the Japanese p len ipo ten ­
t i a r i e s ,  and Senator Reed which began on 27 February. On 12 March, 
the U.S. presented a t h i r d  compromise proposal which had been reached 
as the r e s u l t  of  the meetings and which was subsequent ly conveyed to 
the Japanese government fo r  i t s  f in a l  i n s t r u c t io n  two days l a t e r  with 
the advice t h a t  Japan would not be able  to obta in  any more concessions 
from the U.S.
The ' f i n a l '  proposal agreed to  Japan 's  possession of  70 per  cent 
in l i g h t  c r u i s e r s  and des troyers  as well as a p a r i ty  in submarines v i s -  
a -v i s  the U.S. f o r  which the Japanese Navy did not requ ire  any increase  
as i t  a l ready  held a £e fac to  e q u a l i ty .  On the o the r  hand, Japan would 
be allowed to  achieve only 60 per  cen t  in heavy c r u i s e r s  which the Navy 
regarded as the most important  fo r  her  ' s e c u r i t y  and de fen ce ' .  Nor was 
i t  allowed fo r  her to in terchange the tonnage between the d i f f e r e n t  
s o r t s  o f  v e s se l s ,  which the U.S. had agreed to a t  one s tage  a t  the 
Geneva conference in 1927. In a l l ,  however, Japan was to acquire  a 
c o l l e c t i v e  r a t i o  of  69.7 per cent  in a u x i l i a ry  vesse ls  v i s - a - v i s  the U.S.
The process of  accepting t h i s  proposal was by no means an easy
one fo r  the Hamaguchi cab ine t .  On the one hand, the Foreign Minis try
was anxious to make the conference a success more or  l e s s  a t  any cos t .
On the o the r  hand, the Navy was determined not to concede any of  the
' t h r e e  fundamental c l a im s ' .  A f te r  f r a n t i c  e f f o r t s  by the cab in e t  to
24reconc i le  the d i f fe rence  between the two p a r t i e s ,  the view o f  the
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Foreign Minis try  p reva i led  and the government decided to accept  the 
U.S. proposal ,  thus opening the way fo r  the subsequent c o n f l i c t  between 
the government and the Navy a f t e r  the s igning of  the London t r e a t y  on 
22 Apr i l ,
In both Houses of  the  f i f t y - e i g h t h  Imperial Diet which opened 
on 25 A p r i l ,  the  Hamaguchi cab ine t  somehow managed to weather the 
a t t a c k  from the Opposition Seiyukai and i t s  sympathisers in the House 
of  Peers,  Seiyukai was as anxious to take advantage of  the d i f f i c u l t  
s i t u a t i o n  as the Minseito in opposi t ion had been a t  the time of  the
Kellogg-Briand pac t ,  and pressed the Hamaguchi cab ine t  to answer on
25c o n s t i tu t io n a l  grounds i t s  acceptance of  the U.S. proposal.  The 
f a i l u r e  on the p a r t  o f  the government to  c l a r i f y  t h i s  point  was seen 
as an opportuni ty  by the Privy Council ,  whose a u th o r i ty  had been waning 
in the face of  the growing support fo r  a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  government, to 
regain i t s  former p r e s t i g e .  The Council th e re fo re  'ganged up' with 
the Navy, in p a r t i c u l a r  the Navy S t a f f ,  and the Opposition Seiyukai 
in i t s  at tempt to embarrass the government u n t i l  i t  f i n a l l y  succumbed 
to the unyielding a t t i t u d e s  of  Prime Minis ter  Hamguchi. The f ina l  
approval of  the London t r e a t y  by the Privy Council on 1 October 1930
came only a f t e r  hard bargaining between the government and the Navy
26which included s e c re t  agreement to the 'supplementary plan '  sub­
mit ted  by the Navy, thus minimising the amount of  f inanc ia l  r e l i e f
due to  r e s u l t  from the t r e a t y .
5, London Treaty  and Diplomatic Journals
C r i t i c a l  comments in t h i s  period can be divided in to three
- 88 -
groups. F i r s t l y ,  the re  were those  such as the e d i t o r  of  Gaikojlho 
and the  Fukuoka Nichinichi who continued to  support  the  Navy's o r ig ina l  
c laims.  The second group cons is ted  of  the opinions  of  those who had 
in v a r ia b ly  been s c e p t ic a l  of  the 70 per cent  r a t i o  argument and they 
included Chuokoron, Kaizo, Toyokeizaishinpff and the m ajo r i ty  of  t h e i r  
c o n t r ib u to r s .  F in a l ly ,  the re  was the 'o p p o r t u n i s t i c ' group which had, 
a t  l e a s t  outwardly, supported the ' t h r e e  fundamental c la ims '  but which 
suddenly dropped i t s  former view in support  o f  the t r e a t y  signed by 
the government and the  major newspapers belonged to t h i s  group.
The anti-American a t t i t u d e s  o f  Gaikojiho persuaded the journal  
in t h i s  per iod to advocate the annulment o f  the t r e a t y ,  thus becoming 
the l ead e r  of  those ,  including the Navy i t s e l f ,  who were vehemently
opposed to the government. Indeed, not  only the  government but the
Privy Council and even the naval a u t h o r i t i e s  themselves were condemned 
by the journal fo r  t h e i r  lack o f  f o r e s ig h t  when the e d i t o r  wrote on 
1 September 1930:
Unfortunate ly ,  the  Japanese m i l i t a r y  c l iq u e s ,  
the Privy Council ,  the schola rs  and c r i t i c s  
have a l l  been arguing as to whether or  not the 
London t r e a t y  would be of  danger to the s t a t e
defence of  Japan. I have never encountered argu­
ments t h a t  a re  so lacking in f o r e s ig h t .  The U.S.
would never have proposed the t r e a t y  i f  they had
bel ieved t h a t  i t  would s t i l l  keep Japan in a secure 
p o s i t i o n , 27
Such h o s t i l i t y  was f u r t h e r  extended to the League of  Nations 
towards which the journal  had previously  almost inva r iab ly  shown re sp ec t ,  
i f  not sympathy, This r a th e r  unexpected change of  a t t i t u d e s  had been 
the r e s u l t  o f  i t s  growing suspicion t h a t  the League and the disarmament 
conferences were the essence of  the e f f o r t s  made by the 'u s u r e r s '  to 
p ro te c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  and t h a t  the Kellogg-Briand pact  had been
designed to in cap ac i ta te  the money borrower - in t h i s  case ,  Japan -
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to engage in a war a g a in s t  them. The two p a r t i e s  th e re fo re  would 
never be reconci led .  As the journal  wrote on 1 January 1931:
Although Japan i s  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  considered a 
comrade by them, she i s  a c tu a l l y  in the pos i t ion
to be c r i t i c i s e d  i f  anything happens Japanese
diplomacy has not not iced i t  y e t .  On the con t ra ry ,  
Japan has become t h e i r  guard dog and i s  even proud 
of  h e r s e l f  reading a prayer  fo r  her s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n .
Not a few of  the Gaikojiho c o n t r ib u to r s  sympathised with the 
e d i t o r .  A former ambassador turned c r i t i c ,  Honda Kumataro, fo r  example, 
wrote on 15 August:
In s h o r t ,  the amount of  armament decided a t  London 
i s ,  as Mr. Wakatsuki himself admits,  unacceptable to  
Japan. I cannot f ind  any reasons to push through 
the t r e a t y  from the nat ional  poin t  o f  view except 
t h a t  i t  would be the l i f e  and death issue  f o r  the 
government d o m e s t ic a l ly .29
Even i f  the r a t i o  i t s e l f  was not unacceptable ,  some c r i t i c s  
f e l t  d isconcer ted  by the government's a s se r t io n  t h a t  public opinion 
supported the t r e a t y .  They were convinced t h a t  the people had not been 
provided with s u f f i c i e n t  information to judge the t r e a t y .  What was 
popular ,  they argued,  was disarmament i t s e l f ,  which would in due course 
reduce t h e i r  f in a n c ia l  burden, and not the t r e a t y  as the government 
claimed. In t h i s  sense ,  the rumoured 'agreement '  between the govern­
ment and the Navy on the 'supplementary plan '  would, the c r i t i c s  p re ­
d ic te d ,  soon unmask the ' f r a u d '  by the government, Ozaki Go, the 
Tokyo Asahi r ep o r te r  on the  s u b je c t ,  commented in Gaikoj iho:
I am inc l ined  to be l ieve  t h a t  the t r e a t y  should 
be abrogated in the long run. The major i ty  of  
the people, however, have fo r  f a r  too long l ived
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such a hard l i f e  t h a t  they could not be more 
concerned about the de fec ts  in the s t a t e  
defence than t h e i r  d a i ly  l i f e ,  There i s  no 
reason why they should s u f f e r  both the heavy 
tax  and the defec ts  in the s t a t e  defence as 
a r e s u l t  of  the government’s promise to  the 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  j u s t  fo r  the sake of  
accepting the  t r e a t y , 30
Not a l l  the Gaikojiho c o n t r ib u to r s  were, however, so p e s s i ­
m is t ic  as Ozaki. Indeed, some of  them genuinely bel ieved th a t  the 
t r e a t y  was in accordance with the s p i r i t  o f  the Kellogg-Briand pact 
as the p r in c ip l e  of  armament ' s u f f i c i e n t  to defend onese l f  but shor t  
to a t t a c k  ano ther '  and t h a t  the actual  reduction in armament had been 
f u l f i l l e d  thanks to the  t r e a t y .  As to the noisy c r i t i c i s m  by the Navy 
and i t s  supporters  over the r a t i o ,  they f e l t  i t  i l l - fo u n d ed .  Kamikawa 
Hikomatsu, an i n f l u e n t i a l  p ro fessor  of  law a t  Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty ,  
w ro te :
Considering the pas t  proceedings [ a t  Washington 
and GenevaJ among the th ree  countr ie s  . . . ,
Japan i s  the f i r s t  to achieve her goal and the 
U.S. second. On the o ther  hand, i t  i s  perhaps 
f a i r  to say t h a t  B r i ta in  has come to  accept  the 
minimum success in comparative terms by lowering 
her demand so d r a s t i c a l l y . 3 *
Direct  a t t a c k  on the Navy was a lso  heard through the pages of  
Gaikoj iho. C r i t i c s  such as Yasutomi Shozo argued th a t  the ' l ack  of  
s t a t e  s e c u r i t y '  which the N avaTStaff  claimed would r e s u l t  from the 
London t r e a t y  required  recons ide ra t ion  on two scores .  F i r s t  was t h a t  
the f a i l u r e  to achieve the ’th ree  fundamental c la ims '  had r e su l ted  
from the lack of  nat ional  s t r en g th .  Secondly, the ’lack of  s t a t e
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defence ' should be complemented by p o l i t i c a l  means such as the accep­
tance of  the o b l iga to ry  c o u n te r su i t  to  the In te rn a t io n a l  Cco*ir c*r 
Tusfte a t  the Hague which Japan was v i r t u a l l y  the only major country
to have ignored in s p i t e  of  the embarrassing f a c t  t h a t  one of  her
32n a t io n a l s  was a judge the re .  Yasutomi r e g re t t e d :
I t  would be the normal course i f  complaint and 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  came from young o f f i c e r s  of  
lower ranks.  The Naval C h ie f -o f -S ta f f  and m i l i ­
t a ry  co u n c i l lo rs  on the o th e r  hand should take 
a f a r - s ig h t e d  view and have a duty to calm the 
hot blood. Sadly, the reverse  i s  the c a s e . 33
Kokusaichishiki took a f a i r l y  c l e a r - c u t  a t t i t u d e  towards the 
signed t r e a t y .  I t  held t h a t  although Japan should have taken a g r e a t e r  
i n i t i a t i v e  in the actual reduction o f  armament ins tead  of  s t i ck in g  to 
the  abo r t ive  70 per cen t  r a t i o ,  the t r e a t y  never the less  was welcome 
as i t  was to lessen  the f in a n c ia l  burden of  the people. This view 
prevai led  throughout the leader  and the c o n t r ib u t io n s  a l i k e .  The June 
1930 l e a d e r ,  f o r  example, contended t h a t  the London t r e a t y  deserved 
some b less ing  because:
I t  has recovered the cooperat ion t h a t  had been des­
t royed a t  the  Geneva conference.  At the same time,  
i t  has followed up the undertaking of  the Washington 
conference.  Moreover, i t  has con tr ibu ted  to the 
g re a t  task  of  the League of  Nations f o r  the gradual 
achievement of  the comprehensive l im i t a t i o n  and 
reduction of  armament. The t r e a t y  has the re fo re  
marked a development in the peace movement.34
Presumably to back up t h i s  claim, th ree  noted c r i t i c s  were each 
in v i ted  to c o n t r ibu te  on several occas ions.  They were Ishimaru Tota, 
Matsushita Yoshio and Tagawa Daikichiro.  Ishimaru con t rad ic ted  the
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Navy’s claim t h a t  the ’th ree  fundamental c la im s ’ had been f a u l t l e s s
with h is  a s se r t io n  t h a t  these  ’c la im s’ had been ’incomprehensible,
fu l l  o f  c o n t r ad ic t io n s  as well as i l l o g i c a l  po in ts  and in disagreement
35with the progress  of  the a g e ' .  The Supplementary p l a n ’ agreed
between the  government and the  Navy, Ishimaru fea red ,  would not only
v i r t u a l l y  annul the  reduction o f  the f in an c ia l  burden of  the people
but spur the o the r  Powers to f u r th e r  armament expansion, thus in turn
forc ing  Japan h e r s e l f  to build  more unnecessary warships. The r e s u l t ,
according to Ishimaru,  would be ’ab so lu te ly  no gains but harm should
36Japan go ahead with her e g o t i s t i c  r u s h ' .
Matsushita Yoshio was more concerned about the propaganda - 
o f f i c i a l  or  u n o f f ic ia l  - by the naval a u t h o r i t i e s  which was being t r e a t e d
in the  major newspapers as i f  i t  were succeeding,  thanks to the generous
space provided f o r  the is sue  by the p ress .  His c r i t i c i s m  was d i rec ted  
mainly a t  the Navy's ’a r ro g an t '  claim t h a t  s t a t e  defence could not be 
understood by anyone o the r  than m i l i t a ry  ex p e r t s .  Matsushita chal lenged:
Do they r e a l l y  be l ieve  t h a t  the re  wil l  be ' s t a t e  
s e c u r i t y '  so long as th e re  i s  no def ic iency  in 
armaments even when there  are  unfavourable d ip ­
lomatic r e l a t i o n s ,  poor f in a n c ia l  s t a t e ,  lack of
munitions and d iscontented public op in ion?   I f
i t  i s  t h e i r  t a c t i c s  to ob ta in  a bigger  s l i c e  of  
budget fo r  t h e i r  supplementary plan ,  I cannot help
f e e l in g  outraged by the thought t h a t  they are  mak­
ing foo ls  of  the  peop le .37
F in a l ly ,  Tagawa Daikichiro  concern tra ted  his  c r i t i c i s m  on the 
weak a t t i t u d e s  of  the Japanese government towards i t s  domestic foes.  
Quoting the example of  the Washington conference and now the London 
conference,  he wrote:
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The Japanese government would not l i s t e n  to i t s  
own p e o p le d  plea fo r  tax reduc t ion .  I t  has in 
f a c t  always been s o . . . .  I f  any tax cu t  is  to be 
c a r r ted o u t  a t  a l l ,  i t  i s  so le ly  owing to  the 
fore ign governments. Because t h e i r  pressure  has 
been enforced, i f  only i n d i r e c t l y ,  the tax  cut 
wil l  become a r e a l i t y . 3®
6, Chuokoron and Kaizo
What was ind ica ted  in these  c o n t r ib u t io n s  in Gaikojiho and
Kokusaichishiki was the separa t ion  o f  the i s sue  from the da i ly  l i f e
of  the  people,  and t h i s  was a lso  the main t a r g e t  of  a t t a c k  by- Kaizo
and ChuBkoron. Kaizo, whose main preoccupation a t  t h i s  time was the
level o f  unemployment in Japan, in e v i ta b ly  r e l a t e d  the naval issue  to
t h i s  sub jec t .  To the j o u rn a l ,  the r e s ig n a t io n s  of  Naval C h i e f - o f - S t a f f ,
Admiral Kato Kanji and then Navy M in is te r ,  Takarabe, over the techn i -
39c a l i t y  of  the conclusion of  the London t r e a t y  s ig n i f i e d  nothing o ther  
than the  unbridgeable gap between high level  p o l i t i c s  and the ordinary  
people. I t s  Ju ly  e d i t io n  wrote:
Faced with such su f fe r in g s  by the nat ion as a t  
p re sen t ,  the government does our country a d i s s e rv ic e  
i f  the foundation of  a cab ine t  can be d is tu rbed  
simply because of  a s in g le  fo rm al i ty  i s su e .  I t  
i s  proof t h a t  the adm in is t ra t ion  i s  not concerned
about the  mass i n t e r e s t s  of  the people   Every
member of  the 70 m il l ion  people accepts  t h a t  i t  
would be ab so lu te ly  impossible fo r  the country to 
achieve the amount of  armament des ired  by the Naval 
C h ie f -o f -S ta f f  under the e x i s t in g  f in a n c ia l  s i t u ­
a t i o n , 40
The most f requen t ly  discussed ' t e c h n i c a l ’ poin t  was whether the 
government had v io la te d  the 'supreme command' of  the Emperor as defined
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in the Imperial C ons t i tu t ion ,  To c l a r i f y  t h i s  po in t ,  the major news­
papers and jo u rn a ls  a l i k e  asked some of  the most respec ted  legal  
schola rs  to w r i te  on t h i s  score .  They included Professors  Minobe 
Ta tsukichi  of  Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty  and Sasaki Soichi of  Kyoto
Imperial Univers i ty  who supported the claims made by the government
41t h a t  i t  had not  contravened the  s p i r i t  of  the Cons t i tu t ion .
Chuokoron, however, f e l t  impatient  with the f a c t  t h a t  the press  had 
to take such t roub le  a t  a l l  and contended in Ju ly :
The supreme command issue s t i l l  remains the focus 
of  concern among a c t iv e  p o l i t i c i a n s  a t  the h ighes t  
l e v e l .  There i s ,  however, not a s ing le  poin t  which 
th^/nass o f  the people have to ques t ion .  There 
seems to be an abnormal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  in our 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework, fo r  the issue which we 
cons ider  t o t a l l y  unquestionable does s t ranqe ly  
become a big i s sue  in the p o l i t i c a l  wor ld .42
The inc reas ing ly  c o n c i l i a to ry  government a t t i t u d e s  towards
not only the  Navy but the m i l i t a r y  forces  in general a lso  rek indled
the long-s tanding press  advocacy of  c i v i l i a n  m in is te r s  fo r  the two
s e rv ice  m i n i s t r i e s .  The press  uni ty  in encouraging the government to
43 -  —take i t s  advice was, however, repea ted ly  f r u s t r a t e d .  Chuokoron 
r e g re t t e d :
I t  i s  most unfortunate  t h a t  the Hamaguchi cab in e t  has 
thrown o f f  the honourable t r a d i t i o n  of  f ig h t in g
a g a in s t  the m i l i t a r y  c l i q u e s  This has prevented
the chance of  the nat ional wish from m a te r ia l i s in g  
when the tone of  opinions voiced by various news­
papers which a re  considered to  rep resen t  public opin­
ion was unanimous in a t tack ing  the m i l i t a ry  encroach­
ment in to  p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d s .  I t  i s  extremely d i s ­
appoint ing t h a t  the absolu te  m ajor i ty  o f  thSL Minseito 
does nothing more than boast about i t s  supremacy over 
the Opposition in the Lower House. 4
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The e n th u s i a s t i c  welcome shown by the people a t  Tokyo S ta t ion  
on 18 June to the Japanese p le n ip o te n t i a ry ,  Wakatsuki R e i j i r o ,  upon 
his  return- from London was a lso  widely quoted by the press  as the best  
in d ica t io n  of  public opinion concerning the London t r e a t y .  Not only 
were the ’delaying t a c t i c s '  employed by Naval C h ie f -o f -S ta f f  Kato and 
the Privy Council l a b e l l e d  as ' c h i l d i s h '  by some of  the reg u la r  c o n t r i ­
butors  of  sogozassh i , but noted naval c r i t i c s ,  such as Mizuno Kotoku, 
argued t h a t  i f ,  and when, the Japanese Navy was’ s a t i s f i e d  with i t s  arm­
ament, t h a t  would be the time when the London conference had broken 
down. Mizuno contended in Chuokdron:
I wonder i f  Naval C h ie f -o f -S ta f f  Kato i d e n t i f i e s  
an i n t e rn a t io n a l  conference with a basebal l  game 
and be l ieves  t h a t  o the r  p a r t i e s  wi l l  y i e ld  to our 
demands i f  only we are  backed by a vociferous  
public  o p i n i o n . . . * I  f e a r  t h a t  the nat ional  backing 
with such a f an fa re  would make the mood of  the 
conference more tense  and the conclusion of  an 
agreement more d i f f i c u l t . 43
Even the e d i to r  o f  the p re s t ig io u s  Tokyo d a i ly ,  J i j i s h i n p o , 
who had been the ' l e a d e r '  o f  the 70 per cent  r a t i o  argument within the 
press  ever  since  the Washington conference,  d isagreed with the Navy and 
the Privy Council.  He c l a r i f i e d  h is  view on the t r e a t y  and i t s  e f f e c t s  
in Chuokoron:
Respect and s ince re  cooperat ion are  to be the 
answer to t h i s  question and the f ina l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
in deciding the  level  of armament r e s t s  with the 
government. The consent by the Naval S t a f f  should 
never be a necessary precondit ion fo r  i t .  Whether 
the government has needed the m i l i t a ry  opinion or 
no t ,  i , e ,  whether the proposed s t reng th  was approp­
r i a t e  in the wider context  of  s t a t e  defence,  should 
be judged u l t im a te ly  by the people and not the m i l i ­
t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  or  the Privy Council .43
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7. * Opportunist ic* Newspapers
The Opposition Seiyukai*s a t t i t u d e s  to take advantage of  the
s i t u a t i o n  wm most e loquent ly  condemned by the s taunches t  c r i t i c  of  the
government as well as the U.S.,  Hanzawa Gyokujo, the J i ro n  column
<Ls
e d i t o r  in Gaikoj iho . I t  was notAsu rp r i s in g  as i t  may have looked 
considering his  opposit ion  to  the eq ua l ly ,  i f  not more, * opportunis t ic*  
a t t i t u d e s  of  the Minseito a t  the time of  the Kellogg-Briand pact  a year  
e a r l i e r .  Hanzawa was simply anxious t h a t  such ' f u t i l e *  e f f o r t  by the 
Opposition would harm the bas is  of  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  government. He 
th e re fo re  wrote in his  column on 15 May:
What I cannot help asking here i s  whether Seiyukai ,  
whose s k i l l  has been known through the t r e a t i e s  
of  V er sa i l l e s  and Washington, could conf iden t ly  
have achieved a b e t t e r  r e s u l t  than the London 
t r e a t y ,  however u n s a t i s f a c to ry  i t  may have been.
Even i f  i t  had the courage to  say so,  would the
publ ic  bel ieve  what the par ty  says?47
The major newspapers did not f a l l  behind in condemning the
48a t t i t u d e s  of  the Opposition Seiyukai .  On the o ther  hand, i t  seemed
to be they who deserved blame fo r  being 'o p p o r tu n is t i c* .  I t  i s  po ss ib le ,
49as I to  Masanori r e ca l l e d  th ree  years  l a t e r ,  t h a t  they had held grave
doubts about the wisdom of  i n s i s t i n g  upon the o r ig in a l  demands of  the
Navy. They had, however, c e r t a i n l y  no courage to express t h e i r  ' t r u e '
50view fo r  f e a r  o f  being charged with 'd i s ru p t in g  public opinion '
u n t i l  the  government f i n a l l y  accepted the t h i rd  U.S. proposal .  The
following remark by the 'Seiyukai newspaper ' ,  the Fukuoka Nichinichi  
on 2 November 1930 echoed t h i s  view:
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The most incomprehensible event of  recen t  times 
is  the a t t i t u d e s  of  the Tokyo and Osaka news­
papers towards the Navy,, , ,  I t  was they who 
supported the 70 per cen t  r a t i o  v i s - a - v i s  B r i ta in  
o r  the U,S, most a rd en t ly  a t  the  beginning of  the 
c o n f e r e n c e , , . .  What i s  the reason fo r  these news­
papers to reverse  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  so completely and 
why i s  i t  t h a t  they,  in s tead  of  supporting the Navy,
a t ta c k  i t  as i f  i t  were a nat ional enemy?  We
are in f a c t  d is tu rbed  by t h e i r  shameless behaviour.
What was even more s i g n i f i c a n t , h o w e v e r ,  the f a c t  t h a t
although the leaders  of  these  metropol i tan  newspapers supported the
government, the members of Kuroshiokai , the correspondents '  club
at tached  to the Navy, continued to  w r i te  a r t i c l e s  more sympathetic
52to the  Chief of  S t a f f .  Such discrepancy between the leader  and the 
repo r ts  had appeared and was to increase  on the China i s sue .  So f a r  
as the London t r e a t y  was concerned, however, I to Takashi sums up i t s  
e f f e c t  thus:
As to the London naval disarmament i s s u e ,  the 
' r e fo rm at ion '  ( kakushinl tendency among the 
r e p o r te r s  may not have a l t e r e d  the leader .  On 
the  o the r  hand, the leader  and the repor ts  were 
not c o n s i s t e n t  and the r epo r ts  tended to  be more 
sympathetic towards the Navy. Needless to say, 
i t  weakened the government 's handling of  public
o p in io n .53
Indeed, i t  was t h i s  d i su n i ty  within the p re ss ,  which r e su l t e d  from 
such f a c to r s  as censorsh ip ,  commercialism and r i v a l r y ,  t h a t  opened 
the way fo r  another  and more d r a s t i c  change in the press  ro le  a f t e r  
the  Mukden inc iden t  in September 1931,
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Chapter V -  Press Control and Foreign Policy
For the  f i r s t  eighteen months, the ’second Shidehara Diplomacy'
was not challenged on the  China f ro n t  to any s i g n i f i c a n t  degree , thanks
la rg e ly  to the London naval c o n fe re n c e J  While the re  were some minor
r ip p l e s  over the s o -ca l led  'agr&nent i s s u e '  and the  burning of  the
2Japanese consu la te  a t  Changsha by the  Chinese communist army, the 
press  in general was s t i l l  very sympathetic towards Sh idehara 's  more 
c o n c i l i a to ry  a t t i t u d e s  towards the neighbouring country . The f in a l  
acceptance of  China Is t a r i f f  autonomy by the Japanese government on 
6 May 1930 and i t s  dec is ion  to address  China as the Republic of  China 
in any fu tu re  o f f i c i a l  document on 29 October the same year  were wel­
comed with not a l i t t l e  enthusiasm as a f u r t h e r  stepping stone f o r  a
3
new Sino-Japanese en ten te  c o rd ia l e .  I t  was indeed a na tura l  r eac t ion  
to the previous 'Tanaka Diplomacy' which had appeared to  lead the  
country in to  in te rn a t io n a l  i s o l a t i o n .
The press  was reminded, however, t h a t  the revived 'Shidehara 
Diplomacy' was as se c re t iv e  as the 'Tanaka Diplomacy'. The i n i t i a l  press  
e f f o r t  to turn  disarmament in to  a 'p u b l i c '  i ssue  had been repeatedly  
f r u s t r a t e d  by the government 's s i lence  on the su b jec t ,  u n t i l  i t  became 
an e s s e n t i a l l y  domestic is sue  a f t e r  Japan 's  acceptance of the U.S. 
proposal .  Even more s e c r e t i v e ,  however, were Sh idehara 's  deal ings  with
4
China, e s p e c ia l ly  on the 'r a i lway  i s s u e ' .  While the London naval t r e a t y  
kept the p r e s s ' s  a t t e n t i o n ,  Shidehara escaped much c r i t i c i s m  within 
Japan on t h i s  score. On the o ther  hand, press control was being t i g h t ­
ened up both with and without  the knowledge of  the Foreign M inis te r  and 
t h i s ,  coupled with his  re luc tance  to d i sc lo se  information concerning 
China, was to play a v i t a l  ro le  in the subsequent change of  press  a t t i ­
tudes towards the 'Shidehara Diplomacy'.
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1. Press  Control Laws
The Police  Bureau of  the Home Minis try  had been d i r e c t l y  in 
charge of  press  control f o r  a t  l e a s t  f o r ty  years  by the 1920's .  I t  
was t h i s  body with i t s  subdiv is ions  such as the  newspapers s e c t io n ,  
the  pe r iod ica l  sec t ion  and the book sec t ion  t h a t  exercised t h i s  p re ­
ro g a t iv e  as defined  in the Newspaper Law o f  1909 and the  Publ ica t ion  
Law of  1893,^
These two pieces  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  were the successors  o f  the 
Newspaper Act and the Publ ica t ion  Act which had been ex tens ive ly  used 
to  suppress the Democratic Movement in the 1880s, The two Acts were 
subsequently reformed in 1887 and under the reformed Newspaper Act,  
the adm in is t ra t ion  was allowed to p ro h ib i t  ( k i n s h i ) or  suspend (t e i s h i ) 
the pub l ica t ion  of  any newspaper which had published an a r t i c l e  t h a t  
'd i s tu rb e d  peace and o rd e r '  or 'corrup ted  publ ic  m ora ls ' .  This pre­
roga t ive  was f u l l y  u t i l i s e d  by the  I to  Hirobumi cab ine t  e igh t  years  
l a t e r  in the af termath of  th^feino-Japanese War to 'calm down' the 
na t ional  rage over the T r ip le  In te rv e n t io n ,^
The following Matsukata cab ine t  abol ished  t h i s  r a th e r  high­
handed ad m in is t ra t iv e  prerogat ive  and obliged  the  Police  Bureau to 
obtain a cour t  order  before placing a ban on the pub l ica t ion  of  the 
newspaper concerned. Although t h i s  government a lso  created  a new pre­
roga t ive  fo r  the Foreign Minis ter  to  stop any a r t i c l e  concerning d ip lo ­
matic a f f a i r s ,  the  r e s u l t  was a dramatic decrease in the number of
g
pub l ica t ion  bans placed on a r t i c l e s  in t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  sphere. This 
change was brought about not so much because the government had come 
to acknowledge the increasing  power of  public  opinion represented  
in the  press  as because the adm in is t ra t ion  had learned how best  to 
lessen the vigour of  press  c r i t i c i s m .  Miyake S e t s u r e i , one of the
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best-known Meiji columnists ,  r e f l e c t e d  t h i r t y  years  l a t e r :
So long as the  pub l ica t ion  ban e x i s t e d ,  the newspapers 
r e s i s t e d  i t ,  which in turn  added l i f e  to t h e i r  argu­
ments and encouraged them to develop such a s k i l l  as 
to escape from i t , . . .  Once i t  had been abo l ished ,  
however, the re  appeared the  phenomenon of  the commen­
t a r i e s  becoming l i f e l e s s  because the newspapermen 
had nothing to f i g h t  ag a in s t  and because no response 
came back, however much they a r g u e d . 9
In 1909, the Newspaper Law emerged as a successor  of  the Newspaper 
Act. In  th i s^ th e  Home Minis ter  was newly equipped with a new admini­
s t r a t i v e  p rerogat ive  to p ro h ib i t  the sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the news­
paper which had 'd i s tu rb e d  peace and o rd e r '  or  'corrupted  public 
morals '  (A r t i c l e  23).  He could a lso  suspend the p r in t in g  ( k e i s a i ) 
by the same newspaper o r  any o the r  pub l ica t ion  of  the a r t i c l e  to 
which A r t ic le  23 had been appl ied  (Clause 2,  A r t ic le  23).  In ad d i t io n ,  
t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  empowered the Foreign, Army and Navy M inis ters  to 
issue  an ordinance in order  to p ro h ib i t  or  l i m i t  the p r in t in g  of  a r t i ­
c le s  concerning t h e i r  r e sp ec t iv e  a f f a i r s  (A r t i c le  27).  Although super­
f i c i a l l y  l e s s  high-handed to  appease the p re s s ,  in p r a c t i c e ,  the severe 
punishments i n f l i c t e d  upon the  press  fo r  the v io la t io n  of  t h i s  l a w ^  
and most o f  a l l ,  the f e a r  of  the f in a n c ia l  damage r e s u l t i n g  from the 
sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  ban were enough to persuade the press  to take more 
c o n c i l i a to ry  a t t i t u d e s  towards the government. The Tokyo Asahi 
admitted on the Christmas Day, 1924:
Although the re  i s  no c l e a r l y  w r i t t en  system of  censor­
sh ip ,  the po l ice  a u t h o r i t i e s  can ban the sale and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f ,  and s e iz e ,  the newspaper i f  they 
decide t h a t  i t  d i s tu rb s  peace and order  or  corrupts  
publ ic  morals.  The newspaper th e re fo re  i s  sometimes 
forced to succumb t o ‘in te rn a l  censorship-* 
in order  to ca rry  out  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and duty 
to  the reader  as well as to avoid the huge f inanc ia l  
l o s s J l
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2. ’Pre-Warnings'
The d e t e r r e n t  e f f e c t s  of  the Newspaper Law and the Publ ica t ion  
12Law o f  1893 were by no means e n t i r e l y  e f f e c t i v e ,  as  the Pol ice  Bureau 
soon discovered.  Indeed, as the more l i b e r a l  sentiment spread among the 
people in the Taisho e r a ,  so did the press  r e s i s ta n c e  a g a in s t  the  press  
control  laws. In t h i s  process ,  the Po l ice  Bureau devised more subtle  
manoeuvres to fend o f f  such r e s i s t a n c e  in the form of  ’pre-warnings '  
(j i z e n  keikoku).  They were in general divided in to  th ree  groups.
The f i r s t  was ca l l ed  the  ' suspended matter  s' and cons is ted  of  
th re e  varying degrees of  warnings. 'Order '  ( s h i t a t s u ) was the 
s ev e re s t  and the  pub l ica t ion  of  any matter  in t h i s  category invar iab ly  
r e su l te d  in the sa le  ban. 'Warning' (keikoku) implied t h a t  the 'o f fen ce '  
w ou ld f f ike l^b^ l  to  in v i t e  the same treatment as t h a t  o f  ' o rd e r '  depend­
ing on the cu r ren t  social cond i t ions .  ‘ Informal advice* ( kondan) meant 
t h a t  the a u t h o r i t i e s  would appeal to  the 'm o ra l i ty '  of  the publ isher  
not to p r i n t  any matter  in t h i s  category.  Although i t s  defiance was 
supposed to r e s u l t  in a much l e s s e r  l ike l ihood  of  the  sa le  ban than
the o ther  two, in p ra c t ic e  the p ress  was genera l ly  too a f r a i d  to r e j e c t  
13t h i s  ' r e q u e s t ' .
The second group was 'd e l e t i o n '  which meant t h a t  the a u t h o r i t i e s
s t i l l  regarded the pub l ica t ion  as ' c o n t r ib u to ry  to fchfc socie ty  and
c u l tu r e '  even i f  th e  'u n d e s i r a b le '  p a r t s  were small enough in quan t i ty
to be e a s i ly  de le ted .  The f in a l  group was l a b e l led  as 'adv ice '  (ch u i )
meaning t h a t  although i t s  def iance would not lead to the banning, the
publ isher  would be severely  reprimanded through the local  pol ice  
14a u t h o r i t i e s .
-  1 0 2  -
The matter  r e fe r r e d  to  in these  groupings were presumably 
within the d e f in i t i o n  of A r t i c l e s  23 and 27 of  the Newspaper Law, i . e .  
those which ’d is tu rbed  peace and o rde r '  or  ' corrup ted  public  morals '  
or  those which concerned 'm i l i t a r y  or  diplomatic  a f f a i r s ' .  Yet the 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  these  phrases was l e f t  in the hands o f  the Police  Bureau 
or the  Foreign, Army and Navy M in is te rs ,  thus co n t r ib u t in g  to t h e i r  
abuse of  these  p re roga t ives  on occasions.  How e f f e c t i v e  were these  
'p re -w a rn in g s '?
There was an increas ing  number o f  the  sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  bans 
in the period between 1925 and 1934 a s  Table I I I  (see Appendix p . 302) 
i n d ic a te s .  At the same t ime,  th e re  was a general increase  in the 
proport ion of  such bans in the  'peace and o rd e r '  category as  Table IV 
shows. Table V suggests  t h a t  the ban through the Newspaper Law was 
mainly d i r e c t e d  a t  those whose p o l i t i c a l  views 'd i s tu rb e d  the peace 
and o rd e r '  of  the  cu r ren t  soc ie ty .  On the o ther  hand, the major news­
papers such as the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Nichinichi  seldom received 
such t rea tment  as  Table VI i n d ic a te s .  This tempts us to  suspect modi­
f i c a t i o n  in t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  of  the  government. Even so, as  the China 
issue  gathered momentum towards the  summer of  1931, th e re  was a n o t i c e ­
able  increase  in the bans placed on them in the  f i e l d s  of  diplomacy or
m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  as  i s  c l e a r  from Table VII.  As to the th ree  news­
papers c lo se ly  examined in t h i s  t h e s i s ,  however, th e re  was hardly any 
d i f f e r e n c e  between them, and the Fukuoka Nichinichi  received as many - 
or  few - bans a s  the two metropol i tan  newspapers,  as Table VIII (Appen­
d i x ,  p305) shows. Indeed, so conf ident  was the Pol ice  Bureau of  the 
e f f e c t  of the 'pre-warning '  system t h a t  i t  wrote in 1933:
The a u t h o r i t i e s  th e r e fo re  inform in advance the
p a r t i e s  concerned of  the  matters  which are l i k e l y
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to be banned and warn them not to publish  them, 
thus  enabl ing these  p a r t i e s  to avoid unexpected 
damages. At the  same time,  we can expect the 
thorough enforcement of  the r u le s  in c o n t ro l l in g  
newspaper a r t i c l e s .  We be l ieve  th e re fo re  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  the most e f f e c t i v e  a s  well as appropria te  
control  m easu reJ  5
From the p u b l i s h e r ' s  poin t  o f  view, t h i s  method was the cause 
of  sheer f r u s t r a t i o n  in h is  f i g h t  fo r  p ress  freedom. As the  well-known 
c r i t i c ,  Fuse T a t s u j i ,  observed in 1927:
In the case of  a sale ban, [the publ isher  or  the 
ed i to r ]  cannot co n te s t  the r i g h t s  or  wrongs before  
he has been prosecuted on the evidence of  the 
'd i s tu rb in g '  s ec t io n s .  In o the r  words, they sup­
p re ss  u n i l a t e r a l l y  with these  laws, v i o l a t e  the 
freedom o f  pub l ica t ion  and y e t  t r y  not to a r r e s t  
or  prosecute .  We can t r a c e  the hidden c r a f t i n e s s  
which i s  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  from the method used 
a few yea rs  ago which provoked co u n te r -a t tack  from 
the p r e s s . ! 6
As to the content  o f  the bans l i s t e d  in Tables I I I  - VIII 
(Appendix, pp. 302 - 305),  only t h a t  of  1931 and 1932 has been re ad i ly  
a v a i l a b l e . ^  The number of  'suspended m a t te r s '  ( sashitome j i k o ) , 
i . e .  those  which had been n o t i f i e d  in the  form of  the 'p re -w arn in g s ' ,  
d r a s t i c a l l y  increased from 11 to  64 in 1932 as a r e f l e c t i o n  of  the  o u t ­
breaks of  such se r ious  events  a s  the Manchuria c r i s i s ,  the Shanghai
18inc iden t  and the a s sa s s in a t io n  of  Prime Min is ter  Inukai Tsuyoshi as 
Tables IX - XI (Appendix,pp305/6)indicate.  The most f requen t ly  quoted 
reason f o r  the banning was the v io la t io n  of  ' o r d e r ' ,  suggesting t h a t  
th e re  was s t i l l  a f a i r  amount of  r e s i s t a n c e  l e f t  among perhaps the more 
l e f t  wing newspapers (see Table IX, Appendix, p.3o5}. One s ig n i f i c a n t  
f a c to r  in t h i s  context  i s  t h a t  u n t i l  a f t e r  the d e t e r io r a t i o n  of  the
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s i tu a t io n  in Manchuria, the d e f in i t i o n  of  the  'd i s tu rbance  of  peace 
and order* had remained unc lea r ,  much to the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  even 
the l e s s  c r i t i c a l  newspapers.
3. Reform Movement
The Newspaper Law and the Pub l ica t ion  Law had in many ways been 
complementary to each o the r  e s p e c ia l ly  in t h e i r  ap p l ic a t io n  to  p e r io d i ­
c a l s .  Journals  which d e a l t  with c u r re n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l ,  a f f a i r s  
had been required  to  submit two copies  each to  the Police  Bureau a t  
l e a s t  th re e  days p r io r  to t h e i r  pub l ica t ion  (A r t i c l e  3, Publ ica t ion  Law) 
as  opposed to  the newspaper 's submission a t  the time of  pub l ica t ion  
(A r t ic le  11, Newspaper Law). On the  o ther  hand, these  jo u rn a ls  were 
subjected to  the sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  ban under A r t ic le  23 of  the  News­
paper Law. Such inconsis tency  as  well as the harsh punishment c la u s e s  
and the ambiguous wordings such as 'd i s tu rb a n c e  of  peace and o rd e r '  had
prompted several a t tempts  fo r  the reform o f  the  two p re s s  control  laws
19even before  Showa.
The f i r s t  s e r io u s  a t tem pt ,  however, came from the government in
1926 a f t e r  the  enforcement o f  th e  Peace Preserva t ion  Law the year
before had c l e a r l y  given the  cab ine t  an oppor tun i ty  to embark on a
c e r t a in  amount of  modif ica t ion in p ress  c o n t ro l .  This  and i t s  s im i la r
a t tempts  in 1927 and 1928, though they f a i l e d  to  m a t e r i a l i s e ,  were
s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  several reasons. F i r s t l y ,  the  r e g u la t io n s  ou t l ined
in these proposals  were to be 'r ev ived  in the  subsequent ad m in is t r a t iv e
expedients  devised by the  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  permit ted  to  walk in a grand
manner and allowed to exerc ise  v io lence '  u n t i l  the end of  the Second 
20World War. The most obvious example of  t h i s  phenomenon was the
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proposed l i s t i n g  of  m a t te r s  which would not be permit ted  in p r i n t  
because they ’d is tu rbed  peace and o r d e r ’ or  ’corrupted public m ora ls ' .  
A r t i c l e  31 of  the  1926 proposal and A r t i c l e  25 of  the 1927 proposal 
s ta ted  t h a t  the  following were banned from p u b l ica t ion :
No. 1 - Matters  which degrade the  d ig n i ty  o f  the  Imperial
Family.
2 - Matters  which aim a t  changing the na t ional  p o l i t y .
3 - Matters  which change the  general p r in c ip l e s  of  the
p o l i t i c a l  o rgan isa t ion  i l l e g a l l y ,  or  which deny the 
p r iv a te  ownership system.
4 - Matters  which harm the i n t e r e s t  of  the Empire con­
cerning the sec re t s  of  m i l i t a r y  or  diplomatic  a f f a i r s .
5 - Matters  which encourage or  defend crimes d i s t o r t e d l y
and which p ra i se  or p ro te c t  the c r im in a l ,  cr iminal 
defendant or suspect .
6 - Matters which have been f a l s i f i e d  or  exaggerated to
cause uneas iness  in soc ie ty  and a f f e c t  i t  se r ious ly  
from the point  of  peace p rese rva t ion .
7 - Matters  which degrade good public manners through cor-
21rup t ion  of  morals,  indecency, b r u t a l i t y  e tc .
Although t h i s  l i s t i n g  never l e g a l ly  m a te r ia l i s e d  owing to  the 
shelving o f  the proposals ,  i t  was never the less  enforced by the Police
Bureau as  c lo se ly  as  poss ib le  in the ea r ly  Showa period as  one of  i t s
22in te rn a l  c i r c u l a r s  r e c a l l e d  in 1933.
The second s ig n i f i c a n t  point  about these  reform proposals  was 
t h a t  they became the b a t t l e  ground not only between the government 
and the press  but a lso  between the government departments,  e s p e c ia l ly
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the  Home and the Foreign M in is t r i e s .  Both in 1926 and 1927, the  Foreign 
Minis try wished to  rep lace  the key word, ' s e c r e t s ’ , in No.4 of  the above 
l i s t  with ' a f f a i r s ' ,  thus  extending the range of  mat ters  whose pub l ica ­
t ion  would r e s u l t  in the sale and d i s t r i b u t i o n  ban. Moreover, the  Foreign 
Minis t ry  des ired  to possess the same adm in is t ra t ive  p re roga t ive  as the 
Home Minis ter  who alone could order  the sale ban or the  se izure  of  the 
pub l ica t ion  concerned under the cu r ren t  l e g i s l a t i o n s .  The Foreign 
Min is ter  could, of  course ,  i s sue  an ordinance in order  to p ro h ib i t  or 
l i m i t  the  pub l ica t ion  of  the a r t i c l e s  concerned, but such an ordinance 
in i t s e l f  did not bear any implica t ion  o f  d i r e c t  damage to  the publ isher
in peace time. I t  was t h i s  dilemma t h a t  led the Foreign Minis t ry  to
propose to the Home Minis try  in 1926:
In order  to make up these  d e fe c t s ,  [ the  Foreign 
Minis ter]  proposes t h a t  the cu r ren t  plan provide 
the method through which he can se ize  or ban 
the pub l ica t ion  which has publ ished diplomatic 
m at te rs .  In a d d i t io n ,  the  Min is ter  should be 
empowered to order  a punishment f o r  the pub l ica­
t io n  of s p e c i f i c  m at te rs .  On the o ther  hand,
A r t ic le  18 o f  the Publ ica t ion  Law and A r t ic le  23 
of  the Newspaper Law which tend to be regarded
as the cause of  suppression should be d e l e t e d . 23
In 1927, the Treaty Bureau of  the Foreign Minis try  once again 
sent  two a l t e r n a t i v e  plans to the  Home Minis try  for  the same purpose. 
Suggestion A was v i r t u a l l y  id en t ic a l  with the 1926 plan and obl iged  the 
Foreign M in is ter  to consu l t  the  Home Minis ter  before issu ing  a sale  
ban order .  This c o n s u l t a t io n ,  however, did not mean t h a t  the Foreign 
Min is ter  accepted the ’ i n te rv e n t io n '  by the Home M inis ter  but simply 
t h a t  the Foreign Minis ter  w^ild l i s t e n  to the l a t t e r ' s  opinion on the 
ban. Suggestion B went f u r th e r  to propose t h a t  the Foreign Minis ter  
be the ' s o l e  competent M in is te r '  in exerc is ing  the sa le  ban or  the
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se izure  of  the publ ica t ion  concerned and t h a t  he need not consu l t  the
24Home M inis ter  a t  any s tage .
The reac t ions  o f  the government departments which were c lo se ly  
involved with these  arguments var ied .  The Leg is la t ion  Bureau (Hoseikyoku) 
of  the  cab ine t  showed s trong support  fo r  Suggestion A while the J u s t i c e  
M in is ter  and, r a th e r  s u rp r i s in g ly ,  the Home Min is ter  a l so  ind ica ted  
t h e i r  i n i t i a l  acceptance of  the  plan. The Home M in is te r ,  however, sub­
sequently changed h is  mind and r e j e c te d  i t .  The Army Minis t ry ,  on the
o the r  hand, favoured Suggestion B, h in t ing  t h a t  i t  had been th inking
25along s im i la r  l i n e s  fo r  some time. Although, owing to the ob jec t ion  
from the Home M inis t ry ,  both suggest ions f a i l e d  to m a te r ia l i s e  in the 
f in a l  government proposal which also subsequently  f a i l e d  to pass the 
Diet ,  the  d es i re  on the  p a r t  of  the Foreign, the Army, and presumably 
the  Navy, M in is t r i e s  remained as s trong as  ever before and led to v a r i ­
ous forms of  information control  with and without the a s s i s ta n c e  of  the 
Home Minis try .  Meanwhile, the s t rugg le  between p e r io d ic a l s  and the 
Police  Bureau over press  control  was a lso  in ten s i fy in g .
4. 1 In te rna l  Censorship* and 'S e l f -C en so rsh ip 1
When the 1926 reform proposal was being debated a t  the Imperial
Diet,  v a r ious  'myster ious  documents' on domestic p o l i t i c a l  scandals
were f req u en t ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  among the people,  spreading a cons iderable
26amount of  anx ie ty .  I t  was a l so  the time when the f i r s t  sa le  ban 
placed on Kaizo prompted a d i r e c t  p r o te s t  to the Home Minis try  from 
the  Authors'  Associa t ion and the P e r io d ica ls  Association aga ins t  the 
s t r i c t  press  cft^ Drjflrol Their  ' l e t t e r  of  p r o t e s t ' ,  however, requested 
the Pol ice  Bureau to  point  out any undesirable  sec t ions  in the pub l ica ­
t i o n s  submitted to the Bureau according to the ex i s t in g  press  control
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laws and to al low t h e i r  sa le once those  sec t ions  had been de le ted .
At the same t ime,  the l e t t e r  urged the Home Minis ter  to e s t a b l i s h  an
advisory body j o i n t l y  rep resen t ing  government o f f i c i a l s  and p r iv a te
members o f  the soc ie ty  in order  to ease the  a r b i t r a r y  nature  of  p ress  
28c o n t r o l . -----------
The r e s u l t  of  t h i s  reques t  was the  in t roduc t ion  of  ‘ in te rn a l  
censorsh ip '  (na ie tsu  or  na ikene tsu ).  This meant t h a t  the ga l ley  proof 
o f  the pub l ica t ion  concerned should be checked before pub l ica t ion  by 
the  Pol ice  Bureau, th u s  minimi sing the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f in a n c ia l  damage 
caused by a sa le  ban. The main b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of  t h i s  arrangement 
were, however, the  pub l ica t io n s  which would have 'corrup ted  publ ic  morals '  
r a t h e r  than those which would have '-disturbed peace and o r d e r ' .  Indeed, 
the  number of  sale bans placed on the l a t t e r  a c tu a l ly  increased in the 
per iod between 1926 and 1928 as  Table XII (see Appendix, p . 307) shows.
Nor was the advisory body suggested in the l e t t e r  ever s e r io u s ly  con­
templated by the  Home Ministry  in sp i te  of  the repeated r eq u es t s  from
29the two a s so c ia t io n s  which followed i t .
Such w i l l ingness  to 'coopera te '  with the Pol ice  Bureau was not  
shared by everyone in the  p ress .  The newspapers a t  the time,  in p a r t i c u ­
l a r ,  were highly  s cep t ica l  of  the nature  of  such ' i n t e r n a l  c en s o r s h ip ' .
The announcement by the  Home Ministry  of  i t s  own decis ion  to abandon t h i s
30arrangement on 28 June 1927 'owing to the s t a f f  sho r tage1 was t h e r e ­
fo re  welcomed by them. The Tokyo Asahi wrote on 30 June:
So long a s  the  high-handed sa le  ban remains, the 
pub l isher  asks  fo r  the ’in te rn a l  cen so rsh ip ’ and 
t im id ly  publ ishes  with b lu e -p en c i l le d  passages in
order  to avoid ser ious  f ina nc ia l  damage The
a b o l i t io n  of  the ' i n t e r n a l  c e n so rsh ip ’ i s  very
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welcome and we hope t h a t  thepub l i she r  will  
r e a l i s e  why such high-handeaness as  a sa le  
ban i s  unreasonable and th a t  he will  f i g h t  
along with the  author  a s  well as the reader  
f o r  the freedom o f  the p ress  as guaranteed 
by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 31
The abandonment o f  ' i n t e r n a l  censorship '  did no t ,  however, neces­
s a r i l y  lead to g r e a te r  freedom of  the  p ress .  The subsequent p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  being ordered to d e l e t e  or  c o r r e c t  a f t e r  pub l ica t ion  heightened the
f e a r  of  the publ isher  who in turn  began to  place f u r t h e r  'v o lu n ta ry '
32r e s t r i c t i o n s  on what h i s  product should say. I t  was th e r e fo re  no sur­
p r ise  t h a t  Hoshino Ju n ic h i ro ,  Chairman of  the P e r io d ic a ls  Assoc ia t ion ,  
backed by the Authors'  Association and the E d i to r s '  Assoc ia t ion ,  sent 
a letterjfcn 15 Ju ly ,  l e s s  than a month a f t e r  the Home Ministry  dec is ion ,  
urging the  Home M inis ter  to accept  the following reques ts :
1. We hope t h a t  the Minis try  will  kindly l e t  the publ isher
know i t s  opinion on the sentences  or  p ic tu r e s  in the 
m an u sc r ip t s . . .  which would have been subjected to the 
previous ' i n t e r n a l  cen so rsh ip ' .
1. The pub l isher  wil l  not f i l e  any complaint or  p r o te s t
i f  the sect ions  on which he has consulted  ge t  subjected 
to the control  a f t e r  p u b l ic a t io n .  Nor wil l  he in any 
circumstances  announce the f a c t  t h a t  he has consulted 
the Minis try .
1. I f  the  pub l isher  f e e l s  uncer ta in  on not j u s t  a word or
phrase but the  ideology, view or  v e rd ic t  contained in the 
essay ,  he wi ll  p resent  the*manuscript with the question 
marks a t  l e a s t  one week before the date s ta ted  in the 
l a w . . . .T h e  Minis t ry  can r e s t  assured  t h a t  he wil l  not 
use t h i s  as  an excuse to  avoid punishment.33
Even t h i s  humble p e t i t i o n  was, however, r e j e c te d  by the Pol ice
34Bureau which a t t r i b u t e d  i t s  dec is ion  to the chronic s t a f f  shortage. 
The th re e  a s so c ia t io n s  subsequently f e l t  compelled to adopt ' s e l f ­
censorsh ip '  (j i s h u  kenetsu) ,  de le t in g  the 'undes i rab le  sec t io n s '
-  110 -
v o lu n ta r i l y  to avoid a sa le  ban. This p r a c t i c e  was to  continue u n t i l  
the  Home Minis ter  decided in 1936 to  s top i t  on h is  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  the
35j ou rna ls  had been escaping much of  the legal control  through t h i s  method.
5. ’Voluntary1 Censorship in P rac t ice
Blue-penci l led  passages were a very common f e a tu re  in  the  j o u r ­
na ls  in the  l a t e  20s and ea r ly  30s. Their appearance v a r ied ,  however, 
from journa l  to  journal and from one to p ic  to  another .  Indeed, the re  
was l i t t l e  t r a ce  of  i t  on the issue  o f  the two naval conferences a t  
Geneva and London and the Kellogg-Briand pact  in any of  the major j o u r ­
n a l s .  One of  these  ra re  cases was an essay w r i t t en  by a Marxist  c r i t i c ,  
Noro E i t a ro ,  in Chuokoron on the  London conference which was in f a c t  
the f i r s t  and the l a s t  on t h i s  sub jec t  in t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  journa l  to 
receive  such t rea tment .  In the following passage of  Noro's c o n t r ib u ­
t i o n ,  each separa te  under l ine ,  i . e .  denotes one Chinese or  Japa­
nese cha rac te r  ( h e r e in a f t e r  the same p ra c t i c e  i s  to  be followed):
The ’non-th reatening  disarmament' i s  in f a c t  the  t o t a l  
co lon isa t ion  by Japan o f  not only Manchuria but a lso  
China and the South Sea i s l a n d s .  In o the r  words, i t  
i s  nothing b u t  in order  to  _  t h e  of  the Japa­
nese 'Monroe Doctr ine '  in the Far East  . . . . 3 6
Even on the  China i s s u e ,  the evidence of  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  was not
very apparent in j t h e  case of  Gaikoj iho, Kokusaichishiki and Toyokeizai-  
Toyokeizaishinpo
shinpQ.^escaped i t  in s p i t e  of  i t s  comparatively harsh c r i t i c a l  tone 
thanks la rg e ly  to i t s  smal ler  c i r c u l a t io n  and i t s  nature  as an economic 
journal  whereas the two dip lomatic  jo u rn a ls  did  so perhaps mainly be­
cause of  t h e i r  somewhat milder  tone.  Never theless ,  a t  l e a s t  the 
Gaikdjiho e d i to r  seems to  have been r a th e r  s e n s i t i v e  about the poss ib le  
anger of the Tanaka cabine t  as the following essay on i t s  con t rove rs ia l
-  I l l  -
' recommendation’ of  c ea s e f i r e  to  the  two Chinese governments on 18 May 
1928 by a ' h a r d - l i n e r ’ and former ca ree r  diplomat,  Honda Kumataro 
ind ica ted :
Foreign M in is te r  Tanaka should make publ ic  the  above 
memorandum on the p reserva t ion  of  peace and s e c u r i t y  
in Manchuria and Mongolia to the world. At the same
time, I hear that he has _  the main force of _____
at _  and had arranged aTl t h e ________ around
quickTy. Unfortunately, I have also heard that ____
have been s tranded a f t e r  a l l  ___ 37
As to  sogozassh i , Kaizo i n f l i c t e d  ' s e l f - c e n s o r s h i p ’ on i t s e l f  
more of ten  than Chuokoron. This was not n ec e s sa r i ly  because Kaizo 
publ ished more c r i t i c a l  essays than i t s  r i v a l .  Indeed, severa l  au thors  
such as Komura Shunzaburo, Yamakawa Hitoshi and Nakano Seigo co n t r ib u ­
ted  to  both jo u rn a ls  on the same aspec ts  of  the China issue  almost simul­
taneous ly ,  but only the essays  in Kaizo evidenced the b lu e -p en c i l led  
passages . Rejec ting Tanaka's c a l l  fo r  a 'u n i f i e d  nat ional  opinion* on 
the expedi t ion to Shantung, Komura Shunzaburo, f o r  example, wrote in 
Kaizo's  Ju ly  1928 e d i t io n :
The government was t o t a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t  even when the 
f a l l  of  the Northern m i l i t a r y  c l iques  was imninent 
_  _  _  to  the advancing Southern fo rces .  On the
otFer Fand, i t  showed  to the fa l l ing
Mukden c l ique  and went through hardships to g e th e r  l i k e  
a double s u i c i d e , 88
Yamakawa Hitoshi a lso  v/rote on the same accusat ion  made by 
Tanaka on the ' u n p a t r i o t i c '  a t t i t u d e s  of  the press  in general a t  the 
time.  In both jo u r n a l s ,  he contended t h a t  however hard the Foreign 
M inis te r  t r i e d  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  his  s ty l e  of  ' p o s i t i v e '  diplomacy, i t  
would in the end have to come back to  the more c o n c i l i a to ry  s ty l e  of
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the  Shidehara diplomacy f o r  which the re  had always been a na t ional  con­
census, Only his  essay in Kaizo, however, contained d e l e t i o n s ,  as the 
following passage shows:
This simply means t h a t  the  1 economic diplomacy ',  i . e .  
the  diplomacy of  , whether we ca l l  i t  the  Tanaka 
diplomacy or  the IThTdehara diplomacy, i s  equa l ly
r i g h t .  Public opinion on C h in a ______________has
always been u n i f ie d .39
Such evidence of  'vo lun ta ry '  censorship was much l e s s  appa­
r e n t ,  a t  l e a s t  in the fore ign  pol icy  sphere ,  under the Hamaguchi Min- 
s e i t o  cab ine t .  I t  was, in f a c t ,  not u n t i l  the summer of  1931 when the 
Sino-Japanese r e l a t io n s h ip  was reported  to be a t  i t s  lowest leve l  t h a t
some c r i t i c a l  c o n t r ibu t ions  in sogozasshi began to ca r ry  a s ig n i f i c a n t
40number of  missing words. This owed perhaps l a rg e ly  to  the unw il l ing­
ness o f  Foreign M inis te r  Shidehara to  be d i r e c t l y  involved in any argu-
41ment with the press  while conducting h is  duty in s t r i c t  secrecy .
Another poss ib le  reason was a l so  i l l u s t r a t e d  in the following remark 
by Gaiko j i h o  on 1 February 1931 which had voiced and was to  cont inue 
some of  the seve re s t  c r i t i c i s m  of  the  'weak-kneed' Shidehara diplomacy 
f ree  o f  any 'voluntary-  censorship:
However much h o s t i l i t y  Foreign M inis ter  Shidehara may 
have aga ins t  t h i s  j o u r n a l ,  he would not ask Home M inis ter  
Adachi with whom he i s  not normally f r i e n d l y ,  to  order  a 
sa le  ban even i f  we make the  following remarks 42
6, Army vs. Home Ministry
While the appearance of  b lu e -p en c i l le d  passages was not i n f r e ­
quent in j o u rn a l s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  sogozassh i , under the  Tanaka c a b in e t ,  the 
reader  could f ind  no t ra c e  of  'vo lun tary  ce n so rsh ip 1 in the  major
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newspapers u n t i l  the 'second- Shantung expedi t ion and the  subsequent
Tsinan in c id en t  in May 1928, Even then ,  only the m atters  which were
considered s t r i c t l y  -m i l i ta ry  s e c r e t s ’ such as the number or  name of
43the t roops to be sent  to  China were de le ted  from the a r t i c l e s .
The l e a d e r s ,  however, contained no missing words although they had of ten  
been as c r i t i c a l  of  Foreign M inis te r  Tanaka and the  Army behind him as 
sogozassh i .
An important  tu rn ing  point in the h i s to ry  of  press  control  
a r r ived  when Marshal Chang Tso- l in  was a s sa s s in a te d  by d isconten ted  
Japanese o f f i c e r s  in Manchuria on 4 June 1928, This event was s i g n i f i ­
cant  because even i f  the newspapers were in possession of  fac tua l  i n f o r ­
mation, they were too a f r a id  to  publish  i t  fo r  f e a r  of  rece iv ing  a sa le  
44ban. The f a c t  t h a t  the Army succeeded in persuading the  government
and the Home Minis try  to issue  a ’pre-warning'  in the  name of  'supreme
command' o f  the Emperor was in i t s e l f  an ’epoch-making’ event according
45to Tokawa Isamu, the former Yomiuri correspondent .  Even more impor­
t a n t  was the f a i l u r e  on the p a r t  of the newspapers to mount any publ ic  
p r o te s t  aga ins t  such in te r f e ren ce  with the 'freedom of  speech'  fo r  which 
they had so vehemently fought throughout the  'Taisho Democracy' per iod.  
Ogata Taketora ,  the  c h ie f  e d i t o r  of  the Tokyo Asahi a t  the time,  
r e f l e c t e d  on t h i s  development twenty-four  years  l a t e r :
The prevention of  the P a c i f i c  War would probably have 
-been poss ib le  had the major newspapers seen through 
the domestic s i t u a t i o n ,  e s p e c ia l ly  t h a t  of  the m i l i ­
t a ry  f o rc e s ,  and had they made determined e f f o r t s  to  
prevent the ca tas t rophe  then .  N a tu ra l ly ,  the  guarantee 
of  the freedom of  the press should have been i t s  p re ­
condit ion and a unity  among the newspapers would have
been n ecessa ry   I t  i s  a l so  t r u e ,  however, t h a t  the
e f f o r t s  made by the e d i to r s  of  these  newspapers were 
not s u f f i c i e n t  to achieve t h i s  end .4°
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The most s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  development was the s t r en g ­
thening of  the Newspaper Unit (Shinbunhan)within the Army. This was
based on i t s  b e l i e f  t h a t  the 1 understanding '  by the press  of  i t s  in ten -
47t io n  would be v i t a l  f o r  the  'conquest  of  Manchuria1. The main task 
of  the Unit was to  extend the  range of  ’suspended m a t t e r s ’ with the 
cooperat ion of  the Home Minis t ry ,  To t h i s  end, i t  sen t  in the name of 
the Army M inis te r  a l e a f l e t  e n t i t l e d  ’Request from The M il i ta ry  
A u th o r i t i e s  Concerning Censorship of  P u b l ic a t io n s '  to  the Home, Foreign 
and presumably the Navy Minis ters  in September 1928. In i t ,  the  Army 
r e g re t t e d  the  recen t  increase  in the number of  newspapers and o ther  
pub l ica t ions  which published ’a n t i - m i l i t a r y ' a r t i c l e s ,  thus 'endangering 
the ex is tence  of  the se rv ice  forces  with f a l s i f i e d  as well as exag­
gerated remarks ' .  This had been a f f e c t i n g  the morale of  the occupy­
ing force  in Shantung and t h a t  i s  why, the l e a f l e t  claimed, the Army 
Minis ter  had decided to  urge the  Home Minis ter  to  'pay more a t t e n t i o n '  
t o  censoring the p ub l ica t ions  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  than before.  Among the 
matters  recommended in the reques t  fo r  'more a t t e n t i o n '  were:
1. Those which harmed the mental educat ion of  the se rv ice  
forces  as well as those which degraded the  concept of 
the  m i l i t a r y  duty.
(3) Those which propagate the  t o t a l  a b o l i t io n  of
armament by emphasising the misery of war and by 
f e rv e n t ly  advocating an t i -w ar  arguments and those 
which aim a t  making the  se rv ice  forces  the focus 
of  condemnation through the exaggerated misery 
of  the s o ld i e r s .
(5) Those which delude the m en ta l i ty  of  the so ld ie r s  
and c a s t  doubts upon i t  by r a i s in g  ob jec t ions  to 
the  expedit ion which had been c a r r i e d  out as pa r t  
of the nat ional  pol icy ,
2. Those which des troy  m i l i t a r y  d i s c i p l i n e .
3. Those which a l i e n a t e  the population from the m i l i t a ry
forces  or  those  which make the people misunderstand
t h e m . ^
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Considering the r e l a t i v e l y  mild tone of  c r i t i c i s m  of  the  expe­
d i t i o n  i t s e l f  expressed in the major newspapers and jo u rn a ls  a t  the 
time,  t h i s  appears to have been the r e s u l t  of  the Army's eagerness 
to  s e ize  any opportuni ty  to pursue what i t  had f a i l e d  to  achieve 
through the  reform of  the press  control laws in 1926 and 1927. In­
deed, not only had the m i l i t a r y  ac t ion  in i t s e l f  never been c r i t i c i s e d
by the metropol i tan  newspapers but the re  had been a considerable  number
49of  s a le  bans placed on the ’a n t i -w ar '  p u b l ica t io n s .  Such being the 
case ,  the Home Minis try  may not have paid as much a t t e n t io n  to  the  l e a f ­
l e t  as the  Army had hoped, A co n f id en t ia l  c i r c u l a r  of  the Home Ministry  
c a l l e d  'P u b l ic a t io n  Pol ice  Law', f o r  example, repor ted  in March 1929 
th a t  almost a l l  the cases which had received banning orders  belonged 
to  the  f i r s t  th ree  c lauses  in the reform proposals  of  1926 and 1927.
In o the r  words, they had been def ined as 'suspended' in  the Peace 
Preserva t ion  Law of  1925 whose main vict ims were s t i l l  the  le f t -w ing  
p u b l ic a t io n s .  Indeed, those which 'concerned m i l i t a r y  or  diplomat ic  
s e c r e t s '  o r  which 'would be of  hindrance to  [Japan 's]  r e l a t i o n s h i p '  with 
o ther  coun tr ie s  had seldom been c l a s s i f i e d  as the 'suspended m a t te r s '  
because, the  c i r c u l a r  s t a t e d :
The a u th o r i ty  of  the Home Minis try  over press  control  began to 
wane gradual ly  a f t e r  the inaugurat ion of  the Hamaguchi Minseito 
cab ine t  in Ju ly  1929, Although the Home Min is ter  was s t i l l  the so le  
competent M in is te r  in issu ing  a sa le  ban, the Army began in c reas ing ly  
to  r e s o r t  to  more d i r e c t  means to p re ssu r i se  the p re ss .
These two groups belong to  a r a t h e r  specia l  ca tegory 
in so fa r  as the  banning i s  concerned. We have 
decided to  avoid a d e ta i l e d  explanation about u o i .
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7. Physical Threat
Employment o f  physical t h r e a t  a g a in s t  the press had not been
$eptev»4w'
uncommon in Japan. On 5 1905, the misguided mobs who were ou t-
f\
raged by Japan’s acceptance of  the ’h u m i l i a t in g ’ Portsmouth t r e a t y
a t tacked  the  pro-government newspaper, Kokumin Shinbun. In 1912, the
mobs once again raided the same newspaper fo r  i t s  support of  the
51’u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ’ behaviour of  new Prime M inis te r  Katsura.
The s i t u a t i o n  had changed considerably  s ince the  end of  the
F i r s t  World War and i t  was the pol ice  and hence the  Home Minis t ry  r a th e r
than the  misguided public t h a t  played a major ro le  in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .
Their  u t i l i s a t i o n  of  right-wing o rgan isa t ions  in immobilising the
p r in t in g  machines of  the Osaka Asahi and t h e i r  rumoured involvement in
the a s sa s s in a t io n  attempt ag a in s t  i t s  chairman, Murayama Ryuhei, in the
e a r l i e r  h a l f  of  the 1920s can be seen as the  r e s u l t  of  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  to
suppress the press  c r i t i c i s m  of  the government po l icy  through legal  
52channels.  Such systematic  a s s a u l t  on the press  was not so success ­
ful as the government may have hoped while the more l i b e r a l  sentiment 
of  the ’Taisho Democracy1 s t i l l  p reva i led  over the people. Captain 
M. D. Kennedy, a long-term B r i t i s h  r e s id e n t  in Japan,  observed a t  the 
time:
In adopting t h i s  l i b e r a l  a t t i t u d e ,  the Japanese press  
i s  almost u n iv e r sa l ly  up in arms ag a in s t  the Government 
of  the day, and i t  i s  a s t r i k i n g  f a c t  t h a t  the more a 
paper a t t ack s  the Government the g r e a t e r  does i t s  c i r c u ­
l a t i o n  tend to  inc rease .  Conversely, as amply demon­
s t r a t e d  in the  case of  the Hochi, which supported the  
Marquis (5kuma when he was in power, c i r c u l a t i o n  drops 
r a d i c a l l y  whenever a paper seeks too c o n s i s t e n t ly  to  
defend the Government p o l i c i e s . 53
The re tu rn  of  the ’Shidehara Diplomacy’ in Ju ly  1929 under the
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Hamaguchi cab ine t  marked another  turn ing  p o in t .  Although the Home
Minis try  was s t i l l  a c t i v e ly  engaged in physical t h r e a t  ag a in s t  the
p re s s ,  i t  was the Army t h a t  played the major r o l e  in t h i s  f i e l d .
This development was due l a rg e ly  to the Army's f a i l u r e  to  persuade the
Home Ministry  to  extend the  range of  'suspended m a t t e r s ’ in the sphere
of  fore ign pol icy  and m i l i t a ry  a f f a i r s .  The pol icy  popularly  adopted
by the  major newspapers a t  the time erf- employee 11-known e x - so ld ie r s
as m i l i t a r y  correspondents  made i t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  to  the
press  c r i t i c i s m  d i re c ted  a t  i t s  po l icy  towards Manchuria and disarma- 
54ment. Foreign Min is ter  Sh idehara 's  somewhat a loo f  a t t i t u d e  towards 
the press  c r i t i c i s m  of  these  i ssues  did not help to  calm down the f r u s ­
t r a t i o n  f e l t  by the Army. The r e s u l t  was t h a t  ambitious and r e b e l l i ­
ous s o ld ie r s  who held a grandiose scheme *ft?r Manchuria and m i l i -
55ta ry  expansion came to  regard the  newspapers as an enemy.
The i n i t i a l  method used by the Newspaper Unit was to  issue  to
the  press  p r o t e s t s ,  ve rba l ly  or  in w r i t in g ,  in the name of the vice
C h ie f -o f -S ta f f  or  the  bureau ch ie f s  whenever Army policy was c r i t i c i s e d .
I f  t h i s  did not  work, the  Imperial Reserv is t  Associat ion was a c t iv a te d
to  form a 'boycot t  a l l i a n c e ’ . A l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  right-wing o rgan isa t ions
were employed to  bring about even more d i r e c t  physical damage to  the
56s t a f f  or machinery of the newspaper concerned. Not s u rp r i s i n g ly ,  i t  
was the Asahi of  Tokyo and Osaka t h a t  became the main t a r g e t  of  these  
a t t a c k s .
The Army’s h o s t i l i t y  aga ins t  the two s i s t e r  newspapers was based 
on t h e i r  inf luence r a t h e r  than t h e i r  c on ten t ,  considering the v i r t u a l  
uniformity in the t eno r  of  the opinions expressed in var ious  newspapers 
a t  the time. The Osaka Asahi whose c r i t i c a l  tone ag a in s t  the m i l i t a r y
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adventurism had been the ha rshes t  among the  metropol i tan  newspapers
57under i t s  ch ie f  e d i t o r ,  Takahara Misao, remained under cons tan t  phy­
s ica l  t h r e a t  from the  Army and i t s  c o l l a b o ra to r s .  The Tokyo Asahi , on 
the  o ther  hand, was a l i t t l e  more ' c o n c i l i a t o r y 1 and thanks to the  
e f f o r t s  by i t s  ch ie f  e d i t o r ,  Ogata Taketora ,  to  acquaint  h imself  with 
the  top level  o f f i c i a l s  of  the Army through various 'meal m e e t in g s ' ,  i t  
somehow managed to  escape the  same f a t e  as i t s  s i s t e r  newspaper. Never­
t h e l e s s ,  the  Tokyo Asahi was fo rced ,  i f  g rad u a l ly ,  to  modify i t s  a t t i t u d e s  
u n t i l  the  Osaka Asahi f i n a l l y  dropped i t s  vehement a n t i - m i l i t a r y  tone
in l a t e  summer 1931 in re tu rn  f o r  the promise from the C h ie f -o f -S ta f f
58not to  mount any a t ta c k  on Takahara in pub l ic .  By then ,  however, the  
press un i ty  had a lready been s e r io u s ly  undermined from within  as w e l l .
8. Newspaper Executives vs.  Reporters
Shidehara may have been ' t o l e r a n t '  towards press c r i t i c i s m ,  
but  h is  cab ine t  co l league ,  Home Min is ter  Adachi, was not .  The Min- 
s e i t o  cab ine t  turned out to  be even more ru th le s s  than the previous 
Seiyukai government so f a r  as s a le  bans were concerned. As Tables I I I  - 
V (See Appendix p .302/3) ind ica te ,  the  number of  sa le  bans placed on the 
newspapers increased  under the  Hamaguchi cab ine t  even before 1931 
although as Tables VII and VIII (see Appendix p . 305) show, the  major
newspapers were s t i l l  mostly exempt from such t rea tment .  The press
hope fo r  the eas ing of  press  control  under the new cab ine t  should have 
been high,  as Prime Minis ter  Hamaguchi made the following remark in
his  inaugural speech in Ju ly  1929:
We are e sp e c ia l ly  g ra te fu l  to  the press  which presented 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  c r i t i c i s m  on behalf  of  so c ie ty .  We should 
henceforth r e a l i s e  t h a t  although the  government needs 
the a s s i s ta n c e  of  the par ty  in  the enforcement of  v a r i ­
ous p o l i c i e s ,  we cannot do as -wi thout  the support of  the 
press  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .59
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I t  was in f a c t  t h i s  s tatement t h a t  encouraged the  Authors '  
Associat ion to  organise  immediately publ ic  debates on the reform of  
the  censorship procedure,  though not the e n t i r e  press  control mechanism 
as in 1926 and 1927. I t s  members who had unsuccessfu l ly  fought f o r  the  
same cause under the Tanaka c ab in e t ,  however, soon discovered t h a t  the  
new government was as r e l u c t a n t  to  comply with t h e i r  wish as ever .
The increas ing  number of  'pre-warnings '  issued by Home M inis ter  Adachi 
began to cause some anxie ty  even among the  major newspapers which had 
b a s ic a l ly  been sympathetic towards the Hamaguchi cab ine t .  I t  was no 
s u r p r i s e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  t h a t  the de ten t ion  of  a J i j i s h i n p o correspondent,  
Hosokoshi Masao, by the po l ice  over the condit ion of  h o s p i t a l i s e d  
Hamaguchi on 7 December 1930 led to  a j o i n t  public condemnation of  the 
government signed by the Cabinet Correspondents Club which read:
The government a t t i t u d e  towards the press  has r e ce n t ly  
been in c reas in g ly  v io l e n t  and the u n j u s t i f i a b l e  sus ­
pension o f  a r t i c l e s  and the  se izu re  ofnewspapers are 
more f requent  than e v e r . . . - I t  i s  extremely r e g r e t t a b l e  
t h a t  the government th rea tens  the freedom to  r e p o r t .
We do not accept  i t  simply as the w i l l f u l  neg lec t  o f
co r rec t  procedures on the p a r t  of  the pol ice  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
but recognise  i t  as a systematic  a s s a u l t  on the press  by
the government. We s t rong ly  censure i t  on t h i s  i s s u e .  1
What was s i g n i f i c a n t  «£ t h i s  d e c la ra t io n  was t h a t  i t  ind ica ted  
the growing d i su n i ty  between the executives  and r e p o r te r s  of  the member 
newspapers of the  Club though the  reader  may not have r e a l i s e d  i t .  
Unlike a t  the time of  a s im i la r  conf ron ta t ion  between the press  and
the  cu r ren t  Seiyukai government immediately preceding the Tsinan i n c i -
62dent in 1928, the d e c la ra t io n  was made in the name not o f  the news­
papers themselves but of the  correspondents '  c lub ,  and received  f a r  
le ss  p u b l i c i ty .  I t  was, in f a c t ,  the  r e s u l t  of  the c o n f l i c t  in pro­
cess between the execut ives  of the newspapers and the correspondents '
c lubs.
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The correspondents '  clubs in Japan were the  product of  the 
unique Japanese s i t u a t i o n  in which th e re  was no s ing le  powerful news 
agency fo r  the government to  r e lea se  news through. The ever i n t e n s i ­
fying sa les  war among the newspapers had a lso  prompted each Tokyo news­
paper to  keep i t s  own r e p o r t e r  a t  every major government department.  
O r ig ina l ly  despised as 'news h u n t e r s ' ,  these  r e l a t i v e l y  young , inexper i ­
enced, impressionable and ye t  proud r e p o r t e r s  had been encouraged by 
t h e i r  employers to form t h e i r  own clubs a t  the department to  which 
they were a t tached .  They included Kasumikai a t  the Foreign M in is t ry ,  
Kuroshiokai a t  the Navy M in is t ry ,  Rikugunsho Kisha Kurabu a t  the Army
c o
Minis try  and the Cabinet Correspondents Club.
The f i r s t  real  t e s t  f o r  Kasumikai to  be accepted as a semi-
autonomous body o f  any s ig n i f i c a n c e  came when Kato Takaaki,  the  Foreign
M in i s t e r  of  the Okuma ca b in e t ,  t r i e d  to s i l en ce  the c r i t i c i s m  from
i t s  members by issu ing  Foreign Minis try  Ordinance No.l over the  Twenty-
One Demands in 1915. Although t h i s  motion was s t r i c t l y  within  the legal
framework (A r t ic le  27 of the Newspaper Law), the outraged club members
forced Kato to  back down through the mediation of  the informal group
64of  the  ch ie f  ed i to r s  o f  the Tokyo newspapers c a l le d  Shunjukai which
65was sympathetic to  the cab ine t .
The second and more important conf ron ta t ion  between Kasumikai 
and the  Foreign Minis try took place th ree  years  l a t e r  when the  club 
members questioned the  wisdom of  the S iberian  expedi t ion in t h e i r  a r t i ­
c l e s .  Public opinion on the whole supported t h e i r  argument and Foreign
M inis te r  Goto Shinpei was forced to  recognise ,  a l b e i t  u n o f f i c i a l l y ,
66the ' independence'  of the club once again through Shunjukai .
This ,  however, proved to  be the turn ing  po in t  f o r  Shunjukai .
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The i n i t i a l  cause f o r  the  dec l ine  of  i t s  au th o r i ty  was i t s  f a i l ­
ure to  keep up with the d iscon ten t  o f  the people during the Rice Riot 
which coincided with the  controversy over the  S iberian  expedi t ion .*^
The Great Earthquake of  1923 and the  subsequent increase  in the r e l a t i v e  
inf luence  of  the two Osaka newspaper concerns within the  press  f i n a l l y  
persuaded t h e i r  Tokyo r i v a l s  to  agree to  the replacement o f  Shunjukai 
with the  21st  Day Club whose members cons is ted  of  the ch ie f  e d i t o r s  or
t h e i r  equ iva len ts  of  not only the Shunjukai member newspapers in Tokyo
68but aTso~the Osaka newspapers and the  two major news agencies .
The increased in f luence  of the new group was amply in d ica ted  
when publ ic  opinion with i t s  f u l l  backing f i n a l l y  forced the govern­
ment to  accept the in t roduc t ion  of  universal  male suff rage in 1925, 
although the  simultaneous enforcement of  the Peace Preserva t ion  Law
w i i f -
somewhat^hadowed i t s  achievement. I t  was a lso  la rg e ly  the un i ted  press
opposit ion led by the  21s t Day Club t h a t  k i l l e d  the reform proposals
69f o r  a new Pub l ica t ion  Law in 1926 and 1927. This was, however, the  
height  of  i t s  au th o r i ty  as a major Opposition fo rce .
The f i r s t  major chal lenge to  t e s t  t h i s  u n o f f ic ia l  body came when 
the government issued a suspension order  on the a s sa s s in a t io n  on Chang 
Tso- l in  in 1928 to  which the  press  f a i l e d  to  voice any public  p r o t e s t .  
The c r e d i b i l i t y  of  the 21st  Day Club was f u r t h e r  undermined when the 
Navy su ccess fu l ly  persuaded i t  to  support the ' t h r e e  fundamental 
cl aims} a t  the London naval conference.  Most s i g n i f i c a n t  was, however, 
the  open def iance of  i t s  a u th o r i ty  by the rep o r te r s  a t tached  to  the  Navy 
in the  post-London conference d ispu te  between the government and the 
Navy.
This defiance appeared in the form of  the ' a n t i - t r e a t y ' a r t i c l e s
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w r i t t e n  by the  members of  Kuroshiokai , the correspondents '  club a t  the 
Navy, while the  leader  composed by the 21st  Day Club members or  t h e i r  
immediate subordinates  within the e d i t o r i a l  department suddenly r e v e r ­
sed i t s  former a t t i t u d e  and became 'pro-government’ and ' p r o - t r e a t y ' .
I t  was indeed the  growing degree of  ' independence'  among the  c o r r e s ­
pondents’ c lubs ,  which culminated in t h i s  def iance ,  t h a t  led the  21st 
Day Club to embark on i t s  attempt in November 1930 to  reform them.
I t  was no su rp r i se  th e r e fo re  t h a t  when the Hosokoshi a f f a i r  took place 
a few weeks l a t e r ,  the  d ec la ra t io n  was signed only in the name of  the 
Cabinet Correspondents Club without  the endorsement of  the e d i to r s  of  
i t s  member n ew sp ap e rs .^
Such a development a t  t h i s  junc tu re  did nothing but %e- s trengthen 
the  determination of  the r e p o r te r s  in t h e i r  f i g h t  aga ins t  t h e i r  emplo­
y e r s ,  Although the  21st Day Club managed, with the t a c i t  approval o f  
the  Minseito cab in e t ,  to  d isso lve  the  semi-autonomous correspondents '  
clubs on 21 April  1931, i t s  subsequent at tempt to  e s t a b l i s h  the much 
l e s s  i n f l u e n t i a l  ’committees’ in t h e i r  p lace f a i l e d  in the face  of  the 
unanimous opposit ion from the  r ep o r te r s  who organised the United League 
of  Newspaper and News Agency Correspondents as a coun te rm easure .^
The repercussions  o f  t h i s  'd e f e a t '  by the 21st Day Club proved 
much more se r ious  than i t  may have r e a l i s e d  a t  the time. As the even t­
ful summer a r r iv e d ,  the  d i su n i ty  within the C/uh which had a r i s e n ,  
i f  g radua l ly ,  from the ever  increas ing  sa le s  competition between the
member newspapers and the h i t h e r t o  hidden d i f fe ren ces  in t h e i r  a t t i -
72tudes towards China began to  su rface .  By the time the  group met on 
21 September, th ree  days a f t e r  the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
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h o s t i l i t y  in Manchuria, i t s  dec l ine  as an Opposition fo rce  had been so
t o t a l  t h a t  i t s  members ’did nothing more than have a cup of  tea  and 
73a c h a t ' .  Meanwhile the correspondents  in China continued to  send in 
in c reas in g ly  'an t i -government1 and ’an t i^Shidehara '  a r t i c l e s ,  of ten  
c o n t rad ic t in g  the  s t i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  ’pro-government’ tone of  the  
leader .
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CHAPTER VI - China Correspondents
1, Control of Overseas Communication
Overseas communication with Japan was under the legal control  
of  the  Communications Ministry  r a th e r  than the Home Minis t ry ,  A r t i c l e  
48 of  the  Overseas Telegram Act (Gafkoku Denpo Kisoku) obliged  the 
newspaper o r  news agency to  send out or  rece ive  the telegram a t  the 
local  telecommunication o f f i c e  where i t  had to  submit e i t h e r  the  o r i ­
ginal or  a copy of  the  te legram simultaneously.  This telegram was 
subsequently forwarded to  the  Communication Ministry  from which o the r  
government departments could obta in  a c o p y j
Censorship placed upon overseas telegrams had been r igorous  
and, not s u rp r i s in g ly ,  became a main point of c o n f l i c t  between the 
government and the  press  when the two abor t ive  reform proposals  fo r  a 
new Publ ica t ion  Law were debated a t  the Imperial Diet in 1926 and 1927.
On 21 August 1926, a conference sponsored by the Tokyo branch of  the 
League of Nations S e c r e t a r i a t  was held between fourteen  metropol i tan  
newspapers and two news agencies  which passed a re so lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  
the a b o l i t io n  of  censorship in peace-time. A year  l a t e r  when d iscuss ing
t h e i r  pol icy  fo r  the  coming in te rn a t io n a l  conference of  newspaper
2
experts  a t  Geneva, they reconfirmed t h i s  view claiming t h a t  censorship  
by i t s e l f  could n e i th e r  stop the incoming or  outgoing of  f a l s i f i e d  or  
wrong repor ts  across  the s t a t e  border nor prevent the f a b r i c a t i o n  of  news 
by those i l l - d i s p o s e d  towards the government. Their f in a l  r e so lu t io n  
which was to be presented as t h e i r  proposal a t  Geneva was sent  to seve­
ral  government departments and contained the  following clauses  among 
i t s  'minimum' demands to  be guaranteed by every government of  the 
world:
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1, Telegrams should be censored by exper ts  and be des­
patched as soon as poss ib le  t h e r e a f t e r .
2, In s t ru c t io n s  given to these  exper ts  should be n o t i f i e d  
in advance so t h a t  the correspondents  could a l so  modify 
the te legrams.
3. The correspondents  should be n o t i f i e d  of  the de le ted  
pa r t s  and of  the  exceptional delay of  communication. 
They should a l so  be able  to  choose whether to  despatch 
o r  withdraw the  censored or delayed correspondence.
4. Every correspondent should be given equal t rea tment  
without ex cep t io n .3
The r e l a t i v e  ease f o r  the  government to inf luence the s e le c t io n  
of  overseas telegrams fo r  pub l ica t ion  by the newspapers was of ten  e v i ­
dent  to the reader  e s p e c ia l ly  a t  the time of  the Shantung expedi t ions  
in 1927 and 1928. The teno r  of  the published despatches from China was 
d e c i s iv e ly  in favour of  the Northern c l ique  suggest ing t h a t  the  law and 
order  of  the  area  had become lax when the N a t io n a l i s t  in f luence  expan­
ded whereas the recovery of  the North was usua l ly  described as a
4 -re tu rn  to normality among the local  r e s id e n t s .  Yoshino Sakuzo r e g re t t e d  
t h i s  phenomenon in Chuokoron:
I f in d  i t  very d i f f i c u l t  to understand such a heavy 
suppression of  the d iscuss ion  of  the China expedi­
t i o n ,  not to  mention the f a c t  t h a t  the presen t  c a b i ­
net  i s  too obsessed with the opposing arguments among 
the  p e o p l e . . , .  The government claims t h a t  i f  i t  allowed 
such arguments to spread,  the  morale of the expedi t ionary  
forces  would be adversely  a f f e c te d ,  Do the  people,  how­
ever ,  r e a l l y  have to  keep s i l e n t  so as to  l e t  the govern­
ment force  through i t s  own mistakes?3
On the  o the r  hand, the re  were various ways to escape the  legal  
control  channels i f  the newspaper or  news agency so wished. The co r ­
respondents could and did use i l l e g a l  t r a n sm i t t e r s  to  despatch telegrams 
to Japan a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  January 1932 when Iwanaga Ytikichi, the
-  126 -
Communications M in is te r  and the  p re s id e n t  of  the news agency, Rengo, 
came under f i r e  from the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  fo r  such usage by his
c
company. Some of  the telegrams which appeared under the guise  of  
’received  somewhere1 (bosho chakuden) may well have been these  i l l e g a l  
despatches ,^
An equal ly  common p ra c t i c e  was to send r epor ts  in a l e t t e r  to  
Moji, the  f i r s t  por t  of  c a l l  from Manchuria and o the r  pa r t s  of  China, 
whereupon the r e s id e n t  correspondent conveyed them to  h is  head o f f i c e
o
in Osaka or  Tokyo on the uncensored domestic te lephone.  A l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  
the correspondent in Manchuria could telephone or  w r i te  to  h is  c o l ­
league in Peking or  T ien ts in  from where the  r epo r ts  were forwarded to  
Japan as 'Peking (or  T ien ts in )  t e l e g ra m s ' ,  thus escaping the vigorous 
censorship placed on despatches sen t  out from the Japanese administered 
post o f f i c e  in the rai lway concession zone in Manchuria. Indeed, i t  
was t h i s  method t h a t  was used to d isc lo se  the s e c re t  Sino-Japanese 
' ra i lw ay  n e g o t i a t io n s '  in Manchuria in 1928 much to the embarrassment 
o f  the Tanaka cab ine t .  Not only had the  pub l ica t ion  of  repo r ts  on the 
sub jec t  in *bhe concession zone been banned by the Kwantung Government- 
General but under the  same order  t h e i r  t ransmiss ion  to Japan had a lso  
been c lo se ly  monitored by the local post  o f f i c e s .  Never the less ,  some 
a r t i c l e s  on t h i s  very sub jec t  had s t a r t e d  appearing in the newspaper 
in Japan from mid-September onwards. The local Japanese language news­
paper subsequently f i l e d  a reques t  to the  Kwantung Government-General 
to  l i f t  the  suspension o rde r ,  which was promptly c a r r i e d  out without 
c o nsu l ta t ion  with the Consul General a t  Mukden, Hayashi Kyujiro,  who 
in turn  wrote to  Tanaka on 18 October:
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Considering the cu r ren t  s i t u a t i o n  in the n e g o t i a t io n s ,
I ,  toge the r  with the South Manchuria Railways which 
holds s im i la r  views, immediately proposed the  r e i n ­
forcement of  the su sp en s io n . , , , The reply  [ o f  the Kwan­
tung Government GeneralJ was t h a t  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  
to  comply with my reques t  so soon a f t e r  the l i f t i n g .  We 
have th e re fo re  decided to  leave i t  as i t  i s  f o r  the 
moment in the  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  inescapable s i t u a t i o n . 9
Hayashi and those  involved in the railway n ego t ia t ions  were a lso  
d i s s a t i s f i e d  with the ' l a x '  control  of  overseas communication. The 
Overseas Telegram Act did not ob l ige  the  newspaper to  publ ish  the t e l e ­
grams una l te red  and the  ' f a b r i c a t i o n ' ,  ' r e s t r u c t u r i n g '  and 'enlargement '  
o f  the  o r ig in a l  despatches under the name of  ' sp ec ia l  te legrams ' by 
the e d i t o r i a l  department was a cons tan t  embarrassment to the Foreign 
M i n i s t r y . ^  This led Foreign M inis te r  Tanaka to  e s t a b l i s h  a coordina­
t io n  committee between the th re e  government departments c lo se ly  involved 
in t h i s  i s su e .  Tanaka wrote to  chargl  d ' a f f a i r e s  a t  Peking, Hori,  on 12 
January 1929:
Considering the a r t i c l e s  and the telegrams from China 
. . . ,  i t  was thought necessary f o r  the Foreign Mini­
s t r y  and the Metropolitan Pol ice  to  keep c lose  contac ts  
with each o the r  in order  to  provide prompt and approp­
r i a t e  measures to  control  them. I t  was th e re fo re  d ec i ­
ded to  e s t a b l i s h  a committee which c o n s is t s  of  a member 
from each of  these  th re e  bodies.  They wil l  be meeting 
r e g u la r ly  once a week a t  t h i s  Minis try  and the  f i r s t  one 
should be held on the coming 14th.
What Tanaka should not have fo rgo t ten  was to  include the m i l i t a r y  autho­
r i t i e s ,  who had been working to win over the correspondents  in China 
since  the  Tsinan inc iden t  in May 1928,
2. Correspondents and the  Army
When the Tsinan inc iden t  broke ou t ,  the press  had been voicing 
a n t i - m i l i t a r y  views fo r  some yea rs .  The conclusion of  the Washington
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naval t r e a t y  in 1922 and the  a b o l i t io n  of  four  army d iv i s io n s  a year
l a t e r  had been s t rong ly  supported by publ ic  opinion i n i t i a t e d  by the
press .  I t  was a lso  the time when the former.war correspondents ,  some of
whom had become the s t a f f  members of  the e d i t o r i a l  department ,  s t i l l
remembered the i l l  t rea tment  provided by the  m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  during
the Shantung campaign in the  F i r s t  World War and the  S iber ian  expedi-  
12t io n ,  A Dentsu correspondent who had been sen t  to  Shantung r e c a l l e d  
twenty years  l a t e r :
Correspondents from the newspapers in Tokyo and the pro­
vinces were assigned to  Ts ingtao,  but t h e i r  t rea tm en t  
[by the  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s ]  was not much b e t t e r  than 
a t  the time of  the Russo-Japanese War, They were not 
allowed to  engage in a c t i v e  repor t ing  and some s p i r i t e d  
ones were outraged and even gave up t h e i r  duty on the  
f ro n t  to  re tu rn  to  J a p a n .>3
Such an t ipa thy  towards the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  was, in s p i t e  of
t h e i r  more caut ious  handling of the press  in the e a r l i e r  h a l f  of  the  
141920s , s t i l l  p reva len t  when the Tanaka cab ine t  sen t  the  'second '
Shantung expedi t ion in 1928. A month a f t e r  the  Tsinan in c id e n t ,  the 
Consul General a t  Tsinan, Nishida,  wrote to  Tanaka:
The correspondents of  the newspapers which have been oppo­
sed to  the  expedi t ion  such as the Asahi and the [Tokyo] 
Nichinichi  tended to  pick holes in the army. They t r i e d  
to  f ind  evi l  in f luence in the  s ta t io n in g  of  t roops .  On 
the  o ther  hand, those of  the local [Japanese-owned] 
newspapers in Shantung, as well as the newspapers from 
whose provinces the t roops came, p ra ised  the m i l i t a r y  
e x p lo i t s  and emphasised the need f o r  the permanent s t a t ­
ioning of  the t roops .  Each par ty  put forward i t s  own
s e l f i s h  a rguments . '5
On both occasions,  however, i t  was the supposedly ' a n t i - m i l i t a r y ' 
and ' a n t i - S e i y u k a i ' metropol i tan  newspapers which seemed more eager  to
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se n sa t io n a l i s e  the telegrams which e i t h e r  pra ised  the m i l i t a r y  ac t ions  
o r ,  in the case of  the Tsinan in c id e n t ,  l a b e l l e d  China as ’e v i l 1.
Indeed, the  'Seiyukai newspapers’ such as the  Fukuoka Nichinichi and the 
Shin Aichi of  Nagoya, with t h e i r  smaller  headings than t h e i r  m etropol i ­
tan r i v a l s ,  appeared much q u ie t e r  in t h e i r  r e p o r t i n g , ^  Tables XIII - 
XV (see Appendix pp3C8/310) in d ica te  the number of  telegrams from China 
which were published in the Tokyo Asahi , the  Tokyo Nichinichi  and the 
Fukuoka Nichinichi in the week immediately a f t e r  the outbreak of  the 
inc iden t .  Communications between Tsinan and o the r  c i t i e s  in China and 
Japan had been cu t  off fo r  two days p r io r  to  the inc iden t  and telecommuni­
ca t ion  between Tsinan and Tsingtao was not revived fo r  two weeks. Most 
of  the  telegrams l i s t e d  in the  t a b le s  were th e re fo re  despatched from 
c i t i e s  l i k e  Tsingtao,  Peking and even Shanghai r a th e r  than Tsinan i t ­
s e l f ,  Moreover, they had been sen t  in the  f i r s t  in s tance  by an army 
o f f i c e r ,  Sakai Takashi ,  who was a t tached  to  the  consula te  a t  Tsinan but 
who v i r t u a l l y  monopolised the  only communication means a v a i l a b l e ,  i . e .  
the w ire le ss  a t  the  consu la te ,  without the knowledge of  the consula te  
s t a f f s . ^
The way in which the newspapers published  these  unconfirmed t e l e ­
grams was no d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  during the  Manchuria c r i s i s  a few 
years  l a t e r .  While the re  was l i t t l e  c r i t i c i s e  d i re c te d  a t  the  
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in these  despatches,  China - in t h i s  case the 
revo lu t ionary  army -  remained the  v i l l a i n  with such headings as 'ALAS, 
THIS ATROCITY! ’ (from Ts ing tao) ,  'HEAVEN FORBIDS THIS BRUTALITY! '
(from T s in g ta o ) ,18 and 'JAPANESE RESIDENTS MASSACRED BY SOUTHERN CHINESE 
ARMY AT TSINAN1 (from T ien ts in )  were a t tached  to  the shor t  telegrams
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which of ten  contained nothing more than a rumour. The following Tokyo 
Nichinichi telegram was a typ ica l  example o f  the manner in which the  
t e x t  of  such unconfirmed despatches were presented to  the  reader :
There i s  a rumour t h a t  ON THE MORNING OF 3 MAY ABOUT 
ONE HUNDRED JAPANESE RESIDENTS WERE MASSACRED BY THE 
CHINESE SOLDIERS.T9
This w i l l ingness  on the p a r t  of  the  newspapers to s e n s a t io n a l i s e  
the  telegrams had always e x i s t e d .  What was d i f f e r e n t  t h i s  t ime was 
t h a t  these  telegrams had o r ig in a t e d ,  i f  nominally, from t h e i r  own co r ­
respondents or  the  news agencies  r a th e r  than the government departments 
such as the  Army or  the Foreign M inis t ry ,  As Tables XIII - XV (see 
Appendix pp.308/310) i n d i c a t e ,  the number of  ' o f f i c i a l '  telegrams pub­
l i shed  in the  newspapers was n e g l ig ib le  compared to  t h a t  from the com­
mercial sources . This was in marked c o n t r a s t  to the s i t u a t i o n  a t  the
time of  the  Siberian  expedi t ion when the m ajo r i ty  o f  the telegrams were
20marked as ' r ece ived  by the Army M in i s t ry ' ,  This did not mean t h a t  
the content  of  these despatches had changed very much but i t  meant t h a t  
the p o ten t ia l  ro le  played by the corespondents had become more impor­
t a n t  than ever  before .  Conversely, i t  meant t h a t  the Army needed to  
u t i l i s e  them more sys tem a t ica l ly  i f  i t  was to  overcome the h i t h e r t o  
ap a th e t ic  a t t i t u d e s  of  the  Japanese people towards i t .  This i t  did 
with a cons iderable  degree of  success in the immediate af termath  of  the 
Tsinan in c id en t .
The monopoly of  the  communication f a c i l i t i e s  by the m i l i t a r y  
a u t h o r i t i e s  continued even a f t e r  15 May 1928 and the consula te  general 
a t  Tsingtao had l i t t l e  information to  o f f e r ,  whereas the army o f f i c e r s  
were very well informed, as The New York Times correspondent,  H. Abend,
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21discovered.  This read iness  on the  p a r t  of  the Army was l a rg e ly  due 
to  the  following in s t r u c t io n s  which had been given to  the s ta t io n in g  
troops from Matsumoto Kenj i,  the  c h ie f  of  s t a f f  of  the Sixth
Division:
p h e  China s ec t ion  of  the i n t e l l i g e n c e  department] 
should follow up publ ic  opinion in China and make 
d i r e c t  use of  the  Japanese press  o rgan isa t ions  and 
u t i l i s e  the Chinese ones i f  poss ib le  to  propagate 
favourable  opinions  f o r  the  enforcement o f  our 
nat ional  pol icy  and in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s , . . .
I t  i s  hardly s u rp r i s in g  t h a t  the J a p a n e s ^ i i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s
a t  Tsinan exerc ised  ind isc r im ina te  censorship on the outgoing despatches
from the correspondents which subsequently led to  a publ ic  accusa t ion
23in the Chicago Tribune ag a in s t  the Japanese government. Foreign 
M inis te r  Tanaka, who was s e n s i t i v e  to  the  bad e f f e c t  t h a t  such ac t ion  
might have on publ ic  opinion abroad, wrote on 26 May to ac t ing  Consul 
General Nishida a t  Tsinan:
Needless to  say ,  you should never take any ac t ion  
such as censoring mails or  telegrams which can be r e g a r ­
ded as the enforcement of  m i l i t a r y  adm in is t ra t ion  
unless  i t  i s  a b so lu te ly  necessary.  Our army should 
t h e re fo re  r e f r a in  as much as poss ib le  from g e t t in g  
involved with the censorship c a r r ied  out by the Chi­
nese in the name of  a s s i s ta n c e  and correspondence.
Please make sure to inform t h i s  to  the m i l i t a r y  au tho­
r i t i e s  in your a rea .  I have already consulted the 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  h e r e ,
Unlike the fore ign  correspondents ,  however, many of  the Japanese 
correspondents  were only too w i l l in g  to accept  such ' a s s i s t a n c e '  from 
the army. The correspondents  of  the two g ian t  newspapers were given 
every imaginable help from the d iv is io n a l  headquarters  to  shoot a f i lm
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about Tsinan a f t e r  the  i n c id e n t ,  which was subsequent ly adver t i sed  and 
re leased  f ree  to  th e  publ ic  under the headings l ik e  ’FILMED WITH 
DO-OR-DIE SPIRIT BY OUR CORRESPONDENT1. 25 They were a lso  supplied  with 
the  w r i t t e n  impressions of the  inc iden t  c o l l e c te d  almost f o rc ib ly  
from the Japanese r e s id e n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  refugees and t he hosp i ta l  
s t a f f  in charge of  the  wounded, which were duly published in Japan.
The local  Japanese language newspaper, Se i to  Nippo ( the  Tsif?tao Daily) 
was a l so  taken over by the i n t e l l i g e n c e  sec t ion  which sent  out over 
one thousand copies of  t h i s  newspaper to  var ious- o rgan isa t ions  in 
China as well as in Japan. I n f lu e n t i a l  v i s i t o r s  from Japan such as 
Diet members were provided with the  f u l l e s t  possib le  explanat ion  of 
the  ’r e a l '  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  was, according to  the d iv is iona l  headquar­
t e r s ,  a l l  to  ’co r re c t  any wrong observat ion being presented by the 
press to the  people in Japan and to  c rea te  a un i f ied  na t ional  opinion 
in support  of  the  occupying troops’. ^
These t a c t i c s  worked so long as the consula tes  remained i l l -  
informed, As the  temporary h y s te r i a  over the in c id en t  subsided,  how­
ever ,  the press  in Japan, armed with the more accura te  l a t e r  accounts 
of  the  s i t u a t i o n  provided by~the~ Foreign Minis try  as well as those of  
the more & n t i -m i l i t a ry '  correspondents ,  revived i t s  c r i t i c i s m  of  the 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  I t  was in t h i s  context  t h a t  the d iv i s io n a l  head­
quar te rs  a t  Tsinan r e a l i s e d  the need to  'e duca te '  the correspondents 
more sys tem a t ica l ly  as the in t e l l i g e n c e  sec t ion  suggested:
Among the newspapers in Japan, those which were opposed 
to  the government published a r t i c l e s  disadvantageous 
to  the t roops .  This in turn  was sometimes u t i l i s e d  by 
the  Chinese newspapers and diplomats as mater ia l  which 
they could tu rn  to  advantage in the Sino-Japanese nego­
t i a t i o n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  over the  Tsinan in c id e n t .  Even
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the d isorganised  Chinese newspapers did not publish 
a r t i c l e s  which d isregarded nat ional  defence cons ide ra ­
t i o n .  We be l ieve  t h a t  we should not only provide the  
method to  educate the  correspondents  but to  study 
f u r t h e r  how to  control  them.27
Such r e a l i s a t i o n  by the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  t h i s  ju n c tu re  
was to  prove of  v i t a l  importance as the Foreign M inis t ry ,  confronted 
by the  growing an t i -Japanese  sentiment in China and embarrassed by 
the a s sa s s in a t io n  of  Chang T s o - l in ,  looked s e t  to  conduct the  Sino- 
Japanese negotations  even more s e c r e t i v e ly  than befo re ,  which in turn  
was bound to increase  the h o s t i l i t y  among the correspondents  who were 
eager to  obta in  more, i f  not f u l l ,  information over the  n e g o t i a t io n s .
3, Correspondents and the Foreign Ministry
The Japanese press  had long looked to  the government fo r  o f f i -  
28c ia l  guidance and the  es tabl ishment  o f  the  Information Bureau by the
Foreign Ministry  in 1920 was designed to  f u l f i l  t h i s  need with i t s
twice-daily interviews with the Japanese press  and th ree  times weekly
29meetings with the fore ign correspondents .  The growing, i f  s u p e r f i c i a l ,  
bond between the Bureau and the press  was r e f l e c t e d  in the support  given 
by th e  Foreign Ministry  f o r  the es tab l ishm ent  of  the cooperat ive  news 
agency, Rengo, in 1926,
On the o ther  hand, the r e l a t io n s h ip  between the consula tes  and 
the  correspondents  in China had never been so c lose  as t h a t  in Japan.
No press  o f f i c e r  to deal with the correspondents  was a t tached  to any
30of the consulates.in s p i t e  of  t h e i r  repeated request  to the M inis t ry .
The d i f f i c u l t y  was enhanced by the s t r i c t  secrecy in which the  consula te  
o f f i c i a l s  had to conduct the  n eg o t ia t io n s ,  I t  was perhaps too wishful 
fo r  the  Foreign Ministry  and the consula tes  to hope t h a t  the correspon­
dents and t h e i r  employers in Japan who asp ired  fo r  'scoops '  would not
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outwit  them, and the f i r s t  occasion a r r iv ed  towards the end of  1928.
Consul General in Shanghai, Yata S h ic h i t a ro ,  who had been 
engaged in the nego t ia t ions  over the Tsinan in c id e n t ,  decided to stop 
the correspondents  coming in to  his  o f f i c e  f o r  in terviews and to l e t  
them see vice-Consul Iguchi in the  drawing room in s tead .  On 18 January 
1929, the  day before M in is ter  Yoshizawa was due to  a r r i v e  from Peking, 
however, Yata himself  met the correspondents  from f e a r  t h a t  any mis­
judged repo r t  on the nego t ia t ions  would be detr imenta l  to  the  d e l i c a t e  
Sino-Japanese r e l a t io n s h ip .  Despite doing so, h is  apprehensions were 
to  be r e a l i s e d ,
Hochi Shinbun, the Tokyo d a i ly ,  e i t h e r  misquoted or  ' f a b r i c a t e d '  
a telegram concerning t h i s  in terv iew under the name of  ' Rengo te leg ram 1 
on 19 January which quoted Yata to  have sa id  t h a t  'owing to  the  incon­
s i s t e n t  China diplomacy of  the  p resen t  government, China w i l l  take
31advantage o f  t h i s  weakness of  J a p a n ' .  The Foreign Minis t ry  immedi­
a t e ly  i n s t ru c te d  Yata to  r e le a se  his  views in the form o f  a s ta tement 
r a th e r  than an in te rv iew  so as to avoid the  recurrence of  such an 
in c id en t ,  Yata was, however, to  u t i l i s e  t h i s  developmentto make the 
cu r ren t  n ego t ia t ions  even more s e c re t iv e  as he wrote back to  Foreign 
M inis te r  Tanaka on 22 January:
I be l ieve  t h a t  I have acquired a good excuse f o r  my 
manoeuvring of  them [ i , e .  the Japanese correspondents]  
and I wi l l  most c e r t a i n l y  refuse  any fu tu re  in te rv iew s ,
I should be g ra te fu l  i f  you arrange to  make Hochi Shinbun 
publish a s ta tement withdrawing the te legram according to 
the  Newspaper Law, I t  i s  necessary fo r  my t a c t i c a l  
deal ings  with them.32
Although t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  te legram was supposed to  have o r ig ina ted  
from Rengo which received  subsidy from the Foreign M inis t ry ,  the 
company which most f requen t ly  annoyed the consula tes  was the independent
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news agency, Dentsu. Dentsu's  leaning towards sensa t ional ism  had been 
known f o r  a long time and as such i t  had received repeated warnings 
from the Minis t ry .  On 2 March 1926, f o r  example, Foreign M inis ter  
Shidehara received a l e t t e r  from Yata on a small i n c id e n t  on the Yangtse 
which had been g ro ss ly  d i s t o r t e d  by Dentsu:
Fabr ica t ions  by the correspondents  a r e ,  to  some e x te n t ,  
fo rg ivab le  owing to  the  compet it ive n eces s i ty  to  rep o r t  
quickly .  Those by the head o f f i c e s  a r e ,  however, t o t a l l y  
inexcusable .  When I summoned and questioned the  head 
o f  the Dentsu Shanghai o f f i c e  which had always supplied  
' s e n s a t i o n a l ' te legrams,  h is  answer was: ' I  thought
t h a t  I had sen t  a re so lu te  te legram, but I was scorned 
by the head o f f i c e  t h a t  i t  was not enough'.  When I 
enquired in to  i t  f u r t h e r  by saying,  'bu t  how can you 
f ind  m a t e r i a l s ? 1, he r e p l i e d ,  ' I  can always make them 
up' in a mat ter  of  f a c t  way, I was s t ruck  dumb with
amazement.33
By the spring o f  1929, Dentsu had a lready been barred from
c o l l e c t i n g  m ate r ia ls  a t  the government departments of  China in Peking
owing to  i t s  sensa t ional  r epor t ings  over the  Tsinan in c id e n t .  I t s
correspondents in the c i t y  th e re fo re  had been forced to  r e ly  more or
le ss  so le ly  on the regu la r  in terviews a t  the  Japanese lega t ion  and
34the 'news' from the m i l i t a ry  o f f i c e r s  a t tached  to  i t .  The increas ing  
secrecy surrounding the  neg o t ia t io n s  over the  Tsinan in c id en t  and the 
railways in Manchuria had turned the Dentsu and o ther  correspondents  
f u r th e r  towards these  se rv ice  o f f i c e r s .  This in tu rn  caused more 
embarrassment to  the Foreign Minis try  and the consula te  which were 
incapable of prevent ing t h i s  t r e n d ,  as the following note from charg£ 
d ' a f f a i r s  Hori on 7 March suggested.
Considering t h a t  the Dentsu correspondent  concerned is  
sometimes reported  to  have conveyed propaganda 
repor ts  based on the information provided by the m i l i ­
t a r y  a t taches ,  i t  probably o r ig in a te d  from these
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o f f i c e r s ,  Although on every opportuni ty  I have warned 
them not to d i s t r i b u t e  t h e i r  propaganda r e p o r t s ,  I have 
not been s u c c e s s f u l . , , .  As you know, the Japanese autho­
r i t i e s  have been troubled  by the various  unfounded repor ts  
sen t  and received by the  correspondents  in the wake of
the s i t u a t i o n , 35
Such a tendency on the p a r t  of  Dentsu may well have a r i s e n  
p a r t ly  from i t s  h o s t i l i t y  towards the Foreign Minis try  which subsid ised  
i t s  r i v a l ,  Rengo, whose ' r e l i a b i l i t y *  and ' r e s p e c t a b i l i t y '  had, in t u rn ,  
been enhanced in s p i t e  of  i t s  l a t e  s t a r t  as a news agency. At l e a s t ,  
t h i s  was the general f ee l in g  among the consula te  o f f i c i a l s .  As Hayashi 
Kyujiro,  the  consul general a t  Mukden, reported  on 29 November 1928:
I t  has been a very n o t iceab le  t rend  recen t ly  t h a t  
f ac tua l  repo r ts  have to  be obtained from Rengo as 
much as p oss ib le .  Dentsu's  Mukden o f f i c e  i s  prompt 
in i t s  r epor t ing  a c t i v i t y ,  but a l o t  of  imported 
repo r ts  [from Japan] are ' s e n s a t i o n a l i s e d 1.35
As Hayashi 's  l e t t e r  suggested, the local  o f f i c e s  of  the two 
Japanese news agencies  in  China were ac t ing  not only as the 'e x p o r te r '  
o f  news to  Japan but as the  ' im por te r '  o f  news from Japan. Indeed, 
they had been supplying r ep o r t s  from Japan and o ther  par ts  of  China to 
the  local newspapers in China regard less  of  t h e i r  ownership. The more 
sensa t ional  the repo r ts  from Japan^hey supp l ied ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  the g r e a te r  
the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of these  telegrams being ' u t i l i s e d '  to  f u r th e r  the  
an t i -Japanese  sentiment in China, as Hori r e g re t t e d  in his  l e t t e r  from 
Peking to Tokyo on 28 March 1929:
Dentsu tends to rehash the a r t i c l e s  in the newspapers 
in Japan and to  d i s t r i b u t e  ' s e n s a t io n a l '  r ep o r t s .  As 
a r e s u l t ,  i t  has of ten  been u t i l i s e d  by some quar te rs  
here ,  thus g e t t in g  us in to  t r o u b l e . 37
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The e f f e c t s  of  such a tendency had not  been confined to  o f f i c i a l  
q u a r t e r s .  Although the Japanese newspapers tended only to  re p o r t  the 
hardening a t t i t u d e s  among the Japanese r e s id en ts  as a reac t ion  towards 
the growing an t i -Japanese  sentiment of  t h e i r  Chinese neighbours,  
even though t h i s  had i t s e l f  o f ten  been of  t h e i r  own making, the  more 
conscient ious  among them had f e l t  genuine concern over t h i s  tendency.
In 1927, j u s t  a f t e r  the expedi t ion  had been c a r r i e d  ou t ,  a Japanese 
merchant in Manchuria wrote to  the  Tokyo Nichinichi e d i t o r  in the 
Tsunobue column:
Japanese r e s id e n t s  are  facing enormous obs tac le s  in 
t h e i r  business t r a n sa c t io n s  because of  the 'nonsense'  
fyota]  telegrams f i l l e d  with f a l s e  information which 
nave been publ ished a l l  over Japan. We have been much 
a f f e c t e d ,  d i r e c t l y  or  i n d i r e c t l y ,  and the s i t u a t i o n  
i s  becoming more l i k e  t h a t  of  'nonsense telegrams 
k i l l  the  r e s i d e n t s ' .  I urge you t h a t  you wil l  give 
cool judgments on the telegrams not only from Man­
churia  but a l so  from C h i n a . 33
A year  l a t e r ,  a Japanese r e s id e n t  c r i t i c  in China, Goto Chotaro", 
c r i t i c i s e d  the Japanese press  fo r  preventing the es tab l ishment  of  
'n a t io n a l  diplomacy' between the two peoples which the press  had always 
claimed to be i t s  f in a l  goal .  The p u b l ica t ion  of  only those  which 
reported the  an t i -Japanese  movements or murders of  Japanese re s id e n ts  
by the ' b a n d i t s '  simply encouraged, according to him, the p ro tagon is t s  
o f  an t i -Chinese  movements in Japan. Goto contended in Gaikoj iho:
The a t t i t u d e s  of the  Japanese people are too obvious 
and honest and contain too l i t t l e  l a t i t u t d e .  They 
get fur ious  too e a s i ly  and tend to acquire  an acute  
p leasure  from making every Chinese ac t ion  an o b jec t  
of  a t t a c k .  Some ea rn es t  ones are even convinced t h a t  
they want to  be in the f o r e f ro n t  o f  t h i s  c o n s ta n t ly .
I bel ieve  t h a t  t h i s  i s  nothing more than 'a r icecake 
in a p i c tu r e '  of those  who do not understand China.39
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The p ro tagon is t s  in the ^ f o re f ro n t1 were exac t ly  what many of  
the  Japanese correspondents  in China were becoming in the spring of 
1929. P red ic ta b ly ,  an increas ing  number of  p ro te s t s  to  the Foreign 
M inis t ry  were issued  by the  Chinese government request ing  the t i g h t e r  
control  of  the ant i -Chinese  a r t i c l e s  in Japan,  which in turn  flowed 
in to  China in an exaggerated form. The i n a b i l i t y  on the  p a r t  of the 
Foreign Minis t ry  to  comply with the Chinese request  in s p i t e  of  i t s  
cooperat ion with the  Pol ice  Bureau of  the Home Ministry  and the Communi­
cations Minis try  forced the consula tes  to  devise a s tandard  rep ly  to 
the  Chinese government. Although the wording may have var ied  s l i g h t l y ,  
the  content  of  the  following telegram of 30 October 1929 by Shigemitsu 
Mamoru, the  consul general in Shanghai a t  the time and l a t e r  the  Min is ter  
to  China, to  Foreign M in is ter  Shidehara was often repeated  by himself  
and his  co l leagues :
I to ld  the Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  Japanese o f f i c i a l s  to control  the newspapers and 
news agencies  o f f i c i a l l y .  I a lso  sa id  t h a t  i t  was c le a r  
t h a t  the Japanese people f e l t  sympathy with the  Chinese 
people and t h a t  Japan would not  b e n e f i t  from her involve­
ment in the d is turbance of  the  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in 
China. I added, however, t h a t  I would do my b es t  in my 
capac i ty .  I sha l l  be giving guidance to the p a r t i e s  con­
cerned in the b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  would be e f f e c t i v e  in induc­
ing the  Chinese to  comply with our demands concerning the 
control of  the  an t i -Japanese  a r t i c l e s . 40
This was mere p l a t i t u d e ,  however, and le ss  than two months l a t e r ,  
impat ient  with the in e f fec t iv en ess  of  such p r o t e s t s ,  the Chinese govern­
ment reso r ted  to  d i r e c t  ac t ion  by suspending the a c t i v i t y  of  DentsTi 
and warned the  o the r  correspondents  o f  the  danger of  rece iv ing  the 
same t reatment.  This f i n a l l y  prompted Shigemitsu to request  Shidehara 
to ask fo r  the cooperation of  the m i l i t a r y  a u th o r i t i e s  in Tokyo as well
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as the long overdue i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  a press  a t tache  a t  every major 
consula te  in China, Shigemitsu wrote on 23 December:
The correspondents  do not l i k e  the  f a i r  observat ions  
provided by the consula tes  and are w i l l in g  to con tac t  
the  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n isa t io n s ,  thus in v i t in g  the mis­
understanding t h a t  they are  aiming a t  the confusion of  
the Chinese s i t u a t i o n .  Needless to  say, t h i s  i s  not the 
t ru e  in t e n t io n  of  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  I bel ieve  
t h a t  to  e l iminate  such abuse,  i t  i s  advisable  fo r  
the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in Tokyo to  issue  s t r i c t  
i n s t r u c t io n s  to the  o u t s t a t i o n  a u t h o r i t i e s  in order  
to  make i t  t o t a l l y  impossible fo r  the  l a t t e r  to  supply 
m a te r ia ls  to  the newspapes and news agencies .  I urge 
you to work to  t h i s  end .41
Such at tempts  had a l ready  been made under the  d i r e c t io n  of  
Shidehara and Tanaka before  him, and the  Foreign Minis try  had been ab le ,  
to  some e x t e n t ,  to  e s t a b l i s h  a c lo se r  working r e l a t io n s h ip  with the 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in Tokyo. The M i l i t a ry  A f fa i r s  Sect ion of  the 
Army M inis t ry ,  fo r  example, had sen t  the following i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  four  
months before  Shigemitsu 's  r eq u es t ,  to  the o f f i c e r s  a t tached  to  the 
l ega t ion  in Peking and the consula tes  in o the r  Chinese c i t i e s :
The use of  the shortwave owned by the Foreign Minis try
f o r  m i l i t a ry  telegrams i s  under n e g o t i a t i o n   I t  i s
advised t h a t  you take the utmost caution to  prevent 
the  lack of  understanding [between you and the  consu­
l a t e  o f f i c i a l s ]  which has, in the p a s t ,  sometimes been 
reported  concerning the communication f a c i l i t i e s . 42
The c lo s e r  cooperation in Tokyo did no t ,  however, n ec e s sa r i ly  
lead to a s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n  in China. What Tokyo did not f u l l y  r e a l i s e  
was t h a t  the o f f i c e r s  and the  correspondents  in China had s u f f i c i e n t  
in common to become more sympathetic than a n ta g o n is t i c  towards each 
o the r .  As Shigemitsu r e a l i s e d ,  the Japanese correspondents  in China 
were not very well acquainted with in t e rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Like 
t h e i r  fe llow rep o r te r s  in Japan, they were genera l ly  young and
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inexper ienced,  and to  most of  them China was t h e i r  f i r s t  overseas 
assignment.  At the same time,  they were eager  to  outdo t h e i r  colleagues 
in  Europe and the  U,S, who had been regarded as the ’e l i t e '  among the 
employees of  the newspapers and news agencies .  Much of  t h i s  applied  
also  to  the  m i l i t a r y  a t t ach es  a t  the consula tes  in China who were 
becoming in c reas ing ly  impat ien t  with the more moderate a t t i t u d e s  of  
t h e i r  super io rs  in Tokyo, and were th e re fo re  supplying audacious 
c r i t i c i s m  of  the p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in China mainly from t h e i r  r a th e r  
narrow m i l i t a r y  po in t  of  view. Shigemitsu wrote to Shidehara on the 
e f f e c t  of  such a f f i n i t i e s  between the correspondents  and the m i l i t a r y  
a t taches  in  China on 23 December 1929:
Looking a t  the c u r ren t  s t a t e  of  the Japanese co r ­
respondents ,  they are  a l l  too eager in t h e i r  chase 
a f t e r  novel m a te r ia l s .  They pay l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  to 
what the  r ep o r t s  from Japan as well as o ther  p a r t s  of 
China wil l  have on the  Si no-Japanese r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
They tend d e l i b e r a t e l y  to  accept and despatch these  
c l e a r l y  propaganda repor ts  and rumours so long as 
t h e i r  contents  are ' s e n s a t io n a l ' . -  Such tendency has 
been p a r t i c u l a r l y  no t iceab le  rec e n t ly .  As a r e s u l t ,  
i t  i s  not ra re  f o r  them to  have had bad e f f e c t s  on 
the r e l a t io n s h ip  between the two coun tr ie s  which i s  
f i l l e d  with d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n s . 4 3
4. Correspondents and the Chinese Goverment
While press  a t t e n t io n  during most of  the year  1930 was focused 
on the  controversy over the  London naval t r e a t y ,  the c o n f l i c t  between 
the  Japanese correspondents  and the  Chinese government had been simmer­
ing q u ie t ly  u n t i l  i t  f i n a l l y  came to  the surface  towards the summer. 
This time i t  was the  Osaka Mainichi, the parent company of  the Tokyo 
N ich in ich i , t h a t  was the cen t re  o f  d ispu te .
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I t  a l l  s t a r t e d  with the pub l ica t ion  of  a lengthy ’te leg ram ’ 
sent  by i t s  correspondent,  Tanaka Yukitoshi ,  in the two s i s t e r  news­
papers on 19 June, This despatch was e n t i t l e d  ’ Interview with Mr.
Chiang Kai-shek a t  the F ro n t ’ and was presented as the ’top a r t i c l e '
44on the  f ro n t  page covering s ix  columns. Despite the  head l ine ,  however,
Chiang had apparent ly  never given the in terv iew .  S t i l l  more i n f u r i a t i n g
to the Chinese l eader  was i t s  reference to  h is  ' female companion’
who was not h is  w ife ,  and who accompanied him ’even on h is  inspec t ion  
45t o u r ' ,  Chiang subsequently sen t  a formal complaint through the
Chinese government to  the Japanese correspondents '  club in Shanghai
and th rea tened  to  f i l e  an o f f i c i a l  p r o t e s t  with the Japanese govern­
ment. Alarmed, Consul Kamimutfra a t  Nanking summoned the Osaka 
Mainichi correspondent  in the  c i t y ,  Yoshioka, who subsequent ly  con­
fessed t h a t  his  employer, having heard of  Chiang's r e a c t io n ,  had sen t  
Tanaka Yukitoshi to  Shanghai to  f ind  out and re p o r t  back immediately on
(1) the  p r iv a te  behaviour of both the Chinese leader  and h is  wife ,
(2) his  ^extravagant? conduct and her  pas t  h i s t o r y ,
(3) the emotional s t r a i n s  between the couple caused by the ' in te rv ie w '  
e t c .  Kamimura wrote to  Shidehara on 26 June:
Such personal a t t a c k  wi l l  not only damage the p re s t ig e
of  a major newspaper l i k e  the  Osaka Mainichi but a lso
a f f e c t  cons iderably  the Si no-Japanese r e l a t io n s h ip .
I th e r e fo re  s t rong ly  in s t ru c te d  Yoshioka to r e f r a i n  
from despatching such ' r e p o r t s '  and he expressed h is  
sympathy towards my view. I be l ieve  t h a t  you should 
l ikewise  i n s t r u c t  Shanghai to  show utmost caut ion on 
t h i s  sub jec t  and the Osaka Mainichi head o f f i c e  should 
be admonished from the Foreign Minis try i t s e l f . 4 °
This i n c id e n t ,  however, did not end here.  The Asahi of  Tokyo 
and Osaka published a r e p o r t  on 7 Ju ly  quoting Chiang’s outrage over
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47the unfounded ' i n t e r v i e w 1 by Tanaka Yukitoshi ,  which in turn  led 
to the Immediate launching of  a 'p o s i t i v e  campaign' aga ins t  the Chinese 
government by the execut ive  comnittee of  h i s  employer, the Osaka 
M ain ichi . Only hours a f t e r  the appearance of  the Asahi a r t i c l e ,  
the Osaka Mainichi Shanghai correspondent,  Sawamura, was warned to be 
prepared to  follow t h i s  campaign and his  col league a t  Nanking, Yoshioka, 
to be ready to  leave a t  a moment's n o t ic e .  Such was the r i v a l r y  
between the two newspaper concerns t h a t  Shigemitsu, now charg£ 
d ' a f f a i r e s . reported  to  Shidehara on 9 Ju ly :
Sawamura added t h a t  though he did not know the d e ta i l e d  
p o l ic ie s  of  the campaign, he thought t h a t  they were 
(1) to  expose the f a c t  t h a t  Nanking had been working 
on every Japanese t rad ing  company to  get  i t s  war 
expense, (2) to s ide  with the Northern c l iq u e s ,
(3) to  d i sc lo se  the  p r iv a te  conduct of  Chiang Kai-shek
  I had hoped t h a t  t h i s  mat ter  would not become
a big a f f a i r .  I bel ieve  t h a t  should the Osaka Mainichi 
r e s o r t  to  such p o l i c i e s  hencefor th because of  i t s  r iv a l r y  
ag a in s t  the Asahi , i t  would not  only a f f e c t  the  r e l a t i o n ­
ship  between the two coun t r ie s  but a lso  damage the repu­
t a t i o n  of  both newspapers. I urge you th e re fo re  to 
advise  the Osaka Mainichi in an appropr ia te  w a y . 48
While these requests  poured in to  the Foreign Minis try  from 
China, the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichinichi  went on to  publ ish  
another  a r t i c l e  by the unrepentant Tanaka Yukitoshi to  chal lenge 
the Asahi r e p o r t .  I t  read:
Why did they take such a t t i t u d e s ?  Those who have read 
my telegram c a r e fu l ly  or who know how I ou twit ted  the 
other  correspondents  in reaching the b a t t l e f r o n t  would 
dismiss i t  with a laugh. I simply wrote the fac tsand  
had no o ther  in t e n t io n s .  As I composed i t  on the  busy 
b a t t l e f r o n t ,  however, I cannot guarantee t h a t  there  
was abso lu te ly  no mistake in the te leg ram .49
Shidehara,  who had been very r e lu c t a n t  to get  involved with any
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a f f a i r s  o f  t h i s  kind, remained s u rp r i s in g ly  le n ie n t  to  such develop­
ment and wrote back to  Shigemitsu two days l a t e r  on 18 Ju ly :
I bel ieved t h a t  t h i s  a f f a i r  had a r i sen  mainly from 
the r i v a l r y  between the  two newspaper concerns and 
f e l t  i t  advisable  not to get involved too much. I 
l e t ,  however, the vice-Foreign Minis ter  immediately 
advise the Osaka Mainichi through the General Manager 
of  the  Tokyo N ic h m ic h i , Okazaki,  f o r  more caution a t  
the time. The despatch from Tanaka published on 16 
Ju ly  could be taken as an apo loget ic  one in some way.
I have so f a r  not seen any a r t i c l e s  which we should 
be concerned a b o u t .80
What the Foreign M in is te r  did not r e a l i s e  was t h a t  the h o s t i l i t y
o f  the  Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichinichi  towards China had been
growing, i f  s t e a d i l y ,  s ince the es tabl ishment  of  the East Asia Research
Centre (T5a Chosakai) by t h e i r  chairman, Motoyama Hikoichi ,  on 27
Ju ly  1929, bare ly  th ree  weeks a f t e r  Shidehara resumed h is  duty as Foreign
M inis te r  o f  the  new Minseito c a b in e t .  Consist ing mostly of  the  s t a f f
51members of the e d i t o r i a l  department of  the  two s i s t e r  newspapers,  
the ch ie f  aim of  t h i s  Centre was to  's tudy the  nat ional  p o l i c y 1 on 
i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  because, Motoyama claimed, the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
were too preoccupied with the immediate power s t ru g g le  within  the coun­
t r y  to  produce any coherent pol icy  towards t h e Mgrave c r i s i s  in East  
52A s ia ' .  At i t s  second conference on 8 February 1930, the Centre 
passed r e so lu t io n s  on what i t  considered the f iv e  most immediate 
i ssues  between China and Japan including e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  and 
an t i -Japanese  boycotts .  When the conclusions  of  t h i s  conference were 
sent out to  var ious  government departments and p r iv a te  o rg a n i s a t io n s ,  
both within and without Japan,  in Japanese,  Chinese and English,  
however, the re so lu t io n  on railway cons truc t ion  was l e f t  out owing t o ,  
according to  Motoyama, ' i t s  poss ib le  e f f e c t s  on the Si no-Japanese
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r e l a t io n s h ip  a t  the t im e ' .  Even so,  as he himself r e ca l l e d  two years  
l a t e r ,  the repercussions  o f  t h i s  ac t ion  by the Centre were cons ide rab le :
The s p i r i t  o f  these  r e so lu t io n s  was t h a t  we should 
not follow behind Europe or the U.S. in deal ing with 
China or  Russia but pursue forcefu l  (kyoko) diplomacy. 
Nobody d isagrees  with i t  today, but in those  days even 
the  government o f f i c i a l s  were very embarrassed to  rece ive  
them. Some people misunderstood i t  and c a l le d  us r e a c ­
t io n a ry .  I t  was only a f t e r  the outbreak of  the  Manchuria 
inc iden t  l a s t  September t h a t  the  nat ion r e a l i s e d  how 
i n f l u e n t i a l  these  r e so lu t io n s  had been.83
When press  a t t e n t io n  was r e c a s t  on China following the  su b s i ­
dence of  the  controversy over the London naval t r e a t y  towards the end 
of  1930, i t s  focus was, not s u rp r i s in g ly ,  the  'r a i lway  i s s u e ' .  The 
press  in Tokyo s t a r t e d  to  publish  a r t i c l e s  demanding an e a r ly  s e t t l e ­
ment of  t h i s  s e n s i t i v e  issue e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  Chang Hsueh-l iang 's  
v i s i t  to Chiang Kai-shek during the months of  November and December.
The increas ing  number of  ' a n t i -C h in e se ' despatches in the major 
Japanese newspapers led to  a s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n  in  the number of  o f f i ­
c ia l  p ro te s t s  f i l e d  by the  Chinese government which in turn  made the
54Japanese consu la tes  more defensive .  The continuing s i l e n c e  on the 
sub jec t  by the Foreign Minis try and the South Manchuria Railway which 
were to  begin the neg o t ia t io n s  with the Chinese a t  Mukden a t  the end 
of January 1931 even tempted the Foreign M in is t ry -subs id ised  Rengo to 
d i s t r i b u t e  f a b r i c a te d  'despatches  from Mukden'. Only t h i s  time i t  
was the head o f f i c e  r a th e r  than the correspondents  t h a t  was d i r e c t l y  
respons ib le .
These ' te leg ram s '  claimed (1) t h a t  China would r e s t r i c t  the 
South Manchuria Railways with a plan to bui ld  a railway network based
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on the an t i -Japanese  dec is ion  taken by both Chiang Kai-shek and Chang
Hsueh-liang, (2) t h a t  China intended to  e s t a b l i s h  a bank a t  Mukden
with 30 m i l l ion  yuans j o i n t l y  f inanced by B r i t a in  and China, and
(3) t h a t  the an t i -Japanese  tendency a t  Mukden had been e s p e ic a l ly
no t iceab le  r e ce n t ly .  The Rengo head o f f i c e  a lso  re leased  a ' te legram
from Nanking' suggesting t h a t  the r e l a t io n s h ip  between Chang Hsueh-
l iang  and his  i n f l u e n t i a l  uncle had been d e t e r i o r a t i n g ,  thus increasing
55the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  c i v i l  war in Manchuria e t c .  The r e s u l t  of  these 
repo r ts  was i l l u s t r a t e d  in the  following Tokyo Asahi leader  o f  24 
January:
What we cannot overlook i s  his  [ i . e .  Sh idehara 's j  
misunderstanding of and conclusions about the Chinese 
s i t u a t i o n , . . .  Why has he no t ,  in the  name of  the 
Japanese people, demanded t h a t  the Republic o f  China 
r e f l e c t  i t s  behaviouror shown his determination to  s e t t l e  
the s i t u a t i o n  in ,  as he put i t ,  an appropr ia te  manner?
We cannot help f ee l in g  appalled  by his  t o t a l  s i l en ce  
over the wrong-doings and rea l  s i t u a t i o n  and his  a s s e r ­
t io n  t h a t  the Republic has no in ten t io n  of  endangering 
the pos i t ion  of the South Manchuria Railways.56
Alarmed a t  such repercussions  not j u s t  in Japan but a lso  in 
Ghtrrsrr-CtmsuT General Hayashi summoned the RengQMukden correspondent 
who denied any involvement in these  ' t e l e g r a m s ' .  Subsequent in q u i r i e s  
by both p a r t i e s  discovered who had been behind t h i s  con troversy ,  as 
Hayashi wrote to Shidehara on 31 January:
The head o f f i c e  [of Rengo] re p l ie d  t h a t  these r epo r ts  
had come from the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  As you know, 
the an t i -Japanese  sentiment here in Mukden has been, 
i f  anyth ing,  on the decl ine  in the  l a s t  couple of  
y e a r s , , . .  A news agency such as Rengo which should be 
im part ia l  should not be u t i l i s e d  by some ambitious 
people to  hur t the fee l in g  of  the Mukden a u t h o r i t i e s .  
The harm, d i r e c t  or i n d i r e c t ,  wil l  not be small today 
as we are to s t a r t  the  ra ilway n e g o t ia t io n s .  May I 
t h e re fo re  bother  you, to give a severe warning to  the 
Rengo head o f f i c e ? ^
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What Hayashi did not r e a l i s e  was t h a t  even while he was com­
posing t h i s  l e t t e r ,  the re  was developing a major confron ta t ion  between 
the correspondents and the South Manchuria Railway over the s e c re t iv e  
handling, of  the n e g o t ia t io n s .  On 30 January ,  v i c e - c h i e f  o f  the 
Negotiat ion Bureau of  the ra i lway company, Ishikawa, decided to  ban 
v i s i t s  by the press  to  his o f f i c e .  The o s te n s ib le  reason given fo r  
t h i s  sudden ac t ion  was t h a t  the o f f i c e  was too small fo r  h is  s t a f f s  
to  cope with the corespondents while ca r ry ing  out the normal work 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  The real  cause was, however, t h a t  Ishikawa, l ik e  Hayashi 
with whom he was cooperating over the n e g o t i a t io n s ,  had been annoyed 
by the harm done to  the pre l iminary  nego t ia t ions  by the  press  and t h a t  
he f e l t  i t  impossible to  keep the s t r i c t  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  o f  the o f f i ­
c ia l  n ego t ia t ions  i f  he allowed the press  access to his o f f i c e .  
Outraged, the correspondents  from t h i r t e e n  o rgan isa t ions  including  the 
two g ian t  newspaper concerns and the two major news agencies  f i l e d  
on the  following day a formal p r o te s t  to the company which read:
We regard the n o t i f i c a t i o n  from the Negot iat ion Bureau 
as most contemptuous. We th e re fo re  demand an apology 
from the bureau as well as the immediate withdrawal 
of  the n o t i f i c a t i o n .  8
Even more i n f u r i a t i n g  to  the correspondents was the o f f i c i a l  
order  a few weeks l a t e r  t h a t  the Chinese Post Office should re fuse  any 
of  t h e i r  telegrams to  and from Japan. Nanking a lso  in s t ru c te d  the 
Chinese newspapers not to publish any Rengo te legrams.  Although the 
Rengo correspondents  had encountered s im i la r  t reatment  in Manchuria 
s ince  the ' te legrams from Mukden' a f f a i r  in January, i t  was the p u b l i ­
ca t ion  of  another  Rengo telegram by the Japanese newspapers on 4 March
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t h a t  led to these  measures from Nanking. This telegram sent  by the
Nanking correspondent,  Sasaki,  claimed t h a t  the leader  of  the Board
of L e g is la t io n ,  Hu Han-min, had been under house a r r e s t  because of  his
59disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek. Although Nanking l i f t e d  i t s  orders  
on the te legrams,  o ther  than those from Rengo, within a month, the 
correspondents  took the case to  Kamimura, the consul general a t  Nanking, 
who informed Shidehara on 4 A pr i l :
The correspondents  sa id  t h a t  the time had come fo r  
them to  regard i t  as t h e i r  common problem and asked 
me to  understand t h a t  the re  was no way o ther  than to 
s t a r t  a f i g h t  ag a in s t  the Kuomintang government . . . .
I gave necessary i n s t r u c t io n s  and warnings to  the Rengo 
o f f i c e  here to t r y  to  resolve the issue  on t h i s  occasion,  
to  which i t  agreed. I f e a r ,  however, t h a t  the sub jec t  
might be reported  in an exaggerated manner.
Indeed, the correspondents  were no longer  i n t e r e s t e d  in a local 
se t t lem en t  and sen t  an appeal j o i n t l y  to  the Foreign M inis ter  on the 
same day asking f o r  diplomatic  in te rv e n t io n  by the Foreign Minis try  
i t s e l f .  This appeal was a l so  published by the newspapers in Japan 
two days l a t e r  as a j o i n t  d e c la ra t io n  in the name of  the China c o r re s ­
pondents and read:
We sp e c ia l ly  deplore t h e i r  un jus t  suppression of  the 
press  o r g a n i s a t i o n s . . , .  To ignore such abuse o f  the 
Japanese press  o rgan isa t ions  i s  not only to accept 
i t s  [Nanking’s ]  contempt f o r  the press  but to  damage 
the d ig n i ty  of  the s t a t e .  We th e re fo re  un i ted ly  
wish to  appeal to  the opinion of  the people in order  
to  p ro te c t  our r i g h t  as well as to  c o r re c t  the a r r o ­
gance of  the Kuomintang government.61
Such public  condemnation of  the Chinese government by the cor ­
respondents made the r e so lu t io n  of  t h i s  i ssue  even more d i f f i c u l t .
The executives  of  the Japanese newspapers and news agencies  who belonged
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to  the 21st  Day Club may have wished to help Shidehara but seemed to
62have no choice o the r  than to  back t h i s  motion. The dilemma which 
faced the Foreign M inis ter  even before the eventful  summer was, how­
ever ,  undoubtedly the most d i f f i c u l t .  As Shigemitsu observed on 18 
A p r i l :
The Foreign Office  [of  China] would not respond with 
an uncondit ional  surrender  in t h i s  atmosphere. The 
propaganda [by the Japanese press]  wil l  not only 
complicate the  s i t u a t i o n  f u r t h e r  and delay i t s  s e t t l e ­
ment but worsen the general mood [ in  China} to  the 
extreme. At the  same t ime,  i t  appears probable t h a t  
the re  has been a f a i r l y  complex an t i -Fo re ign  Ministry  
and ant i-government plan behind the a g i t a t i o n  of  
these  correspondents ,  I hope t h a t  you wil l  take app­
ro p r i a t e  measures to prevent  such a p lo t  by Rengo 
and o thers  on t h i s  understanding. 3
5. Summer 1931
While the  c o n f l i c t  between the Japanese press  and the Chinese
64government remained unresolved,  th e re  occurred two unfor tunate  i n c i ­
dents which were to be f u l l y  exp lo i ted  by the m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  
through the correspondents  in t h e i r  at tempt to win over publ ic  opinion. 
Korean peasan ts ,  who had s e t t l e d  in the Chientao area  in Manchuria 
clashed with the  local  Chinese farmers over an i r r i g a t i o n  d i t ch  on 
1 Ju ly .  The issue concerning Korean immigrants in Manchuria had come
up to  the surface  occas io n a l ly ,  but n e i th e r  the Foreign Minis try  nor
65the press  had ever  t r e a te d  i t  as an urgent  i s sue .  This time the 
s i t u a t i o n  was somewhat d i f f e r e n t  in s p i t e  of the f a c t  t h a t  th e re  had 
been no f a t a l i t i e s .  Sensational  telegrams from Manchuria about the 
’pe rsecu t ion '  of  Korean immigrants by the Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s  led to 
a s e r ie s  o f  bru ta l  ra id s  by the Koreans on Chinese re s id e n ts  in Korea. 
I r o n i c a l l y ,  however, the subsequent ' s e n s a t io n a l '  telegrams from the
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Japanese correspondents about the b r u t a l i t y  of  the misguided Koreans
in t h e i r  home land crea ted  a more r e f l e c t i v e  mood in the  Japanese
press .  The Fukuoka N ich in ic h i , f o r  example, sparing no c r i t i c i s m  of  
the government’s neg lec t  of  the Korean immigrant i s su e ,  wrote on 13 
Ju ly :
The blame l i e s  with the Koreans and the  Japanese autho­
r i t i e s .  I t  w i l l  not be an honourable a t t i t u d e  f o r  a 
g rea t  na t ion i f  Japan t r i e s  to  equivocate in t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  with ambiguous s ta tem ents .  Nor wil l  i t  in 
f a c t  be the  wish of  the people.  Most of  a l l ,  i t  would
be unforgiveafxl,e to many of  the dead Chinese who had
been s a c r i f i c e d ^ n  the event 4# Japan t r i e d  to  draw a 
se t t lem ent  more favourable  to  her through the misrep­
re se n ta t io n  of  the s i tu a t io n .® 6
The o ther  i n c id e n t ,  which was to be f u l l y  e x p lo i te d ,  as a r e s u l t
of  a somewhat unexpected sequence of  even ts ,  by the an tagon is ts  of  the
'Shidehara Diplomacy' was the murder by the Chinese s o ld ie r s  o f  a
Japanese spying mission headed by Captain Nakamura Shintaro  in the
Hsing-an-ling area on 27 June. Spying a c t i v i t i e s  by the Army S ta f f
o f f i c e r s  in the unpermitted areas  of  Manchuria and Mongolia had been
67reported to the consula tes  a t  l e a s t  s ince the summer 1930, and the 
Nakamura mission had a lso  been known to  them f o r  a few weeks when the 
in c id en t  took place .  The murder was kept s e c re t  by the Chinese autho­
r i t i e s  fo r  a month before the news f i n a l l y  reached the Japanese autho­
r i t i e s .  Since the nature of  the mission was l i k e l y  to in v i t e  unfavour­
able p u b l i c i ty  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  the Army and the Foreign Ministry  agreed 
to keep s i l e n t  on the issue  u n t i l  the s i t u a t i o n  became c l e a r e r  and 
by means o f  ’informal advice '  through the Home M in is t ry ,  they e f f e c ­
t i v e l y  prevented the pub l ica t ion  of any a r t i c l e s  concerning t h i s  
inc iden t ,*^
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While the press  h y s te r ia  over the Si no-Korean c lashes  seemed 
to  be g radua l ly  cooling o f f ,  Army M inis ter  Minami de l ivered  a speech 
before the conference o f  commanders of  d iv i s io n s  and f o r t i f i e d  zones 
on 4 August in which he o v e r t ly  c r i t i c i s e d  Shidehara’s ' f a i l u r e '  in 
the Si no-Japanese neg o t ia t io n s  and ca l le d  fo r  a ' s t ro n g e r  sense of  
lo y a l ty  and publ ic  s e rv ic e '  from every s o ld i e r .  Minami a l so  accused 
the c r i t i c s  of  the Army's retrenchment programmes of  spreading propa­
ganda to  d i s c r e d i t  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  through t h e i r  advocacy of 
disarmament in ' t o t a l  d is regard  of  the actual  s i t u a t i o n  in Manchuria'
The press  reac t ions  were prompt and almost unequivocal in condemn­
ing the p o l i t i c a l  im pl ica t ions  and suggest ions  in the speech, which in 
turn  led to  an unprecedented move by the  Army Min is ter  to  r e fu t e  spe­
c i f i c a l l y  the Tokyo Asahi leader  through i t s  p a g e s , ^  Minami and his  
subordinates  may have a n t i c ip a te d  a more favourable  reac t io n  in the l i g h t  
o f  the recen t  surge of  an t ipa thy  towards the 'weak-kneed' a t t i t u d e s  
of  the government in i t s  deal ings  with the 'contemptuous' China. They 
must have been aware t h a t  the p o s i t iv e  defence of  the 'Shidehara Dip­
lomacy' which used to appear even in the more ' a n t i -S h id e h a ra '  GaikoT- 
j i h o  u n t i l  the spring had disappeared from v i r t u a l l y  every j o u r n a l . ^
At the  same time,  they were aware t h a t  an increasing  number of  former 
advocates o f  in t e rn a t io n a l  cooperation in the development o f  Manchuria
and Mongolia had s t a r t e d  to  favour a more monopolist ic  po l icy  in these  
72areas .  No l e s s  encouraging to them perhaps was the reported  harden­
ing of  the h i t h e r to  'pro-Nanking'  a t t i t u d e s  of Onishi Sa i ,  the head of 
the China sec t ion  of  the Tokyo Asahi, s ince  his ' f a c t - f i n d i n g  to u r '
throughout China during January and February which had caused much
73anxie ty  among the Chinese leaders  a t  the time. What they may not
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have r e a l i s e d ,  however, was t h a t  such 'a n t i - C h in a 1 and 'an t i -Shidehara*  
sentiment did not n ec e s sa r i ly  lead to sympathy towards them. Indeed, 
even the  Tokyo Nichinichi whose hardening a t t i t u d e s  towards the China 
issue  had been more no t iceab le  than those o f  i t s  main r iv a l  wrote 
on 6 August:
The Army M inis te r  termed the cu r ren t  demand of  the 
people [ fo r  the reduction in the m i l i t a r y  expenditure]  
as an opinion by ' those  who are  i r r e s p o n s ib le  o u t ­
s id e r s  or those who have no deep concern over s t a t e  
d e f e n c e ' . . . .  I t  i s  h is  argument which i s  'b l in d  to  the 
actual  s i t u a t i o n  of  the s t a t e '  t h a t  ought to be 
co r rec ted .
I t  i s  perhaps not  unreasonable to assume t h a t  the unfavourable
p u b l i c i t y  caused by Minami's speech pushed the Army to  press  fo r  the
d isc lo su re  of  the Nakamura inc iden t  on 17 August. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,
n e i th e r  Nakamura's m i l i t a r y  rank nor the nature of  his  mission were
provided, and the government made four r e l a t i v e l y  moderate demands
to  Nanking, namely, a f u tu re  guarantee fo r  t rave l  by Japanese n a t io n a l s
in the Liaoning province,  an o f f i c i a l  apology from the Mukden a u t h o r i t i e s ,
punishment of  those r e sp o n s ib le ,  and compensations fo r  the damage to
75the l i v e s  and property of  those  involved.
Immediately, sensa t ional  telegrams from the correspondents  in
IIV
Manchuria began to f l o o d  claiming t h a t  the 'p ro o f s '  about the  murder
n
of  Captain Nakamura by the Chinese provided by the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s
c i 76a t  Mukden were unquestionable ,  This in tu rn  rekindled  the a n t i -
Chinese sentiment of  the publ ic  which demanded the 'once and fo r  a l l '
s e t t lem ent  of a l l  the pending is sues  lying between Japan and China.
The h y s te r ia  caused by the way in which the press  d e a l t  with the i s sue
could only be descr ibed ,  according to Sasa Hiroo, the Marxist  c r i t i c ,
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as a ’nationwide ceremony' to ’k i l l  a f l y  with a long spear 
Royama Masamichi of  Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty  r e g re t t e d  t h i s  pheno­
menon in Chuokoron:
I be l ieve  t h a t  the opinion which i s  c u r re n t ly  leading 
the people lacks in r e a l i t y  the appropr ia te  foundation 
fo r  the s t r u c tu r e  of  the nat ional  concensus which we 
d e s i r e .  The st rong opinion does not n e c e s sa r i ly  mean 
the r i g h t  opinion.  The ready countermeasure cannot 
always be the appropr ia te  one, I cannot bel ieve  t h a t  
the people have been presented with every aspec t  to 
th ink  about,  to judge from and to a n t i c i p a t e  the r e s u l t  
from. 7°
Such c r i t i c i s m  was, however, confined to the more l i b e r a l
  79
jou rna ls  such as Chuokoron and Kaizo and by the  end of August, the
c h ie f  e d i t o r  of  the Tokyo N ic h in ich i , Takaishi Shingoro, had come to
s u rp r i se  even the higher  echelon of  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in Tokyo
with h is  ’p o s i t i v e '  Manchuria scheme which was, according to  Ogata of
80the Tokyo Asahi, ahead of  the Army’s .  The Tokyo Nichinichi comment 
on 5 September seems to confirm Ogata's observat ion of  the changing 
a t t i t u d e s  o f  his  r i v a l :
We do not lag behind o thers  in admitt ing the danger 
e x i s t in g  between the s o ld i e r  and p o l i t i c s .  We b e l i e v e ,  
however, t h a t  so f a r  as the Manchuria and Mongolia 
i ssue i s  concerned, we should not r e s t r i c t  i t  to such 
t r i v i a l  wordings as ’p o l i t i c s '  any lo n g e r .8 *
Such change in public  opinion was undoubtedly a p leas ing  pheno­
menon to  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  On the o ther  hand, they were not 
t o t a l l y  s a t i s f i e d ,  as the following comment in an Army S ta f f  l e a f l e t  
dated 10 September in d ica ted :
I t  i s  c l e a r l y  recognisable  t h a t  the newspapers are  
proceeding with uni ted  w i l l ingness  fo r  the p r e s e r ­
vat ion of the vested i n t e r e s t s  [o f  Japan] in Manchuria
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and Mongolia . . . .  At the same time, we f ea r  t h a t  they may 
be misunderstanding the in c id en t  as i f  i t  were an oppor­
tu n i t y  to  resolve  the Manchuria and Mongolia issue  once 
and fo r  a l l ,  and t h a t  as a r e s u l t  o f  such a s e t t l e m e n t ,  
the cu r ren t  public sentiment  wil l  vanish i n s t a n t l y . 82
While the telegrams from Manchuria f i l l e d  the pages of  newspapers, 
t h e re  appeared a Rengo telegram from Nanking which added more fuel to  
the a l ready  burning hat red  among the Japanese people towards t h e i r  Chinese 
neighbour. This telegram reported  t h a t  Dr, C. T. Wang, the Foreign
83S ecre ta ry ,  had denied China's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the Nakamura i n c id e n t .
I t s  source was none o the r  than Sasaki ,  whose telegram on the 'row' 
between Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min s ix  months e a r l i e r  had become 
the d i r e c t  cause of  the s t i l l  unresolved d ispu te  between the Japanese 
correspondents  and the  Chinese government. His l a t e s t  te legram was 
based on information obtained from o ther  rep o r te r s  who had a t tended 
the in terv iew on 3 September during which the a l leged  remark by Dr.
Wang was made. The immediate denial by the Foreign Secre tary  and the 
subsequent o f f i c i a l  p r o te s t  from the Chinese government did nothing to 
quel l  the  an t i -Chinese  sentiment in Japan,  which in tu rn  hardened 
Nanking's a t t i t u d e s  towards the neg o t ia t io n s  over the in c id e n t .  Even 
so,  Shidehara was unwil ling to get  involved with the  cu r ren t  h y s te r i a  
c rea ted  by the p ress .  As he wrote back to  Consul General a t  Mukden 
Hayashi on 10 September:
Another ' informal advice '  may well touch the nerve 
o f  the newspapers again ,  which wil l  be unpleasant .
I am a lso  to ld  t h a t  to  i ssue  a banning order  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
according to  the Newspaper Law. We have th e re fo re  
accepted t h a t  the a u t h o r i t i e s  concerned wil l  not t r y  
to advise the press not to  publish  any a r t i c l e s  on
the i n c i d e n t . 84
- 154 -
M inis ter  to  China, Shigemitsu, never the less  feared  t h a t  the
l a t e s t  controversy over S asak i ’s telegram would develop in to  a
85’second Rengo a f f a i r ’ . His apprehensions were understandable  con­
s ide r ing  the f a c t  t h a t ,  on the very day Shidehara wrote the above 
rep ly  to Hayashi, he f i n a l l y  managed to persuade Nanking to sign an 
agreement with Rengo whereby both p a r t i e s  expressed t h e i r  ’r e g r e t  
fo r  the  occurrence of  such an unfortunate  development’ in connect ion 
with the ’f i r s t  Rengo a f f a i r ’ , Shigemitsu had in f a c t  had to  obta in
a s e c re t  promise from the news agency f o r  S a sak i ’s immediate t r a n s f e r
86from Nanking to  Manchuria fo r  t h i s  s e t t lem en t .  Before Sh igemitsu 's  
f e a r  m a te r i a l i s e d ,  howeve'r, the re  occurred a minor ra ilway explosion 
in s id e  the Japanese concession near Mukden t h a t  proved to be the  death 
knell  fo r  the 'freedom o f  the p r e s s ' .
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CHAPTER VII - Manchuria Cris is
1, Mukden Incident
The Mukden incident on the night of  18 September, and i t s  subse­
quent development, brought no d i s c e r n i b l e  change to the Japanese 
correspondents in China, e spec ia l ly  Manchuria. What l i t t l e  res is tance  
they could or dared mount against  the m i l i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  in t h e i r  
reporting a c t i v i t i e s  disappeared almost immediately a f t e r  the i n i t i a l  
death th rea t  by the Kwantung Army o f f ice rs  a t  the Japanese-owned t e l e ­
communication off ices .^  Sato Yukio, the Rengo' Mukden correspondent, 
who had disapproved of the fab r ica t ion  of ' telegrams from Mukden' by 
the head off ice  e igh t  months e a r l i e r ,  apparently noticed the outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese clash one hour e a r l i e r  than his r iv a l s  and sent 
out reports only to  discover th a t  the newspapers on the following morn­
ing were f i l l e d  with despatches not from him but his Dentsu r iv a l ,
Sato recal led  t h i s  episode a f t e r  the Second World War:
As I could not possibly believe th a t  i t  had been a 
railway bombing by the Chinese so ld ie r s ,  I did not 
use those words but composed a report  which implied 
i t  to be a clash between the Japanese so ld ie rs  and 
some unknown bandits.  The telegram did not reach 
our head o ff ice  and therefore  I believe th a t  i t  had 
been stopped a t  Mukden by the army. Some time a f t e r  
t h i s ,  one of our correspondents rang me and sa id ,
'We have to make i t  a clash between the Chinese 
regulars and the Japanese s o l d i e r s . . , . '  After  t h a t ,
I f in a l ly  handed in my re s ig n a t io n .2
Within Japan, c r i t ic i sm  of the unauthorised m i l i ta ry  act ion by
3
the Japanese troops in Manchuria and Korea was immediately voiced by
4
most newspapers but las ted  only a few days, A se r ies  of 'p re -  
warnings' were imposed from 22 September onwards on a r t i c l e s  concerning
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'm i l i t a r y  o r  diplomatic  s e c r e t s '  and t h e i r  ap p l ica t io n  was so extensive
t h a t ,  according to  the e d i t o r  o f  the English language Japan A d v e r t i s e r ,
W ilfr id  F le i s h e r ,  they of ten  ’c o n s t i tu t e d  a r e l i a b l e  o f f i c i a l  source
of  in fo rm at ion1 fo r  the  e d i to r s  who had been unaware of  the events
5
concerned u n t i l  they received  the o f f i c i a l  n o t i f i c a t i o n s .  Even so,  
the Tokyo Asahi was s t i l l  very c r i t i c a l  of  the p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvre
made in the  Kwantung Army d e c la r a t io n  of  4 October which was d i s t r i b u t e d
among the  Chinese re s id e n ts  in Manchuria as the  following comment on 
6 October suggested:
We cannot help f e e l in g  t h a t  the d ec la ra t io n  i s  the 
admission by the  commander-in-chief [of  the  Kwantung 
Army] t h a t  he has in t e r f e r e d  with p o l i t i c s  and d ip lo ­
macy which are beyond his  a u t h o r i t y . . , .  I f  the Army
i n s i s t s  on i t s  independence according to  the  supreme 
command, i t  should a lso  r e spec t  the diplomatic preroga­
t i v e  [o f  the government] and s t i c k  to  the p r in c ip le  
which separa tes  p o l i t i c s  from m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s .  This 
i s  the duty of  the Imperial Army s o ld i e r  who observes 
the Cons t i tu t ion  and who obeys the law of  the s t a t e .
We urge the Army to  r e f r a i n  i t s e l f  [from p o l i t i c a l
i n t e r f e r e n c e ] ,6
Such c r i t i c i s m  was na tura l  considering the improvement, a l b e i t  
s l i g h t ,  in world public opinion which had-seemed—to—follow the govern­
ment 's  d e c la ra t io n  on 24 September.^ The unanimous re so lu t io n  on 30 
September by the League of  Nations Council ,  in which Japan was one of  
the f ive  permanent members, c a l l i n g  fo r  the immediate stoppage of  the 
war had a lso  helped to m ol l i fy  fore ign  opinion.  At l e a s t  t h i s  was
o
how the Tokyo Asahi saw the s i t u a t i o n .  I t s  e d i to r  had a lso  expressed
his doubts on the  ' independence1 movements in Manchuria which followed
9the r e t r e a t  of  the Mukden c l ique  headed by Chang Hsueh-liang. I t
was th e re fo re  no s u rp r i se  t h a t  the Tokyo Asahi showed much concern
about the in t e rn a t io n a l  repercussions  caused by the unauthorised bom­
barding of  the c i t y  of  Chinchow on 8 October which had come to house
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Chang’s headquar ters ,  This t ime,  however, i t s  c r i t i c a l  tone sounded 
very r e s t r a in e d :
The Chinchow a f f a i r  i s  regarded as an evidence of  
Japan’s expansionism overseas .  Needless to say t h a t  
i t  was an unexpected event r a th e r  than an in d ica t io n  
o f  any p o l i c y . . . .  Never the less ,  we hope t h a t  the 
t roops in Manchuria which have h i th e r to  been caut ious
wil l  take even more caution in  the fu tu re  as even
the s l i g h t e s t  movement which they make i s  l i k e l y  to  
be considered a r e f l e c t i o n  of  our nat ional  policy by 
the outs ide  world
The moderate tone of  t h i s  leader  was p a r t ly  due to  the harden­
ing a t t i t u d e s  of  the  Kwantung Army towards the p ress .  The day before 
the Chinchow bombing, i t  had suggested in the name of  i t s  commander- 
i n - c h i e f  to  the  v ice-Chief  o f  S t a f f  in Tokyo th a t  such seemingly 
ino ffens ive  matters  as the n ego t ia t ions  between the Finance Minis try  and 
the Army over the proposed budget should be made the ob jec t  of  a ’pre-
warning' because t h e i r  d isc lo su re  would provide the Chinese with ' s igns
of  f in an c ia l  weakness o f  Japan to  car ry  out  a prolonged w a r ' . ^
Moreover, even the somewhat r e s t r a in e d  comments by the newspapers on
the Chinchow bombing were regarded by the Kwantung Army as a ’t r e a c h -  
12e ro u s ’ a c t .  By the end of  1931, not even the d e t a i l s  of  the proposed
or actual  armament of  the whole Army could be published without  r i s k in g
13a sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  ban, thus making the number of  ac tual  bans
placed on newspapers and jo u rn a ls  seven times as big as in the pre-
14Mukden inc iden t  period.  This led to  a d i r e c t  appeal from the 21s t
Day Club to the Home M inis ter  on 28 January 1932 fo r  the c l a r i f i c a t i o n
15of  the  matters  whose pub l ica t ion  was l i k e l y  to in v i t e  such t rea tment .
The following l i s t  was provided by the Home Ministry as the  answer to  
t h i s  reques t :
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1. A r t ic le s  which do not  regard the ac t ion  of  the 
Imperial Army on 18 September 1931 as se l f -d e fen c e .
2. A r t i c le s  which regard the defensive m i l i t a r y  occu­
pat ion in Manchuria as an ac t  of  aggression by Japanese 
imperia lism.
_3,___A r t ic le s  which regard the ac t ion  of  the Imperial Army
in Manchuria as an ac t  designed to acquire  markets
or  to  plunder na tura l  resources by the im p e r i a l i s t  
Japanese cap i ta l i sm .
4. A r t i c le s  which regard the ac t ion  of  the Imperial 
Army in Manchuria not  as based on nat ional  consensus 
but as a m i l i t a r y  ac t ion  designed to  secure the survival  
of  some m i l i t a r y  c l iques  endangered by the [proposed] 
disarmament.
5. A r t ic le s  which regard Manchuria as nothing more than 
a l i f e - l i n e  f o r  some c a p i t a l i s t s  or  m i l i t a r y  c l iques  
but not as one f o r  workers and peasants .
6. A r t ic le s  which regard the new Manchu s t a t e  not as
based on the voluntary  i n i t i a t i v e s  of  the Manchus
but merely as a puppet regime invented by the Japanese 
m i l i t a r y  c l iques  and some of  the par ty  p o l i t i c i a n s  and 
which regard the actual  power of  the  new s t a t e  as in 
the hands o f  the Japanese Empire whose f a t e  i s  bound 
to follow the path of  Korea in due c o u r s e J 6
The Army was by no means content  with the i n d i r e c t  pressure  on 
the press  exerc ised  through the Home Minis t ry .  The Newspaper Unit not 
only checked the leader  and r epo r ts  of  the newspapers but a lso  t h r e a t ­
ened to  censor the ga l ley  proofs of  the Tokyo A s a h i Some r ig h t  
wing o rgan isa t ions  and the Imperial Reserv is t  Associat ion were a c t i v a ­
ted under the supervis ion  of  the gendarmerie.  By the spring of  1932^ 
i t  was, according to the l i b e r a l  c r i t i c ,  Ashida Kin, the Reservis t  
Associat ion t h a t  had come to  i n i t i a t e  nat ional  opinion. So v icious  
had i t s  a t t a ck  become on any c r i t i c i s m  d i rec ted  a t  the m i l i t a r y  autho­
r i t i e s  t h a t  Chuokoron f e l t  obliged to speak up fo r  two of the most 
outspoken individual  c r i t i c s  in i t s  October 1932 ed i t io n :
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I t  i s  a l l  very well to  f a l l  upon Drs, Nitobe [Inazo] 
and Nagai [RyutaroY because they have c r i t i c i s e d  the 
m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s ,  You a r e ,  however, a group t h a t  i s  
trea ted very favourably by the  public  purse and soc ie ty  
in genera l .  We hope t h a t  you wil l  r e th ink  more deeply 
about how bes t  you could serve soc ie ty  and the people. '®
The t ig h ten in g  of  press  control a lone ,  however, does not e n t i r e l y  
expla in  the  change in the tone of the newspapers. Some newspapers, 
notably  the Tokyo N ich in ic h i , had already s t a r t e d  to change t h e i r  views 
in  favour of  the Army's p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  even before the o u t ­
break of  the Mukden in c id en t  on 18 September 1931 while o thers  such 
as the  Tokyo Asahi had remained s t e a d f a s t l y  opposed to  i t .  Such d i s ­
uni ty  among the newspapers undoubtedly con t r ibu ted  to  the  f a i l u r e  o f
the 21st  Day Club to take uni ted  ac t ion  towards the  development in
19Manchuria when i t  met on 21 September. I t  was perhaps not s u rp r i s in g
t h a t  the East Asia Research Centre s e t  up by the chairman of  the Tokyo 
N ic h in ic h i , Motoyama Hikoichi,  held an ex trao rd ina ry  meeting on 25 
September and passed a re so lu t io n  to  'encourage1 the government to  pro-
r
t e c t  the ' l i f e - l i n e '  o f  Japan, i . e .  the vested i n t e r e s t s  in Manchuria
and Mongolia, which was immediately de l ive red  to the  Prime M in is te r ,
the  Foreign Minis te r  and the Leaders of  both Houses of  the Imperial 
20Diet.  On the o the r  hand, the Tokyo Asahi remained somewhat indec is ive  
perhaps l a rg e ly  because of the d i su n i ty  w ith in  i t s  e d i t o r i a l  d e p a r t ­
ment. I t s  c h ie f  e d i t o r ,  Ogata Taketora ,  r e f l e c t e d  on t h i s  score 
a f t e r  the Second World War:
Immediately [ a f t e r  the Mukden in c id e n t ] ,  I c a l l e d  f o r  
a c o n su l ta t iv e  meeting of  the e d i t o r i a l  s t a f f  to d i s ­
cover t h a t  the opinions of  people l ik e  Messrs,  Onishi 
Sai and Machida Shiro were no t iceab ly  uncompromising 
[towards China], In the end, I f e l t  obl iged to  accept  
t h a t  we could not shoot our own s o ld ie r s  from behind. 
We were subsequent ly dragooned by the f a i t  accompli.
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The a n t i - m i l i t a r y  tone in the  Tokyo Asahi disappeared 
almost completely a f t e r  the meeting of  the League o f  Nations Council 
on 15 October which followed the con trovers ia l  Chinchow bombing a week 
e a r l i e r .  The Council decided to i n v i t e  the U.S.,  a non-member s t a t e  
of  the  League, to  be an observer  by a t h i r t e e n  to  one vote with Japan 
as the so le  o b jec to r .  This was followed by another  Council r e so lu t io n  
nine days l a t e r  which c a l l e d  fo r  the complete withdrawal of  Japanese 
t roops to the ra ilway concession zone before the next scheduled meet­
ing of  the Council on 16 November. Instead of  cas t ing  an opposing 
vote ,  however, the  Japanese de legate  abs ta ined  t h i s  t ime,  but the  count 
was never the less  declared as t h i r t e e n  to  one.
The press reac t ions  to  these  two Council r e so lu t io n s  were almost
v io le n t .  Their  arguments,  l i k e  those of  the government which had by
then come to be d ic ta t e d  l a rg e ly  by the Army S t a f f ,  were based purely
22on the t e c h n i c a l i t y  o f  these  vo tes .  Moreover, the  way in which the 
newspapers presented these  arguments was such t h a t  Tagawa Daikichiro ,  
a d i r e c t o r  o f  the League of  Nations Association in Japan,  wrote in 
Kokusaichish ik i :
Our people misunderstand the Council proposal to 
stop Japan 's  m i l i t a ry  ac t ion  fo r  i n t e rv e n t io n ,  I 
doubt i f  I can say t h a t  they understand the s i t u a ­
t io n  c o r r e c t ly .  I feel ashamed and r e g re t  t h a t  our 
d a i ly  e f f o r t s  and a c t i v i t i e s  [to  en l igh ten  the people 
on the funct ions  of  the League] have not been s u f f i ­
c i e n t .  3
I t  was perhaps unfortunate  t h a t  the more l i b e ra l  and ' i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l i s t '  jo u rn a ls  such as Kaizo, Chuokoron and Kokusaichishiki
could not make t h e i r  f i r s t  post-Mukden inc iden t  ed i t io n  o f f i c i a l l y
24av a i lab le  u n t i l  1 November because of  i t s  monthly p u b l ic a t io n .  In
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t h e i r  absence, Toyokeizaishinpo was the only journal  of  any s i g n i f i ­
cance to  welcome the U.S. p a r t i c ip a t i o n  a t  the League of  Nations as well
2 5as to  voice i t s  opposi t ion to  the continued m i l i t a ry  ac t ion  in Manchuria. 
Among the indiv idual c r i t i c s ,  Yokota Kisaburo was probably the f i r s t  
to support the  Council vo tes .  He was no t ,  however, in v i ted  by any 
commercial newspaper to voice his view but did so only through Teikoku 
Daigaku Shinbun published by and d i s t r i b u t e d  mainly within  Tokyo Imperial
Univers i ty  where he worked as a p ro fessor  of  law. As such, the  impact
26of  h is  opinions on the publ ic  was perhaps not  very s i g n i f i c a n t .
When the November e d i t io n  o f  the monthly jou rna ls  ev en tua l ly
appeared in the s t r e e t ,  i t  was a t  once c l e a r  to  the reader  t h a t  they had
already  accepted,  i f  r e l u c t a n t l y ,  the f a i t  accompli presented by the
Kwantung Army. True, they s t i l l  maintained t h a t  Japan should n e i th e r
a c t  l i k e  a ' t h i e f  a t  a f i r e '  nor support the ' independence'  movements
in Manchuria which had been reported  s ince  the end of  September, On
the o ther  hand, none of  them ques tioned the ' j u s t i c e 1 or  l e g a l i t y  of
the ' s e l f  defence '  claimed by the Kwantung Army fo r  i t s  a c t i o n s .  Kaizo
in f a c t  had come to r e f e r  to  the South Manchuria Railways as the  ' l i f e -
27l i n e '  o f  Japan fo r  the f i r s t  time in i t s  h i s to ry .  Chuokoron and 
Kaizo a lso  seemed to  f e a r  poss ib le  sa le  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  bans to  the  
ex ten t  t h a t  even the d iscuss ions  on the d iv is io n  between the. Foreign 
Minis t ry  and the Army contained the t r a c e  of  much b lu e -p e n c i l l in g  as 
the following e x t r a c t  from a con t r ibu t ion  by Sasa Hiroo sugges ts :  *
The m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  are ahead o f  the Shidehara 
diplomacy. Even i f  the a t t a c k  on the North Barracks 
[of  the Chinese army a t  Mukden] had been an unforseen
a c c i d e n t ,  . , ,_____________can be sa id  to  have
made the  fT r s t  p o s i t iv e  s tep .  Fur ther ,  the  second 
s t e p  . . . _____ . The t h i r d  s te p ,  i . e .  . . .
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  owed to  some ex ten t  to the ___  of  the m i l i t a ry
a u t h o r i t i e s .  When i t  looked __ _   , i t
in v i ted  the ob jec t ion  from the Foreign Ministry  and 2a 
the  i s sue  ended with the  surrender  by the Army Minis t ry .
While the monthly jo u rn a ls  were t ry in g  to avoid sa le  and d i s t r i ­
bution bans by imposing s e l f  censorship on t h e i r  co n t r ib u t io n s ,  the 
Tokyo Nichinichi  chairman, Motoyama Hikoichi ,  sen t  out on 30 October 
to  The Times, The New York Times and some o ther  i n f l u e n t i a l  jou rna ls  
overseas a dec la ra t io n  based on the September 25 r e so lu t io n  of  the 
East Asia Research Centre which defended the Japanese ac t ion  in Man­
churia  as ' s e l f  defence*. This insp i red  the Japan Newspapers A ssocia t ion ,  
to  which most of  the Japanese newspapers belonged, to send telegrams 
f o r  the same purpose to  the League o f  Nations and the individual  govern­
ments o f  the major coun tr ie s  on 14 November. On the following day, 
the Tokyo Nichinichi  repeated  i t s  e a r l i e r  a c t io n ,  which in turn  prompted
the  Tokyo Asahi on 16 November to follow i t s  r i v a l ,  thus c rea t ing  a
29* p a t r i o t i c  race* among the newspapers.
Behind t h i s  enthusiasm, the re  lay the f i e r c e  sa le s  war among 
the newspapers. The d i f f i c u l t y  of  surviving which faced them and, to  
a much l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  the jo u rn a ls  a f t e r  the Mukden inc iden t  was con­
s id e ra b le .  In add i t ion  to  the t h r e a t  from the s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  and 
p r iv a te  o rg a n i s a t io n s ,  they were confronted by an ac t iv e  radio broad­
cas t ing  o rgan isa t ion  which had excel led  them in speed, i f  not accuracy, 
of  r e po r t ing .  Following the Mukden in c id en t ,  the broadcast ing corpo­
r a t io n  a lso  s t a r t e d  c o l l e c t i n g  repor ts  by i t s e l f  which were broadcast
immediately, r a th e r  than simply wai ting fo r  the regu la r  d e l iv e r i e s  from
30the two news agencies .  This increased the number of  i t s  s u b sc r i ­
bers from 300,000 before the in c id en t  to one m i l l ion  in May 1932 and
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31even tua l ly  to th ree  m i l l ion  in 1936. This challenge from the rad io
was a t  f i r s t  countered by the  newspapers with more sensa t iona l ism  in
t h e i r  r e p o r t in g ,  such as more ex t ra  e d i t i o n s ,  more p ic tu re s  and l a r g e r
headl ines .  In the case of  the two la rge  newspaper concerns,  a sepa ra te
sec t ion  was even crea ted  within the e d i t o r i a l  department to produce
news f ilms such as the  ' Tokyo Nichinichi-Osaka Mainichi In te rn a t io n a l
News' and the ' Asahi In te rn a t io n a l  News' which were to  be r e leased
32through cinemas a l l  over the country.  Even t h i s ,  however, was no
answer to  the appeal and advantages o f  the ra d io ,  and the 21s t  Day Club
was forced to  neg o t ia te  with the  broadcast ing corporat ion  through the
mediation of  the Communication Ministry  which c o n t ro l led  i t .  I t  was
in f a c t  not u n t i l - t h e  autumn of  1932 t h a t  the two p a r t i e s  reached an
agreement whereby the regu la r  ' f l a s h  news' programmes on the rad io
32were to  be cut from a d a i ly  t o t a l  of  75 minutes to  50 minutes.  In
the meantime, most of  the newspapers had been compelled to  engage in an
excessive sa les  war among themselves and,according to  I to  Masanori, only
about ten newspapers in the whole of  Japan were able to cont inue to
operate  p r o f i t a b ly  throughout the Manchuria c r i s i s .  Among the  major
vict ims of  t h i s  development was the  e r s tw h i le  most p re s t ig io u s  J i j i s h i n p o
which was taken over by a t e x t i l e  tycoon in 1932^only to  be bought
up again four  years  l a t e r  by one of  i t s  main r i v a l s ,  the Tokyo N ic h in ic h i .
Another equal ly  famous newspaper, Kokumin Shinbun, a lso  f e l l  prey to
the same phenomenon and came under the management of  the  wealthy pro-
33v inc ia l  'Seiyukai newspaper ' ,  the Shin A ich i , of  Nagoya in 1933. I t
would have been su rp r i s in g  had the newspapers not been tempted to 
e x p lo i t  whatever means were l e f t  fo r  t h e i r  survival  including the pro­
motion of ' p a t r i o t i s m '  among the readers ,  Nishinihon Shinbun, the
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post-War successor  of  the Fukuoka Nichinichi  r e c a l l s  what e f f e c t  t h i s  
commercial war had on the  newspapers:
At the time o f  the Manchuria c r i s i s ,  many newspapers 
, , , unw it t ing ly  tended to  concentra te  on s a le s  
expansion a r i s in g  from t h e i r  commercialism and paid 
l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  elsewhere. At l e a s t  in r e t r o s p e c t ,  
they showed t h e i r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  to  the r i g h t  wing 
movements and are  p a r t l y  to blame f o r  i t .  This tendency 
was e s p e c i a l l y  no t iceab le  among the i n f l u e n t i a l  news­
papers,  Most of  the o the r  newspapers unques tionably 
followed t h e i r  l e a d . 34
Even i f  we accept  t h a t  the re  i s  some element of  r i v a l r y  in
t h i s  remark, i t  s t i l l  commands a f a i r  amount of  r e spec t  as i t  comes from
the newspaper which i s  genera l ly  considered to have fought ag a in s t  the
m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  more outspokenly and longer than any o the r  commer- 
35cia l  newspaper. Indeed, the Fukuoka Nichinichi  was the only newspaper 
of  any s ig n i f ican ce  t h a t  sen t  a telegram of p r o te s t  in the  name of  i t s  
e d i t o r i a l  s t a f f  to the Prime M inis ter  when the Chinchow bombing took 
place on 8 October 1931, I t  was a l so  the condemnation o f  the a s s a s s i ­
nat ion of  Prime M inis ter  Inukai on 15 May 1932 by the same newspaper 
in another  telegram to the government as well as i t s  leade r  t h a t  pro­
voked the extreme d i sp leasu re  of  the Army, a d i sp leasu re  which l a s t e d
36more or  l e s s  to  the end o f  the Second World War. Moreover, the
leade r  w r i t e r s  of  the s ix  b igges t  newspapers themselves confirmed in
1934 t h a t  the absence of  any b lue -penc i l le d  passages in the lead e rs
throughout the Manchuria c r i s i s  had been the r e s u l t  not so much of
any to le rance  on the  p a r t  of  the government as of  s e l f - c e n so r sh ip
37deriv ing  from commercial and ‘p sycho log ica l1 p ressure .  I t  was 
perhaps t h i s  pressure t h a t  led the newspapers to  p ro je c t  the League 
of  Nations as a ' v i l l a i n '  who ' lacked the understanding '  (n insh ik i
- 165 -
busoku)of  the Far Eastern s i t u a t i o n .  The following comment by the 
Tokyo Asahl was made on the Council vote of  24 October 1931 which c a l l ed  
fo r  the withdrawal o f  the Japanese troops  to  the ra i lway concession zone:
We cannot t o l e r a t e  o r  overlook the l a t e s t  dec is ion  by 
the Council ,  because i t  i s  intended by those  co u n t r ie s  
which occupy the i n f l u e n t i a l  pos i t ions  with in  the League 
to force  Japan to  follow t h e i r  wish in a high-handed 
manner bv making her look i s o l a t e d  before the world 
p u b l i c , 3®
This s ta tem ent ,  though r e l a t i v e l y  mild in tone ,  gave the impres­
sion t h a t  the  Tokyo Asahi was g e t t in g  c lo se r  in i t s  view of  the  s i t u a ­
t ion  to  Gaikoj iho, which had regarded the Chinchow bombing as p a r t
of  the  'heaven-sent punishment' and which began to  advocate the ' l i b e ­
r a t i o n '  o f  the League from the ' s l a v e ry  by one or  two Powers' a f t e r  the
39Council votes on 15 and 24 October.  The d i f fe rence  between the  two 
jo u rn a ls  became even smaller  as the Kwantung Army occupied T s i t s i h a r  
on 19 November and revived i t s  dr ive  on Chinchow towards the end of  
the  month. The subsequent 'warnings'  from Secre tary  of  S ta te  H.L.
Stimson on 20 and 28 November seemed simply to  harden t h e i r  de te rm i­
nat ion to  support the m i l i t a r y  ac t ion  as well as to  prevent any ' i n t e r ­
vent ion '  in the Far Eastern a f f a i r s  by the o ther  Powers by advocat ing a
regional se t t lem en t  through d i r e c t  nego t ia t ions  between the two Asian
40neighbours r a th e r  than through the League. Some of the most n a t io n a ­
l i s t i c  c r i t i c s  in Gaikoj iho , notably the ex -ca ree r  d iplomats ,  had 
s t a r t e d  to argue in favour o f  Japan 's  withdrawal from the i n t e r ­
na t ional o rgan isa t ion  even before the r e so lu t ion  by the Opposition 
Seiyukai to  the same end on 11 November. Uchida T e i t s u i ,  fo r  example, 
wrote in i t s  November 1 e d i t io n :
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I f  the League of  Nations not only refuses  to  provide 
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  Japan to  carry  out her na t ional  pol icy  
overseas but a lso  becomes an o rgan isa t ion  to r e s t r i c t  
her  r i g h t  of  s e l f  defence,  i t  wil l  be most advanta­
geous f o r  Japan to withdraw from the o rgan isa t ion  and 
stand on the  same bas is  as the U.S.41
The a t t i t u d e s  of  Gaikojiho a t  t h i s  s tage  could a l so  be t ra ced
through i t s  t rea tment  o f  l e t t e r s  from i t s  readers .  Before the Mukden
in c id e n t ,  the journa l  had published those which c r i t i c i s e d  and con t ra -
-  42d ie ted  the argument presented by i t s  e d i t o r ,  Hanzawa Gyokujo. No 
longer ,  however, did such l e t t e r s  appear in p r in t  and those which did 
appear seemed to  be in l i n e  with the e d i t o r i a l  pol icy  o f  the  journa l  
or  even ahead of  i t  in t h e i r  advocacy of  Japan ’s withdrawal from the
4QLeague or  in t h e i r  support  fo r  the ' independence'  movements in Manchuria. w 
In the heat  of  the ' p a t r i o t i c  race '  i n i t i a t e d  by the major met­
ro p o l i t an  newspapers and some jo u rn a ls  such as Gaikojiho, the more ou t ­
spoken c r i t i c s  of  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  found i t  i n c re a s in g ly  d i f f i ­
c u l t  to voice t h e i r  view. True, the Special Police  Branch, which had 
been e s ta b l i s h e d  two decades e a r l i e r  mainly to  suppress s o c i a l i s t  move­
ments, 'watched'  the opinions and statements  by the opponents of  the
government and took ac t ion  aga ins t  outspoken opponents of  the war in
44 .Manchuria. Never the less ,  i t  did not mount any physical a t t a c k  on
any individual  c r i t i c s  of  the government in the sphere of  war or  d ip lo -
45macy u n t i l  the  outbreak of  the undeclared Si no-Japanese war in 1937.
I t  was probably the 'v o lu n ta ry '  r e s t r a i n t  on the p a r t  of  the major 
jou rna ls  t h a t  stopped the express ion of  views by Chinese c r i t i c s  such 
as the w r i t e r ,  Lu-hsun, in the  post-Mukden inc iden t  y e a r s . ^  The n o t i c e ­
able increase  in the b lu e -p e n c i l l in g  from November 1931 onwards was 
a lso  due to  the caution on the p a r t  of  the jo u rn a ls  although i t s  ex ten t
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d i f f e r e d  from journa l  to j o u rn a l ,  Gaikoj iho, with the assurance of  
i t s  ’p r o -m i l i t a ry '  r e p u ta t io n ,  seems to have f e l t  much l e s s  need o f  
s e l f - c e n s o r s h ip ,  judged by the tone of  i t s  c o n t r ib u t io n s .  For 
example, Nakamura Yasanji ,  a l i b e r a l  c r i t i c ,  wrote about the s t r a in e d  
government-mil itary r e l a t io n s  in Gaikojiho in i t s  January 15, 1932, 
e d i t io n :
Such discord within  the i n s t i t u t i o n s  which ca r ry  out 
our nat ional  p o l icy ,  above a l l  the co n t ra d ic t io n s  
between the m i l i t a r y  and the diplomatic  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
have led China to r e s o r t  to  a c l e a r l y  xenophobic 
an t i -Japanese  po l icy .  The uncontro l led  m i l i t a r y  a c t io n ,  
worsening of  i n t e rn a t io n a l  r e a l t io n s  and the bad e f f e c t  
on the  g rea t  p r in c ip le  of  the sacredness  o f  the  Emperor 
r e s u l t i n g  from the  i n d e p e n d e n c e ^  supreme command.
We have already witnessed them.
In f a c t ,  someyther major j o u r n a l s ,  such as Chuokoron and Kaizo, 
f e l t  obliged to  de le te  any d i r e c t  re ference  to the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s '  
between the two government i n s t i t u t i o n s  as the following comment by 
Takayama J o j i  in Chuokoron's  December 1931 e d i t io n  suggested:
In s h o r t ,  Kasumigaseki [ i . e .  the Foreign Minis t ryJ  i s  
_  _  by Miyakezaka [ i . e ,  the Army S t a f f ] .  The e v i l s
of- long-s tanding r e s u l t i n g  from the ' v i c e - m in i s t e r i a l  
diplomacy' ( j ikan  gaiko) a t  Kasumigaseki have been 
exposed through the p resent  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  had pretended 
to  be t r u s t e d  with Japan 's  diplomacy although i t  did 
not have i t s  own. This has f i n a l l y  come to  the surface  
in the face o f _______ being dragooned by t h e  .4®
Not a l l  the missing passages r e su l t e d  from the 'v o lu n ta ry '  s e l f
censorship .  Indeed, an essay by the Marxist  c r i t i c ,  Inomata Tsunao, in
Chuokoron' s November 1931 e d i t i o n ,  e n t i t l e d  'Monopoly Capita l ism and
the C r i s i s  in Manchuria ' ,  had four  e n t i r e  pages (pp .29-32) rep laced  by
49a red l e a f  with a s ta tement ,  ' d e le te d  by c e n s o r s h ip ' .  The main reason 
fo r  t h i s  d e le t io n  by the Home Minis try  was perhaps because Inomata
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had argued t h a t  the Mukden inc iden t  was 'designed to  secure the s u r ­
vival of  some m i l i t a r y  c l iq u e s '  and to secure the ' l i f e - l i n e  fo r  some
50c a p i t a l i s t s  or  m i l i t a r y  c l i q u e s ' .  This trea tment  undoubtedly i n f ­
luenced the t e n o r  of  c r i t i c i s m  in the subsequent c o n t r ib u t io n s  and
leaders  o f  the two sogozassh i . This a lso  ex p la in s ,  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y ,
51the increas ing  t r a c e  of  b lu e -p e n c i l l in g  in th e se  j o u r n a l s ,  while 
o thers  such as Gaikojiho and Kokusaichishiki continued to  publ ish  the 
essays v i r t u a l l y  f ree  from i t ,  thus c rea t ing  a seemingly paradoxical  
s i t u a t i o n  wherein the reader  found more o v e r t ly  c r i t i c a l  and coherent  
comments in Gaikojiho than in the supposedly more ' l i b e r a l '  sogozassh i . 
Perhaps the  most outspoken individual  who voiced his  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the 
' p a t r i o t i c  race '  through Gaikojiho was Okamoto Tsurumatsu.
Writing in i t s  January 15, 1932 e d i t i o n ,  Okamoto r e g re t t e d  
t h a t  the people had come to bel ieve  i t  t h e i r  duty to speak i l l  of  and 
blame the League as i f  they had fo rgo t ten  Japan 's  s ta tu s  as one of  the 
permanent members of  i t s  e l i t e  body, the Council . At the  same time,  
he reminded the government as well as the people of  the need to  d i f f ­
e r e n t i a t e  renmei gaiko (the League diplomacy) which respected  and acted  
upon the s p i r i t  o f  the League Covenant from ta i  renmei gaiko (diplomacy 
d i re c ted  a t  the  League) which was designed to  lead the League to take 
ac t ions  favourable to  the country. Japan,  according to  Okamoto, lacked 
t a i  renmei gaiko owing mainly to  the lack of  a t o t a l l y  uni ted  po l icy  
between the  Foreign Minis try and the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  and i t  was 
the duty o f  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  follow the pol icy  e s ta b l i s h e d  
by the Foreign Minis try  r a th e r  than vice versa i f  she was to avoid 
in te rn a t io n a l  c r i t i c i s m .  Okamoto continued:
Those who bel ieve  t h a t  Japan can behave as she 
l ik e s  once she has withdrawn from the League are  
megalomaniacs. The combination of  renmei gaiko and
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t a i  renmei gaiko should become the main o b jec t  o f  
the Japanese fore ign  pol icy  from now on. To t h i s  
end, the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  and the Foreign Mini­
s t r y  should take concerted:  ac t io n ,  2
Okamoto's view was, however, no longer  shared by many. Indeed, 
the major newspapers seemed by then to  have come to regard the mi l i -  
t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  as the i n i t i a t o r  of Japan’s diplomacy which the Foreign 
Minis t ry  should follow.  They seemed to  have ’i n d o c t r i n a t e d ’ themselves 
to  support t h i s  view by then.  Machida Shiro ,  the head o f  the Tokyo 
Asahi’s fore ign  a f f a i r s  sec t ion  which handled the news concerning the 
League and publ ic  opinion overseas ,  declared through the newspaper on 
27 January 1932, two days before the Si no-Japanese warfare spread to  
Shanghai:
We need to c o r r e c t  our understanding now . . . .  Our t r a g ­
edy has been t h a t  we havefiacked the understanding not  of  
the Manchuria inc iden t  but of  the m i l i t a r y  a c t io n s .
We should have r e a l i s e d  where the nat ional  pol icy  of  our 
empire lay  before t ry ing  to  check th e m . . . .  Even now, 
some people are  s t i l l  claiming t h a t  the government, 
the people and the press  o rgan isa t ions  have equa l ly  been 
dragooned in to  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  by the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i ­
t i e s .  There is^however,  nothing more absurd than t h i s
n o t io n .53
2, Shanghai Incident  and Recognition o f  Manchukuo
The powerless Wakatsuki Minseito cab ine t  was replaced by the  
new Seiyukai government headed by Prime Minis ter  Inukai Tsuyoshi on 
13 December 1931. The es tab li shment  of  another  one-party  c a b in e t  a t  
t h i s  ju n c tu re ,  however, did not  provide much assurance to  the na t ion  
whose hope, i f  any, had ex is ted  in the formation of  a 'w h o le -n a t io n 1 
cab ine t  i f  i t  was to hold toge the r  i n t e r n a l l y  as well as e x t e r n a l ly .
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To those who had f e l t  the  m i l i t a r y  ac t ion  to be excess ive ,  the cab ine t
as composed was a warning of  worse to  come as Seiyukai had g enera l ly
been considered more c o n c i l i a to ry  to  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Even
to  those who supported Japan 's  ac t ion  in Manchuria, i t  was l i t t l e  more
than a chang^fcf the name of  the cab ine t  s ince  the new government seemed
to  possess no concrete po l icy  to resolve the deadlock on the  Manchuria 
56is su e .  Such anxie ty  was soon confirmed.
On December 23, the Kwantung Army began i t s  advance to  Chinchow 
which in v i ted  a 'warning'  not only from the U.S. but a lso  from B r i t a in  
and France. On 27 December, the government asked the th ree  Powers not  
to i n t e r f e r e  with the i s s u e ,  thus giving de fac to  recogn i t ion  to  the 
m i l i t a ry  a c t io n .  The occupation of  the c i t y  on 3 January 1932 was the  
f in a l  blow to  Secre tary  of  S ta te  H .L. Stimson. On 7 January ,  he 
n o t i f i e d  both the  governments of Japan and China^the disapproval by 
the U.S. to  any de fac to  s i t u a t i o n  which had occurred s ince the Mukden 
inc iden t  ( 'Stimson D o c t r in e ' ) ,  The B r i t i sh  government, however, o f f i ­
c i a l l y  decl ined the U.S. proposal fo r  a j o i n t  protocol to Japan four  
days l a t e r .
While the  complicated proceedings over Manchuria continued within  
and without  Japan,  the re  occurred a c lash between the Chinese and Japa­
nese so ld ie r s  in  Shanghai, I t s  i n i t i a l  cause was the a l leged  a t t a c k  
on the f ive  Japanese Buddhist monks by the Chinese on 18 January ,  which 
was, however, subsequently u t i l i s e d  eleven days l a t e r  by the Japanese 
to  occupy la rge  pa r t  of  the c i t y .  In response to the Chinese appea l ,  
the League Council issued  a warning to Japan on 16 February to stop 
m i l i t a r y  ac t io n .  In s p i t e  of  i t s  i n i t i a l  ' f a c e - sa v in g '  re fusa l  to
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comply with the warning, the government was anxious to s e t t l e  the
mat te r  as soon and as q u i e t l y  as poss ib le  in view of  the implicat ion
o f  such h o s t i l i t y  in a c i t y  o f  such a t r u l y  i n t e rn a t io n a l  s t a t u s .  Even
the major newspapers, by now the w i l l in g  spokesmen of  the m i l i t a r y  auth-
55
o r i t i e s ,  shared t h i s  view, Perhaps the  only exception among the 
i n f l u e n t i a l  c r i t i c s  was Hanzawa Gyokujo who wrote on 15 February:
The outbreak o f  the Shanghai inc iden t  in d ic a te s  Japan 's  
in ten t io n  to  re co n s t ru c t  China and to  reform the Far East 
-._a_s_well as her demand f o r  a fundamental re-assessment in 
the understanding of  the area by the Powers in Europe 
and the U.S. The t rue  f ee l ing  of  us Japanese i s  t h a t  we 
be l ieve  t h a t  i t  i s  more e f f e c t iv e  to  explain  and prove 
them through ac t io n  on the spot  r a th e r  than the  diplomatic 
l e t t e r s  or n e g o t i a t i o n s . 56
Few c r i t i c s  questioned the l e g a l i t y  of  the Japanese ac t ion  in 
Shanghai, a t  l e a s t  o v e r t ly .  Indeed, even the c o n t r ib u to r s  to  sogozasshi 
tended to present  almost purely explanatory ins tead  of  c r i t i c a l  essays 
and t h i s  phenomenon was p a r t i c u l a r l y  no t iceab le  among the legal  schol­
a r s .  Whatever the reasons behind i t  may have been, they sounded to have 
completely abandoned t h e i r  ra ison d ' e t r e  as c r i t i c s ,  Matsui H i tosh i ,  
a well-known f ig u re  in the legal  world, wrote in Chuokoron's  March 
1932 ed i t ion  on the l a t e s t  Sino-Japanese c lash in Shanghai:
What s tep  should Japan have taken before the  outbreak 
of  the war on 29 January? What kind of  plan fo r  s e t t l e ­
ment should she e s t a b l i s h  f o r  the fu tu re?  These p o l i ­
t i c a l  arguments are  not my main t a sk .  I would simply 
l i k e  to  observe the Shanghai inc iden t  q u i e t l y  as a
s tudent  of o r i e n ta l  h i s t o r y  At the moment I only
have the mind to pray l i k e  o thers  t h a t  the s i t u a t io n  
would not spread f u r t h e r . ^ '
The tendency among the legal scholars  to  withhold t h e i r  own 
conclusions was confined n e i th e r  to  the Shanghai inc iden t  nor to
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sogozassh i , In s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  somewhat apo loge t ic  remark t h a t  they did 
not wish to  draw too hasty a conclusion on the s i t u a t i o n  concerned, i t  
was q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  they shjed away from committing themselves to  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  view in case i t  provoked the wrath of  somebody, perhaps the 
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Matsubara Kazuo, another  widely respec ted  legal 
scho la r  and one of  the most reg u la r  c o n t r ib u to r s  of  Gaikojiho and 
Kokusaichishiki throughout the l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s, commented 
on the  d e c la ra t io n  of  ' independence'  by the newly e s ta b l i sh ed  regime 
a t  Hsinking in Manchuria which was made on 1 March 1932:
I wil l  not a t tempt to advocate the  recogn i t ion  o f  the new 
regime here . At the same t ime,  I am not going to  claim
t h a t  the recogni t ion  i s  too hasty  a t  t h i s  s t a g e . . . .  I
would simply l i k e  to provide the reader  with the m a te r i ­
a l s  with which he can judge the i ssue  fo r  himself .
The ' independence'  day fo r  Manchuria under the name of  Manchukuo
was in f a c t  the day before the ' f a c t - f i n d i n g '  mission headed by Lord
Lytton o f  B r i t a in  a r r ived  in Tokyo from Geneva on i t s  way to Manchuria.
This commission had o r ig i n a l l y  been proposed by the Japanese government
with most o f  the Japanese newspapers supporting i t  and had been accep-
59ted  by the League Council on 10 December 1931. Ten days a f t e r  i t s  
a r r i v a l  in the  Japanese c a p i t a l ,  the General Assembly of  the League 
passed a r e so lu t io n  not to recognise Manchukuo to which the Japanese 
government immediately r ep l ie d  with the 'Summary of  P r in c ip le s  in Deal­
ing With The Manchuria And Mongolia I s su e '  (Manmo Shori Yoko) in order
finto guide the  new regime. The government, however, r e f r a in ed  from 
giving formal recogni t ion  to Manchukuo u n t i l  s ix  months l a t e r .  Mean­
while the Shanghai in c id en t  was s e t t l e d  with the s igning of  the cease­
f i r e  agreement on 5 May, thanks l a rg e ly  to  the  good o f f i c e s  of the 
B r i t i s h  Minis ter  to  China, S i r  Miles Lampson. Ten days l a t e r ,  Prime
-  173 -
M inis te r  Inukai was a s sa s s in a ted  by the r e b e l l io u s  o f f i c e r s  and the  
non-par ty cab ine t  headed by Admiral Sa i to  Makoto was e s t a b l i s h e d  on 
26 May.
Few c r i t i c s  advocated the immediate recogni t ion  o f  Manchukuo.
The in te rn a t io n a l  outcry  ag a in s t  Japan which followed the outbreak of
the Shanghai inc iden t  and t h e i r  f e a r  t h a t  the  recogn i t ion  might lead
61to  Jap an 's  withdrawal from the League of  Nations were perhaps the
two main reasons fo r  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  s i lence  on th i s  i s s u e .  Indeed,
even Hanzawa Gyokujo did not seem to  feel  sa fe  in dec la r ing  ' J a p a n ' s
unshakeable determination to  f i g h t  ag a in s t  the world, not  to  mention
the League o f  Nations'  u n t i l  a f t e r  the formal recogni t ion  of  Manchukuo
6?by the  government on 15 September. Their anxie ty  was perhaps bes t  
expressed in the following comment by the e d i t o r i a l  s t a f f  o f  Kokusai- 
ch ish ik i  in the e d i t o r i a l  note column of  i t s  May 1932 e d i t i o n :
We bel ieve  t h a t  the government would not dream o f  the  
withdrawal from the League. We also  be l ieve  t h a t  
whatever the metropol i tan  newspapers say, the people 
would not follow i t .  We cannot,  however, as a journa l  
whose mission i s  to  car ry  out  the s p i r i t  o f  the League, 
ignore i t .  We have th e re fo re  decided to  nip the i l l u ­
sion of  withdrawal arguments in the bud by publ ish ing  
the c l e a r  and eminent opinions of  Drs. Tachi and Kamikawa 
[of Tokyo Imperial U n iv e r s i t y ] .63
The pub l ica t ion  of  the  con t r ibu t ions  by the two prominent pro­
fe s so rs  of  law may not have had the des ired  e f f e c t .  True, they argued 
aga ins t  J apan 's  withdrawal from the League. On the o ther  hand, t h e i r  
arguments were based on the assumption t h a t  the League would even­
t u a l l y  accept Japan 's  recogni t ion  of  Manchukuo or  a t  l e a s t  the mandate 
o f  Manchuria by Japan but never questioned whether such a so lu t io n  would 
be acceptable  to the League or  C h i n a . ^  Indeed, these  schola rs  and 
t h e i r  col leagues such as Matsubara Kazuo contended elsewhere t h a t  the 
recogni t ion  would not in f r in g e  in te rn a t io n a l  law 'so long as the new
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65s t a t e  had been f i rm ly  e s t a b l i s h e d ' ,  which few c r i t i c s  dared ques t ion .  
Some people l ik e  Sugimori Kojiro in f a c t  expressed t h e i r  view t h a t  the 
r e o rgan isa t ion  of  the League, the Kellogg-Briand and the Nine Power 
Pacts would be required  fo r  a newly e s ta b l i s h e d  'e q u i l ib r iu m '  in the Far 
East .  Sugimori wrote in Kaizo's  April  e d i t i o n :
Scholars should make i t  a sub jec t  to th e o r i s e  (gakur ika) 
and study (gakujutsuka) t h i s  [the r eo rgan isa t ion  of  
the  e x i s t in g  in te rn a t io n a l  o rd e r ] .  A c t iv i s t s  should 
concentra te  on carry ing  out t h i s  learn ing  s i n c e r e l y . 66
The a t t i t u d e  of  Kokusaichishiki i t s e l f  had been changing, i f  
s lowly, s ince  the Council vote on 24 October 1931. The e d i t o r  had 
a l ready  claimed the ' l a ck  o f  understanding '  of  the Far Eastern s i t u ­
a t io n  on the p a r t  of  the League and had begun to advocate the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  a regional organ within i t s  framework to deal with the Si no-
67Japanese c o n f l i c t .  By the  summer of  1932, his  commitment to  the 
s p i r i t  of  the League Covenant seemed to have f a l t e r e d  so much t h a t  he 
wrote in the August e d i t io n :
Serious is sues  concerning i n t e r e s t s  between Powers 
cannot ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  be solved o ther  than by d i r e c t  
n ego t ia t ions  between the coun t r ie s  c o n c e rn e d . . . .
From t h i s  viewpoint,  i t  would be a mistake f o r  us 
to t r y  to  solve the Sino-Japanese c o n f l i c t  through 
the Council or  the General Assembly, Rather ,  we 
bel ieve  t h a t  we should encourage d i r e c t  n ego t ia t ions  
between them and t h a t  the Council should simply gg
concentra te  on the ro le  of  promoting such n e g o t ia t io n s .
The dilemma which confronted the c r i t i c s  a t  the  time was t h a t  
the ' c r e d i b i l i t y '  of  the Chinese government was in doubt in t h e i r  mind. 
As Kokusaichishiki saw i t ,  the re  were th ree  poss ib le  ways to s e t t l e  
the Manchuria c r i s i s ;  conclusion of  a t r e a t y  concerning Manchuria 
with a ' r e l i a b l e '  Chinese government; annexation of  Manchuria; and
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recogni t ion  o f  Manchukuo. Since the annexation seemed c e r t a in  to
i n v i t e  vigorous opposit ion from the Powers, the recogni t ion  of  Manchukuo
69appeared to  be the only f e a s ib l e  so lu t ion  to  Kokusa ichish ik i .
Kaizo a lso  seemed to  favour the immediate recogni t ion  l a rg e ly  because 
i t  bel ieved t h a t  i t  was the only choice t h a t  would enable Japan to 
withdraw from the c o s t ly  involvement in Manchuria while not  i so l a t i n g  
the  country too much i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . ^  On the o ther  hand, Chuokoron 
was more concerned about the poss ib le  i n t e rn a t io n a l  repercussions  of  
such an a c t  by the government and f e l t  i t  bes t  fo r  Japan to ' a c t  f ree  
from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  by not recognising M a n c h u k u o ' T h e  ' r e s p o n s ib i ­
l i t y '  l ay ,  however, with Japan,  whatever ac t ion  she was to  take ,  and 
t h i s  i s  why even Toyokeizaishinpo, the e r s tw h i le  most outspoken c r i t i c  
o f  *i£ f a c to  s i t u a t i o n  in Manchuria among the major jo u r n a l s ,  had come 
to comment j u s t  before the d ec la ra t io n  of  ' independence'  of  Manchukuo:
Good or  bad, we cannot forsake the new s t a t e  as we have 
a l ready embarked on t h i s  under taking.  I t  i s  the in e s ­
capable duty of  our people to do t h e i r  bes t  in helping 
the new regime to turn  Manchuria and Mongolia in to  a 
t r u l y  safe  and peaceful p a r a d i s e .72
I t  is  noteworthy t h a t  on 5 May^the Tokyo Asahi which had kept
s i l e n c e  on the recogni t ion  issue  demanded f o r  the f i r s t  time t h a t  the
73government give fu l l  recogni t ion  immediately. I t  was in f a c t  the day 
on which the Si no-Japanese c e a s e f i r e  agreement on the Shanghai inc iden t  
was o f f i c i a l l y  signed. On 14 June, the  Lower House of  the Imperial 
Diet unanimously passed a re so lu t io n  c a l l i n g  fo r  the immediate recog­
n i t i o n  of  Manchukuo, which led to the following remark by Machida 
Shiro ,  the head of  the fore ign  a f f a i r s  sec t ion  of  the Tokyo Asahi, in 
Kokusaich ish ik i 's  Ju ly  e d i t io n :
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I f  the people are ready but the  government i s  n o t ,  
t h a t  must be because of  the l a t t e r ' s  lack of  f o r e s i g h t .
To h e s i t a t e  to recognise Manchukuo a t  t h i s  s tage  in
deference to  the  anger o f  the Chinese government or
people would do nothing but in v i t e  the  contempt o f  the 
Chinese na t ion .  I t  would c e r t a i n l y  not c o n t r ib u te  to  
f r iendsh ip  between the two c o u n t r i e s . 74
Few c r i t i c s  questioned the l e g a l i t y  of  Manchukuo o r  advocated 
the postponement of  recogni t ion  as Chuokoron did .  Yanaibara Tadao of  
Tokyo Imperial Universi ty  was unusual in a s se r t in g  t h a t  the  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of  Manchukuo could not be regarded as the independence o f  an opp­
ressed n a t io n ,  as most o f  the  c r i t i c s  d id ,  from an i m p e r i a l i s t  empire 
such as Russia ,  Turkey or  A us tr ia .  Unlike the newly independent coun­
t r i e s  in Europe which had f reed themselves from the control  by another  
n a t io n ,  the m ajor i ty  of  the  people in new Manchuria, Yanaibara reminded,
the reader ,  were of  the same Chinese o r ig in  as in the Republic of  China.
Investment o f  hundreds o f  m i l l ions  o f  yen or  an immigrant populat ion of  
tens of thousands did not au tom at ica l ly  mean a ' sp ec ia l  s t a t u s '  which 
should command specia l  p ro tec t ion  p o l i t i c a l l y  as well as d ip lo m a t i c a l ly ,  
and which had in f a c t  never been enjoyed by Japan. Nor was the  p r in c ip le  
of  nat ional  s e l f -d e te rm in a t io n ,  which had come to  be recognised in
Europe, app l icab le  in the case of  Manchukuo, Yanaibara argued in Kaizo's  
75April e d i t i o n .
Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Foreign M in is ter  under the Inukai cab ine t  
and the  head o f  the Japanese de lega t ion  a t  the League of  Nations when 
the Mukden inc iden t  broke o u t ,  was also  the sole  voice in Chuokoron's  
October e d i t io n  to advocate the postponement of  recogn i t ion .  This e d i ­
t ion  was o f f i c i a l l y  phblished two weeks a f t e r  the announcement of  Japan 's  
formal b less ing  o f  Manchukuo, but Yoshizawa had c l e a r ly  f in i s h e d  his
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essay by then.  In i t  he argued t h a t  the r ig h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  o f  Japan 
in Manchuria were based on the Si no-Japanese t r e a t i e s  and t h a t  the 
c re a t io n  o f  Manchukuo obliged  her to take appropr ia te  measures to 
c l a r i f y  where these  r ig h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  stood before giving formal 
recogni t ion  to  Manchukuo. I t  was e s se n t i a l  fo r  Japan to obta in  the 
understanding of  the  Powers on these measures and even i f  such under­
standing was not forthcoming, the  f a c t  t h a t  she had t r i e d  would count
in the fu tu re .  For t h i s  reason ,  Yoshizawa contended, Japan should not
76recognise  Manchukuo too h a s t i l y .
These opinions by the  ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t '  c r i t i c s  perhaps were 
never given the a t t e n t i o n  o f  the government or  the Foreign M inis t ry .
Even i f  they had been and had found sympathisers within these  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s ,  i t  would have made l i t t l e  d i f fe ren ce  to  the course o f  Japanese 
diplomacy. In f a c t ,  many c r i t i c s  f e l t  t h a t  the re  was no longer  a neces­
s i t y  fo r  the  Foreign M inis t ry ,  which had become nothing more than the 
' fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  bureau'  of  the Army S t a f f .  This protocol became espe­
c i a l l y  st rong a f t e r  Uchida Yasuya, the former p res iden t  of  the  South 
Manchuria Railways, had assumed the p o r t f o l i o  of  the Foreign M inis te r  
on 6 Ju ly  1932. Those who were s t i l l  c r i t i c a l  of  the  Japanese pol icy  
over Manchuria accused Uchida o f  his ' f igurehead  diplomacy' because 
they wished to express t h e i r  disapproval of  the m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  
behind h i m . ^  The majori ty  of  them, however, c r i t i c i s e d  him because 
Uchida seemed to be incapable  of  presenting Japan 's  case to  the League 
o ther  than to  repeat t h a t  the  Japanese ac t ions  including the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  Manchukuo had been c a r r i e d  out fo r  ' s e l f  d e fen ce ' .  Sugiyama 
Shiro ,  f o r  example, r e f e r r in g  to  the conversa t ion between Uchida and 
Lord Lytton on 12 Ju ly ,  proposed the a b o l i t io n  of  the  Foreign Minis try  
in Chuokoron:
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Uchida t o t a l l y  lacks the wisdom and e f f o r t  needed to 
touch the h e a r t s t r i n g s  of  the Lytton commission with 
o rder ly  log ic  aid f r i e n d l y  exp lanat ion .  F ur the r ,  a 
b r a in le s s  man! Nobody can deny the very f a c t  t h a t  Man­
chukuo i s  a l ready a t o t a l l y  independent country  and i t  
would be na tura l  f o r  Japan as a neighbour to  provide 
recogni t ion  to  t h i s  firm f a c t .  He has completely fo r -  
* gotten to remind the commission of  the core of  t h i s
i s s u e , 7 8
I f  the a b o l i t io n  of  the Foreign Ministry was considered approp­
r i a t e  by some, o thers  f e l t  t h a t  the .newspapers were a lso  unnecessary,
t W  M w U M t y  Vtfr'Y* A c
f o r  n e i th e r  xj posses i -fcKeCv* own view. The newspapers may not
A
have been able  to  ' r e c o n s id e r 1, ' c o r r e c t  or  avow' or  ' touch upon the
m er i ts  and demeri ts '  o f  the opinions h i th e r to  held by themselves and
o th e r s .  Nor perhaps did they have any choice o ther  than to  'devote
79the  e n t i r e  pages to  the e f f o r t s  to  car ry  out  the i n e v i t a b le  w a r ' .
This was probably why they showed such in d i f f e ren ce  to  the  opinions
o f  t h e i r  readers  on the China issue  as to publish  hardly any l e t t e r s
in columns such as Tesso of  the Tokyo Asahi and Sankakuten (the
Tr iangular  Point)  o f  the Tokyo N ic h in ich i . Sankakuten, which was the
successor  of  Tsunobue, in f a c t  refused to  present  any 'pa r l iam en ta ry ,
general or savour less '  arguments,  thus excluding the p o s s i b i l i t y  of
any c r i t i c a l  comment by the reader  on the government or  the m i l i t a r y  
80 —a u t h o r i t i e s .  Tesso sounded equal ly  defensive when i t  commented on 
2 September 1932:
Those who cons ider  t h a t  t h i s  column gives the  cold 
shoulder  to  such top ics  as the rescue of  ag ra r ian  
v i l l a g e s  and Manchuria are mistaken themselves . We 
are  simply wait ing fo r  those people who w r i te  in 
such a way t h a t  t h e i r  l e t t e r s  are s u i t a b l e  fo r  pub­
l i c a t i o n  in t h i s  c o l u m n , 81
This remark does not seem to ca rry  much weight when the same 
e d i t o r  went on to express his  d e l ig h t  the f a c t  t h a t  approximately
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tw o- th i rds  of  the l e t t e r s  received during the previous month had
82come from ’well-known f i g u r e s ’ . Not a s ing le  published l e t t e r  in the 
column in August, however, d iscussed Japan’s o f f i c i a l  recogni t ion  o f  
Manchukuo and i t s  poss ib le  e f f e c t  on her r e l a t io n s h ip  with the  League 
o f  Nations, The following remark by Baba Tsunego, one of  the few f r e e ­
lance j o u r n a l i s t s ,  in  the Yomiuri on 27 Ju ly  may well have expressed 
the  f e e l in g s  held by the  readers  whose l e t t e r s  were not  publ ished by 
the newspapers:
The p r in ted  opinions are not public opinion. The 
t ru e  public  opinion i s  kept unsaid and could be 
found in s i l e n c e .  I f  the government o f f i c i a l s  
wish to  know i t ,  there  i s  no way o ther  than to  
read the eyes of  the  people in the s t r e e t  and to  
hear the sighs o f  the workers and p e a sa n ts .83
The obsequious a t t i t u d e  of the newspapers to the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
was to e s c a l a t e  even f u r th e r  as the autumn approached.
3, Lytton Report
On 15 September 1932, the Japanese government gave f u l l  recogn i­
t ion  to  Manchukuo. The recogni t ion  i t s e l f  had been expected e s p e c i ­
a l l y  s ince  the con t rovers ia l  address  by Foreign Minis ter  Uchida on 
25 August in which he declared in e f f e c t i v e  language t h a t  the govern­
ment had decided to  accord de .jure recogni t ion  to  Manchukuo in the 
84near fu tu r e .  The major reason fo r  t h i s  u l t im ate  ac t ion  a t  t h i s  
junc tu re  was because the scheduled publ ica t ion  of  the long-awaited 
Lytton Reporton 1 October seemed c e r t a in  to c o n t r a d ic t  the government
i
propaganda to  the people. Indeed, Chapter 4 of  the Report subsequently  
refused to  accept  t h a t  the Japanese m i l i t a ry  ac t ion  on 18 September 1931
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had been an a c t  of  s e l f  defence, while Chapter 6 r e je c te d  the Japanese
content ion t h a t  Manchukuo had been created  by genuine and voluntary
movements among the people in Manchuria.
The r e j e c t i o n  by theLytton Report of  the Japanese claims added
more fuel to the  t r a d i t i o n a l  tendency of  the Japanese press  to  confuse
85r e fu t a t i o n  with abuse. The condemnation of  the  Report and the personal 
a t t a c k  on Lord Lytton by the major newspapers,  e s p e c ia l ly  the Tokyo
Asahi .were so v io le n t  as to anger Prince Saionji  and the cab ine t
86m in i s t e r s .  Even Kokusaichishiki which was published by the League 
o f  Nations Associat ion in Japan went on to  make the following comment:
These two conclusions are  indeed the two la rge  poison 
fangs pointed a t  Japan. I f  ever  she gets  wounds because 
of  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  they would der ive  from these  f a n g s . . . .  
Even i f  Japan i s  not subjected to any s a n c t io n s ,  i t  w i l l  
leave an e te rna l  smear in the h i s to ry  of  Japanese d ip lo ­
macy as a v io la t io n  of  i n t e rn a t io n a l  t r e a t i e s .
Unlike the emotional tone o f  the l e ad e r ,  most of  the c o n t r ib u ­
t io n s  in Kokusaichishiki were more r e f l e c t i v e .  Some c r i t i c s  who were 
supporters  of  the Japanese claims never the less  r e g re t te d  the personal
a t ta c k  on the members of the Lytton Commission found in the major ___
88newspapers. Others ra i se d  questions  d i re c ted  a t  the m i l i t a r y  autho­
r i t i e s  in conjunction with the Report. Suehiro Shi geo, a noted legal 
scho la r  and one of  the most outspoken opponents o f  Japan’s withdrawal 
from the League, wrote in K okusaichish ik i ' s  November e d i t i o n :
The published p ic tu re  [of  the bombed rai lway a t  
Mukden] had shown nothing more than the completely 
repa ired  ra i lway and a few small pieces of  the 
s leepers  and r a i l s  which were too poor a m ater ia l  
to l e t  the people recognise the ser iousness  of  the 
s i t u a t i o n .  The publ ica t ion  of  such a p ic tu re  was 
not only t o t a l l y  use less  but seems to have spo i led  
Japan 's  content ion t h a t  her army had been forced to 
take such a l a r g e - s c a l e  ac t ion  in s e l f  defence.89
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Another of  these  outspoken c r i t i c s  was Tagawa Daikichiro who 
had cons ta n t ly  expressed his  anger a t  the newspapers which claimed 
Japan’s withdrawal from the League to be more ’manly and n a t u r a l '  
than her obedience to the League Covenant. He had, fo r  example, 
w r i t t en  in the May 1932 e d i t io n  o f  Kokusaichish ik i :
The League of  Nations i s  supported by public  opinion 
which approves i t s  p r in c ip le s  and s p i r i t .  Only those 
c o u n t r ie s ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  which possess such publ ic  opinion 
have the  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  League. 
Those which do no t ,  have no q u a l i f i c a t i o n  to  j o in  the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n .90
Following the pub l ica t ion  of  the Lytton Report, however, Tagawa's 
c r i t i c a l  tone sounded somewhat modified. The o f f i c i a l  recogn i t ion  of  
Manchukuo and the outrage among the people towards the Report may have 
influenced him in not drawing any conclusions on the  d i f f e r e n t  a t t i ­
tudes shown by the Japanese government and the Lytton Commission. Never­
t h e l e s s ,  he wrote:
I would not  say which of  these  ways of  th ink ing  i s  more 
modern and e f f e c t i v e ,  but I bel ieve  t h a t  we need an a t t i ­
tude which l e t s  us l i s t e n  to the arguments o f  the League 
of  Nations and to  look a t  the world trend  with t h i s  in 
mind.91
Another notable  f e a tu re  of  Kokusaichishiki in t h i s  per iod was 
the sudden a c t iv a t io n  of  the ' l e t t e r s  to the e d i t o r ’ column which had 
been almost t o t a l l y  neglected s ince  i t s  es tab l ishment  in the September 
1931 ed i t io n  in which an e n th u s i a s t i c  young farmer wrote:
Diplomacy without  the support  of  public  opinion cannot 
e x i s t .  I t  i s  the age in which even the ideology of  us 
youths in ag rar ian  v i l l a g e s  i s  expressed as c r ed ib le  
diplomacy through newspapers,  jo u rn a ls  e t c .  via the 
Foreign Minis try  o f f i c i a l s . . . .  I bel ieve t h a t  the i n v i ­
t a t i o n  of  l e t t e r s  from readers  s t a r t i n g  in t h i s  e d i t i o n ^  
i s  a big s tep  forward by the journal  in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .
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In f a c t ,  following the outbreak of  the  Mukden in c id e n t ,  t h i s
column became nobody*s column and the journa l  had repeated ly  had to  ask
93i t s  readers  to co n t r ib u te  to  t h i s  column u n t i l  i t  came to  l i f e  in the 
autumn of  1932, Even then ,  few anonymous readers  con t r ibu ted  as the 
farmer^and perhaps the ed i to r ,  had hoped. I n s t ead, the published 
l e t t e r s  in t h i s  per iod were mostly from well-known c r i t i c s  such as 
Akiyama Yasuke who wrote in the  December e d i t i o n :
Is i t  not too hasty fo r  th e j& n e ig n  M inis t ry  and the 
Army to  provide wings to  t h e i r  fancy and dec la re  t h e i r  
in te n t io n  to deal with the e n t i r e  world before  world 
public opinion has given any judgement? I do not 
bel ieve  t h a t  the world i s  so u n f a i r , , . .  Should th e re  
be anything fo r  us to  reco n s id e r ,  i t  would be manly 
to  do so. I t  would be advisable  fo r  Japan who, as a 
permanent Council member, has subscribed to  the League 
p r in c ip le s  of  i m p a r t i a l i t v ,  j u s t i c e  and peace, not  to 
leave a smear on h e r s e l f ,94
Taoka Ryoichi,  a legal s ch o la r ,  a lso  wrote to the e d i t o r  a
month l a t e r  contending t h a t  ’lack of  unders tand ing’ of  the League
was found among the Japanese people r a th e r  than vice versa  as had been
95reported  by the newspapers. By the same token,  a reader  under the 
pseudonym of  Mldosugi ( ' a  temple c e d a r ’ ) f i l e d  a chal lenge to the 
c i v i l i a n s  who had kept s i l en ce  on the i s sue  in s p i t e  of  t h e i r  proclama­
t ion  f o r  peace. He asked:
How do the groups of  p a c i f i c s t s ,  r e l ig io u s  l e a d e r s ,  
ed u ca t io n is t s  and p o l i t i c i a n s  who advocate peace a t  
a normal t ime see t h i s  s i t u a t io n ?  What duty are  they 
intending to ca r ry  out in t h i s  unprecedented c r i s i s  
fo r  Japan? I fee l  deso la te  t h a t  the re  i s  not a voice 
of  c r i t i c i s m  o ther  than t h a t  from some l e f t i s t s . 9®
The ’lack of  unders tand ing’ on the p a r t  of the Japanese govern­
ment and people concerning the Lytton Report and the League procedure 
did not come under f i r e  very of ten  in Gaikojiho which was dominated 
by the p ro tagon is ts  of  the o u t r ig h t  r e j e c t i o n  of  the Report.  The
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j o u r n a l ,  however, published a l e t t e r  from Ueda Kyosuke who had in 
the  pas t  been one of  i t s  c o n t r ib u to rs  but whose opinion had not fo r  
some time been requested,  Ueda's l e t t e r  contended t h a t  the Foreign 
M inis t ry  was respons ib le  fo r  the furore  among the people which r e su l t e d  
from reading the incomplete t r a n s l a t i o n  and i t s  summary of  ’only the 
unfavourable p o i n t s ’ , and commented:
I f  we examine in d e t a i l  the e n t i r e  o r ig in a l  of  the  Lytton 
Report by fo rg e t t i n g  our p o s i t ion  as Japanese,  i t  con­
t a in s  more unfavourable poin ts  fo r  the Nanking govern­
ment than J a p a n , . . ,  Had she not made such n o ise ,  I 
suspect  t h a t  China would have denounced the r e p o r t  and 
t h a t  the argument in favour of  withdrawal from the 
League would have developed t h e r e . 97
The u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  the ' l e t t e r s  to  the e d i t o r '  column to  c r i t i ­
c i se  the a t t i t u d e s  o f  the newspapers was not confined to  the dip lomatic  
jo u rn a ls  such as Kokusa ich ish ik i . Kaizo a lso  s e t  up a column ca l l e d
Kaizo Antena in i t s  October 1932 ed i t io n  to  hear the opinions held by
98people o ther  than the ' s o - c a l l e d  academics and c r i t i c s ' .  Unlike 
those of  Kokusaichishiki and Gaikoj iho, t h i s  column remained a place 
fo r  the ord inary  reader ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  J apan 's  withdrawal from the 
League in March 1933, who accused the major newspapers o f  having become 
the pawns of  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  A reader  in the c i t y  o f  Kobe, 
f o r  example, expressed his  hope in the ro le  played by so g o zassh i :
The immediate ta sk  i s  to  lead them [ i . e .  the  news­
papers] back to t h e i r  o r ig in a l  ra ison d ’e t r e  and the only 
way to achieve t h i s  wil l  be to  press them to r e f l e c t  
by pu t t ing  on external  p ressu re .  In o the r  words, i t  
may well be a way to get them back in to  the r i g h t  path 
by a c t iv a t in g  the a u t h o r i t a t i v e  ' journa l ism  by pe r iod ­
i c a l s '  (zasshi jaanar izumu) .99
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A c e r t a in  Arai from Tochigi P re fe c tu re ,  w r i t ing  in the a f t e r -  
math o f  Japan ’s withdrawal from the League, r e g re t t e d  t h a t  the Japanese 
people , in p a r t i c u l a r  the working c l a s s ,  had ho j o u r n a l i s t i c  i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  to deny and r e fu te  what the coimiercial newspapers s a id .  To Arai ,  
the re  had never been a consensus among the people to back the w ith­
drawal,  con trary  to  the newspaper r e p o r t s ,  and th e r e fo r e ,  he wrote:
The 'newspaper journa l ism '  accepts  the d i s t o r t e d  
p a t r io t i sm  of  the and the _  and make up 
'newspaper publ ic  opTnion' .  Tlvis Ts what i s  
t r e a t e d  as the  public opinion of  the s o -ca l l ed  
people in Japan .100
Unlike i t s  r i v a l ,  Chuokoron l e t  i t s  regu la r  c o n t r ib u to r s  speak 
up ag a in s t  the newspapers in a s p e c ia l ly  e s ta b l i sh ed  column e n t i t l e d  
' Contemporary Cr i t ic i sm  Of The Newspapers'.  This column was s t a r t e d  
in i t s  September 1932 e d i t io n  and was the f i r s t  and most comprehensive 
c r i t i c i s m  of  the  newspapers mounted by a major journal  in the pre-war 
per iod.  Indeed, i n so fa r  as fore ign pol icy  was concerned, t h i s  was 
perhaps the l a s t  occasion on which the newspapers were subjec ted  to 
systematic  c r i t i c i s m , ^  Baba Tsunego, w r i t ing  as the f i r s t  c o n t r i ­
bu tor ,  argued t h a t  the ' s h o r t  review' columns in  the evening e d i t io n s  
of  the Tokyo newspapers were often f u l l  o f  'phrases  c l e a r ly  intended 
to  f l a t t e r  someone' with t h e i r  i l l  comments on fore ign  c o u n t r ie s .  Such 
behaviour was unforgivable  fo r  the newspapers which should a t  l e a s t  keep 
s i l e n c e ,  i f  not speak up a g a in s t ,  the d isgracefu l  a t t i t u d e s  o f  the
government, and t h i s ,  Baba contended, would in e v i ta b ly  lead to  the
102f a l l  of  the newspapers themselves.
Ishihama Chiko, a p ro fesso r  of  law a t  Kyushu Imperial U nivers i ty ,  
a l leged  in the same column a month l a t e r  t h a t  the Japanese newspapers
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had not been informative on the Manchuria c r i s i s  and argued t h a t  the  
f in a n c ia l  reason could not be u t i l i s e d  as an excuse as every ac t ion  o f  
the Japanese team members o f  the cu r ren t  Olympic Games a t  Los Angeles 
was being reported  by them. The reader ,  according to Ishihama, could 
f ind  the  t r u t h  only through the fore ign  language newspapers.  He 
r e g re t t e d :
The newspapers seem to have l o s t  r e s i s ta n c e  and 
f ig h t in g  s p i r i t  and have been following without  
c r i t i c i s m  the government and o ther  cen tra l  f o rce s .
In the  December e d i t i o n ,  Yamakawa Hitoshi charged t h a t  i t  was 
in f a c t  the  newspapers t h a t  had l a b e l l e d  Lord Lytton as a Don Quixote 
and Secre tary  o f  S t a t e ,  H.L, Stimson, as a tw is ted  as well as i l l -  
natured man, thus fo rg e t t in g  t h e i r  mission as the r e p o r te r s  o f  the  
t r u t h .  Yamakawa wrote:
I t  i s  no longer an important issue  whether the op in­
ions of  the newspapers have a leading power or not .
Their  ro le  today i s  not to guide the people with a 
p r in c ip le  based on a c e r t a in  concrete  view or  pol icy  
but to lead the  nat ion to have a mental a t t i t u d e  
adaptable to  the f a i t  accompli
S im ilar  c r i t i c i s m  was a lso  found in the  prov inc ia l  newspaper, 
the Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i , which regarded the reac t ion  of the  major news­
papers and t h e i r  r ep o r te r s  towards the Lytton Report as the  bes t
in d ica t ion  of the d e t e r io r a t i o n  of  the j o u r n a l i s t i c  s tandard t h a t
105had been in progress fo r  the previous twenty to t h i r t y  y ea r s ,
Most r e g r e t t a b l e ,  according to  the e d i t o r ,  was the f a c t  t h a t  the 
Report,  which was based on the prolonged research c a r r i e d  out  by the 
impart ia l  exper ts  on the s u b jec t ,  was t r e a t e d  as nothing more than a
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worthless  shee t  of  paper by the newspapers which had become the spokes­
man of  the governing c i r c l e s .  He remarked on 5 October 1932:
I t  i s  t r u l y  dangerous f o r  those  who should be caut ious  
and s i l e n t  to be the f i r s t  people to  t a lk  about the d e t e r ­
mination of  Japan and the  pol icy  of  the Empire e t c . . . .
The thoughtful Japanese people demand t h a t  the s t a t e  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the Foreign M inis t ry ,  take  
the  utmost c a u t i o n .106
4. Opinions Overseas
The ' d i s c r e d i t a b l e '  a t t i t u d e  of  the major newspapers seemed to  
appear most c l e a r ly  in t h e i r  coverage of opinions  overseas concerning 
the Manchuria c r i s i s .  The Japanese newspapers,  according to  Kakegawa 
Tomiko, quoted views c r i t i c a l  o f  Japan 's  fo re ign  policy from the fore ign  
press  in a d e l ib e r a t e  at tempt  to 'avoid d i r e c t  a s so c ia t io n  with a n t i -  
government s ta tem ents '  and the  American press received most a t t e n t i o n  
fo r  t h i s  reason in the per iod between 1931 and 1 9 4 1 . ^
So f a r  as the eighteen months of  the Manchuria c r i s i s  were con­
cerned, i t  was the B r i t i s h  r a th e r  than the American newspapers t h a t
were quoted most of ten  by the  Japanese newspapers. Tables XVI and 
f.311
XVII (see Appendix^ in d ica te  how of ten fore ign  newspapers were quoted 
in the  Tokyo Asahi,  the  Tokyo Nichinichi and the Fukuoka Nichinichi 
in the period between September 1931 and February 1933. The f ig u re s  in 
the  brackets  show how many of  these quota t ions  had been sent  by the 
s t a f f  correspondents  of  each of  these  two Tokyo newspapers. As the 
t a b le s  suggest ,  the B r i t i s h  newspapers were quoted more of ten  than the 
American or  the French newspapers throughout the c r i s i s ,  The t a b l e s  a lso  
in d ica te  t h a t  the Tokyo Asahi quoted foreign  newspapers most o f ten
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and the  Tokyo Nichinichi  the l e a s t  while the  provinc ia l  Fukuoka
Nichinichl r e g re t t e d  the tendency among the  major newspapers to  ’give
108cold shoulder  to  the fo re ign  p r e s s *.
Tables XVIII and XIX (see Appendix pp .312/314)show which 
American and B r i t i s h  newspapers were more of ten  quoted by each o f  the 
th ree  Japanese newspapers. Among the B r i t i s h  newspapers,  The Times 
was quoted most of ten  by everyone followed by o the r  ’Conservat ive '  
newspapers such as the Daily Mail , the Morning Post and the  Daily 
Telegraph, which tended to be more r e s t r a in e d  in t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  of  
Japan, On the o the r  hand, with the exception o f  the Tokyo Asahi , 
the  more outspoken c r i t i c i s m  of  Japan voiced in such newspapers as 
the News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian (both ‘L i b e r a l ’ ) and 
the Daily Herald ( 'Labour ' )  was much le ss  f requen t ly  quoted. Even the 
Tokyo Asahi tended to  neg lec t  these newspapers a f t e r  J apan 's  recogn i ­
t io n  of  Manchukuo and the p u b l ica t ion  of  the Lytton Report.  As to the 
American p re s s ,  The New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune and 
the Washington Post were more f requen t ly  quoted than o thers  l a rg e ly  
perhaps because the s t a f f  correspondents of  the two Tokyo newspapers 
were th e re  to  monitor the views of  these most i n f l u e n t i a l  newspapers 
in the  U.S. I t  i s  noteworthy t h a t  an American newspaper was seldom 
quoted to b u t t r e s s  an argument by a Japanese newspaper or c r i t i c  
while some of  the B r i t i s h  newspapers were u t i l i s e d  to  the f u l l  to  t h i s  
end as a ’j u s t  argument1 ( se i ro n -) or  ’g r a t i f y in g  argument ' (t s u r o n ) . 
The following remark by Professor  Takagi Nobutake of  Chuo Univers i ty  
in Gaikojiho was a good example of t h i s  phenomenon:
The Times [of  London} of  23 November [1931} went so
f a r  as to say t h a t  the nature of  the advance by the
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Japanese army in such s i t u a t i o n s  was d i f f e r e n t  from 
invasion of  one c i v i l i s e d  country by another  and t h a t  
i t  was impossible fo r  one to judge the s i t u a t i o n  accord­
ing to  general law. As everyone knows, The Times 
s tands out more prominently than the p o l i t i c i a n s  a t  
the League of  Nations,  Had the re  been p o l i t i c i a n s  with 
such in s i g h t ,  the  League would not have been perverted 
so much,*®9
The problem was t h a t  such ’jus t*  and ’gra t i fy ing*  arguments 
were in c reas in g ly  ra re  and some Japanese newspapers such as the Tokyo 
Nichinichi  and the  Osaka Mainichi began to  p resen t  such d i s to r t e d  
p ic tu re s  of  the fore ign press  t h a t ,  f o r  example, an anonymous reader  
of the Fukuoka Nichinichi  wrote to i t s  e d i t o r  under the pseudonym of 
'an in h ab i tan t  o f  Regent S t r e e t '  on 20 November 1931:
Why should the Osaka Mainichi r e f e r  to the [D ai ly ] 
Mail or  the [Daily]  Express as 'g r e a t  newspapers ' ? . . .  
The f a c t  i s  t h a t  the q u ie te r  newspapers such as 
The Times, the Guardian and the [Daily] Telegraph 
deserve the acclaim though t h e i r  c i r c u l a t io n s  may be 
s m a l l e r , . . .  Perhaps there  a r i s e s  a d i f fe rence  i n e v i t ­
ably between those who regard the newspapers as s a l e ­
able goods and those who cons ider  them as the forum 
to advocate t h e i r  p r in c ip le s  and i d e o l o g i e s J 1 0
Even i f  the Japanese newspapers had published press opinions from 
overseas which disapproved of  the Japanese a c t io n s ,  as the Tokyo Asahi 
c e r t a in ly  did a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  the end of  1931, i t  is  doubtful whether 
the reader  would have paid much a t t e n t io n  to  them. Indeed, Shimomura 
Kainan, the noted columnist of  the Osaka Asahi , r e g re t t e d  a t  the time 
t h a t  the people almost t o t a l l y  d isregarded world public opinion and 
t h a t  the e n t i r e  nat ion had come to  demand so pass iona te ly  'na t ional  
diplomacy based on public o p in io n ’
The unwil lingness of  the Japanese newspapers to provide a more 
balanced view on publ ic  opinion overseas did not der ive  from a shortage
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of  m a te r ia l s ,  In add i t ion  to  the regu la r  supply of  news from t h e i r  
own correspondents  as well as Reuter ,  Havas, AP and UP through Rengo 
and Dentsu, the major newspapers in Tokyo and Osaka - and some i n f l u ­
e n t i a l  c r i t i c s  -  received  cons tan t  supply of  a booklet e n t i t l e d  
Manshu J ihen ni t a i s u r u  Qbei Shinbun no Roncho ( ’Press Opinions in 
Europe and the U.S. Concerning The Manchuria I n c id e n t ’ ) .  A s im i la r  
pub l ica t ion  had been c i r c u l a t e d  by the same Information Bureau of  the 
Foreign Minis try  a t  the time of  the Tsinan inc iden t  in 1928, but t h i s
time i t s  coverage was more ex tens ive  and i t s  pub l ica t ion  more frequent
112with one in  almost every o ther  day.
Table XXI (see Appendix p .318 ) i s  the ana lys is  of  t h i s  bookle t ,
nos. 91-100 (ten volumes) which were published between 23 February and
4 March 1932 when the Shanghai in c id en t  and the expected d e c la r a t io n  of
’independence’ by Manchukuo were much in controversy .  The t a b le  l i s t s
only the number of  occasions on which the newspapers in B r i t a i n ,  France
and the U.S. were quoted in these  volumes and they counted 25, 17 and
61 times r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  thus making t h e i r  t o t a l  103. In c o n t r a s t ,  the
quota t ions  by the Tokyo Asahi, r e l a t e d  or unre la ted  to t h i s  bookle t ,
in the per iod between 20 February and 10 March numbered only seven;
The Times and The New York Times twice each and the New York Herald
Tribune, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times once each. The
Sunday Times quotat ion was headlined,  ’ "JAPANESE THREAT" ARGUMENT BY
4o
A BRITISH NEWSPAPER' while the Daily Telegraph was quoted^that  i t  was 
cautioning i t s  readers  o f  the  danger of  the B r i t i s h  involvement in 
the furore  over the l e t t e r  sen t  by Secretary  of  S ta t e ,  H.L, Stimson, 
to the Senate Foreign A ffa i r s  Conmittee Chairman on 23 February which
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reconfirmed the U.S. disapproval of  the Japanese ac t ions  in China.
The New York Times and the  New York Herald Tribune were quoted on 
26 February as support ing the Stimson l e t t e r  while The New York Times 
was once again quoted th ree  days l a t e r ,  but t h i s  time under the  headline 
of  'DETERIORATING U.S. FEELINGS TOWARDS JAPAN: U.S. NEWSPAPER STILL
LACKS UNDERSTANDING'. The Times was quoted to  in d ic a te  t h a t  i t  had 
published a r a th e r  cau t ious  but fac tua l  ana lys is  of  the Japanese 
expedi t ion to  Shanghai on 27 February while the Tokyo Asahi 's  London 
correspondent repor ted  the  p u b l ica t ion  of  a 'p ro -Japanese '  l e t t e r  
signed by s ix  B r i t i s h  n a t io n a l s  in  the 'L e t t e r s  to  the E d i to r '  column 
of  The Times. The Tokyo Asahi put a heading to t h i s  te legram, 'PRO- 
JAPANESE SENTIMENT RISES HIGH: JOINT LETTER BY INFLUENTIAL BRITISH
SUBJECTS',113
The Tokyo Nichinichi was even more one-sided in i t s  quo ta t ions  
which in f a c t  numbered only two during these th ree  weeks. These quo­
t a t i o n s  were not even those  from the actual  p u b l ic a t io n s .  The Tokyo 
Nichinichi London correspondent ,  who had been sen t  to monitor the League, 
despatched the  personal views expressed by his fel low correspondents  
from the Manchester Guardian and the Morning Post a t  Geneva which 
appeared subsequently in Japan under the heading, 'EXHAUSTED ARGUMENT 
OVER MANCHURIA: NEW STATE RECOGNISED BY THE MORE SENSIBLE: INSIGHT
INTO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MIND', The actual  t e x t  read:
The Manchester Guardian which has been the cen t ra l  
f ig u re  in the an t i -Japanese  o p in io n . . .  has come to 
recognise  the  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of  accepting , , , ,  The 
Morning Post of  the B r i t i s h  Conservative Party  i s  
congra tu la t ing  on the es tab l ishment  of  the g rea t  
Manchukuo as a r e a l i s a t i o n  of  Manchuria fo r  the 
Manchus.. ,  .114
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The provinc ia l  Fukuoka N ic h in ich i , which had been highly  c r i t i ­
cal of  the major newspapers in t h e i r  'unbalanced '  r e p o r t in g ,  l ived  up 
to  i t s  pr ide  a t  l e a s t  in t h i s  per iod.  I t s  quo ta t ions  counted n ine ,  
two more than the Tokyo Asahi ;  The Times twice and the Daily
Telegraph, the News Chronic le , the Oberver, the Morning P o s t , the
He
Daily Express,  the Washington Post and^St. Louis S ta r  once each. I t
was e s p e c i a l l y  noteworthy s ince  the Fukuoka Nichinichi was e n t i r e l y
dependent on only Rengo and Dentsu fo r  i t s  news supply and was not
even on the c i r c u l a t io n  l i s t  o f  the Information Bureau bookle t .  The
American newspapers and the News Chronicle as well as The Times were
quoted more o r  l e s s  as 'a n t i - J a p a n e se '  while the o thers  were p r in ted
fo r  t h e i r  somewhat 'sympathe t ic '  a t t i t u d e  towards Japan, thus p re se n t -
115ing a more 'balanced '  view to  the reader .
The p re sen ta t io n  of  an 'unbalanced '  veiw of  press  opinions 
overseas  was by no means the only way in which the major Japanese news­
papers 'cooperated* with the  Foreign Minis try  and the m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  behind i t  during the Manchuria c r i s i s .  On a more ' p o s i t i v e '  s id e ,  
they ,  e s p e c ia l ly  the Tokyo Nichinichi  and i t s  s i s t e r  newspaper, the 
Osaka Mainichi , w i l l in g ly  co l labo ra ted  with the s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  in 
t h e i r  at tempt to  win over the fore ign  press .
Attempts to inf luence fore ign  correspondents  based in Japan and 
China in r e tu rn  fo r  money began immediately a f t e r  the Mukden in c id e n t .
At f i r s t ,  i t  was the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  who took i n i t i a t i v e s  in 
t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  thus causing much embarrassment to  the uninformed
Foreign Minis try  o f f i c i a l s  who were s t i l l  anxious to check uncontro l led
116m i l i t a ry  a c t io n s .  As such, these at tempts  were without much success .
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As the power balance s h i f t e d  in favour of  the m i l i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  even 
in the  f i e l d  of  diplomacy, they  embarked on a ' b u y i n g - o f f  po l icy  
using diplomats as t h e i r  agents .  Once again ,  however, i t  was discovered 
t h a t  such at tempts  were un l ike ly  to  succeed i f  the correspondents  con­
cerned were f u l l y  employed by the major fore ign  newspapers and news 
agencies .  With more success ,  however, those j o u r n a l i s t s  who had been 
sympathetic towards Japan s ince before the Mukden inc iden t  were encou­
raged to w r i te  e i t h e r  in t h e i r  own. jo u rn a ls  or to the newspapers and 
o the r  communication organs in t h e i r  na t ive  co u n t r ie s .  Perhaps the most 
prominent among them was the e d i t o r  of  the Far Eastern Review, pub­
l i shed  in Shanghai, who was l a t e r  to  accompany the u n o f f ic ia l  Manchukuo 
de legat ion  to  the League o f  Nations as an adv ise r .  The Japanese press  
almost in v a r iab ly  presented the opinion of  t h i s  American with such 
headings as 'CHINA, REFLECT UPON YOUR OWN DISGRACEFUL STATE OF AFFAIRS! 
JAPAN TAKES THE. RIGHT PATH: GRATIFYING ARGUMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE
FAR EASTERN REVIEW, MR. REA', followed by somewhat i n f l a t e d  comments
l i k e ,  'He i s  one of  the best-known China hands in the U.S.A. and his
117opinion has the inf luence to  guide the American i n t e l l e c t u a l s !  ' ,
The inaugurat ion of  Uchida as the Foreign Minis ter  on 6 July  
1932 marked another  turn ing  po in t .  Ins tead  o f  conf ining i t s  'buying- 
o f f '  at tempts  to  the  correspondents  and o ther  ind iv idua ls  working in 
the Far East ,  the  Foreign Minis t ry  s e t  as i t s  t a r g e t  the more i n f lu e n ­
t i a l  ind iv idua ls  working in t h e i r  own countr ie s  and, i f  p o s s ib le ,  
the newspapers as wel l .  I t  was c le a r  to  the Foreign Minis try  o f f i c i a l s ,  
however, t h a t  in B r i ta in  and the U.S.,  n e i th e r  the major newspapers 
themselves nor the i n f l u e n t i a l  columnists could poss ib ly  be 'bought
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118off ' . .  Moreover, the e f fe c t iv en e s s  of  such at tempts  was doubted 
by some of  the o f f i c i a l s  themselves as charge d ’a f f a i r e s  a t  Washington, 
Sai to  H irosh i ,  wrote back to Uchida on 27 September:
The s o -ca l led  propaganda in a narrow sense through 
newspapers,  books and l e c tu re s  e t c ,  i s  e f f e c t i v e  only 
when th e re  i s  a p rec ise  t a r g e t  of  p o s i t iv e  a t t a c k . . . .
The propaganda aimed a t  a defensive t a r g e t  such as to
make o ther  coun tr ie s  understand the f a i r  a t t i t u d e s  of
a country has d i f f i c u l t y  in achieving i t s  goal qu ick ly .
I t  i s  easy fo r  one to p ro je c t  another  as crooked but 
hard to  present  on ese l f  as f a i r  and j u s t . H 9
In s p i t e  o f  the f a i l u r e  by the Foreign Ministry to  win over the 
American and the B r i t i s h  pub l ic ,  the Japanese newspapers remained anxious 
to  emphasise t h a t  there  were s t i l l  some c r i t i c s  o f  ’conscience '  in the 
U.S. and B r i t a in  who presented t h e i r  ' j u s t  argument’ to t h e i r  fe l low 
countrymen. True, the re  were some, e s p e c ia l ly  in the U.S.,  who were 
'bought o f f ’ by the Foreign Minis try  and who were presented by the Japa­
nese newspapers as a ' f i r s t - c l a s s  p o l i t i c a l  co r responden t ' ,  'one of  the 
bes t  known exper ts  on the Far Eas t '  or  a 'well-known e x p e r t  on China 
in London'. They were in f a c t  not so i n f lu e n t i a l  as the newspapers
reported  and the more a l e r t  reader  would have n o t i c e d - t  hart-most-of—
these  quota t ions  had o r ig in a ted  from 'our  own s t a f f  correspondents '
of  the two g ia n t  newspaper concerns. Once again ,  i t  was the Tokyo
120Asahi t h a t  published most despatches of  t h i s  kind.
In France, the s i t u a t io n  was somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  Although 
some ind iv idua ls  were 'bought o f f ' ,  the Foreign Minis try  a l so  could 
and did succeed in doing the same to  some of the newspapers. At l e a s t  
f iv e  newspapers were 'bought o f f '  fo r  th ree  months from October to 
December 1932, Three o thers  including le  Soir  were a lso  won over by
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the Japanese while the re  was a lso  a t e n t a t i v e  approach with the more
i n f l u e n t i a l  newspaper, le  Temps, following the pub l ica t ion  of  the Lytton 
121Report,  In a d d i t io n ,  there  was a ' spec ia l  reward'  to the c h ie f  
e d i t o r  of  l e  Matin who had been w r i t ing  fo r  the Tokyo Nichinichi 
and i t s  s i s t e r  newspaper, the Osaka Mainichi , as a specia l  correspon­
dent ,  Not s u rp r i s in g ly ,  the 'reward '  was paid through the Osaka 
Mainichi which in f a c t  quoted more French newspapers,  e s p e c ia l ly  le  
Matin, than the Tokyo Asahi in the period between October and December 
1932 [See Table XX, Appendix p . 316).  ^
While the Foreign Minis try  o f f i c i a l s  were bus i ly  engaged in the 
'buy ing -o f f '  o f  some French newspapers with the cooperation of  the 
Osaka Mainichi, the c r e d i b i l i t y  of  the Japanese news agency, Rengo 
decl ined rap id ly  among i t s  fore ign  co n t ra c to rs .  Rengo had been d e s ig ­
nated s ince  the Mukden inc iden t  as the sole organ through which the
Foreign Minis try  would make publ ic  i t s  deal ings  with the League of 
123Nations, Disputes between the Japanese news agencies and t h e i r  
fore ign  co n t rac to rs  such as Reuters ,  Havas and AP over the  handling of  
repo r ts  from each o th e r  had not been uncommon, of ten  with diplomatic  
consequences. An AP rep o r t  of  an interview with Secretary  of  S ta te  
H.L, Stimson, on the poss ib le  Japanese advance to Chinchow in November 
1931 had been misreported by Rengo - and the re fo re  the Japanese news­
papers -  thus even in v i t i n g  the wrath o f  the h i t h e r to  r e s t r a in e d
124Foreign M inis ter  Shidehara towards the U.S. a t  the  time.  This 
t ime,  however, Rengo was c r i t i c i s e d  by i t s  fore ign co n t rac to rs  fo r  
sending too many propaganda r e p o r t s .  No longer did Reuters ,  AP and Havas 
au tom at ica l ly  d i s t r i b u t e  the Rengo repor ts  from Japan to t h e i r  respec­
t iv e  c l i e n t s ,  and Havas even went on to f i l e  o f f i c i a l  complaints with
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1 2 5the Japanese Ambassador in Par is  to t h i s  e f f e c t .  In t h i s  con­
t e x t ,  i t  i s  worth noting the following observation on s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
with overseas communication by former Foreign .Minister I sh i i  Kikuj iro  
in h is  memoir published  in 1930:
Instead  oT~attempting d i r e c t  propaganda overseas ,  
na t iona l  opinion within the  country should be put 
in to  o rder .  We should not fo rg e t  t h a t  more often 
than n o t ,  i t  i s  e a s i e r  to  achieve our goal i f  we 
l e f t  i t  to  the p r iv a te  news a g e n c i e s . ' 26
5. Withdrawal from the League of  Nations
On 21 November 1932, the League of  Nations Council opened a t  
Geneva to renew d iscuss ion  on the Si no-Japanese c o n f l i c t ,  which had 
entered a new phase with Japan 's  recogni t ion  o f  Manchukuo and the p u b l i c ­
a t ion  of  the Lytton Report. A deadlock between the two Asian neigh­
bours developed in s p i t e  of  the r e l a t i v e l y  f l e x ib l e  'general p r in ­
c i p l e s '  adopted by the  s p e c i a l ly  appointed Committee of  Nineteen 
which recognised t h a t  n e i th e r  the r e s to r a t i o n  o f  the s ta tu s  quo ante
nor the  m a in ten an c e ^  Manchukuo was s a t i s f a c t o r y  and t h a t  a new solu-
127t ion  should be found as the Lytton Report had suggested.
While the League sess ion was in Christmas rec e ss ,  the Japanese 
army t h r u s t  in to  Jeho! a f t e r  the occupation of  Shanfhaikuan, an impor­
t a n t  por t  n o r th -e a s t  of  Peking, on 3 January, 1933, On 14 February, the 
Committee of  Nineteen decided to  ca l l  fo r  the withdrawal of  Japanese 
troops to  the ra i lway zone, and approved Chinese sovereignty  of  Man­
churia  r a th e r  than Manchurian independence. The Japanese government 
r e t a l i a t e d  by approving of  the advance to  Jehol o f f i c i a l l y  th ree  days 
l a t e r  and on 20 February, the cab ine t  meeting decided to  withdraw from
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the League should the General Assembly pass the r e so lu t io n  recommended 
by the Committee of  Nineteen, This the Assembly did on 24 February and 
the Japanese de legat ion  walked out  of  the Assembly Hall followed by 
an o f f i c i a l  n o t i f i c a t i o n  of  Jap an 's  withdrawal from the League on 27 
March 1933,
Any remaining r e s i s ta n c e  among the newspapers a g a in s t  the m i l i ­
t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  disappeared when in November 1932 the Army published 
i t s  ' r e q u e s t s '  in the in te rn a l  t rade  c i r c u l a r ,  'Newspapers and Newspaper 
Correspondents ' ,  j u s t  before the depar ture  of  the Japanese delegat ion  
headed by Matsuoka Yosuke fo r  Geneva. These ' r e q u e s t s '  urged the news­
papers and t h e i r  specia l  correspondents  who were to accompany Matsuoka 
to stand behind the Japanese de legat ion  to  the end even i f  t h a t  meant 
Japan 's  withdrawal from the League. From now on, even the s l i g h t e s t  
h in t  of  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the ' c r i s i s '  argument propagated by the Army to
keep i t s  control  over 'na t iona l  opinion '  was to r e s u l t  in^summoning <rr
128the  e d i t o r  of  the newspaper concerned to  the Army S ta f f ,
Such a t h r e a t  may not have been necessary fo r  some of  the news­
papers,  Eight days before the pub l ica t ion  of  the Lytton Report, the 
East Asia. Research Centre within the Tokyo Nichinichi  and the Osaka
Mainichi had a l ready  passed a re so lu t io n  which ca l le d  fo r  the  r e j e c -
129t ion  of  the ' i n t e r v e n t i o n '  by the League ' a t  any c o s t ' .  These 
two s i s t e r  newspapers and t h e i r  main r i v a l s ,  the Asahi of  Tokyo and 
Osaka had a lso  earned a bad repu ta t ion  among some c r i t i c s  fo r  t h e i r  
' u n f a i r '  and 'unbalanced'  r epor t ing  from overseas .  A Japanese 
nat ional  who worked a t  the League, fo r  example, had w r i t t e n  nine months 
e a r l i e r  in the p rovinc ia l  Fukuoka Nichinichi under the pseudonym, 'An 
old man o f  Lake Geneva':
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The [Japanese] correspondents received  a s e r i e s  of 
telegrams fu l l  o f  in s t ru c t io n s  from t h e i r  head 
o f f i c e s .  They sa id  t h a t  the tone of  t h e i r  despatches 
had not  been in tune with the hardened public  opinion 
in the home country. What were wanted were those  
which denigra ted  the a u th o r i ty  of  the League o f  
Nations. The correspondents  abs ta ined  from sending 
any repor ts  on the  i l l o g i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  of  the  Japanese 
government or  any c r i t i c i s m  heard among the people here 
o f  the Japanese r e p re s e n ta t iv e s .  In s h o r t ,  the  accurate  
repor t ing  of  f a c t s  has seldom been welcomed by the 
Japanese newspapers.
The a r r iv a l  of  the Matsuoka mission marked another  tu rn ing  
po in t .  The correspondents who had been s ta t io n ed  in Europe s ince  before 
the Mukden in c id en t  had a t  l e a s t  come to pay a c e r t a in  amount of  r e s ­
pect to the League o f  Nations. Most of  the la rge  number o f  Japanese 
correspondents  who s p e c i a l ly  accompanied Matsuoka had never been ou t­
s ide  the home country fo r  a long time. Moreover, having been misinformed 
by the  ' d i s t o r t e d 1 r ep o r t s  from Europe and the U.S. s ince  the Mukden 
in c id e n t ,  they had no such awe of  the League or  any publ ic  opinion 
overseas .  Their  main task  as i n s t ru c te d  by the Army was not so much
to repo r t  the ac tual s i t u a t i o n  as to  despatch t h e i r  personal observa-
or
t ions  of Matsuoka himself  fo r  more o f  l e ss  purely 'domestic consumption' .  
As a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  usual ly  very sketchy telegrams described l i t t l e  more 
than 'Japanese v ic to ry '  whenever Matsuoka spoke. Trying to c o r re c t  such 
a tendency among the correspondents  was t o t a l l y  use le ss  as t h e i r  emplo-
131yers  in Japan would have shelved any telegrams which implied otherwise.
Not a l l  the r ep o r t s  from Geneva were, however, u n re l ia b le  
desp i te  the ' d i s c r e d i t a b l e '  a t t i t u d e  of  the Japanese newspapers.  The 
more a l e r t  reader  would have noticed t h a t ,  in the shadow of  the sensa­
t iona l  headlines  a ttached to  the despatches from the ' spec ia l  c o r re s ­
ponden ts ' ,  the re  were more fac tua l  and informative and usual ly  much
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longer  despatches from Rengo and Dentsu, The Rengo telegrams had in 
f a c t  o r ig in a ted  from Reuters ,  Havas and AP and the Dentsu repo r ts  from 
UP. The f a c t  t h a t  they had been sen t  in to  Japan in t h e i r  o r ig in a l  
languages may have helped them escape too close a sc ru t in y  from the 
Communications M in is t ry ,  which was respons ib le  fo r  overseas communica­
t ion  c o n t ro l .  At the same t ime,  the cos t  o f  these  longish  telegrams 
was perhaps another  reason fo r  the considerable  degree of  dependence 
of  the Japanese newspapers on the two news agencies even a f t e r  they 
had sen t  t h e i r  own specia l  correspondents to  Geneva with the Matsuoka 
mission.
Table XXII (See Appendix p . 320) i s  the ana lys is  o f  the  
published telegrams concerning the debate a t  the League of  Nations a t  
var ious s tages  o f  the  Manchuria c r i s i s .  The despatches o r ig in a te d  a t  
Geneva except fo r  the period between 16 November and 12 December 1931 
when the League Council conducted the debate in P a r i s .  The f igures  in  
the brackets  in d ica te  t h a t  these telegrams came from the s t a f f  c o r r e s ­
pondents o f  the two Japanese news agencies who were s p e c i a l ly  sen t  to 
Geneva with Matsuoka. They were in f a c t  published with remarks such 
as ' DentsU (or  Rengo) specia l  correspondent1 in s tead  of  the usual 
1Dentsu (or  Rengo) 1. As the t a b le  i n d i c a t e s ,  the telegrams which had 
come from Reuters ,  Havas, AP and UP and which were published as ' Dentsu 
(or Rengo) ' te legrams,  i f  combined, mostly outnumbered and were almost 
in va r ia b ly  more s u b s ta n t ia l  in content  than those from the ' spec ia l  
correspondents ' .
What made i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the reader  to judge the actual  s i t u ­
a t ion  a t  the League was the f requen t ly  misleading emphasis of  the 
headlines a t tached  to these telegrams from the in te rn a t io n a l  news
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agencies .  Even when the despatch reported the sympathy which the
Chinese r e p re s e n ta t iv e  had won, the headline read l ik e  'CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE THROWS HIMSELF ON THE MERCY OF THE LEAGUE' and 'VICTORY
FOR MATSUOKA IN TALKIE AS WELL: POOR PERFORMANCE BY MR. KU' . 132 At
the same t ime,  much c r i t i c i s m  d i re c ted  a t  Japan, e s p e c ia l ly  by the
re p re se n ta t iv e s  of  the smaller  n a t io n s ,  was reported  by the same
fore ign  news agencies through Rengo and Dentsir, but the t e x t  tended
to be d i s t o r t e d  by such emotive wordings as 'venomous tongue'  and
133'malicious  i n t e n t i o n ' ,  thus tw is t in g  the otherwise fac tua l  r epo r t ing
of  the  telegram.
The reader  was perhaps puzzled when some newspapers such as
the Tokyo Asahi and J i j i s h i n p o  suddenly s t a r t e d  to  argue ag a in s t  the /
withdrawal of  Japan from the League of  Nations.  He had been to ld  by
these  and o the r  newspapers t h a t  Japan was f ig h t in g  aga ins t  the ev i l
world and t h a t  the League was the cause of  a l l  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  to
which Japan had been subjec ted  s ince  the Mukden in c id en t .  The sudden
change in the a t t i t u d e  o f  the Tokyo Asahi and J i j i s h i n p o  towards the
end of  January 1933 was c a r r ie d  out  in defiance of  the ' r e q u e s t s '  from
the Army two months e a r l i e r .  By then ,  however, the leader  of  one o r  two
newspapers could ,  as Ogata Taketora of  the Tokyo Asahi admitted a f t e r
134the Second World War, 'no longer  change the nat ional  s i t u a t i o n ' .
The reader  could c e r t a i n l y  not be blamed i f  he found the changed app­
roach of  these  newspapers unconvincing.
I f  the newspapers did not sound very convincing in t h e i r  oppo­
s i t i o n  to  Japan 's  withdrawal ,  nor did most o f  the j o u rn a l s .  True, 
sogozasshi and Kokusaichishiki c r i t i c i s e d  the ' d i s c r e d i t a b l e '  a t t i t u d e s
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of  the newspapers. On the o the r  hand, both Chuokoron and Kaizo had 
a l ready made a s i g n i f i c a n t  change in t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  immediately a f t e r  
the pub l ica t ion  of  the Lytton Report,  when they began to  advocate the
\ Y'-
c rea t io n  o f  a new p r in c ip le  the world. I t  was f u t i l e ,  they argued, 
fo r  the Foreign Minis ter  to cont inue his  attempt to  j u s t i f y  Japan ’s 
ac t ions  on the bas is  of  the  e x i s t in g  p r in c ip l e s .  In s tead ,  a new p r in c i ­
p le ,  which could be termed an ’East Asian Monroe D octr ine1 and which 
would requ ire  the ’t o t a l  expulsion of  any external  i n t e r v e n t i o n s ’ , 
should be in troduced i f  the Si no-Japanese c o n f l i c t  was to  be s e t t l e d  
in a s a t i s f a c t o r y  way, Japan had already p av ed ^ f i r s t  s teps  to t h i s  
end when she gave an o f f i c i a l  recogni t ion  to  Manchukuo. The reexamin­
a t ion  of  t h i s  new p r in c ip le  was e s se n t i a l  before a f u r t h e r  s tep  was 
taken i f  too heavy a burden on the fu tu re  generation of  the country 
was to  be avoided. Never the less ,  the  adoption of  t h i s  p r in c ip l e ,  the
jo u rn a ls  contended, would be t k e  ’a t t i t u d e  worthy of  the magnanimity
135of  a g rea t  n a t i o n ’ . In t h i s ,  they drew c lo se r  to the view long held
— 136by the  Gaikojiho e d i t o r ,  Hanzawa Gyokujo.
People l i k e  Yamakawa Tadao, the most i n f l u e n t i a l  d i r e c t o r  of
137the League of  Nations Associat ion in Japan, a lso  sounded co n t rad ic ­
to ry  in opposing the withdrawal while s t i l l  maintaining t h a t  world 
public  opinion,  which had been unanimously ag a in s t  Japan,  was wrong
and t h a t  the League was simply suffused with ’lack of  understanding*
138of  the Far Eastern s i t u a t i o n .  The following comment by Toyokeizai-  
shinpo was one of the few examples which sounded coherent:
The disadvantage r e s u l t i n g  from her withdrawal wil l  
be immeasurable in the fu tu re  when in te rn a t io n a l  
f r iendsh ip  and cooperation develops f u r t h e r ,  Many 
of  the i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a r e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  opposed to the 
withdrawal.  I f  the re  i s  any way in which i t  can be 
avoided, however high the p r ice  fo r  i t ,  they would
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a rd en t ly  l ik e  the government to do i t s  b e s t .  We 
bel ieve  t h a t  t h i s  i s  the hope of  the m ajo r i ty  of  
our people with common sense and th e r e fo re  public 
o p i n i o n J 39
Whatever the  ’t r u e ’ publ ic  opinion may have been, the Japanese d e l -  
gati.on walked out of  the Assembly Hall in a 'manly1 manner on 24 February, 
thus f i n a l i s i n g  Japan ’s withdrawal.
6. Aftermath
A fter  a l l  the  h y s te r i a ,  which had l a s te d  more than eighteen  
months, th e r e  was some f e e l in g  of  depr iva t ion  in the country.  The 
'u l t im a te '  goal having j u s t  been achieved, the e n t i r e  na t ion  seemed 
t o t a l l y  l o s t  fo r  the moment. Then the increas ing  anxie ty  about Japan 's  
i s o l a t i o n  c rep t  in to  t h e i r  mind and the press  was l e f t  with a d i f f i c u l t  
task  to  convince the nat ion  once more t h a t  Japan would survive sa fe ly  
without the League of  Nations.  The reac t ions  shown by the newspapers 
and the jo u rn a ls  var ied to  achieve t h i s  end.
The metropol i tan  newspapes sounded unrepentant .  To the Tokyo 
Asahi , the withdrawal simply meant t h a t  d i r e c t  diplomacy between Japan 
and the o ther  Powers would become more important than before and t h a t
140i t  provided the country with a chance to  promote a new s ty l e  o f  diplomacy.
The ’new’ diplomacy advocated by the Tokyo Asahi, however, sounded 
l i k e  l i t t l e  more than the diplomacy h i th e r to  d ic ta t e d  by the Army, 
as the following leader  o f  28 September 1933 suggested:
Since the  Manchuria i n c id e n t ,  the Kasumigaseki 
diplomacy has been revived gradual ly  thanks to 
the impetus provided by the enforcement of  the 
progressive  nat ional  policy by the m i l i t a r y  
a u t h o r i t i e s . , . .  In order  to dispel  the  i l l u s i o n s  
held by China and to e s t a b l i s h  a c lo se r  r e l a t i o n ­
ship between the two c o u n t r ie s ,  Japan’s China 
diplomacy, needless  to  say, is  l e f t  with a p os i ­
t i v e  ro le  to pi a y  J  4"!
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C r i t i c i sm ,  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t ,  of  the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  was
voiced mainly by the smaller  newspapers such as the Teito  Nichinichi
and Yorozu Ch^ho in Tokyo and some provinc ia l  newspapers such as the
Fukuoka Nichinichi  and the Shi nano Mainichi t h a t  showed more courage
in  speaking o u t ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  the February 25 upr is ing  in 1936 when
some of  the most i n f lu e n t i a l  members o f  the Establ ishment were mur-
142dered by the r e b e l l io u s  group o f  young o f f i c e r s .  The major news­
papers seemed content  with the pub l ica t ion  of  fore ign newspaper leaders  
which were c r i t i c a l  of  the Japanese pol icy ,^** The number of  overseas 
te legrams,  however, gradual ly  decreased.
Kokusa ich ish ik i , which had been published by the League of  
Nations Associa t ion in Japan, f e l t  obl iged to  change i t s  ch a rac te r  as 
a r e s u l t  of  the withdrawal.  This change was not j u s t  a change in name 
but a l so  in c on ten t ,  s ince  i t s  a t t i t u d e  had turned ag a in s t  the League 
and public opinion overseas to a cons iderable  degree. The following 
d e c la ra t io n  of  12 May 1933 by the Associa t ion ,  which changed i t s  name 
to  the In te rn a t io n a l  Associat ion of  JapM i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  point  c l e a r l y :
The presen t  name and aim of  A r t ic le  1 of  the 
Associa t ion  have tended to  be misunderstood by 
the general pub l ic .  I t  has been thought o f  as 
a branch of  the League of  Nations or  reputed 
to be a body which u n c r i t i c a l l y  supported the 
League. I t  has a lso  been considered -  very 
h a s t i l y  -  to  have nothing to do with general
i s s u e s , . , .  These have of ten  caused o bs t ruc ­
t ions  to the a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h i s  a s soc ia t ion  
even a t  a normal t i m e . ‘44
As to the o ther  diplomatic  j o u rn a l s ,  G a ik i j ih o , which had been 
f i l l e d  with almost h y s te r ica l  'pro-withdrawal '  co n t r ib u t io n s ,  some calm 
re turned.  Some indiv idual c r i t i c s  such as Honda Kumataro, Royama
Masamichi and Machida Shiro ,  who had t r i e d  in vain to  calm down the
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h y s te r ia  through t h i s  journal  j u s t  before the withdrawal found t h a t  they
would a t  l a s t  be able  to  t a l k  to  a more sober audience. Indeed, i t
wWo
was they r a th e r  than the more n a t i o n a l i s t  co n t r ib u to rs  tfea* played a 
major ro le  in the post-withdrawal Gaikoj iho, Machida o f  the Tokyo 
Asahi, who had come to  support the m i l i t a ry  ac t ion  in  Manchuria but 
who had remained opposed to  the withdrawal ,  warned in the April  1,
1933 e d i t i i o n :
I t  i s  a l l  r i g h t  to  advocate the ' imperial-way-ism'
(kodo sh u g i ) . We must not fo rg e t ,  however, t h a t  the 
c i v i l i s e d  countr ie s  » have t h e i r  own pos i ­
t i o n s , . . ,  I t  would not br ing any p leasan t  reward i f  
Japan, with her xenophobic s p i r i t ,  advocated the 
e x a l t a t i o n  o f  the Japanese s p i r i t , ^ 5
Such f e a r  was s t ronger  among the c o n t r ib u to rs  of  Chuokoron
and Kaizo. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi who, according to Ogata Sadako, had been
146the only c r i t i c  to  chal lenge the Uchida diplomacy p u b l ic ly ,  com- 
pared UchidaAwith Komura.who was the Foreign Minis ter  a t  the time of 
the Russo-Japanese War, Uchida and Prime Minis ter  Sa i to  a t t r i b u t e d  
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  J apan 's  i s o l a t i o n  to  the ' t r en d  of  publ ic  o p in io n 1 
or  the 'consensus of the people'  whereas Komura and his  prime m in i s t e r ,  
Katsura,  had proceeded with the conclusion of  the Portsmouth t r e a t y  
in s p i t e  of  the enormous pressures  from p u b l ic  opinion '  fo r  the fu tu re  
good o f  the country,  Kiyosawa asked in Chuokoron:
We have no objec t ion  to par l iamentary  p o l i t i c s  based 
on the voice of  the people. However,is i t  not a lso  
the duty o f  the members, e s p e c ia l ly  the lea d e r ,  of  
the nation to  ignore 'pub l ic  opin ion '  f o r  the time 
and s a c r i f i c e  themselves in favour of  the s t a t e  when 
i t  i s  facing a grave d i f f i c u l t y ? ^
Yokota Kisaburo, perhaps the only legal scho la r  to claim t h a t
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Japan’s m i l i t a r y  ac t ion  had been a v io la t io n  of  in t e rn a t io n a l  law, 
was a l so  in v i ted  by Chuokoron to reexamine the 'E as t  Asian Monroe 
Doctr ine '  which had been espoused by i t s  e d i t o r  e ig h t  months e a r l i e r .  
Contrary to the impression given in the l e a d e r ,  Yokota warned, t h i s  
could not be used as a ready-made p r in c ip le  fo r  Japan to j u s t i f y  her 
case.  The o r ig in a l  Monroe Doctrine did not possess any vested i n t e ­
r e s t s  to p ro te c t .  I t  r e j e c te d  European in te rv e n t io n  but was w i l l in g  
to  i n v i t e  a r b i t r a t i o n  by a t h i r d  country including one from Europe. I t  
aimed a t  the  s t a tu s  quo among the  American s t a t e s  and f i n a l l y  was recog­
nised in t e r n a t i o n a l l y  as in the Nine Power and the Kellogg-Briand Pacts .  
On the o th e r  hand, the Asian version as advocated by the government 
and i t s  supporters  was intended to  funct ion  in order  to  p ro te c t  Japan 's  
vested i n t e r e s t s ,  r e je c te d  any kind of  in te rv e n t io n  including a r b i t r a ­
t ion  by a t h i r d  country,  and was designed to  encourage and help the 
independence of  the nat ions  in the region.  The 'Eas t  Asian Monroe
D o c t r in e ' ,  th e r e fo r e ,  Yokota contended, could only be pursued as a
148pol icy  fo r  the fu tu re .
Perhaps the general f ee l in g s  among the Chuokoron co n t r ib u to r s  
a t  the  time were bes t  summarised by Murofushi Takanobu who argued t h a t  
respons ib le  p o l i t i c i a n s  should not i n s t i g a t e  a b e l l i c o se  s p i r i t ,  respon­
s ib l e  statesmen not th ink  more l i g h t l y  of  the economic blockade than 
r e a l i t y  requ i red ,  and respons ib le  so ld ie r s  not speak of  v ic to ry  so 
th o u g h t le ss ly .  Murofushi wrote in the June 1933 e d i t io n :
We have to speak up bravely to  say t h a t  Japan 's  
p o l i t i c s  have lacked wisdom and t h a t  the Foreign 
Minis try  did not have a diplomacy. People might 
say t h a t  we are in a c r i s i s .  Indeed because we 
are in a c r i s i s ,  we ought to be wise. In c r i s i s ,  
the Foreign Ministry  has to  have a diplomacy.149
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F in a l ly ,  the p a r t i c ip a t i o n  of  the reader  in the d iscuss ion
of  fore ign  p o l icy  appeared to  be expanding when Toyokeizaishinpo
decided to  i n v i t e  i t s  readers  to co n t r ib u te  in i t s  March 11, 1933
150e d i t i o n ,  thus extending i t s  hand to  'pub l ic  o p in io n 1. On the 
o the r  hand, Kaizo abolished i t s  Katzo Antena column from December 
1933 onwards. Perhaps the following l e t t e r  from a Mr, Matsuda in i t s  
June e d i t io n  was the ' t r u e  voice of  the p eo p le ' .
Many of  those who thought the withdrawal was 
in e v i t a b le  should admit t h a t  they have a socia l  
o b l ig a t io n  to  recons ider  what they have sown.
I f  they do not admit the t o t a l  f a i l u r e  of  Japan 's  
diplomacy, the fu tu re  misfor tune wi l l  be even 
g r e a te r .  Once Baron Shidehara s ta ted  t h a t  d ip lo ­
macy should not be something to be pra ised  by 
the people o f  the  time. This i s  indeed the word 
which we should s av o u r .15 '
The course which Japan subsequent ly followed was in f a c t  not the  one 
encouraged by t h i s  w r i t e r .
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CHAPTER VIII - Conclusion
The main theme o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  this d e c l in e
o f  th e  p re s s  a s  an independent c r i t i c a l  fo rc e  in
Japan* The Japanese  new spapers , i t  was suggested  in  1930,
had long  p r id e d  them se lves  on t h e i r  an ti-governm en t
a t t i t u d e ,  which alm ost i n v a r i a b ly  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e i r
expansion*^ It was alleged in 1938, however, that
th e  same newspapers had sought and ensured  t h e i r
s u rv iv a l  and expansion  a s  government •spokesmen* ever
2s in c e  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s *
Such a  t r a n s fo rm a t io n  in  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  p r e s s  
was no t an e n t i r e l y  new development* The p re s s  had 
a c te d  as  a  government * spokesman* to  u n i t e  th e  n a t io n  
a g a in s t  th e  enemy co u n try  d u r in g  th e  S ino -Japanese  and 
th e  Russo-Japanese  Wars a few decades e a r l i e r .  On 
th e s e  o c c a s io n s ,  however, th e  p re s s  in v a r ia b ly  resumed i t s  form er 
r o le  as  a m ajor c r i t i c s  o f  th e  government as  soon as  
th e  immediate c r i s i s  seemed to  have p a s se d .  This  
does not mean that,  p r e s s  c r i t i c i s m  always d e r iv e d  from a 
more r a t i o n a l  o r  lo g i c a l  p o in t  o f  view* Indeed , i t  
was th e  m isinform ed and em otional to n e  o f  p re s s  
condemnation o f  th e  more ’ r e a l i s t i c *  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
Portsm outh t r e a t y  o f  1905 t h a t  had been l a r g e ly  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  subsequent r i o t  i n  Tokyo* Even 
th e n ,  however, th e  p r e s s  a c te d  as  th e  vox po p u li  
r a t h e r  th a n  an a p o lo g is t  f o r  th e  government.^
This proud t r a d i t i o n  o f  th e  Japanese  p re s s  
seems to  have been m ain ta in ed  and s tre n g th e n e d  
d u r in g  th e  e r a  o f  ’Taisho Democracy*. The
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g r a n t in g  o f  u n iv e r s a l  male s u f f ra g e  in  1925,
though somewhat overshadowed by th e  s im u ltaneous
enforcem ent o f  th e  Peace P r e s e r v a t io n  Law, owed much o f
i t s  su ccess  to  th e  u n eq u iv o ca l p re s s  campaign
a g a in s t  th e  government. The p re s s  a l s o  s t im u la te d  p u b l ic
o p in io n  on disarmament as  a  means o f  re d u c in g
th e  f i n a n c i a l  burden borne by th e  p e o p le .  I t s
u n i t e d  e f f o r t  undoub ted ly  made i t  e a s i e r  f o r  th e
government to  overcome th e  pow erful o p p o s i t io n  from th e
Navy in  a c c e p t in g  th e  Washington n av a l  t r e a t y  in
1922. I t  i s a l s o  p robab le  t h a t  th e  government
was g r e a t l y  encouraged by th e  p re s s  support f o r
th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  fo u r  Army d iv i s io n s  i n  192$,.
Thus th e  p r e s s  appeared  to  have become not on ly  
a  fo rm idab le  c r i t i c  o f  th e  government but a lso  
a v a lu a b le  a l l y  in  th e  l a t t e r * s  f i g h t  a g a in s t  th e  
more * re a c t io n a ry *  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .
Throughout th e  p e r io d  o f  *Taisho Democracy*, 
th e  p r e s s  had a lso  seemed to  ta k e  p r id e  in  
e n l ig h te n in g  th e  p u b l ic  on th e  r e a l  n a tu r e  o f  
government p o l i c y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  
f o re ig n  a f f a i r s  where th e  government was a t  i t s  
most s e c r e t i v e .  T his  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  was much he lped  
by th e  improvement o f  th e  communication network 
w i th in  and w ithou t Japan in  th e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  
t h i s  c e n tu ry .  The m ajor newspapers encouraged 
t h e i r  r e p o r t e r s  to  form corresponden ts*  c lu b s  
a t  most o f  th e  more im portan t government d ep a r tm en ts .
The Asahi and th e  M ainichi newspaper concerns
sen t out s t a f f  members a s  t h e i r  permanent c o r re sp o n d e n ts
in  th e  West w h ile  most o f  th e  major newspapers
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a lso  e v e n tu a l ly  opened o f f i c e s  in  v i r t u a l l y  every
c i t y  o f  any s ig n i f i c a n c e  i n  China* The
* commercial newspaper* ( shogyo sh inbun) o f  th e
Taisho e r a  d id  perhaps no t p o ssess  th e  c r i t i c a l
vigour of the ’leader newspaper* (bokutaku shinbun)
of the previous Meiji era which was alleged
to  have t h r i v e d  on i t s  r e p u ta t io n  as  th e  most
frequently punished newspaper for its anti-government 
4
view* Nor perhaps  was th e  lead  a r t i c l e  o f  th e
•commercial newspaper* th e  most im portan t
commercial f a c t o r  any lo n g e r  as  i t s  emphasis
s h i f t e d  from d is c u s s io n  to  re p o r t in g *  N e v e r th e le s s ,
th e s e  ’ shortcomings* seem to  have been amply
compensated for not only by its sheer size but
a ls o  by th e  c r i t i c a l  to n e  o f  i t s  ’f a c t u a l  r e p o r t s * .
Indeed , i t  was th e  a r t i c l e s  w r i t t e n  by th e
c o r re sp o n d e n ts  a t ta c h e d  to  th e  F o re ig n  M in is t ry
that angered the government over the Twenty-One
Demands and th e  S ib e r ia n  E x p e d it io n .  I t  was a lso
l a r g e ly  th e  sym pathe tic  to n e  o f  ’f a c t u a l  r e p o r t s ’ t h a t
encouraged th e  sp re a d in g  o f  th e  Rice Rio-ty in  1918,
which brought down the government. Nakane Sakae,
a form er r e p o r t e r  o f  th e  independent news agency,
D entsu , r e c a l l e d  in  1936 th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  t h e s e
’ f a c t u a l  r e p o r ts *  :
The air at the CCabinet Correspondents]
Club could  cause a change o f  government.
I t  was n e i t h e r  t h a t  th e  le a d  a r t i c l e  
a t ta c k e d  th e  government no r t h a t  th e  
e d i t o r  w rote w ith  th e  i n t e n t i o n  to  
to p p le  i t . . . .  The a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  in  th e  
atmosphere crem ated a t  th e  Club would 
s w ir l  w ith  g r e a t e r  power and charm th a n  
any o th e r  a r t i c l e  in  th e  newspaper, th u s  
open ing  th e  way f o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  change 
which would end th e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  a 
Prime M in is te r  o r  which would fo rc e  th e  
government to  r e s ig n .  People  o f te n  say 
t h a t  i t  i s  m erely  a newspaper c l i c h e ,  
bu t i t  was th e  a i r  o f  th e  Clubj-that produced 
a  c l i c h e  which was fo rm id a b le .
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In  r e t r o s p e c t ,  however, t h i s  c la im  was a s l i g h t  
o v e r s ta te m e n t .  EJven th e  uneq u iv o ca l p re s s  campaign 
would not have changed th e  government had i t  been 
su p p o rted  o n ly  by th e  p e o p le .  More th a n  one 
J o v e rn m e n t  f e l l  i n  th e  middle o f  n a t io n -w id e  p r o t e s t s  
d u r in g  th e  e r a  o f  'T a ish o  Dem ocracy '• On th e s e  
o c c a s io n s ,  however, th e  government was not 
formed by th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  which h e ld  a  m a jo r i ty  
in  th e  Lower House o f  th e  Im p e r ia l  D ie t .  The 
m a jo r i ty  p a r ty  t h e r e f o r e  jo in e d  f o r c e s  w ith  
th e  p re s s  and th e  people  a g a in s t  th e  'n o n - p a r ty '  
c a b in e t .  C onverse ly ,  s im i l a r  a t te m p ts  f a i l e d  i f  
th e  m a jo r i ty  p a r ty  d id  no t s id e  w ith  th e  p re s s  and 
th e  p e o p le .^  By th e  l a t e  1920s, th e  'p a r t y  c a b i n e t '  
system appeared  f i r m ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  and th e  m a jo r i ty  
p a r ty  was i t s e l f  p a r t  o f  th e  government which 
was under  c o n s ta n t  f i r e  from th e  p r e s s .  In  
a d d i t i o n ,  th e  main O p p o s i t io n  p a r ty  seldom 
jo in e d  f o r c e s  w ith  th e  p r e s s  to  f i g h t  a g a in s t  
th e  government. Indeed , more o f te n  th a n  n o t ,  
i t  was th e  O p p o s itio n  t h a t  was su b je c te d  to  
h a r s h e r  c r i t i c i s m  from th e  p re s s  because  o f  
i t s  'o p p o r t u n i s t i c '  a t t i t u d e .  Hamaguchi and 
h i s  M inse ito  p a r ty  w ere, f o r  example, 
condemned by th e  p re s s  when th e y  jo in e d  th e  
P r iv y  C ouncil i n  d e la y in g  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  K ellogg-B riand  P ac t in  1929* T h e ir  
a t t a c k  on th e  s e t t le m e n t  o f  th e  T s inan  in c id e n t  
a lso  pushed th e  p re s s  c l o s e r  to  th e  Tanaka 
c a b in e t ,  which had l a b e l l e d  th e  p r e s s  as  
a  ' t r a i t o r '  who spoke f o r  China r a t h e r  th a n  i t s  
own c o u n try .  Thus, th e  government seemed to  have
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even few er cau ses  o f  concern  f o r  i t s  s u rv iv a l
in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s th a n  a t  th e
h e ig h t  o f  'T a ish o  Democracy'.
The p re s s  could  and perhaps  d id ,  however,
in f lu e n c e  government p o l ic y  so long  as  i t
r e p re s e n te d  th e  m a jo r i ty  o p in io n  o f  th e  p e o p le .
I f  Prime M in is te r  Hamaguchi cou ld  be b e l ie v e d ,
no t o n ly  had th e  p r e s s  su p p o rt  been a
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  f o r  h i s  e l e c t io n  v i c t o r y  in
1929 bu t i t  was a lso  an e s s e n t i a l  p re c o n d i t io n  f o r
7t h e  enforcem ent o f  h i s  p o l i c i e s .  I t  was 
suggested  i n  1938 t h a t  th e  'co n cen su s  o f  th e  
mass o f  th e  p e o p le ' had n ev er  e x i s t e d  in  Japan 
because t h e r e  were n e i t h e r  'c i t i z e n s *  nor  
'c i t o y e n s '  and t h a t  'p u b l i c  o p in io n ' in  Japan Q
sim ply  meant th e  o p in io n  exp ressed  by th e  p r e s s .
I t  i s  a lso  a l l e g e d  t h a t  th e  Japanese  newspapers
th roughou t t h e  1920s supp o rted  th e  p r in c ip l e
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e ra t io n  as  exp ressed  in
'S h id e h a ra  Diplomacy' more because o f  t h e i r
commercial need to  r e p re s e n t  th e  'o p p o r tu n is t i c *
i n t e r n a t io n a l i s m  p re v a le n t  among th e  people th a n
9because o f  t h e  needs o f  th e  s t a t e .  I f  th e  
p r e s s  was 'o p p o r tu n i s t i c *  in  conform ing w ith  
th e  p u b l ic  s e n tim e n t ,  however, t h i s  'o p p o r tu n ism ' 
was a lso  i t s  s t r e n g th .  What would have happened 
had th e  newspapers not sw itched  support from 
th e  Navy to  th e  government i n  th e  post-London 
nav a l con fe ren ce  d is p u te  ? The p u b l ic  sen tim en t 
was overwhelmingly in  fav o u r  o f  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  London t r e a t y  which promised t a x  
r e d u c t io n ,  i f  t e m p o r a r y . ^  The con tinued  
support f o r  th e  Navy by th e  major newspapers 
would most c e r t a i n l y  have c o s t  them a  s iz e a b le  
r e a d e r s h ip .  A major r i o t  might have e ru p ted
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as  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e  d e la y  o r  even f a i l u r e  o f
th e  government to  r a t i f y  th e  t r e a t y  which
could  have fo rc e d  th e  government to  r e s ig n ,
as the Rice Riot had done twelve years earlier*
Hamaguchi's M inse ito  p a r ty  would p ro b ab ly  not have
won th e  subsequent e le c t io n *  I t  can o f  course
be argued t h a t  th e  p r e s s ' s  w i l l in g n e s s  to
' r e p r e s e n t '  th e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  people
works as  a  s a f e t y  v a lv e  in  t h e i r  s t r u g g le  a g a in s t
t h e  government*** There i s  l i t t l e  doub t,
however, t h a t  w ithou t th e  encouragement from th e
press, the Rice Riot would not have spread so
w idely  and q u ic k ly  as  t o  cause  th e  change o f
th e  government* C o n s id e r in g  t h a t  th e  w h o le -h ea r ted
support for the Riot by the Asahi and the Mainichi
newspaper concerns  gave them a  much needed
im petus f o r  t h e i r  commercial dom ination  over
12their somewhat hesitant rivals in Tokyo, 
the newspapers needed to conform to 'public 
opinion' if they were to survive and expand*
The 'p a r t y  c a b i n e t '  in  th e  l a t e  1920s and 
e a r ly  1930s needed to  r e f l e c t  th e  'p u b l i c  
opinion* exp ressed  in  th e  p r e s s  in  o rd e r  
to  s ta y  in  power when fa c e d  w ith  an i s s u e  o f  
n a t io n a l  importance* Thus th e  sw itch  of 
support by th e  major newspapers to  th e  government 
o ver  th e  London n av a l  t r e a t y  was i n e v i t a b l e  
even i f  i t  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  'o p p o r tu n ism '*
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  Japanese  p re s s  
was g en u in e ly  i d e a l i s t i c  about disarmament and 
world peace in  th e  1920s* The U*S. p ro p o sa ls  f o r
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■the Geneva n av a l  co n fe ren ce  in  1927 and th e  
P a r i s  peace con fe ren ce  a y e a r  l a t e r  which was 
to  produce th e  K ellogg-B riand  Pact were g r e e te d ,  
a t  l e a s t  i n i t i a l l y ,  by a c e r t a i n  amount o f ,c y n ic is m  
from th e  p ress*  T h is  was l a r g e ly  because 
th e  p re s s  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  th e s e  co n fe ren c es  
would have been u n n ecessa ry  had th e  U*S* jo in e d  
th e  League o f  N ations  whose Covenant ep itom ised  
-  a t  l e a s t  i n  th e  eye o f  th e  Japanese  p r e s s  -  i d e a l s  
f o r  world peace and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  coopera tion*
The somewhat lukewarm p r e s s  campaign f o r  th e  
K e llo g g -B rian d  Pact may have d e r iv e d  p a r t l y  
from th e  f a i l u r e  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  c r i t i c s  
to  comprehend i t s  r e a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e .  On th e  
o th e r  hand, i t  was a l s o  th e  u n c o n d i t io n a l  
accep tance  o f  such id e a l ism  by th e  c r i t i c s  
t h a t  enab led  th e  government to  escape p re s s  
c r i t i c i s m  f o r  i t s  f a i l u r e  to  g ive more s e r io u s  
c o n s id e ra t io n  to  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  e x c e p t io n a l  
c a se s  to  which th e  P ac t would not a p p ly .
I t  wajfr a lso  p a r t l y  t h i s  u n te s t e d  id e a l ism  
o f  th e  p r e s s  t h a t  weakened i t s  c r i t i c a l  tone  
over  th e  China i s s u e .  F o re ig n  M in is te r  
S h id e h a ra 's  ’m utual economic p r o s p e r i t y '  
between th e  two Asian ne ig h b o u rs  and h i s  
'n o n - in te rv e n t io n *  in  th e  Chinese c i v i l  war 
accorded w ith  th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  League Covenant. 
Almost any government a c t i o n  which appeared  to  
c o n t r a d i c t  th e s e  p r in c ip l e s  was, t h e r e f o r e ,  
s t r o n g ly  condemned th roughou t th e  1920s .
T anaka 's  ' p o s i t i v e '  p o l ic y  as  r e f l e c t e d  in  th e
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Shantung e x p e d i t io n s  in  1927 and 1928 was
su b je c te d  to  c o n s ta n t  p re s s  c r i t i c i s m  f o r  th e
same re a so n ,  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y ,  I t  can o f
co u rse  be argued t h a t  th e  p r e s s  opposed Tanaka
because  h i s  p o l ic y  b rought Japan s u b s t a n t i a l
f i n a n c i a l  damage* N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  was th e
p r e s s ' s  u n q u e s t io n in g  accep tan ce  o f  th e
id e a l ism  o f  th e  League Covenant t h a t  le d  to
i t s  f a i l u r e  to  fo re s e e  th e  in c o m p a t ib i l i t y
between th e  h igh  p r in c ip l e s  o f  'm u tu a l
c o p r o s p e r i t y '  and 'n o n - in t e r v e n t io n '  on th e
one hand and th e  defence  o f  v e s te d  Japanese
i n t e r e s t s  in  China on th e  o ther*  When t h i s
am bigu ity  was c h a llen g ed  by T a n ak a 's  Shantung
e x p e d i t io n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  'p r o t e c t i o n  o f
th e  l i f e  and p ro p e r ty  o f  th e  Japanese  r e s i d e n t s '
which p ro v id ed  th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e s e
seem ingly in te r v e n t io n a r y  a c t io n s  was never  q u e s t io n e d
by th e  p ress*  This am bigu ity  was a lso
re s p o n s ib le ,  a t  l e a s t  a t  th e  i n i t i a l  s ta g e
o f  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s ,  f o r  th e  f a i l u r e
o f  th e  p r e s s  to  q u e s t io n  th e  ' s e l f  d e fe n se '
f o r  which th e  Kwantung Army claim ed to  have
tak en  a c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  Chinese army a t  Mukden*
I t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  i f  th e  p r e s s ' s  subsequent
p r o je c t io n  to  th e  people  o f  th e  League o f
N ations  as  a v i l l a i n  was p a r t l y  th e  r e s u l t
o f  i t s  i n s t i n c t i v e  r e a c t i o n  to  p reven t
t h i s  am biguity  from b e in g  exposed to  th e
p u b l i c .  The League 's  a t t i t u d e  th roughou t th e
Manchuria c r i s i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  appeared  to
c l a r i f y  t h i s  am biguity  and to  p lace  'n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n '
b e fo re  th e  defence o f  v e s te d  Japanese  i n t e r e s t s  in
Manchuria and Mongolia.
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The s t r e n g th  o f  th e  p re s s  in  i t s  
f i g h t  a g a in s t  th e  government depended no t on ly  
on w hether i t  r e p re s e n te d  th e  p u b l ic  sen tim en t 
but a lso  on w hether th e  p r e s s  was u n i t e d .
The u n i t y  w i th in  th e  p r e s s  d u r in g  th e  e r a  o f  
'T a ish o  Democracy' had been m ain ta ined  
l a r g e l y  th ro u g h  th e  c a r t e l  agreement among 
th e  f iv e  m ajor newspapers in  Tokyo. The 
commercial r i v a l r y  among them was growing 
but s t i l l  c o n t r o l l a b l e .  The co rresponden ts*  
c lu b s  showed an i n c r e a s in g  s ig n  o f  
independence bu t s t i l l  g e n e r a l ly  a c te d  on 
th e  g u id e l in e s  drawn by th e  e d i t o r s .  By th e  
l a t e  1920s, however, th e  o ld  c a r t e l  agreement 
in  Tokyo had a l r e a d y  been broken up by th e  
Asahi and th e  M ainichi c o n c e rn s .  Some 
i n f l u e n t i a l  j o u r n a l s ,  n o ta b ly  Chuokoron and 
K aiz£ , were b eg in n in g  to  c h a l le n g e  th e  
predominance o f  th e  newspapers not o n ly  in  
d is c u s s io n  but a lso  in  r e p o r t i n g  on almost 
every  m ajor i s s u e .  The growing r e p u ta t io n  
o f  th e  two news a g e n c ie s ,  Rengo and D entsu , 
among th e  s m a l le r  newspapers was a n o th e r  
source  o f  concern  f o r  th e  m ajor new spapers .
No l e s s  d a u n t in g  to  th e  newspapers a s  a  whole 
was th e  e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  th e  sem i-governm ental 
Japan  B ro a d c a s t in g  C o rp o ra t io n  (NHK) in  1 9 2 8 . ^  
In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  power s t r u g g le  between th e  
r e p o r t e r s  and th e  e d i t o r s  o f  th e  newspapers 
i n t e n s i f i e d  as  th e  s h i f t  o f  emphasis from th e  
lead  a r t i c l e  to  r e p o r t s  p ro g ressed  f u r t h e r .
Even so , th e  more o v e r t  forms o f  s t a t e  
in t e r f e r e n c e  in  th e  'freedom  o f  th e  p r e s s '  
were met by u n i t e d  a c t io n  from th e  v a r io u s  
p re s s  o r g a n i s a t io n s .  The reform  p ro p o sa ls  f o r
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th e  t i g h t e n i n g  o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  p r e s s  c o n t ro l  
laws were th u s  k i l l e d  in  1926 and 1927. 
T a n ak a 's  i n s i s t e n t  c a l l s  f o r  a  'u n i f i e d  
n a t io n a l  o p in io n ' over h i s  'p o s i t i v e  d iplom acy ' 
f a i l e d  l a r g e l y  because o f  h i s  contempt f o r  
'p u b l i c  o p in io n ' as  exp ressed  in  th e  p r e s s .
Once th e  ou tw ard ly  l e s s  h igh-handed and 
more l i b e r a l  Hamaguchi c a b in e t  was in  power, 
however, th e  s i t u a t i o n  was bound to  change.
The g r e a t e r  degree  o f  sympathy between 
th e  e d i t o r s  o f  th e  m ajor newspapers and th e  
Hamaguchi M inse ito  c a b in e t  and th e  ev e r  
i n t e n s i f y i n g  commercial r i v a l r y  were th e  main 
cau ses  o f  th e  subsequent d i s u n i ty  w i th in  th e  
p r e s s ,  a  d i s u n i t y  which proved to  be 
i r r e p a r a b le *  The owner o r  th e  a d v e r t i s e r  o f  
a  major Japan ese  newspaper who c o n t r ib u te d  
n e a r ly  h a l f  o f  i t s  e n t i r e  income i s  a l le g e d  
to  have seldom i n t e r f e r e d  w ith  th e  e d i t o r i a l  
p o l ic y  d u r in g  th e  e r a  o f  'T a isho  Democracy'
The i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  commercial co m p e ti t io n  
among th e  newspapers in  th e  l a t e  1920s, 
however, le d  to  th e  s ta g e  whereby th e  s a le s  
departm en ts  d i c t a t e d  t h e i r  c o n te n t .  
S e n s a t io n a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  ' f a c t u a l  r e p o r t s '  
was commonly employed f o r  th e  expansion  o f  
t h e i r  r e a d e r s h ip  and any move by th e  e d i t o r i a l  
departm en ts  to  r e v e rs e  t h i s  tendency  was 
bound to  f a i l  as  th e  Tokyo Asahi d isc o v e re d  
w e l l  b e fo re  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s .  The somewhat 
a lo o f  a t t i t u d e  of F o re ig n  M in is te r  Sh idehara  
under th e  Hamaguchi c a b in e t  tow ards th e  p re s s  
and h i s  no l e s s  s e c r e t iv e  h a n d l in g  o f  th e  China
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i s s u e  th a n  T a n ak a 's  were u t i l i s e d  to  th e  f u l l  
by th e  Jap an ese  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in  
China to  s t i r  a n t i -S h id e h a r a  sen tim en t among 
th e  p u b l i c .  The head o f f i c e s  , in  p a r t i c u l a r  
th e  s a l e s  d e p a r tm en ts ,  o f  th e  newspapers and news 
ag e n c ie s  a l s o  encouraged t h e i r  c o r re sp o n d en ts  
in  China to  send d e sp a tc h e s  w ith  a n t i -S h id e h a r a  
as  w e ll  as a n t i -C h in a  t o n e s .  The d i s p a r i t y  th u s  
appeared  more c l e a r l y  th a n  ever  b e fo re  between th e  
' f a c tu a l*  r e p o r t s  and th e  le a d  a r t i c l e s  
which g e n e r a l ly  remained sym pathe tic  tow ards 
th e  government, i f  no t S h idehara  h im s e l f ,  
alm ost r i g h t  up to  th e  o u tb re ak  o f  t h e  Manchuria 
c r i s i s .  As th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  e d i t o r s  in  th e  
s p r in g  o f  1931 to  r e o rg a n is e  th e  c o r re s p o n d e n ts '  
c lu b s  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  government departm ents  
i n  Japan  su g g es ted ,  however, th e  e d i t o r s  had l o s t  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e i r  su b o rd in a te s  not o n ly  in  China 
but a lso  in  t h e i r  own co u n try  long  b e fo re  th e  
Manchuria c r i s i s .
P re s s  o p in io n s  in  Japan were as  d iv e r s e
as  th o se  in  many Western c o u n t r i e s ,  a t  l e a s t
u n t i l  th e  o u tb re ak  o f  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s  in
th e  autumn o f  1931* The 'c o m m e rc ia l i s a t io n '
o f  newspapers in  th e  f i r s t  few decades o f  t h i s
c e n tu ry  l e d ,  i t  i s  a l l e g e d ,  to  a  v i r t u a l
15u n i fo rm i ty  in  t h e i r  e d i t o r i a l  p o l i c i e s .
There were, however, n o t i c e a b le  d i f f e r e n c e s  
even between th e  two most 'c o m m e rc ia l ise d ' 
newspaper co n ce rn s ,  th e  Asahi and th e  M a in ich i .
The A sahi, f o r  example, k ep t  s i l e n c e  on th e  
r a t i o  i s s u e  b e fo re  and d u r in g  th e  Londona nav a l 
con ference  d e s p i t e  th e  i n s i s t e n t  p e r su a s io n  by 
th e  Navy to  ga in  p re s s  support f o r  i t s  'minimum'
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70 per  cen t r a t i o  as  a g a in s t  th e  U .S . in  c a p i t a l
w a rsh ip s .  The M ain ich i,on  th e  o th e r  hand,
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  supported  th e  Navy in  s p i t e
o f  i t s  p roc la im ed  commitment to  disarmament and
world  p eace .  I t  was a lso  th e  M ain ich i tow ards
th e  end o f  August 1931 t h a t  r e v e rs e d  i t s  form er
o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by
th e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  in  c o n t r a s t  to  th e
A sah i ' s s t e a d f a s t  commitment to  t h i s  end,
a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  th e  Chinchow bombing by th e
Kwantung Army on 8 O ctober 1931. I t  was
a^ in#  th e  Asahi in  e a r ly  1933 t h a t  d e f i e d ,
i f  t e m p o ra r i ly ,  th e  g u id e l in e s  drawn by th e
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  and opposed J a p a n 's
w ithdraw al from th e  League o f  N ations  w hile  th e
M ainichi passionate ly  advocated  i t .  T h is  does not
mean t h a t  th e  Asahi was always more l i b e r a l
o r  p r o g re s s iv e  th an  i t s  r i v a l .  Indeed , i t  i s
a l l e g e d  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i v e  la c k  o f  f a c t i o n a l
c o n f l i c t s  w i th in  th e  Asahi o f te n  le d  to  a more
'c o n s e r v a t iv e '  o r  'b u r e a u c r a t i c '  a t t i t u d e . ^
I f  th e  M ain ich i showed, a s  has  been su g g es ted ,
a tendency  to  u se  more emotive words on th e  China
is s u e  th an  th e  Asahi in  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  th e  
171920s, th e n  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  M ainichi 
sounded more sym pathe tic  tow ards China and 
more c r i t i c a l  o f  T a n ak a 's  ' p o s i t i v e  d iplom acy ' 
th a n  i t s  r i v a l .  In  th e  post-London nava l 
con ference  c o n tro v e rs y ,  th e  M ain ich i a lso  sounded 
o f te n  more c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  Navy which i t  had so 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  supported  th a n  th e  A sah i. 
N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  was th e  Asahi r a t h e r  th a n  th e  
M ainichi t h a t  was th e  main t a r g e t  o f  a t t a c k  from
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th e  s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  th roughou t th e  1920s and 
18e a r ly  1930s. The fo l lo w in g  remark by
M ita ra i  Tatsuo perhaps sums up th e  rea so n  f o r  t h i s
phenomenon most a p t ly  s
The Asahi adhered  to  th e  p r in c ip l e  and 
id eo lo g y  h e ld  by £ i t s  founder] Murayama. 
The M ainichi possessed  no c o n s is t e n t  
id e o lo g y .  To put i t  k in d ly ,  i t  moved 
w ith  th e  c u r r e n t  o f  th e  t im e .  To put i t  
u n k in d ly ,  i t  had no c h a r a c t e r  and was 
n o th in g  more th a n  o p p o r tu n i s m . . . .  The 
M ainichi appeared  to  oppose to  a t  one 
moment and to  sym pathise w ith  a t  a n o th e r  
£.the government o f  th e  t im e ] ,  th u s  
changing  i t s  s id e  s k i l f u l l y  and q u ic k ly .  
For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  th e  M ain ichi was n e i t h e r  
h a ted  no r  though t much o f .
I f  th e  M ainichi sounded more ’o p p o r t u n i s t i c 1 
th a n  th e  A sah i . th e  m ajor newspapers as  a  whole 
were c e r t a i n l y  more ’o p p o r tu n is t ic *  th an  some o f  
th e  sm a l le r  new spapers . A p r o v in c ia l  newspaper, 
th e  Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i  i n  Kyushu, was more 
s c e p t i c a l  o f  th e  po p u la r  ’Sh idehara  Diplomacy* 
th a n  i t s  m e t ro p o l i ta n  r i v a l s .  Though as a 
’ Seiyukai newspaper*, i t  was perhaps n a tu r a l  
f o r  th e  Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i  to  remain f a i t h f u l  
to  th e  Tanaka Seiyukai c a b in e t ,  i t s  p r i o r i t y  
was always th e  defence o f  v e s te d  Japanese  
i n t e r e s t s  f i r s t  and ’n o n - in te rv e n t io n *  second, 
th u s  showing much l e s s  in c o n s is te n c y  in  i t s  
support o f  th e  ’p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  l i f e  and 
p ro p e r ty  o f  th e  Japanese  r e s id e n ts *  as  ex p la in ed  by 
F o re ig n  M in is te r  Tanaka f o r  th e  Shantung 
e x p e d i t io n s  th a n  th e  Asahi o r  th e  M a in ic h i .
Nor d id  t h i s  p r o v in c ia l  newspaper support th e  
Navy’ s ’minimum* demands b e fo re  o r  d u r in g  th e
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th e  London n a v a l  c o n fe re n c e ,  c la im in g  t h a t  
th e  70 p e r  cen t r a t i o  a s  a g a in s t  th e  U .S . in  
c a p i t a l  w arsh ip s  was d e s i r a b l e  but n o t e s s e n t i a l .
I t  was a lso  th e  Fukuoka N ic h in ic h i  t h a t  openly  
condemned th e  Ja p an ese  advance to  Chinchow, which 
fo llow ed  th e  S ino -Japanese  c la s h  a t  Mukden in  
th e  autumn o f  1931, as  an a c t  which would i n v i t e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o u tc ry  a g a in s t  Japan . Moreover, 
i t  was th e  Fukuoka N ic h in i c h i ’ s c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  a b o r t iv e  
coup by th e  r e b e l l i o u s  o f f i c e r s  in  February  1936 t h a t  
has g e n e r a l ly  been reg a rd ed  as  th e  most
20courageous action of the pre-War Japanese press.
I t  should  no t be f o r g o t t e n  however, t h a t
p r e s s u re s  on th e  p r o v in c ia l  newspapers were not
n e c e s s a r i l y  l e s s  th an  th o s e  on th e  m e tro p o l i ta n  
21newspapers.
D if f e r e n t  o p in io n s  were a lso  heard  th rough  
jo u rn a ls  o th e r  th a n  new spapers . Among th e  major 
jo u r n a l s ,  G a ik o jih o . th e  d ip lo m a tic  j o u r n a l ,  was 
th e  most concerned  about ’n a t io n a l  p re s t ig e *  
and th e  economic jo u r n a l ,  T o y o k e iz a ish in p o , 
th e  l e a s t .  T oyoke iza ish inpo  p re se n te d  t o t a l  
disarmament a s  th e  u l t im a te  goal and advocated  
th e  abandonment o f  J a p a n ’ s ’ s p e c ia l  s ta tu s*  
in  Manchuria and Mongolia u n t i l  September 1931.
I t  was a lso  th e  on ly  jo u rn a l  o f  any s ig n i f i c a n c e  
t h a t  welcomed th e  U .S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as  an 
o b se rv e r  a t  th e  League o f  N ations  fo l lo w in g  
th e  o u tb re ak  o f  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s .  In  
c o n t r a s t ,  G aikojihg  supported  v i r t u a l l y  any 
p o l ic y ,  e i t h e r  by S h idehara  o r  by Tanaka, which 
would promote Ja p a n ’ s ’p r e s t i g e ’ . Naval 
disarmament was th u s  d e s i r a b l e  only  i f  J a p a n ’ s 
s ta n d in g  as  ’one o f  th e  t h r e e  Great Powers' was
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guaranteed, th ro u g h ,  in  th e  case  o f  th e  London
n av a l  c o n fe re n c e ,  h e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a 70 p e r
cen t  r a t i o  as  a g a in s t  th e  U .S . in  c a p i t a l
w a rsh ip s .  O verseas c a p i t a l  was welcomed to  e x p lo i t
n a t u r a l  r e s o u rc e s  in  Manchuria but o n ly  i f
J a p a n ’ s ' s p e c i a l  s ta tu s*  was kep t i n t a c t .
Once th e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  appeared  to  be th r e a te n e d
by e x te r n a l  f o r c e s ,  th e  'w eak-kneed ' a t t i t u d e
o f  n o t  o n ly  S h idehara  o r  Tanaka bu t a lso  th e
m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  were condemned. By th e
s p r in g  o f  1931* G aikojiho had in  f a c t  become
so f a r  ahead o f  most o th e r  newspapers and jo u r n a l s
in  th e  ' p a t r i o t i c  r a c e '  t h a t  an anonymous
re a d e r  w rote to  th e  e d i t o r  in  May 1931 t
We urge  you to  work a t  and d i r e c t  u s  
in  our  a t tem p t to  make th e  people  
th in k  more s e r io u s ly  and h e lp  them 
c u l t i v a t e  th e  s p i r i t  o f  independence 
and s e l f - r e s p e c t ,  th u s  w ip ing  out 
th e  s la v e  s p i r i t  o f  w orsh ipp ing  
f o r e ig n  c o u n t r i e s .  I  add t h a t  th e  
le a d in g  s p i r i t  o f  your company i s  th e  
o n ly  one in  Japan th a t  h o ld s  t r u s t  among 
th e  y o u n g p lo y a l i s t s .  I  c o n g r a tu la te  you 
f o r  t h i s .
The two most r e p u t ^  'omnibus j o u r n a l s ' ,
Chuokoron and K aizo, jo in e d  G aikojiho in  t h e i r
c la im  f o r  'non-a lignm ent*  w ith  t h e i r
' r o o m - le t t i n g '  s t r u c t u r e ,  th u s  in t ro d u c in g
23o p in io n s  o f  every  p o l i t i c a l  shade . 
K o k u s a ic h is h ik i , ' a l i g n e d '  w ith  t h e  League o f  
N ations  A s s o c ia t io n  in  Jap an , a lso  p u b lish e d  
d i f f e r i n g  views o f  th e  members o r  sy m p a th ise rs  
o f  th e  A s s o c ia t io n .  S o c i a l i s t  o r  M arxist c r i t i c s  
such as  Yamakawa H i to sh i  and Hasegawa Nyozekan 
were prominent in  Kaizo and t h e i r  o p in io n s  b e fo re  
th e  Manchuria c r i s i s  were not v ery  f a r  from 
T o y o k e iza ish in p S ' s .  They con tin u ed  to  p re se n t
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some o f  th e  h a r s h e s t  c r i t i c i s m  even a f t e r  th e
Mukden in c id e n t  in  September 1931 bu t w ith
a  c o n s id e ra b le  amount o f  t r a c e a b le  b l u e - p e n c i l l i n g
c a r r i e d  out by Kaizo i t s e l f ,  th u s  lo s in g  much o f  t h e i r
c r i t i c a l  v igour#  On th e  o th e r  hand, some
l i b e r a l  c r i t i c s  such as Kiyosawa K iyoshi and Shinobu
Ju n p e i a t  t im e s  sounded l e s s  ' l i b e r a l *  th a n  no t
on ly  th e  s o c i a l i s t  o r  M arxist c r i t i c s  but a lso  th e
major newspapers b e fo re  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s
l a r g e ly  because  th e s e  l i b e r a l  c r i t i c s  p laced
th e  defence o f  v e s te d  Japanese  i n t e r e s t s  in  China
b e fo re  th e  h ig h  p r in c ip l e  o f  'n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n ' .
T his  does no t mean t h a t  th e y  supported  th e  Shantung
e x p e d i t io n s  w h o le h e a r te d ly .  Nor were th e y  so concerned
oabout 'n a t i o n a l  p re s t ig e *  as  th e  more n a t i n a l i s t i c
A
c r i t i c s  w ere . Indeed , Kiyosawa was one o f  th e  
most c o n s ta n t  and outspoken c r i t i c s  o f  th e  Navy 
a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  London n av a l  c o n fe re n c e .
Shinobu was a ls o  one o f  th e  v e ry  few who 
a c t u a l l y  u rged  th e  government to  g ive  more 
s e r io u s  c o n s id e ra t io n ^  to  th e  qi£stion o f  
e x c e p t io n a l  c a se s  under th e  & ellogg-B riand  Pact 
because  o f  t h e i r  grave im p l ic a t io n s  on J a p a n 's  
v e s te d  i n t e r e s t s  in  Manchuria and Mongolia.
T h e ir  f r i e n d ,  Tagawa D a ik ic h i ro ,  a  d i r e c t o r  o f  
th e  League o f  N ations  A sso c ia t io n  in  Japan , 
a lso  co n tin u ed  to  ex p ress  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  not 
o n ly  w ith  th e  government and th e  newspapers bu t 
a lso  w ith  K o k u s a ic h is h ik i , th e  A s s o c ia t io n 's  jo u rn a l  
i t s e l f ,  f o r  t h e i r  m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  
s p i r i t  o f  th e  League o f  N ations  d u r in g  th e  
Manchuria c r i s i s .  Thus, p re s s  o p in io n s  in
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Japan  were no t un ifo rm , a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  th e  
t i g h t e n i n g  o f  p re s s  c o n t r o l  which fo llow ed  th e  
o u tb re ak  o f  th e  Manchuria c r i s i s  came-to l im i t  
th e  'freedom  o f  th e  p r e s s '  to  a much g r e a t e r  
degree  th a n  e v e r  b e f o re .
The change,w hich th e  Japanese  p re s s  underwent 
in  th e  l a t e  1920s and e a r ly  1930s, p roved , however, 
fundam ental and i r r e v e r s i b l e .  The a b o r t iv e  coup 
in  F ebruary  1936 le d  to  a f u r t h e r  t i g h t e n i n g  o f  
p r e s s  c o n t r o l .  Some t r a d i t i o n a l l y  l i b e r a l  j o u rn a ls  
such as  Chuokoron and Kaizo s t i l l  con tin u ed  
to  show t h e i r  r e s i s t a n c e  th ro u g h  v a r io u s  
'anonymous c r i t i c a l  e s s a y s '  ( tokumei h ih y o ) o f  
government p o l i c y ,  i f  in  a more m oderate t o n e . ^
By then, however, the major newspapers and 
news agencies had come to accept virtually without 
resistance or criticism the guidelines drawn up 
in the various Army pamphlets which dictated 
Japanese foreign policy since Japan's
25withdrawal from the League of Nations.
N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  major newspapers c laim ed
to  r e p re s e n t  'p u b l i c  opinion* as  th e  company
history of the Tokyo Nichinichi wrote in 1941 :
[After the Mukden incident in September 
1931] the political parties were, in 
effect, no longer a propelling force 
in politics. This shook the conventional 
view held in some quarters that so long 
as they enjoyed the patronage of the 
political parties, they could ignore 
the entire press. As a result, society 
in general began to acknowledge again 
that the right path for public opjgion 
lay with the press organisations.
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Whether this assertion was right is an
open question. Any possibility of a reversal in the
role of the press from a 'spokesman' of the
government to one of its critics was, however, ended when
the undeclared Sino-Japanese War broke out in
July 1937* Following th e  summoning of th e
presidents of the four major 'omnibus journals'
including Chuokoron and Kaizo« even the latter,
which had been one of the staunchest opponents
of the military 'adventurism' in Manchuria,
became an ardent advocate of Japan's aggressive 
27
China policy. Occasional signs of minor resistance
against further tightening of press control could
still be heard mainly in the smaller newspapers in
28Tokyo and the provinces. The enforcement of 
the 'one paper per prefecture* (ikken isshi) 
system in 1942 was, however, the end of such 
resistance.
Notea for Preface
1* For details on tljj^ e pointy , see for example Murayama Ruheiden. 
Asahishinbunsha, Tokyo, 19£3 ^ pp *±4 0-34! and Tonichi Nana.jtmenshi. 
Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbunsha, Tokyo 1941, pp*3?)-32aetc*
2* The Tokyo Nichinichi was part of the Mainichi newspaper 
concern betweejyl911 and 1945^and in post-¥ar Japan it has been 
renamed - 'the Tokyo Mainichi*
3* On this point, see Ogawa Setsu, Shinbun Sei.1l Gaiko Ki.ii no 
Kisochishiki. Kuritashoten, Tokyo, 1932, p.20.
4* For details on this , see Tamura Kazuo, "Newspaper 
Review", Chuokbronr December 1939, p*77*
5* For derails, see Shibukawa Genji, "General Review of 
Newspapers", Chuokoron. January 1934, pp*33-64*
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shareholders  of  Rengo were Hochi Shinbun, Kokumin Shinbun, 
J i j i s h i n p o  and ChCTgai Shogyo Shinpo.
10. Ono Hideo, Nihon Shinbunshi , Ryoshofukyukai, 1948, p . 258.
11. I b i d . ,  pp .253-258. The Osaka Asahi was in f a c t  the f i r s t  to 
agree to the  es tab l ishment  o f  Domei, which was the  r e s u l t  of  
the forced merger of  Rengo and Dentsu. Until then ,  the Mainichi 
and the Asahi groups kept a t  l e a s t  one s t a f f  correspondent 
each in New York, London, P a r i s ,  Washington, Ber l in  and Moscow, 
though few of  them commanded any re sp ec t  from the local  press
in s p i t e  of  t h e i r  ' s t a r '  s t a tu s  within t h e i r  companies. For 
th e se ,  see Shimaya Ryosuke, Sh in j ida i  no Shinbun, Etsuzando, 
1926, p p .143-145 and Murayama Ryuhei Den, Asahi Shinbunsha,
1953, p . 663.
12. Ono Hideo, 1955, p p .101-102
13. For the a dve r t i sed  f i g u r e s ,  see the Tokyo Nichinichi (hence­
fo r th  TN in the fo o tn o te ) ,  1 January 1924, p . l  and the Tokyo 
Asahi Thenceforth TA), 2 January 1924, p . l .  According to
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(13,) Shinbun Zasshisha Tokuhi Chosa published by the Pol ice  Bureau 
of  the Home Minis try  in 1927, TN and TA had c , 450,000 and
400.000 c i r c u l a t io n s  r e sp e c t iv e ly  whiTe t h e i r  s i s t e r  news­
papers in Osaka were c red i ted  with 1,166,432 and 1,260,596 in 
t h i s  order .  This Pol ice  Bureau rep o r t  was r ep r in ted  on 15 
October 1979 by the  courtesy  of  Hajima Tomoyuki who owns
the  o r i g i n a l ,  and w i l l  be r e fe r r e d  to as Hajima. J i j i s h i n p o , 
Hochi Shinbun and Kokumin Shinbun were a l so  c red i ted  with 
c , 200,000, 250,000 and 150,000 r e sp ec t iv e ly  in Hajima.
14. I to  Masanori,  1933, pp .21-23,
15. I b i d . ,  p . 22.
16. Okamoto Kozo, o p . c i t , ,  p . 389.
17. Hajima l i s t s  the Fukuoka Nichinichi  ( h e re in a f t e r  FN in fo o t ­
notes)  with a c i r c u l a t i o n  of  131,000 and the KyusTnT Nippo
with only 4,500. The ‘Seiyukai newspapers1 tended to  enjoy 
bigger  c i r c u l a t i o n s  than the 'Minseito newspapers’ . In Nagoya, 
the Shin Aichi ( 'S e iy u k a i ' )  had, according to Hajima, 170,000 
c i r c u l a t i o n  while Nagoya Shinbun ( 'M in s e i to ' )  was c re d i te d  
with 90,000, Such a phenomenon mighthave been due to  the f a c t  
t h a t  a la rge  number of  the  Minseito supporters  read the 'p ro ­
v inc ia l  e d i t i o n s '  o f  the metropol i tan  newspapers whidi tended 
to support Minseito as wil l  be d iscussed .  The Kyushu Asahi 
which was published in the same p re fec tu re  as FN and the Kyffshu 
Nippo was c red i ted  with 233,722 c i r c u l a t io n  and- the Seibu 
Mainichi with 22,282 in Hajima.
18. This poin t  w i l l  be d iscussed in Chapters VI and VII.
19. For the d e t a i l ,  see K.T.Y.,  "New Development In Press Control:
Dentsu' s Refusal To P a r t i c i p a t e  In Domei" , Sekaikoron, March 
1936, p . 60. > —
20. Dentsu Shash i , Nihon Denpo Tsushinsha,  1938, pp .902-903,
The m ate r ia ls_o f  the ' f l a s h  news' programmes were supplied a t  
f i r s t  by Rengo and Dentsu, but the broadcast ing corporat ion  
s t a r t e d  c o l l e c t i n g  news through i t s  own correspondents  as well 
a f t e r  the outbreak of  the Manchuria c r i s i s .  This poin t  wil l  
be discussed  in Chapter VII.
21. Chikamori Haruyoshi, J inbutsu  Nihon Shinbunshi, Shin j inbutsu  
Oraisha , 1970, p . 241.
22. I to  Masanori, 1933, pp,21-23.
23. Matsuura Sozo (ed , ) ,  Zasshi Kaizo no Yonjunen,Kowado, 1977,
p,33.
24. Hajima c re d i ted  300,000 to Kingu, 20,000 to Chubkoron and
100.000 to Kaizo. The d i f fe ren ce  between the two sdqozasshi
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(24.) seems much bigger  than genera l ly  be l ieved ,^  See Matsuura,
Bungeishunju Sanj tigenen Shiko, Bungeishunjusha, 1959, p . 70. 
Chudkoron's 500th e d i t io n  hoped t h a t  the reader  would 'see  
us in the long run as a benef ic ia l  f r iend  who s t r i c t l y  main­
t a i n s  the ro le  o f  being a high c lass  journal  . . .  without 
being b o r in g ' .  See Chuokoron, October 1929, p . l ,
25, Matsuura Sozo claims t h a t  the ' n e u t r a l i t y '  o f  the newspapers 
was R ig h t - inc l ined ,  See Matsuura, Tenno to  Masukomi, Aoki- 
shoten,  1975, p,63.
26, This in c id e n t  was c a l l ed  Hakko Kanten J iken ( l i t e r a l l y ,
' t h e  w h i te -1 ig h t -p e n e t r a te s - th e -sk y  i n c i d e n t ' ) and the 
Osaka Asahi l ead e r  c r i t i c i s e d  the  government 's r i c e - p r i c in g  
pol icy  saying t h a t  the white l i g h t  seen in the sky a t  the time 
was the omen f o r  God's punishment to f a l l  on the country run 
by cor rup t  p o l i t i c i a n s .  Other newspapers c r i t i c i s e d  the 
government as w e l l ,  but did not in v i t e  the same rea c t io n .
27, Okamoto Kozo, o p . c i t . ,  p . 344,
28, Toyokeizaishinpo Genron Rokojunen, Toyokeizaishinpdsha, 1955,
p . 474, Toyokeizaishinpo was the f i r s t  weekly journa l  to  succeed 
in Japan,  thus breaking the long-held b e l i e f  t h a t  a weekly 
journal  was bound to f a i l .  I t  had been published th ree  times a 
month u n t i l  i t  became a weekly in 1919.
29, Asahishinbun Shuppankyokushi, Asahishinbunsha, 1961, p . 47.
30, Hajima c re d i ted  Shukan Asahi with the c i r c u l a t i o n  of  173,750 
and Sande Mainichi with 249J 54.
31, This was l a rg e ly  because i t s  most famous c o n t r ib u to r ,  Fukuda
Tokuzo, s t a r t e d  to  co n t r ib u te  more fo r  Kaizo, thus los ing  
i t s  former vigour.  See Kimura Tsuyoshi,  ’Kaizo's  Twentieth 
Anniversary: Memoir of  a Bys tander ' ,  Kaizd, April  1938,
p p .111-112.
32, Nipponhyoran was the successor  of  the economic jo u rn a l ,
Kelzaidrai ('Economic Thoroughfare ' ) .  Bungeishunju had
258,000 c i r c u l a t io n  in 1932. See Matsuura Sozo, o p . c i t . ,
1959, p,70,
33, Odagiri  Hideo, Showa Shoseki Zasshi Shinbun Hakkin Nenpyo, 
Meijibunken, 1965, l i s t s ,  on average,  more than 20 cases of  
these sa le  bans every month a f t e r  September 1931. This book 
c o n s is t s  o f  two volumes,
34, According to Omori Yoshi taro ,  the re  was a sudden f lo u r i sh in g  
o f  smaller  ' s c h o la r ly '  jo u rn a ls  in the l a t e  20s and e a r ly  30s.
This was, in his  opin ion ,  nothing more than an in d ica t io n  of
the dec l ine  in the q u a l i t y  o f  s ch o la r s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  the 'bourgeois '  
p ro fe s so r s ,  whose opinions were_no longer  welcome to  the mo£e 
progressive  and i n f l u e n t i a l  sogozassh i . __See Omori Yoshitaro,  
"Real i ty  Of The Scholar ly  Jo u rn a l s " ,  Chuokoron, June 1931, 
p p .141 and 152.
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35. Ikeshima Shinpei ,  Zasshi Kisha, Chuokoronsha, 1960, p . l 3.
Ikeshima po in ts  out t h a t  once w r i t t e n ,  the con t r ib u t io n  was 
published i n t a c t  whether the  e d i t o r  agreed with i t s  content  
e n t i r e l y  or  not and t h a t  the ' room - le t t ing  e d i t i n g '  i s  a g rea t  
c o n t r a s t  to the  post-War method of  g e t t in g  the news from o u t ­
s ide  on which the s t a f f  themselves w r i te .  See a l so  Mimasaka 
Taro 's  comment in "The_Dark_History of  the Press in Showa",
Sogo Jaanarizumu Kenkyu, November 1966, p . 24.
36. " In v i t a t i o n  To The Contr ibutor  For The Kaizd Antenna Column", 
Kaizd, November 1932, p . 189 and Chuokoron, October 1929, p . l .
37. "Declarat ion Concerning The P r in c ip le  of  Chuokoron" .  _
Chuokoron, January 1929, _JLnjournals such as Chuokoron, Kaizo 
and Gaikffjiho, the page number fo r  the ' leader* was usuaTTy 
omitted In t h i s  t h e s i s ,  the essay t i t l e  without the page 
number in the foo tno te  from now on w i l l ,  unless  otherwise s t a ­
te d ,  in d ic a te  t h a t  i t  i s  the ' l e a d e r '  which was normally p r in ­
ted r i g h t  a t  the beginning o f  each e d i t io n .
38. Gaikoj ihd, No. l ,  11 February 1898. Gaikojiho was a t  f i r s t  
published th re e  times a month, but l a t e r  became a twice-monthly 
jo u rn a l .  In the fo o tn o te ,  the volume number o f  t h i s  journal  
and i t s  date o f  pub l ica t ion  wil l  be s ta t e d  in order  to  avoid 
confusion.
39. According to Baba Akira,  Gaikdjiho enjoyed the backing of  the 
Foreign Minis try  and the m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  a l a t e r  s tage  
and became a ' s e m i - o f f i c i a l '  journal  fo r  these  two s t a t e  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s .  This claim is  mentioned in footnote  2, Okamoto Shunpei, 
"Sino-American Relat ions  In The Eyes Of The Japanese I n t e l l e c ­
t u a l s " ,  in Hosoya Chihiro ( e d . ) ,  Washington Taisei  to  Nichibei 
Kankei, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978, p , 278. Okamoto does
_______ nat_s.ta.te.,- however, whether Baba had suggested a t  what s tage
such backing was made.
40. The League of  Nations Associat ion in Tokyo came in to  ex is tence  
under the  chairmanship o f  the well-known businessman, Shibusawa 
E i i c h i ,  in 1920. No re p re s e n ta t iv e  of  the ' p r o l e t a r i a t '  had 
been in v i t e d ,  however. See Matsushita Yoshio, Hansen Undoshi, 
Gengensha, 1954, p . 174. The Foreign A ffa i r s  Association of  
Japan a lso  published Kokusaihyoron (the In te rn a t io n a l  Review), 
but i t s  c o n t r ib u to r s  were more or  l e s s  the same as those of  
i t s  two r i v a l s ,  Kokusaihyoron and Kokusaichishiki even tua l ly  
merged in the post-Manchuria c r i s i s  e ra .
41. Kokusaichishiki had repea ted ly  to urge i t s  readers  to introduce 
new readers  in  the 20s and even of fe red  a p r ice  reduction o f  20% 
in 1927, to  l i t t l e  a v a i l .  I t s  r eadersh ip ,  i f  confined to  the
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(41.)  members o f  the a s s o c i a t i o n ,  was more or  l e s s  f ixed a t  j u s t  over
6,000 in the l a t t e r  h a l f  of  the decade. See, fo r  example,
"News Of The A ssoc ia t ion" ,  Kokusaichish ik i , May 1927, in s ide  
the back cover .  I t s  membership c l e a r ly  increased a f t e r  the
Mukden in c id en t  to  11,771 in 1932, See Ogata Sadako, "Diplo­
macy And Public Opinion", Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu, No.l ,  1969, 
p . 41. Gaikojiho never ind ica ted  the s ize  of  i t s  r ead e rsh ip ,  but 
l i k e  many o th e r  jo u rn a l s  a ' g r e a t  i n c re a se '  was reported  a f t e r  
the Mukden inc iden t  and i t  urged i t s  readers  to  subscribe 
y ea r ly  'because of  a poss ib le  s h o r t a g e ' .  See Gaikoj iho,
No,648, 1 December 1931, in s ide  the  f ro n t  cover.
42. This poin t  wi l l  be d iscussed l a t e r .
43. Inoue Kiyoshi and Watanabe Toru ( e d s . ) ,  Taishoki no Kyushinteki
J iy u sh u g i , Toyokeizaishinposha,  1972, p p . l ,  9 and 354.
44. Toydkeizaishinpo Genron Rokujunen, p . 5.
45. I t s  c i r c u l a t i o n  was not d isc losed  a f t e r  1907 when i t  was
claimed to be 5,000, but in the spring of  1931, a weekly in c ­
rease of 50 was repo r ted ,  thus making i t  r e spec tab le  fo r  an 
economic jo u rn a l .  See Watanabe Toru and Inoue Kiyoshi,  o p . c i t . ,  
p. 30.
46. What had been a p r iv a te  ownership became a l im i ted  l i a b i l i t y  
in 1921, but most of  the  t o t a l  of  1,400 shares  a t  the time 
were r e g i s t e r e d  in the name o f  the c h ie f  e d i t o r  as the co­
property  o f  the s t a f f  and the  r e s t  were personal ly  owned by 
sen io r  members of  the s t a f f ,  pas t  and p resen t .  Any employee 
l o s t  h is  share o f  co-ownership upon leaving the company and 
t h i s  arrangement l a s t e d  u n t i l  the end of  the  Second World 
War. See Tdyokeizaishinpo Genron Rokujunen, p . 474.
47. Only a handful of  ex terna l  c o n t r ib u to r s  were in v i te d  to con­
t r i b u t e  on p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic  sub jec ts  throughout the 
per iod.  Tagawa Daikichiro ,  a d i r e c t o r  of  the League of  Nations 
Associat ion and a f r i e n d  of  the ch ie f  e d i t o r  o f  the  j o u rn a l ,  
I sh ibashi  Tanzan, was the most r eg u la r .  Tagawa's opinions 
were expressed more of ten  through Kokusaichish ik i , however.
48. Murayama Ryuhei Den, Asahishinbunsha, 1953, p . 240. In perhaps 
the f i r s t  monitoring of  i t s  kind,  Shinbunkenkyujo (the Newspaper 
Research Centre) o f  Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty  reported  in 1933 
t h a t  the 21,190 newly r e c ru i t e d  s o ld ie r s  who had answered i t s  
ques t ionna ires  placed the l eader  in fourth  place behind s o c ie ty ,  
p o l i t i c s  and spor t  in the case of  TA and TN. The ques t ionna ires  
had asked them what column of  these  newspapers they thought 
' s u p e r i o r ' .  None of  the o ther  four major newspapers^scored any 
po in ts  in t h e i r  leader  column. See l t d  Masanori Shinbun 
Gojunenshi, Masushobo, 1943, pp .371-372.
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49. In the  *20s, the leader  normally cons is ted  of  one column out
of  t h i r t e e n  in a page and discussed only one or  two sub jec ts  
with in  t h i s  l i m i t .  Not every day did the leade r  appear ,  nor 
was i t  very argumentative.  On the o ther  hand, the 1 shor t  
reciew* was reported  to  be very popular among the r eaders .
50. Hugh Byas, as quoted in M. D, Kennedy, The Changing Fabric  of
Japan , Constable,  London, 1930, p . 183. The phenomenal commer­
c ia l  success was bes t  r e f l e c t e d  in the c i r c u l a t i o n  of  the 
Tokyo Nichin ichf  whose f ig u re  of  64,847 in 1911 increased  to 
an a dve r t i sed  c i r c u l a t i o n  of  over a m i l l ion  on 1 January 1924, 
See Tonichi Nanajunenshi,  Tokyo Nichinichishinbunsha,  1941, 
p p .354-365,---------------------
51. For these  a t tem pts ,  see Mainichishinbun Hyakunenshi,
Mainichishinbunsha, 1972, p . l7 8 ;_  I t s  Masanori o p . c i t . ,  1943, 
pp .344-346; and Kawai Isamu, Shosetsu A s a h i j in , Yagishoten, 
1968, pp .50-52. The f i r s t  headl ine was used by the Tokyo 
Nichinichi  on 4 January 1871 and i t  was the Osaka Mainichi 
t h a t  introduced equal spacing fo r  the headline and the t e x t  
in l a t e  Taisho, thus making the headl ine f o r  the shooting of  
Premier Hamaguchi in 1930 much bigger  than t h a t  fo r  the shoot­
ing o f  Prime M inis te r  Hara in 1921. See Sato Junzo, “News­
paper Headlines",  Chudkoron, Ju ly  1931, pp .66-70 and 
Mainichishinbun Hyakunenshi, p . 178.
52. Ono Hideo, Nihon Shinbunshi , Ryoshofukyukai, 1948, p . l 79.
Fukuchi was one of  the  best-known columnists a t  the time of  
the  Democratic Rights Movement in the 1880s. For the popula­
r i t y  o f  the ' s h o r t  rev iew1, see_Ito  Masanori, . , 1933,
pp .65 and 186 and Tonichi Nanajunenshi, p p .386-388.
53. For example, a t  the time of  the s ix th  general e l e c t io n  in 1899 
and over the  Portsmouth conference in 1905, the major newspapers 
published a number o f  l e t t e r s  from readers  every day.
54. KageyamaSaburo, Dokusha no Genron, Gendai Jaanarizumu 
Shuppankai, 1976, pp .142 and 201.
55. Ichikawa, "Collect ion  of  Tesso",  Tesso. TA, 18 February 1923.
A reader  named Koshu even suggested the es tab l ishment  of  a 
'f an  c l u b ’ . See, "Tessokai?" .  Tesso, TA, 17 August 1921.
56. The maximum length  of the e n t i r e  column was l im i ted  to  60 
l in e s  with 15 ch arac te r s  in each l i n e ,  i . e .  approximately one 
t h i r d  o f  a column in a newspaper which cons is ted  of  8 pages 
with 13 columns in each page. Only one or two very shor t  
l e t t e r s  were, t h e r e fo r e ,  published on any, but not every, day.
57. "To The C on tr ibu to rs" ,  Tesso, TA, 18 October 1924, p . 3. See
a lso  TA, 3 April 1927 and 3 November 1931, p . 3.
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58. Tesso, TA, 3 September 1931, p . 3,
59. Tesso, TA, 3 November 1931 and 2 February 1933, J i j i s h i n p o
is  reported  to  have found the same trend  and had to  ' f i l l  up' 
the column with l e t t e r s  w r i t t e n  by the s t a f f  not in f req u en t ly .  
See, I to  Masanori,  1933, p . 66,
60. 'Quite a few1 l e t t e r s  received by Tesso in Ju ly  1931 had 
discussed the Sino-Korean c lash  in Manchuria, and the Sino- 
Japanese c lash  two montsh l a t e r  and i t s  repercussions  a t  the 
League of  Nations a t t r a c t e d  66 and ‘over 60‘ responses in 
September and October t h a t  year  r e sp e c t iv e ly .  See Tesso. TA,
4 August,  2 October and 3 November 1931, p . 3. Tesso, however, 
very seldom d isc losed  the  content  o f  the l e t t e r s  received .  
Tsunobue and the  equ iva len t  column in FN never published any 
f ig u res  and, th e r e fo r e ,  t h e i r  s t a t i s t i c s  in  Chart I can show 
only those which were a c tu a l l y  publ ished.
61. Ogawa Setsu ,  Shinbun S e i j i  Gaiko Kiji  no Kiso C h ish ik i ,
Kur i ta sho ten , 1932, p p .13-14.
62. Shimanaka Yusaku who became the e d i t o r  of  Chuokoron in March 
1927 was respons ib le  fo r  t h i s .  Chudkoron's  May 1926 e d i t io n  
contained 17 co n t r ib u t io n s  in the t o t a l  o f  409 pages while
i t s  May 1927 ed i t io n  c a r r i e d  36 essays in the reduced t o t a l  of  
368 pages. See Chuokoronsha Nanajunenshi,  Chuokoronsha, 1955, 
pp .185-186.
63. J i ron  took over the  ro le  o f  the leader  a f t e r  the a b o l i t io n  
of  the l a t t e r  in the  summer of  1931.
64. This wil l  be discussed in a separa te  chap te r .
65. The Japan Year Book, the Foreign A ffa i r s  Association of  Japan, 
p . 223 (1930 ed i t io n )  and p . 231 (1931 e d i t i o n ) .
66. Captain M. D. Kennedy, a B r i t i s h  r e s id e n t  in Japan a t  the
time,  observed: In adopting t h i s  l i b e r a l  a t t i t u d e ,  the
Japanese press  i s  almost u n iv e r sa l ly  up in arms ag a in s t  the 
Government of the day, and i t  i s  a s t r i k i n g  f a c t  t h a t  the more 
a paper a t t a c k s  the  Government, the g r e a te r  does i t s  c i r c u l a ­
t ion  tend to  inc rease .  See M. D. Kennedy, o p ^ c i t . ,  p . 188.
For a s im i la r  obse rva t ion ,  see Uehara E t s u j i r o ,  "Our People 
And China Diplomacy", Kaizo, February 1929, pp .81-83.
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1. See f o r  example, TA and TN, 1 January 1927, pp .2-3.
2. HShowa Diplomacy", Gaikoj iho, No,531, 15 January 1927,
3. TA, 10 June 1927.
4. For the d e ta i l e d  account o f  Shidehara’s a t t i t u d e  on these
occas ions ,  see G. P. McCormack, Chang T s o - l in ,  The Mukden 
M i l i t a ry  Clique and Japan,  1920-1928: The Development And 
T n te r -R e la t lonsh ip  In North East China, Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  London 
U nivers i ty ,  1974, p p .134-139.
5. TA, 28 September, 14 and 15 October 1924, 10 December 1925 e t c .
6 . TA, 16 December 1925. See a l so  TA, 19 December 1925.
7. The f a c t  t h a t  Shidehara himself  was opposed to  the expedi t ion
is  i r r e l e v a n t  as the press  was not informed - a t  l e a s t  o f f i c i a l l y  
-  o f  the  proceedings of  the  cab ine t  meeting. For t h i s ,  see 
Bamba Nobuya, Manshujihen eno Michi, Chuokoronsha, 1975, 3rd 
e d i t i o n ,  p . 160” This book i s  a rev ised  vers ionof  Bamba's 
Japanese Diplomacy in A Dilemma: New Light on Japan 's  China
Policy .  1924-1929. Minerva P ress .  Kvoto. 1972. Tney are  no t ,  
howeve r , i den t i  ca1.
8 . As quoted in Japanese in  Bamba Nobuya, 1975, p p .131-132.
9. TA, 13 February 1926. For the c r i t i c i s m  of  the  g rea t  ’f u s s ’ 
on the  ’specia l  i n t e r e s t s ’ a t  the time, see Hanzawa Gyokujo, 
"Special S ta tus  In Manchuria And Mongolia", Tesso, TA, 19 
February 1926, p . 3. This i s  one of  the ra re  occasions  on which 
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to  any ' i n te rm e d ia te '  duty,  i . e .  between 7.5% and 12.5%, 
but would cons ider  8% or  9% as the maximum; f i n a l l y  the 
recovery of  t a r i f f  autonomy by China should be gradual ly  achieved.
- 231 -
CHAPTER II
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33, TA, 3 April 1927, p . 2,
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Publication_Law and the Publ ica t ion  Act r e f e r  to Shuppanho 
andShuppanjore i , and t h i s  p r a c t i c e  wil l  be followed in t h i s  
t h e s i s .
7. Russia,  France and Germany j o i n t l y  sent  an o f f i c i a l  note on 
23 April  1895 to Japan advis ing her to re tu rn  the concession
in Liaotung to  China. According to  Ono Hideo, the Home Minis try  
exerc ised  the a d m in is t ra t iv e  'p r o h ib i t io n  o rd e r '  87 times b e t ­
ween August and December 1892, 87 times again between January 
and December 1893, 56 times between January and May 1894 and 
222 times between March and December 1895. The m ajor i ty  of  the 
222 cases  in 1895 were appl ied  to  a r t i c l e s  concerning the 
T r ip le  In te rv en t io n .  See Ono, Shinbun no Rekishi ,  Dobunkan,
1955, p . 56.
8 . Ono Hideo s t a t e s  t h a t  the Osaka Asahi made a new record fo r  
being suspended th ree  times in the post  Russo-Japanese war 
fu rore  in which the press  in general s t rong ly  c r i t i c i s e d  the
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(8 .)  'weak' a t t i t u d e s  of  the Katsura cab ine t  towards the defeated 
Russia.  TA and th re e  o th e r  newspapers were a l so  subjected to 
the same t reatment  twice each while the eventual c losure  on 
29 January 1905 of  the weekly newspaper, Heiminshinbun, fo r  
i t s  an t i -w ar  and a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t  views was r a t h e r  unusually  
c a r r i e d  out through the  more complicated j u d i c i a l  procedure.
See Ono, i b i d , ,  p p .56-58 and Matsushita Yoshio, o p . c i t . ,  p . 82.
9. Miyake S e t s u r e i , "F i f ty  Years’ His tory  of  Newspapers", TA,
3 January 1929, p . 3,
10. A r t i c l e  38 o f  the  Newspaper Law s ta t e d  t h a t  the offence would
r e s u l t  in e i t h e r  up to  s ix  months' imprisonment o f  the publ isher  
or  the e d i t o r ,  or  a f in e  of  up to th ree  hundred yen. Accord­
ing to A r t i c l e  12, 2,000 yen should be deposited by a Tokyo
or Osaka newspaper as i t s  guarantee fund with the  local a u th o r i ­
t i e s  concerned fo r  i t s  pub l ica t ion  while the comparable f ig u re s  
f o r  a newspaper publ ished in a c i t y  with i t s  populat ion over 
and under 70,000 were 1,000 yen and 500 yen r e sp e c t iv e ly .
11. TA, 25 December 1924.
12. The Pub l ica t ion  Law was the new name given to the amended
Pub l ica t ion  Act in 1893.
13. For these  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  see Odagiri Hideo, o p . c i t . ,  p . 18
and Naimushgshi, Chi ho Zaimu Kyokai, 1971, V o l . I I ,  p . 758.
14. For the second and the t h i r d  groups, see Showa Shichinen ni
okeru Shuppan Kenetsu Gaikyo ( h e re in a f t e r  SSSKG in the 
f o o tn o t e ) , p . 142. This l e a f l e t  was published in 1933 by the 
Pol ice  Bureau as an in te rn a l  c i r c u l a r  and l i s t e d  the  summary 
of  p u b l ica t ion  control  in the year  1932. S imilar  l e a f l e t s
fo r  o ther  years  might have e x i s t e d ,  but have not  been discovered 
y e t .  For the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  these  two groups, see a lso  
Yamane S h in j i r o ,  "Press Control By The A u th o r i t i e s " ,  Kaizo,
April 1927, p . 73.
15. SSSKG, p . 69.
16. Fuse T a t s u j i ,  "P ro te s t  Against The Suppression Of The Press 
and Class S t rugg le" ,  Chuokoron, October 1927, p . 90. For a 
s im i la r  op in ion ,  see Fukuda Tokuzo, "On The Seizure Of Pub l i ­
c a t i o n s " ,  Kaizo, October 1927, p . 162.
17. The reason fo r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  the content  an a ly s is  comes from
SSSKG. See footnote  14 above.
18. These events  wil l  be discussed in Chapter VII.
19. In 1922 and 1923, the minor Opposition p a r ty ,  Kakushin Kurabu
(the  Reform Club) presented reform proposals  to the Imperial 
Diet only to encounter staunch opposit ion  from both the gpvern- 
ment and the p ress .  The government r e j e c ted  them as too
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(19.)  ’p ro g re s s iv e 1 while the press  f e l t  them to  be too ' r e a c t i o n a r y ' .
For the content of  these  p roposa ls ,  see TA, March 1923.
20. This i s  a comment made by Fukuoka I k ic h i .  See Odagir i ,  o p . c i t . ,  
V o l . I ,  pp .8-9.
21. For the l i s t i n g ,  see fo r  example, Shuppan Keisatsuho. Vol.6,
March 1929, p . 110.* This booklet was a lso  publ ished by the Po l ice  
Bureau as a monthly c i r c u l a r  on the ac tua l  enforcement of  press  
control  and i t s  f i r s t  volume was publ ished as the October 1928 
e d i t io n  under the Tanaka cab in e t .  I t  w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  to in
the foo tno te  as SK from now on.
22. SSSKG, pp .27-28. On 28 January 1932, the r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of  
the  major Tokyo newspapers and news agencies v i s i t e d  the  Home 
M in is te r  a t  his  res idence  to  d iscuss  t h e i r  anxie ty  over the 
increase  o f  the s a le  bans. They requested the c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
of  the  'suspended matters* to  avoid unnecessar i ly  damages.
The Pol ice  Bureau subsequent ly  ou t l ined  two c a teg o r ie s  of  c r i ­
t e r i a ,  the f i r s t  one o f  which was an exact copy of  the  l i s t  in 
SK, Vol .6, p . 110 (see footnote  21 above).  The second c a t e ­
gory cons is ted  of  the  purpose of  p u b l ic a t io n ,  i t s  range of  
r eadersh ip ,  i t s  c i r c u l a t i o n  and socia l  in f luence ,  the socia l  
condit ion a t  the time o f  i t s  p u b l ic a t io n ,  i t s  area o f  d i s t r i b u ­
t ion  and the amount of  d isqu ie ten ing  s e c t io n s .  Both c a teg o r ie s  
were f u l l y  taken in to  account in the ap p l ic a t io n  of  the  News­
paper Law and t h i s  was why, the Pol ice  Bureau claimed, d i f f e r e n t  
p ub l ica t ions  received d i f f e r e n t  t rea tments  fo r  the p u b l ica t io n  
of  the same a r t i c l e .  For t h i s  argument by the Police  Bureau, 
see SK, Vol.41, February 1932, p . 99.
23. "Explanation On Diplomatic Matters In The Publ ica t ion  Law
Proposal" ,  Foreign Min is t ry  Archives (Gaiko Shiryokan - 
h e r e in a f t e r  FMA in foo tno tes )  f i l e  No. N.2 .2 .0 .6  ( t h i s  f i l e  
number i s  as c l a s s i f i e d  a t  FMA), and fo r  the t i t l e  of  the f i l e ,  
see the b ibl iography.  A r t i c l e  18 of  the Publ ica t ion  Law
was the  same in i t s  content  as A r t i c l e  23 of  the Newspaper Law,
but was appl ied  to  books and ' n o n - p o l i t i c a l '  j o u rn a l s .
24. FMA, N.2 .2 .0 .6 ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the l e a f l e t s  e n t i t l e d ,  "Regulat ions
In The Publ ica t ion  Law Proposal Concerning The Foreign M in i s t e r ' s  
Right To P roh ib i t  The Pub l ica t ion :  Drafted On 27 January 1927",
"Clauses In The Proposed Publ ica t ion  Law Relating To The Foreign 
Ministry" and "Opinions of  Each Bureau On The Proposed Pub l ica ­
t io n  Law".
25. Ib id .
26. For the c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h i s  pehenomenon, see TA, 6 and 15, 1926.
27. Kaizo was banned fo r  the pub l ica t ion  of  a play ca l le d  'S a c r i f i c e '
by Fujimori Seikichi in i t s  Ju ly  1926 e d i t i o n .  Kaizfr and
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(27.)  Chuokoron were to rece ive  th re e  and four  sa le  bans r e sp e c t iv e ly  
in the period between January 1927 and December 1933. The formal 
l e t t e r  of  ’p r o t e s t ’ to  the Home Minis try  by the two bodies was 
dated 23 Ju ly  1926.
28. Hashimoto Motome, Nihon Shuppan Hanbaishi, Kodansha, 1964,
p . 458. _______
29. The l a s t  of  these  requests  before the outbreak of  the Manchuria 
c r i s i s  in September 1931 was made in April  1931. In i t ,  they 
even proposed to  pay fo r  the employment o f  the e x t r a  personnel 
needed f o r  the revival  of  the ' i n t e r n a l  c e n s o r s h ip ' ,  only to be 
r e j e c t e d .  See, i b i d . ,  pp ,462-463.
30. I b i d . ,  p . 460.
31. TA, 30 June 1927.
32. Mitsueda Shi geo, Showa Genronshi, Nihonhyoronsha, 1958, p . 22.
33. Hashimoto Motome, o p . c i t . ,  pp .461-462.
34. According to  TA, 1 March 1923, the Publ ica t ion  Sect ion (Toshoka)
of  the Police“~Bureau had e ig h t  subdiv is ions  including the 
newspapers d iv is ion  and the jo u rn a ls  d iv i s io n ,  but had only 
one sec t ion  c h i e f ,  two superv isors  and twenty minor o f f i c i a l s  
who were kept cons tan t ly  busy. This s i t u a t i o n  was v i r t u a l l y  
unchanged even a f t e r  the  outbreak of  the Manchuria c r i s i s  when 
the number of  s a le  bans and the 'suspended m a t t e r s '  increased 
d ram at ica l ly .  See Naimushoshi, V o l . I ,  pp .804-805.
35. Abe Shinnosuke, "Banning Of Blue-Pencil led  Passages", Ekonomisuto, 
Vol .14, No.27, 21 September 1936, pp .15-16,
36. Noro E i t a ro ,  "Real i ty  Of Japan 's  So-Called Non-Threatening
Disarmament", Chuokoron, March 1930, p . 51. For a s im i la r  example, 
see Yasutomi Shozo, '“National Defence Issue Result ing From The 
Naval Trea ty" ,  Kokusaichish ik i , Ju ly  1930, p . 50.
37. Honda Kumataro, "Fa i lu re  Of The Shideharaj liplomacy And Mis­
management Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", Gaikojiho,  No.567,
15 Ju ly  1928, p . 12.
38. Komura Shunzaburo, "Cr i t ic ism  Of The China Policy Of The
Seiyukai Government", Kaizo, Ju ly  1928, p.80^ Compare t h i s  with 
his  "Mainly On The Sino-Japanese Trea ty" ,  Chuokoron, September 
1928, p p .31-41.
39. Yamakawa H i tosh i ,  "Unif ica t ion  Of National Opinion On China",
Kaizo, October 1928, p p .68-69. For a s im i la r  example of  blue-  
penci/l led passages, see his "Finale Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", 
Kaizo, March 1929, p p .70-71. Compare these  w i t h j i i s  non-penci l led  
"C h a ra c te r i s t i c s  Of The Tanaka Diplomacy", Chuokoron, September 
1928, p p .57-60.
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40. See f o r  example, Nakanishi Inosuke, "Wan Paoshan Inc iden t  
and Korean Peasan ts" ,  Chuokoron, August 1931, p . 268.
41. This was probable judging from his  a t t i t u d e s  towards the  
despatches from the  Japanese correspondents  in China which were 
published  in the major newspapers,  This p o in t  wil l  be d iscussed  
in  d e t a i l  in the next chap te r .
42. "Foreign Minis ter  Sh idehara 's  Speech", Gaikoj iho , No.628,
1 February 1931, Gaikojiho never received a sa le  ban between 
1927 and 1933.
43. No d e le t io n s  were found in the newspapers in 1927.
44. The Japanese correspondents  a t tached  to  the Kwantung Army knew, 
according to Chiba Yujiro ,  who were re spons ib le  fo r  the a s s a s ­
s in a t io n .  See his  remark in " In s ig h t  Into The His tory Which 
Left  The People In The Cold", Shukan Posuto, 5 November 1971, 
p p .165-166. Also see Mori Katsumi, Manshujihen no Rimenshi, 
Kokushokankokai, 1976, p . 32. I t  i s  poss ib le  t h a t  the  head- 
q u a r te r s  of  the  major newspapers a lso  knew the t r u t h  about 
t h i s  a f f a i r  as the next  chap ter  wi ll  suggest .
45. Tokawa's comment in the above Shukan Posuto a r t i c l e ,  p p .164- 
165. Some o the r  grave events  such as the  planning o f  the occu­
pat ion  of  Manchuria by the Army S ta f f  in 1929 and the March 
and the October Inc idents  in 1931 in which some o f  the  young 
o f f i c e r s  p lo t t e d  a m i l i t a r y  coup were subsequent ly suspended 
f o r  the same reason. See a lso  Mitsueda Shi geo, o p . c i t . ,  p . 56.
46. Ogata Taketora ,  "Earnest  Wish Of Ai^Old S o ld ie r :  Freedom Of 
The Press  Is  Everything", Bungeishuju, specia l  issue  e n t i t l e d  
"Newspapers, Radio and Books", December 1952, pp .27-28.
47. Takamiya Tahei ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p .52-53.
48. FMA, A.3 .5 .0 .1 0 ,  Despatch ( h e re in a f t e r  Des. in foo tno tes )
No.103, 29 September 1928 from Head o f  The Pol ice  Training 
School Yokoyama, to  The Foreign Minis t ry .
49. Odagiri Hideo, o p . c i t . ,  passim.
50. SK, Vol .6, March 1929, p . 110.
51. "Roundtable Talk By The Leader Writers Of The Six Major News­
papers Over Press  Freedom And Control" ,  Bungeishunju, June 
1934, p . 76. This t a l k  wi l l  be quoted several  t imes in t h i s
t h e s i s  and wil l  be r e fe r r e d  to as Zadankai (Roundtable Ta lk) .
52. Mitarai Tatsuo, o p . c i t . ,  1952, p p .12-15. The immobilsation of
the Osaka Asahi machines was d i re c te d  a t  i t s  advocacy of  an 
immediate general e le c t io n  based on universal  manhood su ff rage  
which was even tua l ly  l e g a l i s e d  in 1925. The group respons ib le
- 252 -
CHAPTER V
(52.)  fo r  t h i s  ac t ion  was the Fellow Thinkers '  Society  Towards China 
(Taishi  Doshikai) whose o s te n ta t io u s  aim was to promote 'ha rd ­
l ine* diplomacy towards China r a th e r  than any domestic goal .
53. M,D. Kennedy, The Changing Fabric  of  Japan, Constable,  London, 
1930, p . 188.
547~ Hosokawa Ryugen, J i t su ro k u  Asahi Shinbun, Chuokoronsha, 1958, 
pp .35-36. Kffno Tsunekichi (ex-Army) o f  the Tokyo Asahi and 
Ishimaru Tota (ex-Navy) of  the Tokyo Nichinichi  were two of  
the best-known c r i t i c s  in t h i s  ca tegory.  Kono was, however, 
not allowed to  wri te  a f t e r  the Mukden in c id en t  in order  to 
avoid 'unnecessary '  conf ron ta t ion  with the Army, according 
to  Hosokawa.
55. Mitarai  in Okamoto Kozo ( e d . ) ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 341.
56. Ogawa Setsu ,  o p . c i t . ,  p,20.
57. Watanabe Toru and Inoue Kiyoshi ( e d s . ) ,  o p . c i t . ,  pp .366-367.
For the  f r u s t r a t i o n  f e l t  by the Army, see Mori Katsumi, o p . c i t . ,  
pp .59-60. Mori quotes the "Observation Of In te rn a t io n a l  S i t u ­
a t i o n " ,  a booklet annually  publ ished by the  Army S t a f f  r epor t ing
in i t s  1930 i s sue  t h a t  the Army had not  been successful  in i t s
at tempt  to  win over the press  on the Manchuria i s su e .  The majo­
r i t y  of  the  p re ss ,  i t  s t a t e d ,  was ag a in s t  the Army's plan to 
solve the question even by fo rce ,  i f  necessary.
58. Takamiya Tahei , o p . c i t . ,  pp .45, 54-55, Takamiya was TA 
correspondent a t tached  to  the Army from 1930 onwards. “The 
leaders  of  the two Asahis were not united u n t i l  1934.
59. As quoted in an a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  "Serious Press Suppression
By The Government", TA, 15 December 1930, p . 2.
60. These debates were held a t  Tokyo Imperial Univers i ty  in Ju ly .
The Authors'  Association and the Pub l i she rs '  Association j o i n t l y
sen t  a l e t t e r  to  the Home M in is ter  four  months l a t e r  request ing 
the  ' e a s in g '  o f  the  censoring procedure. I t  i s  a l so  noteworthy 
t h a t  these  two o rgan isa t ions  had been working on t h i s  s ince 
they e s ta b l i s h e d  the League For The Reform Of Censorship System 
in 1927 whose members included a r t i s t s ,  t h e a t r e  d i r e c to r s  and 
some o f  the labour  movement l ead e r s .  See Hashimoto Motome, 
o p . c i t . , pp .462-463.
61. See fo r  example, TA, 15 December 1930, p . 2. Hosokoshi was
a l leged  to  have passed some information to  a news agency
owner f r i e n d  on the cu r ren t  condit ion of  Prime Minis ter  Hamaguchi 
who had been shot a t  Tokyo s t a t i o n  by a f a n a t i c  opponent of  
the London naval t r e a t y  in November t h a t  year .  Hosokoshi was 
held by the po l ice  under the Rumour Control Act.
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62, See footnote  20, Chapter I I I .
63. Kasumikai was so c a l le d  because t h e  Foreign Minis try  was a t  
Kasunrigaseki while Kuroshiokai ( the  Black Current Club) took 
i t s  name from the  warm cu r re n t  which flowed northward near 
Japan,
64, Shunjukai can be t r a n s l a t e d  as the Spring-Autumn Socie ty ,  but
Shunju was one o f  the  Four Chinese C lass ics  w r i t t en  a t  the time 
of  Confucius.
65. Kato never withdrew the  ordinance i t s e l f  to  avoid a ' l o s s  of
face '  but promised i t s  'harmless a p p l i c a t i o n ' ,  thus in e f f e c t  
n u l l i f y in g  the order  to  p r o h ib i t  c r i t i c i s m  of  his  po l icy .  His 
ultimatum to China to  accept the  Twenty-One Demands on 4 May 
leaked and was b i t t e r l y  c r i t i c i s e d  by the  p re ss .  This o rd in ­
ance became the f i r s t  and the  l a s t  to be issued ag a in s t  the 
press  before the enforcement of  the  National Mobil isa t ion Law 
in 1938,
66. Nakane Sakae, Shinbun Sanjunen, Sogabo, 1936, p . 116.
67, See Arase Yutaka, "Formation Process Of Monopoly In Newspapers", 
Shi s o , February 1955, p . 39 and Nomura Hideo, " P o l i t i c a l  Corres- 
pondents In The Old Days" in Gojunin No Shinbunjin ,  Dentsu,
1955, p . 227.
68, One of  the two news agencies ,  Rengo, was e s t a b l i s h e d j in  1926
and jo ined  immediately while the o the r  agency, Dentsu, was a 
founder member of  the new group. I to  Takashi claims t h a t  the  
' r e s p e c t a b i l i t y '  of  the  newspaper e d i to r s  was enhanced by the 
es tabl ishment  of  the New Japan All iance  whose members included 
the e d i t o r s ,  the younger members o f  the House o f  Peers and some 
top o f f i c i a l s  o f  the Home M inis t ry .  The jo in ing  o f  such noted 
schola rs  as Yoshino Sakuzo and Oyama Ikuo with TA, according
to  him, a lso  worked to  t h i s  end. See I to  TakasTn", o p . c i t . ,  
p . 435.
69. I to  Masanori,  1933, p p .73-74.
70. No newspaper condemned the  government in the leade r  concerning
t h i s  i s su e .
71, Kitagawa Kazuo, "Towards The Unity Of Newspaper And News Agency
Correspondents: Mainly On The Correspondents ' Clubs", Chuokoron,
June 1931, pp .284-285. The Home Min is t ry  did issue  an apology
to the 21st  Day Club, but t h i s  was, according to  Kitagawa, 
nothing more than to  calm down the anger of the r e p o r t e r s .
The execut ives  o f  the 'bourgeo is '  newspapers,  he contended,
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(71.)  had 'shaken hands' with the Minseito government 'a s  a token 
o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  co o pera t ion1.
72. This point  wil l  be discussed l a t e r .
73. I to  Takashi ,  o p . c i t , ,  p,441. By 1934 when the second London 
naval conference was taken up by the p re s s ,  the 21st Day Club 
was 'c o n su l ted '  by the two serv ice  M in i s t r i e s ,  the Home and 
the Foreign M in i s t r i e s ,  but i t s  opinion was t o t a l l y  ignored. 
See Ono Hideo, o p . c i t . ,  1955, p p .113-114,
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1. Some FMA f i l e s  contain  the copies of  these te legrams.
2. This conference opened on 27 August 1927.
3. FMA, B,10 ,9 .0 .11 ,  document No,15. For the press  debate on 
t h i s  s u b je c t ,  see fo r  example, TN^ , 27 and 28 Ju ly  1927.
4. For ac tua l  examples o f  these  ' c enso red1 te legrams,  see TA
and TN, 30 May-31 Ju ly  1927, p . 2, —
5. Yoshino Sakuzo, "On The China Expedit ion",  Chuokoron, August 
1927, p . 12. Yoshino quoted his f r iends  in the newspapers 
complaining t h a t  they had been warned of  heavy punishment i f  
they def ied  the government order  to  p resen t  the telegrams in 
t h i s  way. See a lso  Yamakawa H i tosh i ,  "Change Of Government, 
P a r t i e s  and Expedit ion",  Kaizo, Ju ly  1927, pp .68-76.
6 . Uchida Shinya, Fusetsu Gojunen, J i t sugyo  no Nihonsha, 1951,
2nd e d i t i o n ,  p p .132-133. See a l so  Furuno Inosuke, Shinbun 
Tsushin Chosakai, 1970, p . 171. This in c id en t  took place during 
the Sino-Japanese b a t t l e  in Shanghai towards the  end of .January  
1932 and Iwanaga bare ly  escaped punishment.
7. For the number of  telegrams 'r ece ived  somewhere', see Tables 
XIII -  XV (Appendi^ pp. 3o £ - 3 lo;>
8 . FMA, A,3 .5 .1 .1 0 ,  Cable No.52, Des, No.481.
9. FMA, A.3 .5 .0 .1 0 ,  Des, No.650. Also see Hayashi Kyujiro, _
Manshujihen to  Hoten S o r y o j i : Hayashi Kyujiro~ Iko , Harashobo,
1978, p . 48. In Manchuria where Japan was considered to hold
a ' s p ec ia l  s t a t u s ' ,  p ress  control  imposed upon the Japanese 
correspondents  and the  Japanese-owned newspapers tended to  
be harsher  than in o th e r  p a r t s  of  China o r  in Japan,  and the 
a u th o r i ty  d i r e c t l y  in charge of  i t  was the Kwantung Government 
General,  For t h i s ,  see Ishikawa Junkichi ( e d . ) ,  Kokka Sodoinho, 
Vol.IV, Kokka Sodoinho KankQkai, 1975, pp .3-75.
10. FMA, A.3 .5 .1 ,1 0 ,  Des. No.52, from Hayashi to  Tanaka, 19 March 
1929. See a lso  Des. No.481, from Tanaka to  Hayashi, 17 May 1929.
11. FMA, A.3 .5 .0 .1 0 ,  Des, No. 65, Tanaka to Hori . The t h i r d  par ty  
unmentioned in t h i s  passage was the  Communications Minis try  
and t h i s  m a t te r  was reported  in ,  fo r  example, FN, 9 January 
1929, p . l .
12. Jap an 's  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in the F i r s t  World War was l a rg e ly  con­
f ined  to  Shantung where Germany had held some important conces­
sions including the naval base a t  Tsingtao,  The t rea tment  of 
war correspondents  by the  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  had been
- 256 -
CHAPTER VI
(12,)  r e g re t t e d  by many and, u n t i l  the Russo-Japanese War, the r e p o r t ­
e r s  had been c l a s s i f i e d  in the same category as c a t t l e .  The 
f i r s t  legal r egu la t ions  concerning these  correspondents  came 
in to  force  during the Russo-Japanese War thanks l a rg e ly  to  the 
p a r t i c ip a t i o n  of  t h e i r  col leagues  from overseas ,  but the s i t u ­
a t io n  had c h a n g e d l i t t l e  when the S iberian  expedi t ion  took place .  
Among the  most notable  former correspondents  who subsequently 
became the  executive members of  the newspapers was Okuno Shin- 
t a r o  o f  the Osaka Mainichi-TN. For the d e t a i l s  of  these  a sp e c t s ,  
see Maruyama Kanji,  "On TheUar  Correspondents" ,  Kaizo,
December 1937, pp .266-270.
13. Dentsu Shash i , Nihondenpotsushinsha, 1938, p . 821.
14. See fo r  example, Army Minis try  Archives ( h e r e in a f t e r  AMA),
Mitsu D ain ikki , 1929, V o l . I ,  Des. No.107 from Ono Toyoshi, 
the commander of  the  17th D ivis ion ,  to Army M inis ter  Ugaki,
7 March 1924. This despatch was e n t i t l e d  "Notes On the 
Planning And Prepara t ion  For Expeditions In Case Of Catas­
trophe And Disturbance."
15. FMA, A . l .1 .0 .2 -17 .  The t roops  came from Kumamoto which was 
the headquarters  of  the 6th Divis ion,  FW was publ ished in the 
neighbouring Fukuoka p re fec tu re  and s t ro n g ly  supported the 
ex ped i t ion ,  as noted in Chapter I I I .
16. See fo r  example, TA, TN^ and FN, 4-15 May 1928, pp. l  and 2.
17. Mainichi Shinbun Hyakunenshi, 1972, p . 155.
18. TA, 6 and 7 May 1928, p . 2, r e sp ec t iv e ly .
19. The c a p i t a l i s e d  p a r t  was in Gothic as well as much la rg e r
types .  TN, 4 May 1928, p . 2. On the  f in a l  account re leased  
by the government a few days l a t e r ,  l e s s  than t h i r t y  had been 
k i l l e d .
20. Oba Keishu had w r i t t en  on th is  score in Nihon oyobi Nihonjin 
(Seikyosha, 1 May 1920, pp .24-25);
Those who have observed the s i t u a t i o n  im p a r t i a l ly  can 
e a s i l y  see how c r e d i t a b l e  the so -c a l le d  ' rece ived  a t  
the Army M in is t ry '  telegrams a re .  Our s tupid  newspapers 
today which haveno f ixed views, however, have been 
t r e a t i n g  such m i l i t a r y  propaganda telegrams from S ibe r ia  
as i f  they were so precious .  With a l i t t l e  more shrewd 
observa t ion ,  the readers  should be ab le  to discover  
t h a t  the re  are  some re p o r t e r s  in S ibe r ia  who have 
become devoted admirers of  the m i l i t a r y  propaganda.
21. FMA, A . l .1 .0 .2 -1 7 ,  Des. No.700, Minis ter  Yoshizawa to Tanaka,
21 May 1928,
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22. AMA, Riku Shi Mitsu , No.11, "Detai led Reports Of The Actions 
in the Seventh Year of  Showa.", pp .802-803,
23. FMA, A, 1 .1 ,2 -5 ,  Des. No.22, from Consul Tamura in Chicago to 
Tanaka, 10 May 1928. See a lso  AMA, Riku Shi Mitsu, No. I I ,  
booklet  c a l le d  "Enforcement Report Concerning Propaganda And 
S tra tegy" .
24. FMA, A.1 .1 .0 .2 -1 9 ,  Des. No,54,
25. TA evening e d i t i o n ,  10 May 1928, p . l .
26. AMA, Showa Sannendo Riku Shi Mitsu Dainikki ,  p p .710-715 and 
779-7W .
27. AMA, i b i d . ,  p p .741-742.
28. W. F l e i s h e r ,  Volcanic I s l e , Jonathan Cape, London, 1942, p . 183.
29. The e f f i c i e n c y  of  the bureau was however, ques tioned by various  
c r i t i c s  even before the Mukden inc iden t  in 1931. See Shimaya 
Ryosuke, Shin J id a i  no Shinbun, Etsuzando, 1926, p . l 53.
30. This poin t  wil l  be c l a r i f i e d  l a t e r  in t h i s  chapter .
31. See Hochi Shinbun, 19 January 1929, p . 2.
32. FMA, A.3 . 6 .0 . 3 ,  Des. No.82, from Yata to  The Head of  the 
Information Bureau, 22 January 1929. See a lso  Des. No.44 in the 
same f i l e .
33. FMA, i b i d . ,  Des. No,178, from Yata to Shidehara. The company
motto of  Dentsu was, "Do not despatch a f a l s e  te legram, but make 
sure o f  i t s  accuracy before sending ou t" .  See Nakane Sakae, 
Shinbun Sanjunen, Sogabo, 1936, p,229.
34. FMA, A.3 .6 .0 .2 - 1 ,  Des. No. 294, from Hori to  Tanaka, 28 March
1929. Dentsu claimed the death casu a l ty  f igu re  of  the Japanese 
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FN, 4 - 1 5  May 1928, pp.! and 2,
35. FMA, A.3 ,6 .0 .3 ,  Des. No.238, from Hori to  Tanaka,
36. FMA, A,3 .6 .0 ,2 - 1 ,  Des. No.955, from Hayashi to Tanaka. This
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to  Tanaka.
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of  the  Foreign M inis t ry ,  The Chinese-owned Chinese language 
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the en t ry  o f  3,000 p la in -c lo th e d  Chinese s o ld ie r s  to  Dairen 
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have been required  fo r  such a la rge  sca le  o pera t ion ,  which 
should have made i t  impossible fo r  the  s o ld e i r s  to  land
' s e c r e t l y '  as had been reported .
39. Goto Chotaro, "A t t i tudes  Of The Japanese Who Are Unskilful 
In China Diplomacy", Gaikoj iho,  No.571, 15 September 1928, 
p,123. A
40. FMA, A.3 .5 .0 -1 1 ,  Des.No.1259, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara.
41. FMA, i b i d . ,  Des.No.1443, from Shigemitsu to  Shidehara.
42. AMA, Mitsu Dain ikk i , 1929, V o l . I ,  " In s t ru c t io n s  From The Head
Of The M il i t a ry  A f fa i r s  Sect ion To The Off ice rs  And I n te l l ig e n c e  
O ff icers  Attached To The Legation In China", dated 17 August
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43. FMA, A.3 .5 .0 -1 1 ,  Des.No.1443, from Shigemitsu to Shidehara.
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46. FMA, A,3 .5 .0 .1 0 ,  Des.No.509.
47. TA, 7 Ju ly  1930, p . 2.
48. FMA, A 3 .5 .0 .10 ,  Des.No.720.
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53. I b i d .
54. FMA, A,1.1 .0 .1 -1 3 ,  Des,No,24, from Shigemitsu to  Shidehara;
Des.Nos, 30 and 40, from Hayashi to  Shidehara dated 18 and 22 
January r e s p e c t iv e ly ;  Des,No.614, from Hayashi to  Shidehara,
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55. See f o r  example FN, 16 January 1931, evening e d i t i o n ,  p . l .
56. TA, 24 January 1931, This l eader  was s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i re c ted  
a t  the ' r a i lw ay  n e g o t i a t io n s '  which was conducted in s t r i c t  
secrecy between Chang Hsueh-liang and the South Manchuria 
Railways.
57. FMA, A . l .1 .0 .1 -1 3 ,  Des.No.71. See a lso  Des.No. 102 in the same
f i l e ,  from Hayashi to  Shidehara dated 16 February 1931. The
l a t t e r  claimed t h a t  the Japanese language newspapers a t  Mukden 
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59. See fo r  example TA and TN, 3 March 1931, evening e d i t i o n ,  p . l .
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from Shigemitsu to Shidehara. See a lso  FMA, A.3 .6 .0 .3 ,  Des.No. 
368, from Shigemitsu to  Shidehara dated 7 April 1931.
61. See fo r  example, TA, 6 April  1931, p . 2,
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62. TA, fo r  example, wrote a leader  on t h i s  su b jec t  condemning 
tFe Chinese government. See TA, 15 April  1931.
63. FMA, A,3 . 6 ,0 , 3 ,  Des.No,405. On 20 A p r i l ,  Shigemitsu reported  
to  Shidehara t h a t  the E n g l f s h  language newspaper, the China 
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before s ince  i t s  a c q u i s i t io n  of  the ’domestic only '  news 
agency, Teikoku Tsushinsha, in March 1929. For the d e t a i l e d  
account ,  see Furuno Inosuke, p p .160-166. Hajima, p . 16, c i t e s  
t h a t  in 1927, Dentsu had c i r c a  650 c l i e n t s  while Rengo had 350 
approximately.
64. For the  press  accounts of  the  continuing c o n f l i c t  between the 
two p a r t i e s ,  see TA, 2 May 1931, p . 2 and 5 May 1931, evening 
e d i t i o n ,  p . l  e t c .
65. For the d e ta i l e d  account of  the Japanese a t t i t u d e s  towards 
the Korean immigrants,  see Lytton Report,  pp .61-63. For the 
' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n '  o f  t h i s  i s s u e ,  see FMA, A.1 .1 .0 .2 0 -3 ,
Vol.VII,  Des. No.2951, from the Head of  the Police  Bureau of  
the Kwantung Government General to  Shidehara, dated 11 Ju ly
1931. The overreac t ion  by the Army to t h i s  inc iden t  and the  
following Nakamura inc iden t  led even the Emperor to  summon 
the Prime M in is te r  fo r  ques t ion ing .  See Yabe T e i j i  ( e d . ) ,
Konoe Ayamaro, Kobundo, 1952, p . 194.
66. FN, 13 Ju ly  1931, See a lso  TA and TN, 7 Ju ly  1931 fo r  s im i la r
opin ions .  A.M. Young who was the  eHTtor o f  the  English language 
newspaper, the Japan Chronicle ,  published in Kobe a t  the t ime,  
confirms the ’s e n s a t i o n a l i s a t i o n '  of  the i n i t i a l  i s s u e ,  but 
does not mention i t s  i ro n ic a l  e f f e c t .  See A.M. Young, Imperial 
Japan: 1926-1938, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1938, p p .74-75.
67. The In te l l ig e n c e  Office  of  the Kirin Province was quoted by 
the Japanese consula tes  a t  Kirin and Mukden to  have n o t i f i e d  
i t s  e n t i r e  po l ice  fo rces  t h a t  the  k i l l i n g  of any Japanese 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f f i c e r  could be c a r r i e d  out as ’s e l f - d e f e n c e ' .
See FMA, D.2 .6 ,0 ,3 2 ,  Des,No.892, from Consul General a t  Chientao, 
Okada, to  Shidehara,  29 August 1930,
68. Mori Katsumi, o p . c i t . ,  p . 54. The ‘informal advice '  was prompted, 
according to Mori, because of  the publ ica t ion  of  a telegram
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from the South Manchuria Railways, For the  i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  by
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(68.)  the  Foreign Minis t ry  to prevent  the leak o f  t h i s  news, see
FMA, D.2 .6 ,0 .3 2 ,  Des.No.301, from Council lor  Yano to  Shidehara,
24 Ju ly  1931; No,429, from Shidehara to Hayasht,  25 Ju ly  1931; 
No,486, from Hayasht to  Shidehara,  31 Ju ly  1931 e tc .
69. TA, 5 August 1931, p ,2 ,  As to  the c r i t i c i s m  of  the Army’s 
retrenchment p lan ,  see TA, 18 June 1931; "Issue Of C iv i l ian  
M in is te rs  For the Service M in i s t r i e s " ,  Kaizo, August 1931 e t c .  
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from an army o f f i c e r  who regarded i t  as a ' t r i a l  in absence'  
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the meeting, Ogata in tu rn  made ' th e  l a s t  d i r e c t  plea by a 
newspaper e d i t o r  to  the Army Minister* before the Second World 
War fo r  his  reassurance not  to  r e s o r t  to  such extreme means.
See Ogata, "Ardent Wish Of An Old So ld ie r :  Freedom Of Speech
Is  Everything", Bungeishunju, ex t ra  e d i t i o n ,  December 1953,
pp .27-28, See a l so  Asahi Shinbun no Kyujunen, Asahishinbunsha, 
1969, p p .359-361, For the ac tua l  comments by the p a r t i c ip a n t s  
of  the symposium, see TA, 16 May 1931 e tc .
70. Harada Kumao, o p . c i t . ,  oral  sta tement on 7 August 1931, p p .18-19.
71. The l a s t  examples which defended the 'Shidehara Diplomacy' were 
Matsumoto Tadao, "Inquiry  Into The Essence Of The Shidehara 
Diplomacy", Gaikoj iho , No.627, 15 January 1931, p . 104; Sotomatsu 
Moa, "Forceful Dipkomacy Or Weak Diplomacy?", Kokusaichish ik i , 
March 1931, p . 19 e t c .
72. See fo r  example, Hashimoto Masukichi,  "Consequence Of The Man­
chur ia  And Mongolia I ssue" ,  Gaikojiho, No,632, April 1931,^_  __
p . 78 and "Chinese S i tu a t io n  And Our National P o l icy" ,  Gaikoj iho , 
No.642, 1 September 1931, p ,22;  Sato Yonosuke, "MistaT<en 
Manchuria P o l icy" ,  Gaikoj iho, No.627, 15 January 1931, p p .36-
48 and "Observation For The Sett lement Of The Manchuria And 
Mongolia I ssue" ,  Gaikoj iho , No.641, 15 August 1931, pp .87-98 
e t c .
73. FMA, A . l ,1 ,0 .1 -1 3 -1 ,  Des.No.135, from the Consul General a t
Hankow, Sakane, to Shidehara,  17 February 1931. This was 
important because the r e l a t i v e  importance of  the c h ie f  e d i to r  
within  the e d i t o r i a l  department had been s t e a d i l y  dec l in ing  
and t h a t  of  the heads of  the subdivis ions  increas ing  in pro­
por t ion  to  the growing degree of commercialization of  the news­
papers ,  TA had e ig h t  sec t ions  within the department including 
China, fore ign a f f a i r s ,  economics and p o l i t i c s  in 1928. For 
these  see Ogawa Setsu ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 23 and Niinobe Shuzo, Asahi 
no Bucho San: Asahi Shinbun o Okoshita H i tob i to ,  Harashobff,
1972, p . 3.
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74. TN^  6 August 1931, See a l so  TA, 5 and 6 August 1931,
75. Sasa Hiroo, *Sino-Japanese C r i s i s  Near*, Kaizo, October 1931,
p,143. See a l so  *Ref lect ion On The Manchuria And Mongolia 
Issue* ,  Chuokoron, October 1931,
76. See fo r  example, TA, TN^and FN, 18 August -  5 September 1931, 
pp. l  and 2.
77. Sasa,  Kaizo, October 1931, p,143.
78. Royama Masamichi, "Aggravation Of The Manchuria And Mongolia
I s su e ’1, Chuokoron, October 1931, p.111.
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"Changing Manchuria And Mongolia Po l icy" ,  Chuokoron? August 
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a 'c ru s a d e r '  o f  Japanese diplomacy and began to advocate the 
employment of  actual  force  to ' rescue  the Chinese p e o p le ' .
See Hanzawa, "Uneasy Sino-Japanese Re la t ionsh ip" ,  Gaikoj iho , 
No.642, 1 September 1931, p . 3. Gaikbj iho’s ' l e a d e r '  column 
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80. Yabe T e i j i  ( e d . ) ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p .191-193; Kido Koichi,  o p . c i t . ,  
p . 89; Ogata Taketora,  Bungeishunjfl, Dec.1953, pp .27-28 e t c .  
Ogata, Takaishi and Iwanaga Yukichi of  Rengo were in v i ted  by 
some o f  the top Army o f f i c i a l s  to d iscuss  the press  a t t i t u d e s  
towards the Manchuria issue  and Ogata expressed his s t e a d f a s t  
opposi t ion  to any hasty m i l i t a r y  adventurism a t  the meeting in 
c o n t r a s t  to  T a k a i sh i ‘s w i l l ingness  to support the Army's 
Manchuria po l icy .
81. TN, 5 September 1931. For a s im i la r  view by FN, see FN^,
TT September 1931.
82. FMA, D.2 .6 ,0 .3 2 ,  the Army S ta f f  l e a f l e t  e n t i t l e d ,  "Summary
Of The Captain Nakamura In c id en t" ,  preface .
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Shidehara,  6 September 1931.
84. FMA, D.2 .6 .0 .3 2 ,  Des. No.190, from Shidehara to Hayashi.
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1. The s t a f f  of  these  telecommunication o f f i c e s  were not allowed
to send any telegrams except  those re leased  through Major 
Mftani of  the Kwantung Army fo r  the f i r s t  two days and to  
have ignored th f s  o rder  would have r e su l t e d  in death .  See 
Mort Katsumi, o p . c i t , ,  p,85. See a lso  FMA, A,1 .1 ,0 ,2 1 ,  Des.
No,113, from Consul a t  Chanchung Tashiro to  Shidehara,  22 
September 1931, Correspondents in oth e r  areas  of  China on
the  o the r  hand were refused access  to telecommunication by
the  Chinese government fo r  a t  l e a s t  a few weeks a f t e r  the  Mukden 
in c id e n t .  See FMA, A,1 ,1 .0 .2 1 -4 -4 ,  Des.No,1357, from Shigemitsu 
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2. Quoted in Imai Yukihiko, Tsushinsha, Chuokoronsha, 1973,
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APPENDIX
Table I .  'L e t t e r s  To The Editor*
Number of  L e t te r s Number of  Le t te r s Published
Received by Tesso ( In te rn a t io n a l  I ssues)
Total From Tokyo TA TN FN
1930
\
January 32 21
February 33 12
March 28 26
April 29 16
May 28 6
June 32 (1) 27 (1)
Ju ly 32 (1) 27
August 33 (1) 25
September 30 21
October 34 (1) 23 30
November 25 17 38 (1)
December 25 14 52
1931
January 37 17 35
February 30 23 35
March 32 27 34
April 28 (2 ) 24 41
May 514 29 21 34
June 310 27 0 41
Ju ly 281 29 (1) 0 36 (1)
August 391 28 0 30 (2)
September 521 365 30 (1) 0 26
October 421 286 25 (1) 0 24 (1)
November 410 274 25 (6 ) 0 10 (4)
December 368 237 23 0 10 ( 1 )
1932
January 389 260 26 ( 1 ) 0 8
February 473 289 21 (1 ) 0 10 ( 1 )
March 445 260 27 0 14
(Continued)
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TABLE I (Cont.)
Number of  L e t te r s  Number o f  L e t te r s  Published 
Received by Tess7 ( In te rn a t io n a l  Issues)
Total From Tokyo TA TN FN
1932
Apri 1 504 307 26 ( 1 ) 0 19
May 592 405 26 36 13 (1)
June 625 331 26 48 20
Ju ly 448 293 25 43 11
August 468 315 26 24 20
September 452 281 24 41 16
October 351 264 26 40 18
November 338 209 27 * 34 19
December 305 198 22 36 16
1933
January 272 161 26 42 11
February 342 202 24 41 5
March 487 295 29 (2) 33 8
Note 1: Ie&sIL f igures  fo r  -To ta l1 and 'From Tokyo1 come from the monthly 
summary published in the column.
Note 2: Number of  published l e t t e r s  are  counted by the author.
Note 3: Figures in the brackets  in d ic a te  the number of  l e t t e r s  which 
d iscussed ' i n t e r n a t io n a l  iss.ues*, i . e .  any l e t t e r  which 
touched on m atters  r e l a t e d  to  diplomat ic i s su es .
Note 4: The t o t a l  number o f  l e t t e r s  published in Tesso was 395, 367 and 
374 in 1927, 1928 and 1929 r e sp e c t iv e ly ,  making the average 
monthly f ig u re  32.92, 30.58 and 31.17. For Tsunobue (TN), 
the  corresponding f igu res  were 265, 251, 243 and 22.08, 20.92,  
20.25.
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TABLE I I  Disarmament, Kellogg-Briand Pact and Contr ibutors
Geneva Kellogg^Briand London Total
(1927) (1930)
GaikojihS
SAKAMOTO Shuntoku 6 2 3 11
OZAKI Go 0 0 9 9
0KAM0T0 Tsurumatsu 3 2 3 8
INAHARA Katsuji 1 1 5 7
SHINOBU Junpei 0 5 2 7
YANAGISAWA Shinnosuke 4 2 1 7
HONDA Kumataro 1 1 4 6
ISHIMARU Tota 4 0 2 6
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu 0 3 3 6
MATASUBARA Kazuo 1 3 1 5
YASUTOMI Shozo 0 0 5 5
MATSUNAMI J in i c h i r o 0 0 4 4
TACHI Sakutarff 0 4 0 4
MACHIDA Shiro 1 2 0 3
NINAGAWA Shin 0 1 2 3
OYAMA Ujiro 0 0 3 3
YONEDA Minoru 1 0 2 3
AOKI Setsuichi 0 2 0 2
HIROSE Hikota 0 0 2 2
SEKINE Gunpei 0 0 2 2
TAKAHASHI Seizaburo 0 1 1 2
YAMAKAWA Tadao 0 2 0 2
Others (once each) 6 13 41 60
Total 28 44 95 167
Kokusaichishiki
TAGAWA Daikichiro 1 1 9 11
ISHIMARU Tota 2 0 8 10
MATSUSHITA Yoshio 0 0 4 4
MIZUNO Kotoku 2 0 1 3
SHINOBU Junpei 1 2 0 3
TAKAHASHI SeizaburO 0 0 3 3
YAMAKAWA Tadao 0 2 1 3
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu 0 2 0 2
KIYOSAWA Kiyoshi 0 1 1 2
0KAM0T0 Tsurumatsu 0 1 1 2
ROYAMA Masamichi 0 2 0 2
TERASHIMA Shigenobu 1 0 1 2
YASUTOMI Shozo 0 0 2 2
Others (once each) 3 5 8 16
Total 10 16 39 65
— ----------
(Continued)
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TABLE I I  (Continued)
Geneva
(1927)
Kellogg-Briand London
(1930)
Total
ChOokoron
MIZUNO Kotoku 3 0 1 4
KIHOSAWA Kihoshi 1 0 2 3
Y0SHIN0 Sakuzo 1 0 2 3
ITO Masanori 0 0 2 2
Others (once each) 7 2 8 17
— — — ■ ■
Total 12 2 15 29
Kaizo
TAKAHASHI Kamekichi 2 0 0 2
YASUTOMI Shozo 0 0 2 2
Others (once each) 0 2 14 16
— — — --------
Total 2 2 16 20
— — — —
TABLE I I I  Number of  Pub l ica t ions  Banned From Sale and D is t r ibu t ion
Year Total According to 
Newspaper Law
According to  
Publ ica t ion  Law
1925 947 175 (18.5%) 772 (81.5%)
1926 1,334 295 (22.1%) 1,039 (77.9%)
1927 1,582 355 (22.4%) 1,227 (77.6%)
1928 1,178 389 (33.0%) 789 (67.0%)
1929 1,589 442 (27.8%) 1,147 (72.2%)
1930 2,461 539 (21.9%) 1,922 (78.1%)
1931 3,451 876 (25.4%) 2,575 (74.6%)
1932 5,803 2,246 (38.7%) 3,557 (61.3%)
1933 4,877 1,733 (35.5%) 3,144 (64.5%)
1934 2,260 1,185 (52.4%) 1,075 (47.6%)
Total 25,482 8,235 (32.3%) 17,247 (67.7%)
Note: Reconstructed from Uchikawa Yoshimi ( e d . ) ,  Gendaishi Shiryo ,
Vol .40, Misuzu Shobo, Tokyo, 1973, p . 366.
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TABLE IV Number of  Pub l ica t ions  Banned From Sale and D is t r ibu t ion
Year Total 'Disturbance of  'Corruption of
Peace and Order'  Publ ic Morals'
1925 947 225 (23.8%) 722 (76.2%)
1926 1,334 412 (30.1%) 922 (69.9%)
1927 1,582 547 (34.6%) 1,035 (65.4%)
1928 1,178 829 (70.4%) 349 (29.6%)
1929 1,589 1,309 (82.4%) 280 (17.6%)
1930 2,465 (s ic ) 2,171 (88.1%) 294 (11.9%)
1931 3,451 3,075 (89.1%) 376 (10.9%)
1932 5,803 4,945 (85.2%) 858 (14.8%)
1933 4,876 ( s ic ) 4,008 (82.2%) 868 (17.8%)
1934 2,260 1,702 (75.2%) 558 (24.7%)
Total 25,485 ( s ic ) 29,223 (75.4%) 6,262 (24.6%)
Note 1: Reconstructed from i b i d . ,  p . 367.
Note 2: According to Showa Shichinen ni okeru Shuppan Kenetsu 
GaikyS publ ished  by the Pol ice  Bureau, p . 30, the number 
o f  p u b l ica t ions  banned fo r  'd i s tu rb in g  peace and o rd e r '  
was 158 in  1922, followed by a ' temporary decrease '  
between 1923 and 1925,
TABLE V Number of  Pub l ica t ions  Banned From Sale and D is t r ibu t ion  
According to  the Newspaper Law
Year Total 'Disturbance of  'Corruption of
Peace and Order ' Public Morals'
1925 175 154 (88.0%) 21 (12.0%)
1926 295 251 (85.1%) 44 (14.9%)
1927 355 331 (93.2%) 24 ( 6.8%)
1928 389 345 (88.7%) 44 (11.3%)
1929 442 374 (84,6%) 68 (15.6%)
1930 543 504 (92.8%) 39 ( 7.2%)
1931 881 832 (94.4%) 49 ( 5.6%)
1932 2,246 2,081 (92.7%) 165 ( 7.3%)
1933 1,732 1,531 (88.4%) 201 (11.6%)
1934 1,185 989 (83.5%) 196 (16.5%)
Total 8,243 7,392 (89,7%) 851 (10.3%)
Note: Reconstructed from Uchikawa Yoshimi (ed .)  Gendaishi Shiryo
e t c . ,  p . 373.
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TABLE VI Number of  Publ ica t ions  Banned From Sale and D is t r ibu t ion
According to  the Newspaper Law
Month 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
January 5 1 31 17 26 206(5) 124
February 2 1 37 38(4) 31 269 148
March 13 1 34 27 30 245(12) 191(2)
Apri 1 24(1) 4 47 51 28 176 145(1)
May 17 6 32 64(2) 32 192(9) 222(2)
June 14 8(5) 36 38 41 100(2) 140
Ju ly 0 22 43 37(1) 64 200
August 0 7 24 38 53 132
September 0 21 23 36 78(3) 184(8)
October 0 25 32 45 118(3) 182(4)
November 2 21(1) 19 120(4) 246(10) 136(2)
December 6 30 17 46 112 117(1)
Total 83(1) 147(6) 375(0) 557(11) 859(16) 2,139(43)
Note 1: Reconstructed from Odagiri Hideo, Showa Shoseki
Zasshi Shinbun Hakkin Nenpyo, Meijibunken, Tokyo, 1965, 
Vol.1.  Figures quoted by Odagiri a re  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ­
r en t  from those in Uchikawa although the sources used 
by them are  the  same, i . e .  Shuppan Keisatsuho and 
Shuppan Keisatsu Gaikan which were the in t e rn a l  c i r c u ­
l a r s  of  the Police Bureau.
Note 2: Figures in the brackets  show the number of  t imes on
which the e ig h t  b igges t  newspapers were banned.
They were the Asahi of  Tokyo and Osaka, the Tokyo 
N ic h in ic h i , the Osaka Mainichi , Hochishinbun,
ChUgai Shbgyo Shinpo, Kokuminshinbun, and J i j i s h i n p o .
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TABLE VII Sale and D is t r ib u t io n  Ban Placed on the Eight Major
Metropoli tan Newspapers
Total 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933*
Morning Edi t ion 60(31) 0 6 0 6 12(11) 31 (18) 5(2)
Evening Edi t ion 10(2) 0 0 0 5 U D 4(1) 0
Extra Edit ion 12(7) 1 0 0 0 3(3) 8(4) 0
Total 82(40) 1 1 0 11 16(15) 43(23) 5(2)
Note 1: Figures  in the  brackets  in d ic a te  the occasions on which the
e ig h t  newspapers (see Table VI, Note 2) were subjec ted  to  
t h i s  t rea tment  because t h e i r  content  concerned e i t h e r  the 
diplomat ic or  m i l i t a r y  matters  which had been banned.
Note 2: * denotes t h a t  the f ig u res  a re  only up to  June 1933.
TABLE VIII Sale and D is t r ib u t io n  Ban Placed on the Tokyo Asahi,  the 
Tokyo Nichinichi  and the Fukuoka Nichinichi
Total 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933*
Tokyo Asahi 8(5) 0 1 0 2 2 (2) 3(2) 1(1)
Tokyo Nichinichi 7(5) 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 6(4) 0
Fukuoka Nichinichi 9(8) 0 1 0 0 3(3) 4(4) KD
Re. As in Table VII
TABLE IX Number o f  Suspended Matters Imposed on Newspapers and Journals
Total By Order By Warning By Informal Advice
1931 11 3 7 1
1932 64 44 19 1
From: Showa Shichinen ni okeru Shuppan Kenetsu Gaikyo, p p .69-74
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TABLE X Content Analysis o f  the 64 Matters in Table IX and the Sale Ban 
Placed on the Publ ica t ion  o f  These Matters
Number o f  Number of  Banned
Suspended Matters Cases______
Manchuri a-Mongoli a 27 259
Shanghai Inc iden t 14 437
M il i t a ry  Secrets 7 39
May 15 Revolt 1 224
Others 15 121
Total 64 1,080
Note 1: For the source ,  as in Table IX.
Note 2: In 1931, 11 m at ters  and 480 cases  were reported .
TABLE XI Monthly S t a t i s t i c s  o f  the 1,080 Cases Lis ted  in Table X
Month j Manchuria- Shanghai M il i t a ry May 15
Mongolia Inc ident Secre ts Revolt
January 10(1) 0 0 0
February 16(14) 187 0 0
March 19(18) 153 0 0
April 51(20) 3 0 0
May >0 20(5) 0 89
June 18(3) 2 (1) 0 2
Ju ly 14(12) 71(70) 0 0
August 27(27) 0 0 2
September 76(53) 1 0 1
October 24(10) 0 39 0
November 0 0 0 0
December 4(2) 0 0 0
Total 259(160) 437(76) 39 94
Note 1: For the source,  as in Tables IX and X.
Note 2: Figures in the  brackets  in d ic a te  the cases c l a s s i f i e d  as ‘d iplomatic
s e c r e t s ' .  The to t a l  numbers given fo r  'Manchuria-Mongolia' and
Shanghai In c id en t '  show the combined t o t a l s  o f  'd ip lomatic  s e c r e t s '
and ‘m i l i t a r y  s e c r e t s '  as c l a s s i f i e d  in the  same source. The
'M i l i t a ry  S ec re t s '  a t  the  top o f  the t a b le  means those unre la ted  to  these two i s sues .  c i a i e a
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TABLE XII Number o f  Pub l ica t ions  Banned From Sale and D is t r ib u t io n
According to  the Publ ica t ion  Law
Year Total ’Disturbance of  
Peace and Order '
'Corruption of  
Publ ic Morals '
1925 772 71 (9.1%) 701 (90.9%)
1926 1,039 161 (15.5%) 878 (84.5%)
1927 1,227 216 (17.6%) 1,011 (82.4%)
1928 789 484 (61.3%) 305 (38.7%)
1929 1,179 565 (47.9%) 614 (52.1%)
1930 1,922 1,667 (86.7%) 255 (13.3%)
1931 2,518 2,233 (88,7%) 285 (11.3%)
1932 3,609 2,916 (80.8%) 693 (19.2%)
Reconstructed from Hashimoto Motome, Nihon Shuppan Hanbaishi , 
Kodansha, Tokyo, 1964, pp .456-457.
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TABLE XIII: Tokyo Asahi and Telegrams from China
Abbreviat ions: T.A,: Own Correspondents F.M.: Foreign Minis try
A.M.: Army Minis try  N.M.: Navy Ministry
E.:  Evening Issue M.: Morning Issue
u p p l ie r  T.A. Dentsu Rengo 'somewhere' F.M. A.M.& 
\  N.M.
Total
Date
1928
May
May
May
May
May
9 May
10 May
115Total
1931
19 Sept.  (E.
-2a
209Total 119
Note 1: Where the re  i s  only the (M.) s igh ,  the day was Monday, fo r  there  
was no evening issue  p r in ted  on a Sunday. The evening issue  was 
dated one day e a r l i e r  than the day of  s a l e ;  the evening issue  
dated 4 May 1928 was a c tu a l ly  p r in ted  and sold on 3 May 1928.
(Continued on next page).
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TABLE XIV: Tokyo Nichinichi and Telegrams from China
^ ^ S u p p l i e r
Date
T.N. Dentsu Rengo 1 somewhere’ F.M, A.M.&
N.M.
Total
1928
4 May (E. 2 0 0 0 0 1 3
(M. 9 0 2 1 0 0 12
5 May (E, 4 0 1 0 0 0 5
CM. 13 2 0 0 0 0 16
6 May (E. 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
(M. 5 0 2 1 0 0 8
7 May CM. 6 1 1 0 0 0 8
8 May {E. 3 0 4 1 0 0 8
(M. 8 4 4 0 0 0 16
9 May (E. 6 0 1 0 0 0 7
CM. 9 4 5 0 1 0 19
10 May(E. 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
CM. 11 2 3 0 0 1 17
Total 76 13 25 4 1 4 123
1931
19 Sept. CE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(M. 1 6 0 0 0 0 7
20 Sept. (E. 20 5 6 0 0 0 31
(M. 9 2 3 0 0 1 15
21 Sept. (M. 10 3 6 0 0 0 19
22 Sept. (E. 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
(M. 8 6 7 0 0 0 21
23 Sept. (E. 6 2 5 0 0 1 14
CM. 5 1 3 1 0 0 10
24 Sept. (E. 2 1 2 1 0 0 6
CM. 7 3 3 0 0 0 13
25 Sept. (E. 3 2 0 0 0 0 5
(M. 2 1 2 0 0 0 5
Total 74 34 37 2 0 2 149
Abbreviations:  T.N.: Own Correspondent;  fo r the  o th e r s ,  see Table XIII
(Notes continued from p. 308)
Note 2: The abbrev ia t ions  ( p . 308) apply to Tables XIV and XV a l so .
Note 3: As these  two per iods were when the two big even ts ,  i . e .  the
Tsinan Inc ident  and the Mukden In c id en t ,  took p lace ,  these  news­
papers p r in ted  and d i s t r i b u t e d  several ex t ra  e d i t io n s  (gogai).  
These f ree  ex t ra  ed i t io n s  are  not taken in to  account here however.
- 310 -
TABLE X V : Fukuoka Nichinichi and Telegrams from China
Suppl ie r
Date
F.N. Dentsu Rengo 'somewhere' F.M. A.M.&
N.M.
Total
1928
4 May (E.) 0 3 2 1 0 2 8
(M.) 3 4 1 1 0 3 12
5 May (E.) 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
(M.) 0 4 3 0 0 1 8
6 May (E.) 0 6 1 0 0 0 7
(M.) 2 9 1 1 1 0 14
7 May (M.) 1 8 0 1 1 0 11
8 May (E.) 0 6 2 0 0 0 8
(M.) 1 16 5 1 1 0 24
9 May (E.) 0 3 7 0 0 0 10
CM.) 2 10 6 0 1 0 19
10 May (E.) 1 3 0 0 1 0 5
CM.) 2 10 2 0 2 1 17
Total 12 84 32 5 7 7 147
1931
19 S e p t . ( E . ) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
CM.) 0 5 2 0 0 0 7
20 S e p t . (E . ) 0 16 17 0 1 2 36
(M.) 0 19 5 0 0 2 26
21 Sept.CM.) 3 21 12 0 0 0 36
22 Sept.CE.) 0 6 4 0 0 1 11
CM.) 0 5 6 0 0 1 12
23 S e p t . ( E . ) 5 6 15 0 0 0 26
(M.) 0 12 11 1 0 1 25
24 S ep t , (E . ) 1 6 3 0 0 0 10
CM.) 1 9 8 1 0 1 20
25 S ep t . fE . ) 0 11 0 0 0 0 11
(M.) 0 15 9 1 0 0 25
Total 10 131 103 3 1 8 246
Abbreviat ions:  F.N. Own Correspondent
For the o th e r s ,  see Table XIII
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TABLE XVI Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press
Year 1931 1932 1933
Month Sept. J a n . - April J u ly - Oct . - J a n . - Total
-Dec. March -June Sept. Dec. Feb.
American: T.A. 23(23) 12(12) 2(2) 12(10) 12(12) 5(5) 66(64)
T.N. 10(7) 2(2) 0 0 4(4) 3(3) 19(16)
F.N. 5 3 0 5 3 3 19
B r i t i s h :  T.A. 24(12) 18(11) 3(2) 7(3) 17(5) 19(5) 88(38)
T.N. 9(8) 7(5) 5(5) 2 (2) 3(0) 5(0) 31(20)
F.N. 9 19 0 5 12 11 56
French: T.A. 13(9) 2 (0) 1(0) 7(6) 5(5) 11(11) 39(31)
T.N. 3(1) 0 (0) 0 (0) K D 7(1) 3(3) 14(6)
F.N. 7 0 1 0 9 2 19
Others: T.A. 2(0) 2 (1) 3(2) 0 (0) 8(7) 4(1) 19(10)
T.N. 3(0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7(0) 2 (2) 12(2)
F.N. 3 0 2 0 5 5 15
A bbrev ia t ions : T.A. - Tokyo Asahi
T.N. -  Tokyo Nichinichi
F.N. -  Fukuoka Nichinichi
TABLE XVII Journals  Quoted in the Japanese Press
Total American B r i t i sh  French Others
Tokyo Asahi:  212(100%) 66(31.1%) 88(41.5%) 39(18.4%) 19(9%)
Tokyo N ich in ich i :  76(100%) 19(25%) 31(40.8%) 14(18.4%) 12(15.8%)
Fukuoka N ich in ich i :  112(100%) 19(16.9%) 58(51.8%) 19(16.9%) 15(13.4%)
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TABLE XVIII American Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press
Year
Month
1931
Sept.
-Dec.
1932
Jan.
-March
Apri 1 
-June
July
-Sept .
Oct.
-Dec.
1933
Jan.
-Feb. Total
In Tokyo Asahi
N.Y. Times 5(5) 4(4) KD 5(4) 3(3) 2(2) 20(19)
N.Y.H. Tribune 5(5) 4(4) 0 2(2) 4(2) KD 16(14)
N.Y.W. Telegram 2(2) KD 0 1 0 ) 1(1) 0 5(5)
N.Y.E. Post 4(4) 2(2) 0 0 KD 0 7(7)
N.Y. Sun 2(2) 0 0 1(1) 0 0 3(3)
Wash. Post U D 0 0 1(1) 2(2) 1(1) 5(5)
Wash. E. S ta r KD 0 0 0 0 1(1) 2(2)
P h i l .  Record 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 1(1)
Bal . Sun 0 0 0 1 0 0 1(0)
Hearst papers 2(2) 0 1(1) 0 1(1) 0 4(4)
For. A f fa i r s KD KD 0 0 0 0 2(2)
Total 23(23) 12(12) 2(2) 12(10) 12(10) 5(5) 66(62)
In Tokyo Nichinichi
N.Y. Times KD 0 0 0 0 0 KD
N.Y.H. Tribune 2(2) 0 0 0 0 3(3) 5(5)
N.Y.W. Telegram 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 1(1)
N.Y.E. Post 2(2) 0 0 0 KD 0 3(3)
Wash. Post 2(1) 0 0 0 0 0 2(1)
Wash. E. S ta r 1 0 0 0 0 0 1(0)
Wash. News 1 0 0 0 0 0 1(0)
Hearst Papers 0 2(2) 0 0 0 0 2(2)
S e a t t l e  Times 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 KD
J .  of  Commerce 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 1(1)
Harpers Mag. 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 HD
Total 10(7) 2(2) 0 0 4(4) 3(3) 19(16)
(Cont.)
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TABLE XVIII(Continued)
Year 1931 1932 1933
Month Sept.
-Dec.
Jan .
-March
Apri 1 
-June
July.
-Sept .
Oct.
-Dec.
Jan.
-Feb. Total
In Fukuoka Nichinichi
N.Y. Times 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
N.Y.H. Tribune 1 0 0 1 0 1 3
N.Y.W. Telegram 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Wash. Post 2 1 0 1 1 1 6
Wash. E. S ta r 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
Wash. News 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
Phi 1. Record 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
S t .  Louis S ta r 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
S.F. Monitor 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 5 3 0 5 3 3 19
Abbreviat ions:  N.Y. - New York
H. - Herald
W. - World
E. -  Evening
Wash.- Washington 
P h i l . -  Ph i ladelph ia  
Bal . -  Baltimore 
For. -  Foreign 
J .  t -  Journal 
S.F. -  San Francisco 
Mag. -  Magazine
Notes: 1 'Hears t  papers '  were normally r e fe r r e d  to  the newspapers owned
by the  Hearst family.
2 Only those jo u rn a ls  which were s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e fe r r e d  to  in the 
th ree  Japanese newspapers are  l i s t e d  here.
3 Figures in brackets  show the number of  t imes on which the  telegrams 
concerned had been sen t  by the newspapers' own correspondents .  The 
Fukuoka Nichinichi  did not keep i t s  own correspondents  anywhere in 
the  United S ta t e s .
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TABLE XIX British Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press
Year 1931 1932 1933
Month Sept.
-Dec.
Jan.
-March
A p r i l -
June
July
-Sept .
Oct.
-Dec.
Jan.
-Feb. Total
In Tokyo Asahi
Times 5(3) 3(2) KD 2 2 (1) 5(5) 18(12)
D. Mail 2 (1) 2 (2) 0 1(1) 4(1) 2 11(5)
D. Telegraph 3(1) 3(1) 0 0 KD 2 9(3)
Morning Post 0 2 (1) 1 KD 0 1 5(2)
Observer 3 0 0 0 1 2 6 (0)
D. Express 1 2 (1) 0 1(1) 0 1 5(2)
S. Times 2 1 0 0 1 0 4(0)
News Chronicle 4(2) 2 (2) 0 1 2 2 11(4)
D. Herald 0 1(1) 0 0 3(1) 1 5(2)
M. Guardian HD 1 (1) 0 1 0 0 3(2)
Sat .  Review KD 0 0 0 0 0 1(1)
Spec ta to r KD 0 0 0 0 1 2 (1)
W. End Review 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 1(1)
E. News 0 0 0 0 1 0 1(0)
19th Century 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 1(1)
S. Despatch 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 1 (1)
E. Standard 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0)
D. Mirror 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0)
A. Quarter ly 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 (0)
Total 24(11) 18(11) 3(2) 7(3) 16(5) 19(5) 87(37)
Abbreviat ions:  D.
S.
M.
Sat .
W.
E.
A.
-  Daily
-  Sunday
- Manchester
-  Saturday
- Week
- Evening
- Army
(Continued)
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TABLE XIX (Continued)
Year 1931 1932 1933
Month Sept. J a n . -
March
April
-June
Ju ly
-Sept.
Oct.
-Dec.
J a n . -
Feb. Total
In Tokyo Nichinichi
Times 0 1 KD KD 1 1 5(2)
D. Mail 2 (2) HD 0 0 0 2 5(3)
D. Telegraph 1 0 ) 1 0 ) 2 (2) 0 0 0 4(4)
Morning Post KD 2 (1) 0 0 1 1 5(2)
Observer 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0)
D. Express 2 (2) HD 1(1) 0 0 0 4(4)
S. Times 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 (0)
News Chronicle 2 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 2 (2)
D. Herald 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
M. Guardian 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 0 KD
Sat .  Review 0 0 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1)
Total 9(8) 7(5) 5(5) 2 (2) 3(0) 5(0) 31(20)
In Fukuoka Nichinichi  
Times 2 3 0 1 5 2 13
D. Mail 2 1 0 0 0 3 6
D. Telegraph 1 2 0 1 1 2 7
Morning Post 1 5 0 0 1 4 11
Observer 0 3 0 1 1 0 5
D. Express 1 3 0 0 0 1 5
S. Times 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
News Chronicle 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
D. Herald 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
M. Guardian 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Sat.  Review 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
'Star* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 9 19 0 4 11 13 56
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TABLE XX French and Other Journals Quoted in the Japanese Press
Year
Month
1931
Sept.
-Dec.
1932
Jan.-
March
April
-June
July-
Sept.
Oct.-
Dec.
1933
Jan.
-Feb. Total
In Tokyo Asahi
French
Journal 4(3) 0 0 K D K D 2(2) 8(7)
Temps 2(2) 1 1 2(2) 0 K D 7(5)
Echo de Paris 2(1) 1 0 0 1(1) H D 5(3)
Debat K D 0 0 1 0 2(2) 4(3)
Matin 3(1) 0 0 0 1(1) 0 4(2)
Liberte 1(D 0 0 K D 0 2(2) 4(4)
Soir 0 0 0 2(2) 1(1) 0 3(3)
Peti t  Parisien 0 0 0 0 1(1) H D 2(2)
Peti t  Journal 0 0 0 0 0 H D H D
Populaire 0 0 0 0 0 H D H D
Total 13(9) 2(0) 1(0) 7(6) 5(5) 11(D) 39(31)
Chinese 1 0 3(2) 0 3(3) 3 10(5)
German 1 2(0) 0 0 1(1) H D 5(2)
Russian 0 0 0 0 1 0 1(0)
Others 0 0 0 0 3(3) 0 3(3)
In Tokyo Nichinichi
French
Journal 1 0 0 0 1 H D 3(1)
Echo de Paris 0 0 0 0 1 0 1(0)
Debat 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 H D
Matin 1 0 0 1(1) 3(1) 0 5(2)
Liberte 0 0 0 0 0 H D H D
Petit  Parisien 0 0 0 0 2 0 2(0)
Intransigeance 0 0 0 0 0 H D H D
Total 3(1) 0 0 1(1) 7(1) 3(3) 14(6)
Chinese 2 0 0 0 0 0 2(0)
German 0 0 0 0 6 2(2) 8(2)
Russian 1 0 0 0 0 0 1(0)
Others 0 0 0 0 1 0 1(0)
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TABLE XX (Continued)
Year 1931 1932 1933
Month Sept.
Dec.
J a n . -
March
April
-June
Ju ly -
Sept.
O c t . -
Dec.
J a n . -
Feb. Tot<
In Fukuoka Nichinichi
French
Journal 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Temps 2 0 1 0 1 0 4
Echo de Par is 1 0 0 0 2 0 3
Debat 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Matin 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Liber te 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Soir 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
P e t i t  Pa r is ien 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
P e t i t  Journal 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Populaire 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Total 7 0 1 0 9 2 19
Chinese 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
German 0 0 0 0 5 4 9
Russian 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Others 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
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TABLE XXI Foreign Journals Quoted in 'Manshu Jihen ni Kansuru Obei
Shinbun no Roncho , Vols.91 -100 (23 February - 4 March 1932)
Vol. 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 Total
U.S.
N.Y. Times 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
N.Y.H. Tribune 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
N.Y.W. Telegram 1 1 1 1 4
N.Y.E. Post 1 1 1 3
N.Y. Sun 1 1 1 1 4
Brooklyn Eagle 1 1 1 3
J .  o f  Commerce 1 1
Wash. Post 1 1 2
Wash. E. S tar 1 1 1 1 4
P h i l .P u b l ic  Ledger 1 1 1 1 4
P h i l .  Inqu ire r 1 1 2
Bal t .  Sun 1 1 1 1 4
Ch.Sci.  Monitor 1 1
L.A. Times 1 1 2
S.F. News 1 1 2
S.F. Examiner 1 1 2
S e a t t l e  S ta r 1 1
S e a t t l e  P . I n t e l l i g e n c e r 1 1
Chicago Tribune 1 1 2
Chicago D. News 1 1 2
Oregonian 1 1
‘Scripps Howard* 1 1
Total 3 3 6 13 9 7 6 2 6 6 61
(Continued)
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TABLE XXI (Continued)
Vol. 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 Total
B r i t i s h
Times 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
D. Mail 1 1
D. Telegraph 1 1 1 1 4
Morning Post 1 1 2
Observer 1 1 2
D. Express 1 1 2
S. Times 1 1
News Chronicle 1 1 2
D. Herald 1 1 1 3
M. Guardian 1 1 2
Total 0 4 2 2 0 4 2 5 3 3 25
French
Journal 1 1 2
Temps 1 1 1 1 4
Echo de Paris 1 1 2
Deb a t 1 1
Matin 1 1 2
Others 1 1 1 1 4
Total 0 5 3 2 0 1 2 2 0 2 17
Notes: 1. Whenever a journa l  was quoted more than twice in the same i s s u e ,
i t  was counted as one. The f i r s t  quoted date  was 19 Feb.1932 
and the  l a s t  2 March 1932.
2. This booklet was compiled by the Information Bureau o f  the 
Foreign Minis try .
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TABLE XXII Telegrams from Geneva and Paris
Tokyo Asahi
24 Sept .  -  2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva) 
14 Octo. - 26 O c t .1931 (Geneva) 
16 Nov. -  12 Dec.1931 (Par is )  
26 Jan. -  8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva) 
18 Nov. -  22 Dec.1932 (Geneva) 
16 Jan. -  26 Feb.1933 (Geneva)
Total T.A. Rengo Dentsu
23 13 6 4
108 49 45 14
167 103 39 25
69 34 11 24
394 183 129 82
351 144 123 84
Tokyo Nichinichi
24 Sept . -  2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva) . . 41 9 24 8
14 Oct. -  26 O c t .1931 (Geneva) 91 31 43 17
16 Nov. - 12 Dec.1931 (Par i s ) 192 65 71 56
26 Jan. -  8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva) 43 14 17 12
18 Nov. -  22 Dec. 1932(Geneva) 334(4) 97 142(3) 95(1)
16 Jan. -  26 Feb,1933 (Geneva) 337 87 138 112
Fukuoka Nichinichi
24 Sept.  -  2 Oct. 1931 (Geneva) 30 13 17
14 Oct. -  26 Oct. 1931 (Geneva) 93 49 44
16 Nov. - 12 Dec. 1931 (Par is )  208 93 115
26 Jan .  -  8 Feb. 1932 (Geneva) 57 16 41
18 Nov. -  22 Dec. 1932 (Geneva) 421(274) 168(127) 253(147)
16 Jan.  - 26 Feb. 1933 (Geneva) 439(292) 127(109) 312(183)
Note: 1. T.A. and T.N. means t h a t  the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo
Nichinichi  received the  telegrams from t h e i r  own correspon­
d en ts ,  r e s id e n t  or  o therwise.
2. Figures in the brackets  are the  numbers of  telegrams received 
from the spec ia l  correspondents  of  Rengo and Dentsu who accom­
panied the  Matsuoka mission to  the League of  Nations.  Before 
t h i s  miss ion,  the  two news agencies  had supplied  the newspapers 
with only those telegrams received from t h e i r  fore ign  c o n t r a c t ­
o r s ,  i . e .  Dentsu from UP and Rengo from Reuters ,  AP and Havas.
3. Only the telegrams in the morning and evening ed i t io n s  are 
l i s t e d .  (Extra ed i t io n s  are  not included) .
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TABLE XXIII China Issue and Contributors
1 J a n . *27 
-31 May'28
1 June '28 
-30 S e p t . '31
1 O c t . '31 
-31 M ar . '33 Total
Gaikojiho
INAHARA KatsujT---------- 4 8 7 19
MATSUBARA Kazuo* 2 2 8 12
SUEHIRO Shigeo* 2 7 2 11
NAGANO Akira 5 4 0 9
ONISHI Sai 1 5 3 9
HONDA Kumataro 1 3 4 8
KIMURA Masutaro* 1 5 2 8
01 J i r o  — • 5 3 0 8
OYAMA Ujiro* 2 1 7 10
YOSHIDA Torao 2 4 2 8
FUNAKOSHI Mitsunojo 1 3 3 7
HASHIMOTO Masukichi 0 3 4 7
IZUMI Tetsu 1 1 5 7
SHINOBU Junpei* 1 6 0 7
YANO J i n ' i c h i 0 1 6 7
GOTO Chotaro 1 4 1 6
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu* 0 0 6 6
NISHIZAWA Ei ichi 0 0 6 6
TACHI SakutarO* 0 1 5 6
YASUOKA Hideo 2 4 0 6
FUJISAWA Chikao 0 1 4 5
IJUIN Kanekiyo 0 0 5 5
KASHIWADA Tadakazu 1 4 0 5
MATSUMOTO Tadao 0 1 4 5
NAKAYAMA Yu 1 2 2 5
NAOMI Zenzo 0 1 4 5
NISHIYAMA Eikyo 2 3 0 5
QGAWA Setsu 2 1 2 5
OTA Unosuke 2 0 3 5
OKABE Saburff 1 1 3 5
0KAM0T0 Tsurumatsu 0 0 5 5
UCHIDA Te i t su i 0 1 4 5
UEDA Kyosuke 0 3 2 5
YAMAKAWA Tadao* 0 2 3 5
YONEDA Minoru* 4 0 1 5
Others (4 or  l e s s  per  person) 36 87 142 265
Total 80 " 172 255 507
Notes; 1. Note one i s  app l icab le  to the o the r  two char ts  as w el l .  
2. * denotes a Doctor of  Law.
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TABLE XXIV China Issue and Contributors
1 Jap.* 27 
-31 May'28
1 June '28-  
30 S e p t . ’31 •
1 O c t . 131- 
-31 Mar. '33 Total
Kokusaichishiki
TAGAWA Daikichiro 0 1 9 10
ISHII Kikujiro 0 1 5 6
OGAWA Setsu 3 3 0 6
ISHIKAWA S e i te i 2 3 0 5
MATSUBARA Kazuo 0 1 3 4
SAITO Yoshie 0 0 4 4
TACHI Sakutaro 0 0 4 4
IZUMI Tetsu 0 2 1 3
KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu 0 0 3 3
NAGANO Akira 1 2 0 3
ROYAMA Masamichi 0 1 2 3
SHINOBU Junpei 0 1 2 3
TAKEUCHI Fumiaki 0 3 0 3
YAMAKAWA Tadao 0 0 3 3
KIMURA Masutaro 0 2 0 2
NISHIYAMA Eikyu 0 2 0 2
ODA Man 0 1 1 2
UEHARA E ts u j i ro 1 1 0 2
YOKOTA Kisaburo 0 0 2 2*
Others (once each) 13 13 25 51
Total 20 37 64 121
Chuokoron 
YONEDA Minoru 2 2 2 6
KOMURA Shunzaburo 3 1 1 5
ROYAMA Masamichi 0 1 3 4
SUZUKI Mosaburo 0 3 1 4
KIYOSAWA Kiyoshi 2 1 0 3
NAGAI Ryutaro 1 1 1 3
NAGANO Akira 1 1 1 3
HIRANO Reij i 0 0 2 2
KAJI Ryuichi 0 0 2 2
KANDA Masao 2 0 0 2
KOMAI Tokuzo 0 0 2 2
MUROFUSHI Takanobu 1 1 0 2
NAGAOKA Katsuaki 0 2 0 2
SAITO Yoshie 0 0 2 2
SAKURAI Tadaatsu 0 0 2 2
TANAKA Kyuichi 0 0 2 2
Others (once each) 10 11 35 56
Total 22 24 56 102
(Table XXIV Cont.
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TABLE XXIV (Cont.)
1 J a n . '27 1 June '28-  1 0 c t . ' 3 1 -
-31 May'28 30 S e p t . ' 31 -31 M ar . '33
Kaizo
HASEGAWA Nyozekan 0 2 4 6
KAJI Ryuichi 0 3 1 4
NAGANO Akira 0 3 1 4
SUZUKI Mosaburo 0 1 3 4
IKEDA Tosen 2 0 1 3
SASA Hiroo 0 0 3 3
YAMAKAWA Hitoshi 2 1 0 3
MAEDAGAWA Ko~ichiro 0 1 1 2
NAKANISHI Inosuke 0 1 1 2
NAKANO Seigo 0 2 0 2
OTSUKA Reizo 0 1 1 2
ROYAMA Masamichi 0 0 2 2
SUGIMORI Ko-j iro 0 0 2 2
SUZUE Genichi 0 1 1 2
UEHARA E ts u j i ro 0 2 0 2
YASUTOMI Shozo 0 1 1 2
Others (once each) 5 18 17 40
Total 9 37 39 85
* Yokota's "Lecture on the League Covenant" cons is ted  o f  12 l e c tu r e s  
and was published one a t  a t ime.
